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R 081725Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0424
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR (X) Date: 11/6/97
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FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISLAMIC COUNCIL APPEAL TO US

1. AS AMBASSADOR DRAPER ENTERED HIS DECEMBER 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN INTRODUCED MUHAMMAD AMIN AD-DA'UQ, WHO PRESENTED DRAPER WITH A LETTER FROM THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL, A GROUPING OF MODERATE SUNNI INTELLECTUALS TRYING TO MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD ABOVE THE GUNS. THE LETTER CALLS ON THE US TO "MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE EFFORTS TO FULFILL ITS PROMISES AND GUARANTEES TO... END THE UNJUSTIFIED AND UNJUST OCCUPATION OF THIS AFFLICTED COUNTRY." DRAPER ASKED AD-DA'UQ TO THANK THE COUNCIL FOR HAVING SHARED ITS THOUGHTS WITH HIM AND PROMISED TO TRANSMIT THE LETTER TO WASHINGTON. THE FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BELOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT

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BEIRUT, DECEMBER 6, 1982

HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR MORRIS DRAPER

-- THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL, WHICH HAS LIVED THROUGH THE TRAGIC INCIDENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY SINCE LAST JUNE, HAS PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED ITS APPRECIATION FOR THE AMERICAN EFFORTS INITIATED BY AMBASSADOR

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PHILIP HABIB. THESE EFFORTS LED TO AN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT THAT OBTAINED A US GUARANTEE AND BEGAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE FULL APPROVAL OF ALL SIDES CONCERNED WITH THE COURSE OF A DISPUTE THAT HAD LED TO SEVERAL CHANGES THAT DISRUPTED MANY EXISTING DELICATE BALANCES, AS WELL AS THE DEPARTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE AND THE SYRIAN FORCES FROM BEIRUT AND FROM MANY OTHER LEBANESE REGIONS, IN PREPARATION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A TOTAL SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES FROM ALL OVER LEBANON IN ORDER TO REINSTATE ABSOLUTE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OUR NATIONAL HOME-LAND THROUGH A POWERFUL, CAPABLE, EFFECTIVE STATE.

-- THE SUPPORTIVE STANDS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE US GOVERNMENT WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN DECISIONS WERE TAKEN AND CARRIED OUT, THUS EARNING EXTENSIVE APPROVAL IN LEBANON, THE ARAB WORLD, AND ALL OVER THE WORLD.

-- THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL, WHICH HAS LONG BEEN REASSURED BY AMERICAN CONFIRMATIONS THAT ALL THE WITHDRAWALS FROM ALL OVER LEBANESE TERRITORY WILL BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR, IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT THIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ACHIEVEMENT WILL GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO THE RESCUE OPERATION TO BRING THE CURRENT EXPLOSIVE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER CONTROL PROMPTLY BY MEANS OF A STRONG, CAPABLE STATE THAT WILL DO ITS BEST TO SPARE THIS AFFLICTED NATION MORE DISASTERS AND FOREIGN CONFLICTS ON ITS LAND. SUCH A STATE WILL BE ABLE TO PROTECT ITS SOVEREIGNTY, WILL, DECISIONS, AND POSITIONS FROM ALL ARBITRARY PRESSURES AND DOMINATION, ENABLING LEBANON TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE FREE, RESPECTABLE, SELF-RULED COUNTRIES.

-- WHAT AROUSES THE DEEP ANXIETY OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL, WHICH CONSISTS OF 85 PARTIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS, IS THE PRESENT DARK SITUATION, WHICH INDICATES THAT THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER LIKE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE FACING AN IMPASSE.

-- AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI OBSTINACY, WHICH SEEKS TO ACHIEVE ALARMING GOALS, THE TRAGIC AND DANGEROUS INCIDENTS TAKING PLACE IN THE MOUNTAIN AND IN SOME OTHER LEBANESE DISTRICTS ARE PERHAPS BUT A PART OF ITS DIRECT AND INDIRECT RESULTS, WHICH ARE THREATENING THE UNITY OF OUR HOME-LAND, ITS DESTINY AND FUTURE, MORE THAN ANY OTHER TIME IN THE PAST.

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-- IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE ABOVE FACTS AND THE AMERICAN
ROLE, ON WHICH WE CONTINUE STRONGLY TO PLACE OUR REAL
HOPES, AND BECAUSE WE ARE POSITIVELY CERTAIN OF
AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATIONS ARE THREATENING LEBANON
AS WELL AS OTHER PARTS OF THE SURROUNDING AREA, WE
CALL UPON THE US TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE AND FIRMER
EFFORTS TO FULFILL ITS PROMISES AND GUARANTEES ON ITS
SINCERE COMMITMENTS TO REMOVE THE UNJUSTIFIED AND UN-
JUST OCCUPATION OF THIS AFFLICTED COUNTRY, SO LEBANON

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[REDACTED]

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CAN RESUME ITS NORMAL LIFE AS A SOVEREIGN, DEMOCRATIC,

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FREE, AND UNIFIED COUNTRY AND AGAIN BECOME ABLE TO
PLAY ITS PREVIOUS ACTIVE AND COOPERATIVE ROLE IN THE
AREA AS WELL AS IN THE WORLD, AFTER THE TRAGIC SUFFERINGS
ENDURED DURING THE PAST EIGHT MISERABLE YEARS
ARE BROUGHT TO AN END.

-- BEING FULLY AWARE OF THE PRESENT THREATENING
DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE IN LEBANON AND THEIR
ENORMOUS DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON AND
MIDDLE EAST, WE HOPE THAT THIS MEMORANDUM WILL BE
TRANSMITTED THROUGH YOU TO THE HIGHEST AMERICAN
RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES, SO THAT THEY MIGHT SEE THE
CLEAR OBJECTIVE FACTS THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO REMOVING
THE OBSTACLES WHICH ARE BLOCKING ALL PATHS TO
THE SOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM.

-- WE EXPECT THE US, OUR TRADITIONAL FRIEND, TO STAND
AT OUR SIDE BY BACKING THE JUST RIGHTS OF THE LEBANESE
PEOPLE AND IMPLEMENTING AND FULFILLING ALL OF THE
AGREEMENT THAT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN US.

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-- PLEASE, YOUR EXCELLENCY, ACCEPT OUR EXPRESSION OF
SINCERE APPRECIATION TO THE US GOVERNMENT, ITS PEOPLE,
AND YOU PERSONALLY.

-- (SIGNED) M.A. AL-DA'UQ, FOR THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL.

END TEXT. DILLON

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EXCISE

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DATE= 11 NOV 88

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SUBJECT= PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI TAKES A BOW IN TOKYO

REFERENCE= 88 TOKYO 20185, 88 STATE 351795

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TAGS= PREL, PGOV, PTER, XF, JA, PLO

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4273
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SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 21100

E.O 12356 DECL OADR
TAGS PREL. PLO. PNC. XF. JA
SUBJECT PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI TAKES A BOW
IN TOKYO

REF (A) TOKYO 20185 (B) STATE 351795 (NOTAL)

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SUMMARY

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2. PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI'S FOUR-DAY VISIT TO JAPAN WAS MARKED BY LESS POMP THAN IN 1976. MORE SUBSTANCE AND BROAD PRESS COVERAGE. HIS SCHEDULE INCLUDED A CALL ON THE PM, FONMIN AND A HOST OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS. GOJ INTERLOCUTORS -- ESPECIALLY FONMIN UNO -- PRESSED FOR RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM. KADDOUMI DID NOT/NOT SEEK RECOGNITION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DESCRIBED PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE PLO'S "LAST CARD" WHICH SHOULD NOT BE SHOWN NOW. MOFA FOUND HIM BACKING AWAY FROM MORE "POSITIVE" RECENT STATEMENTS BY ARAFAT. KADDOUMI SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE PLO SUPPORTS EFFORTS TO FREE TERRY ANDERSON. HE PREDICTED THE PNC MEETING WILL PRODUCE A PALESTINIAN STATE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES. HE PROMOTED THE IDEA OF A UN TAKEOVER OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. KADDOUMI DECLARED THAT UNSCR 242 AND 338 ARE INSUFFICIENT BY THEMSELVES. HE WELCOMED WASHINGTON'S "RECOGNITION" OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. PM TAKESHITA DESCRIBED THE MIDDLE EAST AS IDEAL FOR JAPANESE PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS. KADDOUMI SHARED THAT ARAFAT IS CONSIDERING TRAVEL TO NEW YORK. KADDOUMI ASKED FOR NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM THE JAPANESE -- NOT EVEN MONEY.

LESS POMP. MORE SUBSTANCE

3. PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR FAROUK KADDOUMI VISITED TOKYO NOVEMBER 6-10 AT THE INVITATION OF THE JAPAN-PALESTINE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION FOR

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PARLIAMENTARIANS HE WAS LAST HERE IN 1976 THE ONLY OTHER MAJOR PLO REPRESENTATIVES TO VISIT TOKYO HAVE BEEN YASSAR ARAFAT IN 1981 AND THEN-PNC PRESIDENT FAKHAN (PH) IN 1982.

[REDACTED] OBSERVED TO US THAT KADDOUMI'S FIRST VISIT ENTAILED MUCH POMP AND HAND-SHAKING WHILE THIS LATEST VISIT WAS INTENSELY SUBSTANTIVE

A HIGH-LEVEL WELCOME

4. KADDOUMI MET WITH PRIME MINISTER TAKESHITA, FOREIGN MINISTER UNO, LDP SECRETARY-GENERAL ABE.

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JAPAN-PALESTINE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION
FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS ITO. CHAIRMAN OF THE JAPAN-ARAB
FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION SAKURAUCHI AS WELL AS WITH
LEADERS FROM THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES. MOFA
PARLIAMENTARY VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER HAMADA HOSTED A
DINNER THOUGH THEN PM MIKI RECEIVED KADDOUMI IN HIS
CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE LDP IN 1976. PM TAKESHITA
OPENED THE DOORS OF THE PM'S RESIDENCE THIS TIME AROUND

JAPAN PRESSES ISRAELI RECOGNITION AND RENUNCIATION
OF TERRORISM

5. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] TOKYO'S OBJECTIVE IN
DISCUSSIONS WAS TO DISPLAY A POSITIVE AND ACTIVE
ATTITUDE TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AND TO OFFER A
CLEAR OUTLINE OF JAPAN'S VIEWS. [REDACTED] RECALLED THAT
DURING FONMIN UNO'S JUNE TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, UNO

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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SECTION 02 OF 05 TOKYO 21100

E.O. 12356. DECL. OADR
TAGS. PREL. PLO. PNC. XF. JA
SUBJECT: PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI TAKES A BOW

USED STANDARD TALKING POINTS WHEREVER HE WENT. WITH
KADDOUMI. UNO AND OTHER JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS USED
THE SAME POINTS. SUPPORTING RECOGNITION OF
PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI
TROOPS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AND PLO
PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. HOWEVER. THEY
(ESPECIALLY VICE FONMIN MURATA. WHO MET KADDOUMI FOR

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AN HOUR) ALSO URGED THE PLO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
ISRAEL AND RENOUNCE TERRORISM

KADDOUMI DID NOT SEEK RECOGNITION OF STATE

6 THE JAPANESE HAD BRACED FOR A KADDOUMI APPEAL FOR
JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE OR
GOVERNMENT IN EXILE -- DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE
ALGIERS PNC MEETING. JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS WERE
ARMED TO RESPOND BY EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A
"PACKAGE" APPROACH THAT INCLUDES RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL
AND RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM AS THINGS TURNED OUT.
KADDOUMI SURPRISED EVERYONE BY NOT REQUESTING
RECOGNITION OF WHATEVER CAKE THE PNC BAKES

ISRAELI RECOGNITION IS PLO'S "LAST CARD"

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7. KADDOUMI REPEATEDLY ANNOUNCED APPRECIATION FOR JAPANESE SUPPORT OF PALESTINIANS, PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, "WHICH INCLUDES THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE." [REDACTED] CAUTIONED THAT KADDOUMI WAS SPEAKING "CONCEPTUALLY" HERE, DISPLAYING EXTREME CAUTION ON RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM. THE PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR SIDESTEPED ANY CLEAR STATEMENTS ON THESE POINTS. KADDOUMI DID TELL VICE FOREIGN MINISTER MURATA AT ONE POINT THAT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL IS THE "LAST CARD" THE PALESTINIANS HAVE TO PLAY AND THEREFORE THE PLO CANNOT SHOW IT YET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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STEPPING BACK FROM ARAFAT

8. [REDACTED] OBSERVED THAT KADDOUMI WAS "TAKING A STEP BACK" FROM THE "VERY POSITIVE WORDS" YASSAR ARAFAT USED IN EUROPE IN SEPTEMBER. HE DESCRIBED KADDOUMI AS A MODERATE WHO IS "RATHER HAWKISH" WHEN COMPARED WITH ARAFAT. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS HAD CAST SOME RIPPLES INTO THE PLO AND KADDOUMI HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED -- IN VIEW OF THE PNC MEETING -- TO BE EXTRA CAUTIOUS IN TOKYO

PLO SUPPORTS RELEASE OF TERRY ANDERSON

9. DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE SEVERAL JOURNALISTS ASKED KADDOUMI FOR ASSISTANCE OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF TERRY ANDERSON FROM CAPTIVITY IN LEBANON. KADDOUMI REPLIED THAT THE PLO SUPPORTS ALL EFFORTS TO FREE ANDERSON, TO WHICH A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS APPLAUDED

PALESTINIAN STATE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES UNDER UN AEGIS

10. [REDACTED] DESCRIBED ANOTHER JAPANESE OBJECTIVE DURING THE VISIT AS CAPTURING A PREVIEW OF THE PNC MEETING. KADDOUMI SPOKE SPARINGLY AND PREDICTED THAT THE PLO

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WILL PROCLAIM AN INDEPENDENT STATE BUT WITHOUT
DEFINITE BOUNDARIES. HE REFERRED TO THE IDEA OF A UN
TAKEOVER OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. SAYING THIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4275
INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS
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SECTION 03 OF 05 TOKYO 21100

E.O. 12356 DECL OADR
TAGS PREL. PLO_PNC. XF. JA
SUBJECT PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI TAKES A BOW

WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA WHILE NURTURING A BETTER ATMOSPHERE
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (ENOKI SAID THE GOJ
UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE TOTALLY UNREALISTIC AT PRESENT.
ALTHOUGH THEY COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE UN
ADMINISTRATION AS A PKO-LIKE STAGE IN A FULL PEACE
SETTLEMENT)

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO SET BOUNDARIES

11 KADDOUMI SUGGESTED THAT BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE DEFINED LATER AT THE INTERNATIONAL "PEACE TALKS" (I.E., CONFERENCE) HE STATED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD PLAY A BIG ROLE ON THE WAY TO A UN TAKEOVER AND PEACE CONFERENCE. LDP SEC GEN ABE POINTED OUT THAT JAPAN WILL BE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN DECEMBER (ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] SAID IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHAT ABE WAS DRIVING AT).

242 AND 338 ARE INSUFFICIENT ON THEIR OWN

12. VFM MURATA ASKED FOR PLO VIEWS ON UNSCR 242 AND 338. KADDOUMI RESPONDED THAT THE TWO RESOLUTIONS ARE "INSUFFICIENT" ON THEIR OWN. [REDACTED] OBSERVED TO US THAT ARAFAT HAD SEEMED MORE POSITIVE ON THE RESOLUTIONS WHILE IN EUROPE. ASKED ABOUT THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, KADDOUMI SAID THAT SHAMIR AND PERES ARE "MORE OR LESS THE SAME." ESPECIALLY WHEN IT COMES TO OPPOSING PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

13 KADDOUMI SAID THAT ONLY THE U.S. CAN INFLUENCE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ISRAEL AND THE PLO EXPECTS WASHINGTON TO DO SO. HE FREQUENTLY QUOTED SECRETARY SHULTZ AS SAYING ON SEPTEMBER 16 THAT "PALESTINIANS SHOULD PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN ALL STAGES OF THE PEACE PROCESS." KADDOUMI CHARACTERIZED THIS AS THE FIRST CLEAR CHANGE TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS IN U.S. POLICY. KADDOUMI PREDICTED THAT THIS NEW ATTITUDE WILL BE MAINTAINED AND POSSIBLY DEVELOPED FURTHER AFTER THE U.S. ELECTIONS

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A "LOVE CALL" TO WASHINGTON

14. [REDACTED] SHARED HIS OWN VIEW THAT THE PLO IS FRUSTRATED OVER BEING UNABLE TO OBTAIN A POSITIVE SIGN FROM WASHINGTON ON ACTUAL PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. CITING THE PART OF SECRETARY SHULTZ' PEACE PLAN DEALING WITH A JOINT PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN DELEGATION, KADDOUMI REPORTEDLY OBSERVED THAT EXECUTIVE MEMBERS OF THE PLO AND SENIOR PNC MEMBERS ARE EXCLUDED. [REDACTED] OPINED THAT KADDOUMI HAS A "VERY STRONG" DESIRE TO SEE THE PLO BE ACCEPTED BY THE U.S. IN THE PEACE PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS, [REDACTED] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KADDOUMI OFFERED NOTHING TO SUGGEST THE PLO WAS PREPARED TO REVISE ANY KEY POLICIES TO ACHIEVE THIS. HE ADDED THAT KADDOUMI WAS CERTAINLY AWARE THAT HIS WORDS WOULD BE REPORTED BACK TO THE U.S.

JAPAN'S SPECIAL CLOSENESS TO THE PLO

15. [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT TOKYO'S VIEW OF THE PLO ROLE DIFFERS FROM WASHINGTON'S. THE JAPANESE FEEL THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SECTION 04 OF 05 TOKYO 21100

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PLO, PNC, XF, JA
SUBJECT: PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI TAKES A BOW

PLO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN SOME MODALITIES AND SHOULD
BE RECOGNIZED. THEREFORE, [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT TOKYO
IS IN A POSITION TO BE CLOSER TO THE PLO AND THUS
BETTER CONVEY PLO CONCERNS.

MIDDLE EAST IDEAL FOR JAPANESE PEACEKEEPING
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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16 DISCUSSING JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WITH
KADDOUMI, PM TAKESHITA REFERRED TO TOKYO'S
"INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INITIATIVE" WHICH INCLUDES
ACTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS.
TAKESHITA DESCRIBED THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE AS
MOST APPROPRIATE FOR JAPANESE EFFORTS. HE POINTED OUT
THAT JAPAN ATTENDS ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND WILL PRESIDE
AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN DECEMBER. KADDOUMI
WELCOMED THE REMARKS ADDING THAT JAPAN IS ALSO A
DEVELOPED COUNTRY THAT SUPPORTS THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT
TO SELF-DETERMINATION

TOKYO MOVING AHEAD WITH ISRAEL, TOO

17 [REDACTED] POINTED OUT TO US THAT TOKYO INTENDS TO
FURTHER STRENGTHEN EXCHANGES WITH ISRAEL AS WELL AS
WITH THE ARABS. HE ANNOUNCED THAT DIET FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ITOYAMA WILL VISIT ISRAEL
IN DECEMBER AFTER VISITING THE U.S. IN ADDITION, THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
NAKAYAMA WILL PROBABLY TRAVEL TO ISRAEL IN 1989.
[REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT A JAPANESE INVITATION TO THE
ISRAELI FONMIN TO VISIT JAPAN MAY BE ACCEPTED IN 1989.

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ARAFAT VISIT TO NEW YORK

18 KADDOUMI TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT AN ARAFAT TRIP TO
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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NEW YORK WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND A DECISION IS
EXPECTED BY THE END OF NOVEMBER.

KADDOUMI DIDN'T EMBARRASS US

19 [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT KADDOUMI BEHAVED WELL
BECAUSE HE AVOIDED EMBARRASSING REQUESTS: DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY FOR PLO REPS HERE. DIRECT FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE. RECOGNITION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. [REDACTED]
SPECULATED THAT KADDOUMI AGREED TO VISIT JAPAN AT THIS
TIME TO EXTEND THE RECENT PLO INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY
CAMPAIGN. KADDOUMI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PLO REPS FROM
WESTERN EUROPE AND BY ONE AMERICAN PALESTINIAN (NFI).
SINCE THEY PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE TALKS TALKS IN TOKYO.
[REDACTED] SPECULATED THAT KADDOUMI WAS SIMPLY REWARDING
HIS FAVORITES WITH A FOREIGN JUNKET (THE JAPANESE
HOSTS PAID THE BILLS).

COMMENT

20 KADDOUMI. THANKS TO MEDIA INTEREST IN CONTROVERSY
AND HIS LIBERAL GRANTING OF INTERVIEWS TO MOST MAJOR
NEWSPAPERS AS WELL AS TO TELEVISION. GOT MEDIA
COVERAGE BEYOND THAT ENJOYED BY SOME FOREIGN LEADERS
WHO VISIT HERE. THE GOJ SEEMED PLEASED WITH THE
VISIT. NOT LEAST BECAUSE TOKYO HAS NOW DEMONSTRATED
"BALANCE" AFTER FONMIN UNO'S ISRAEL VISIT WITHOUT
HAVING TO FACE ANY UNCOMFORTABLE REQUESTS FROM
KADDOUMI. [REDACTED] LEFT NO DOUBT THAT MOFA PERCEIVES ITS
PLO CONNECTION AS ONE WAY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MIDDLE EAST
PEACE EFFORTS. NEVERTHELESS, HE STRESSED THAT GOJ
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ACTION EAP-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[REDACTED] SECTION 05 OF 05 TOKYO 21100

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS PREL. PLO. PNC. XF. JA
SUBJECT PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR KADDOUMI TAKES A BOW

PROGRESS WITH ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY REQUIRES MOVING
BOTH FEET (I E ISRAEL AND THE ARABS) ONE AFTER THE
OTHER

MANSFIELD

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FROM HABIB

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E.O.12065: RDS 1,3,4 12/4/91 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PEPR, FR, IS, LE, SY, IS, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: VISIT TO ISRAEL BY CHEYSSON

1. [REDACTED]

2. RECOMMEND THAT DEPARTMENT CONSIDER PROVIDING CHEYSSON--
CONFIDENTIALLY--HIGHLY CONDENSED SUMMARY OF HABIB TALKS
IN LEBANON AND SYRIA, AND THEN URGE CHEYSSON--DURING HIS
FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ISRAEL--TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS
ABOUT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI SITUATION:

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO
SUSTAIN AND REINFORCE THE "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES"
(CEASE-FIRE). THE PALESTINIAN MAINSTREAM (FATAH), AS
WELL AS THE SYRIANS--AND CERTAINLY ALL LEBANESE QUARTERS--
APPEAR CONVINCED OF THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-
FIRE.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL DO WHAT IT CAN TO REIN IN
HADDAD AND COOL DOWN THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN HADDAD AND
[REDACTED]

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-- FRANCE IS DOING ITS PART TO BE HELPFUL IN THE LEBANESE
SITUATION. THE U.S. AND FRANCE IN THIS SENSE HAVE
PARALLEL OBJECTIVES.

-- THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT THE TIME TO HEAT UP THE ISSUE OF
THE SAM MISSILES IN LEBANON. IT WILL TAKE FURTHER TIME
TO RESOLVE. GROVE

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E.O.12065: GDS 12/3/87 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: XF, IS, SA, EG, LE, SY, US, LE

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: FORTHCOMING TRAVEL

REF: DAMASCUS 7591^{missing} (NOTAL)

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1. [REDACTED]

2. CONFIRMING PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS, HABIB MISSION WILL CROSS BRIDGE FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, IN TIME TO ARRIVE AT CONGEN JERUSALEM BY ABOUT 0930. REGARDING TEL AVIV 18527, MOVE CROSSING TIME AT BRIDGE BACK 50 MINUTES TO 8:40 A.M. HABIB AND DRAPER ACCEPT INFORMAL DINNER HOSTED BY BAR-ON.

3. AS FOR FUTURE TRIP TO RIYADH FROM ISRAEL, HABIB DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WANT TO MISS ANY OPPORTUNITY TO SEE BEGIN, HOWEVER BRIEFLY. WE THEREFORE ARE PREPARED TO REMAIN IF NECESSARY UNTIL SATURDAY EVENING, AFTER SHABBAT, IF BRIEF APPOINTMENT WITH BEGIN IS POSSIBLE. WILL WISH TO DISCUSS [REDACTED]

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THIS WITH CHARGE BROWN BEFORE SETTING FUTURE SCHEDULE IN CONCRETE.

4. CONSEQUENTLY, IF NO BEGIN MEETING IS POSSIBLE, WOULD PLAN TO LEAVE TEL AVIV AIRPORT AT 0900, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 5. ALTERNATIVELY, IF POST-SHABBAT MEETING POSSIBLE, WOULD LEAVE AT 0300, SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 6. FLIGHT TIME TO RIYADH, INCLUDING FUEL STOP AT CAIRO, IS APPROXIMATELY FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS.

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5. FUTURE TRAVEL FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL,
AND THENCE TO EUROPE, WILL BE SUBJECT SEPARATE CABLE.
VIETS

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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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DECAPTIONED

FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 4 12/1/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN

1.

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON, DAS DRAPER AND POLOFF CROCKER, MET WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN FOR AN HOUR ON NOVEMBER 30. AL-WAZZAN WAS IN AN UPBEAT MOOD, PLEASED ABOUT THE FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTION ON LEBANON, AND RELATIVELY POSITIVE OVER WHAT HE TERMED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL ENTENTE.

3. CEASE-FIRE/PALESTINIANS.

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RESPONDING TO HABIB'S STATEMENT THAT HIS NEW VISIT TO THE AREA WAS TO A LARGE EXTENT CONCERNED WITH THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH LEBANON, AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS POSITIVE FOR THE LEBANESE AS WELL AS THE PALESTINIANS, ONE BENEFIT HAS BEEN IMPROVED LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HE NOTED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS A MEANS, NOT AN END, AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH RESOLUTION 425 (MOVING UNIFIL TO THE BORDER) EVEN IF FULL IMPLEMENTATION IS NOT POSSIBLE.

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IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM HABIB, AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT MOST PALESTINIANS ALSO FAVORED THE CEASE-FIRE, ESPECIALLY FATAH, ALTHOUGH SOME PALESTINIANS HAVE "OTHER AMBITIONS". BECAUSE OF THESE DIVERGENCIES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REINFORCE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PLO.

4. ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE/SAUDI ROLE.

IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S QUESTION ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE (AFC), AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT THE AFC WAS A POSITIVE ELEMENT WHICH HAD ACHIEVED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SUCCESS. LIKE BOUTROS, HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE SAUDIS MAY LOSE INTEREST IN THE PROCESS AS A RESULT OF THEIR SETBACK IN FEZ. AL-WAZZAN STRESSED THAT SAUDI INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFC WAS VIEWED BY BOTH HIMSELF AND THE GOL AS A WHOLE AS VERY BENEFICIAL.

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5. 1982 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE TALKS, AL-WAZZAN MENTIONED HIS BELIEF THAT THERE IS A NEW, POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE IN LEBANON RESULTING FROM A FEELING ON THE PART OF THE POPULATION THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD A REAL NATIONAL ENTENTE WAS POSSIBLE. HABIB ASKED IF IN AL-WAZZAN'S VIEW SUCH

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AN ENTENTE, OR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, COULD TAKE PLACE IF THE ADF REMAINED IN LEBANON. AFTER SOME BACKING AND FILLING, AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT EVEN IF THE ADF DID WITHDRAW, "THE OTHER SIDE" (I.E., THE PHALANGE) WOULD THEN BECOME THE DOMINANT FORCE, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, AL-WAZZAN SAID THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF THE SYRIANS WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE IN THE OUTCOME: EXTREMISTS FROM EITHER SIDE COULD NOT BE ELECTED IN ANY EVENT. BOTH SIDES MUST WORK THROUGH DISCUSSION, NOT ARMS, TO FIND A SUITABLE CANDIDATE. (AT SEVERAL POINTS, AL-WAZZAN REFERRED NEGATIVELY TO BASHIR GEMAYEL'S NOVEMBER 29 SPEECH WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, DEMANDS A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL BEFORE ELECTIONS CAN TAKE PLACE--FBIS NC291328.)

6. HABIB CLOSED BY NOTING THAT, WHILE THE U.S. COULD NOT BE IN THE POSITION OF BACKING ANY ONE CANDIDATE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO USE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS CONTINUE, AND SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR AL-WAZZAN'S GENERALLY POSITIVE APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION. AS HIS MISSION CONTINUED, HABIB SAID, IN ADDITION TO URGING THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE (IN SYRIA AND ISRAEL), HE WOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO REINFORCE SAUDI PARTICIPATION IN LEBANESE EFFORTS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

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BEIRUT 8673

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3, 4 11/30/01 (HABIB, PHILIP C.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE, SY, SA, IS, US, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH NATIONAL MOVEMENT HEAD

MALID JUMBLATT

1. [REDACTED]

2. HABIB, JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON, DAS DRAPER AND POLOFF CROCKER, MET WITH NATIONAL MOVEMENT (NM) LEADER WALID JUMBLATT FOR AN HOUR ON NOVEMBER 30. JUMBLATT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER OF TOURISM MARWAN HAMMADI. JMBLATT WAS GENERALLY NEGATIVE AND SHOWED LITTLE INCLINATION TO COMPROMISE ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS THE ARAB FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE OR THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL DIALOGUE INCLUDING THE PHALANGE, BUT WAS SUPPORTIVE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE DESIRABILITY OF KEEPING THE SAUDIS INVOLVED IN LEBANON.

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3. ARAB FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE (AFC): JMBLATT BEGAN BY ASSERTING CUSTOMARY NM POSITION THAT BASHIR GEMAYEL HAS NOT YET GIVEN SATISFACTORY PROOF THAT HE HAS BROKEN HIS TIES WITH ISRAEL. HAMMADI TOOK A MORE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH, MAINTAINING THAT THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY WAS THAT THE LEBANESE WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE AFC SET FORTH A TIMETABLE THAT WAS NOT LINKED TO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. NEITHER THE SYRIANS, THE PALESTINIANS OR THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS

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NECESSARY WITHOUT SOME CORRESPONDING CHANGES ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL. HOWEVER, AFTER SOME PRODDING BY HABIB, BOTH JUMBLATT AND HAMMADI EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE AFC IS BENEFICIAL FOR LEBANON AND SHOULD CONTINUE. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE SAUDI ROLE WAS POSITIVE AND HOPED THAT THE SETBACK IN FEZ WOULD NOT RESULT IN A SAUDI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEBANON SCENE.

4. POLITICAL REFORM/PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: JUMBLATT SAID THAT THE NM IS CALLING FOR SOME FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGES. THESE INCLUDE A REORGANIZATION OF THE LAF, AND A NEW NATIONAL PACT THAT WILL PUT AN END TO MARONITE DOMINATION OF LEBANON. THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE 1982 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WHICH JUMBLATT SAID MAY BE ACCOMPANIED BY "TROUBLE" POSSIBLY LEADING TO PARTITION. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S POINT THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO LIVE WITH THE MARONITES, HAMMADI SAID THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION: ALTHOUGH THE GEMAYELS WERE NOT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MARONITES, THEY HAVE THE POWER TO VETO ANY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT THE SYRIANS OR THE NM HAVE THE SAME ABILITY. IT WAS, THEREFORE, ESSENTIAL THAT ALL SIDES RECOGNIZE THIS FACT AND MOVE TO SELECT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE BY PEACEFUL MEANS. HAMMADI AND

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JUMBLATT EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT WHILE IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL ENTENTE BY SEPTEMBER THERE MIGHT BE A WAY TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS ON A NEW PRESIDENT WHO COULD TAKE CHARGE OF THE PROCESS.

5. CEASE-FIRE: NEITHER JUMBLATT NOR HAMMADI NEEDED ANY URGING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. HAMMADI SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, FOLLOWED BY KEEPING THE SAUDIS ENGAGED IN THE BAYT AD DIN PROCESS.
DILLON

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USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3, 4 11/30/01 (HABIB, PHILIP C.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE, SY, SA, IS, US, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: LEBANESE VIEW OF THE EVOLVING SITUATION

1. [REDACTED]

2. DURING TWO DAYS OF TALKS WITH A BROAD CROSS-SECTION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL LEADERS, DRAWN FROM MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPINGS, I STRESSED TWO BROAD THEMES WHILE SOLICITING THEIR COMMENTS AND THEIR SUPPORT:

--THE IMPORTANCE OF STAINING AND REINFORCING THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE BORDER REGION, AND IMPROVING BASIC CONDITIONS AFFECTING THAT SITUATION;

--THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING TOWARDS A PEACEFUL NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AMONG THE IMPORTANT LEBANESE GROUPINGS,

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GIVEN THE DANGER FROM FACTIONAL AND COMMUNAL CONFRONTATION AS THE COUNTRY MOVES TOWARDS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1982. IN THIS REGARD OUR INQUIRIES INCLUDED THE POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE WHICH EARLIER THIS YEAR BROUGHT SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA AND KUWAIT INTO DEALING WITH THE LEBANESE UNDER THE MANDATE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE.

3. BASIC IMPRESSIONS GARNERED FROM THESE CONSULTATIONS

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ARE AS FOLLOWS:

--FIRST, AND MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, ALL LEBANESE ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE BORDER AREA. WHILE THEY ARE FOCUSING RELATIVELY MORE OF THEIR ATTENTION ON OTHER ISSUES, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT A CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN COULD COMPLICATE THE SITUATION TO AN UNMANAGABLE DEGREE. EVEN THOSE MARONITE LEADERS WHO MIGHT--UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES--WELCOME MAJOR ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS (AND SYRIANS) WOULD STILL PREFER THIS AT A TIME OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, AND AFTER OTHER REMEDIES HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. I HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THE PLO CONTINUES TO SUPPORT ADHERENCE TO THE CEASE-FIRE. --FONMIN BOUTROS, FOR ONE, IS WORRIED ABOUT ISRAELI IMPATIENCE, NOT ONLY AS IT APPLIES TO THE PALESTINIAN MILITARY BUILDUP BUT ALSO AS REGARDS THE PROSPECT OF SYRIAN DOMINATION OF 1982 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY SUGGESTED I SHOULD PUT ACROSS TO THE SYRIANS--SUBTLY BUT EFFECTIVELY--THAT ISRAELI INTERVENTION IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. HE HOPES THAT SYRIAN RECOGNITION OF THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD INDUCE GREATER SYRIAN FLEXIBILITY IN THE INTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE. --EVEN AMONG THOSE INCLINED TO ACCEPT A MAJOR SYRIAN ROLE IN THE COUNTRY, THERE IS CONCERN ABOUT SYRIA'S HEAVY-

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HANDED TACTICS. THERE IS A CONSENSUS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE SYRIANS MAY FALL A FEW VOTES SHORT OF BEING ABLE TO CONTROL PARLIAMENT'S VOTE FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT, THEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE THE POWER TO DENY THE PRESIDENCY TO ANYONE THEY FIND OBJECTIONABLE. IN VARYING DEGREES, ALL SEE VALUE IN DEVELOPING DE FACTO UNDERSTANDINGS ON A PREFERRED CANDIDATE WHOM THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REJECT BUT WHO WOULD BE STRONG OF CHARACTER AND A LEBANESE NATIONALIST. THE THINKING THAT HAS GONE INTO THIS ISSUE LARGELY CONSISTS OF VIEWING NEGATIVELY THOSE WHO ARE "EXTREMISTS" FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER (E.G., FRANGIYYAH, BASHIR GEMAYEL? CHAMOUN, RAYMOND EDDE, ETC.). THERE IS A PRONOUNCED RELUCTANCE TO BEGIN TO IDENTIFY "ACCEPTABLE" FIGURES THIS EARLY IN THE GAME. --WITH ONE EXCEPTION, OUR CONTACTS SENSED THAT THERE WAS NOW MORE GENUINE SENTIMENT FOR RECONCILIATION AMONG THE LEBANESE FACTIONS AND AN UNDERSTANDING AT LEAST ON SOME ISSUES THAN HAVE EXISTED FOR MANY YEARS. THERE WAS, OF COURSE, MUCH ACCOMPANYING SKEPTICISM THAT THESE SENTIMENTS COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO SOMETHING CONCRETE. THE NEGATIVE POSITION TOWARDS THE SYRIANS--WHETHER VOICED IN TERMS OF FEAR, RESENTMENT, CHALLENGE, OR FATIGUE, CAME THROUGH IMPRESSIVELY FROM ALL QUARTERS, INCLUDING FROM ERSTWHILE SUPPORTERS OR ALLIES OF SYRIA.

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FROM HABIB

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--EVERYONE ASSIGNS AT LEAST SOME IMPORTANCE TO A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE, PARTICULARLY THE FUNCTION CARRIED OUT BY SAUDI ARABIA. MOST WOULD LIKE US TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO PRESERVE AND ENCOURAGE A STRONG SAUDI ROLE, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL FEAR THAT THIS MAY BE ENDANGERED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SAUDI EXPERIENCE AT THE FEZ ARAB SUMMITT.

--THE POSSIBILITY THAT BASHIR GEMAYEL'S PHALANGE WOULD CHALLENGE MILITARY A SYRIAN EFFORT TO INSTALL A PUPPET IN THE ELECTIONS AND PERHAPS MOVE TO PARTITION WAS FREQUENTLY MENTIONED, INCLUDING BY BASHIR HIMSELF.

--FONMIN BOUTROS WANTS US TO EXPLORE WITH THE SAUDIS WHETHER THEY COULD OFFER TROOPS, AS PARTY OF A COMBINED

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ARAB INITIATIVE, TO REPLACE THE SYRIANS IN BEIRUT AND
KEYS AREAS OF LEBANON AND THEREBY ASSURE A FREER ELECTION

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ATMOSPHERE. OTHERS ALSO SEE IN SAUDI ARABIA A DEGREE
OF PROTECTION AGAINST SYRIAN DOMINATION OF THE LEBANESE
SCENE.

--THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF SARKIS, WAZZAN AND BOUTROS,
JOINED BY KEY POLITICIANS, IT APPEARS NOW DECIDED THAT
PARLIMENTARY BALLOTING FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL NOT
TAKE PLACE EARLIER THAN JULY 23, AND PERHAPS NOT UNTIL
WELL INTO AUGUST, IN LIEU OF CONVENING EARLIER, AS THE
SYRIANS HAD WISHED. THIS WOULD PROVIDE ADDED TIME FOR
THOSE SEEKING A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE WHO IS NOT A
SYRIAN PUPPET.

--ALL APPEAR AWARE THAT THE U.S. HAS TRIED TO INFLUENCE
BASHIR GEMAYEL IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT HE DOES NOT ACT
PREMATURELY OR GO TOO FAR, MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY.
WE HEAR NO CRITICISM OF THIS FACT, ALTHOUGH ONE CANNOT
DRAW HARD-AND-FAST CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS.

--AS THE FEZ SUMMIT SHOWED, THE ARAB WORLD IS IN CON-
SIDERABLE DISARRAY. FOR A VARIETY OF REAONS, MOST
LEBANESE BELIEVE THIS HOLDS NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR
LEBANON'S FUTURE. MODERATE LEBANESE FEEL THE THREAT OF
RADICALISM AND WORRY THAT MODERATE ARAB LEADERS--
INCLUDING FAHD, HUSSEIN AND HASSAN--MAY HAVE BEEN HURT.

--DESPITE MANY OF THE USUAL CRITICISMS OF AMERICAN
"FAILURE" TO SOLVE THE OVERALL ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM,
ALL ASSUMED THE U.S. COULD AND SHOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT
ROLE IN INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENTS CENTERED ABOUT LEBANON,
WHETHER WITH SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, OR ISRAEL.

--SCRAPING ADIDE THE POLITENESS, SOME SATISFACTION
APPEARED THAT THE U.S. IS REMAINING ENGAGED IN LEBANON
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND ME ON THIS
MISSION. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S.
CARRY OUT ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN A
WAY THAT DOES NOT IMPLY A SPECIFIC U.S. "PLAN," WHICH

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ONLY AROUSES UNNECESSARY SUSPICION AND WHICH IN ANY
CASE WOULD AUTOMATICALLY GENERATE OPPOSITION IN KEY
QUARTERS.

--NO LEBANESE RAISED OR QUESTIONED THE ROLE OF UNIFIL.

3. WE ARE NOW (DECEMBER 1, TUESDAY) PROCEEDING TO
DAMASCUS FOR TALKS THERE.
DILLON

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
USMISSION GENEVA
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT

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AMEMBASSY SANAA
USMISSION SINAI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

UNCLAS STATE 316003

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING NOVEMBER 27, 1981

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
DEAN FISCHER.

Q. ISRAELI RADIO IS CARRYING A REPORT THIS MORNING THAT
THE SECRETARY IS GOING TO BE VISITING THERE AS PART OF
THIS PLANNED TRIP IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. DO YOU HAVE ANY-
THING ON THAT?

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A. I'M AWARE OF THOSE REPORTS, AND THE SECRETARY IS
CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF SEVERAL STOPS
FOLLOWING HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS,
BUT HIS ITINERARY REMAINS UNDER CONSIDERATION. WE WOULD
HOPE TO HAVE AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY?

A. JUST LEAVE IT WHERE I DID.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON MR. HABIB'S MOVEMENTS?

A. YES, AMBASSADOR HABIB IS LEAVING SHORTLY FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST. ON WEDNESDAY HE CONSULTED WITH THE SECRETARY
AND DURING HIS CONSULTATIONS THE PRESIDENT CALLED HIM TO
DISCUSS HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE INDICATED PLEASURE THAT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AREA HAS
REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET AND STABLE SINCE THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES LAST JULY. HE FURTHER REITERATED THAT THE
U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO REINFORCING THAT SITUATION.

AMBASSADOR HABIB IS RETURNING TO THE REGION TO REVIEW HOW
THE U.S. COULD BE HELPFUL IN REDUCING TENSIONS FURTHER

AND IS IMPROVING BASIC CONDITIONS IN LEBANON.

Q. WHO IS THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT?

A. THE PRESIDENT.

Q. CAN YOU SAY WHETHER IT WILL BE BEFORE DECEMBER 1?

A. I CAN'T GIVE YOU THE PRECISE TIME, BUT FOR YOUR GUIDANCE, YES.

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Q. WAS HE IN CONFERENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR TODAY AT ALL?

A. I HAVE NOT HEARD THAT HE IS ACTUALLY PARTICIPATING IN THESE DISCUSSIONS.

Q. IN TERMS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION, IS HE STILL COMMITTED TO THE REMOVAL OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES FROM THE BEKAA VALLEY?

A. WE'VE ADDRESSED THIS IN THE PAST, AND I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO WHAT WE'VE SAID BEFORE. WE PREFER TO DESCRIBE HIS MISSION THERE AS REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE REGION AND PARTICULARLY IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF BASIC CONDITIONS IN LEBANON ITSELF, HOPEFULLY WITH AN EYE TOWARD THE ULTIMATE ASSUMPTION OF AUTHORITY BY THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OVER THE ENTIRE AREA OF LEBANON.

Q. DOES THE USG BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE ARAB SUMMIT ON THE ISSUE OF THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN, AMBASSADOR HABIB'S JOB MAY BECOME MORE DIFFICULT IN LEBANON BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA AND SO ON?

A. I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE IMPACT OF VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS THE ONE YOU REFER TO ON HIS DISCUSSIONS.

Q. DO WE HAVE ANY CONCERNS THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON COULD BECOME MORE COMPLICATED AND MORE TENSE BECAUSE OF THIS?

A. I CAN JUST REPEAT WHAT I SAID. I HAVE NO COMMENT

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TO MAKE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT IN FEZ. NO COMMENT.

Q. WILL AMBASSADOR HABIB'S FIRST STEP BE BEIRUT?

A. I HAVE NOTHING ON THE ITINERARY THAT I CAN GIVE YOU. AS USUAL, AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS ASKED US TO DISCLOSE VERY LITTLE ABOUT HIS MOVEMENTS AND HIS ITINERARY. IN FACT, HE EVEN SAYS HE'S PREPARED TO TAKE THE BLAME FOR IT.

Q. THE DATE AND THE ITINERARY HAVE BEEN SET?

A. I CAN'T SAY THAT FOR THE ENTIRE DURATION OF HIS TRIP IT HAS BEEN SET, NO.

Q. THE DEPARTURE BEEN SET?

A. I CAN'T TELL YOU.

Q. PART OF THAT FORMATION YOU USED A MINUTE AGO, I THINK

YOU SAID PART OF THE MISSION IS TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS IN THE REGION AND THE IMPETUS ON LEBANON. HIS MANDATE HAS NOT BEEN BROADENED?

A. IT HAS NOT. IT'S PRECISELY THE SAME AS IT IS. I MAY HAVE USED THE WORD "REGION" BUT I MEANT THE REGION OF LEB ANON, IN THAT CONTEXT.

Q. DO YOU HAVE A COMMENT ON THE BREAKUP OF THE FEZ CONFERENCE?

A. I SAID EARLIER I HAVE NO COMMENT.

Q. IS THE SECRETARY GOING TO COME DOWN (ACCOMPANYING ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR?

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A. YES, WE EXPECT HIM TO.

Q. ABOUT WHEN?

A. IT COULD BE AS EARLY AS TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES FROM NOW. I CAN'T GIVE YOU AN EXACT TIME.

Q. DO YOU HAVE A SCHEDULE FOR THE AFTERNOON ON THIS THING?

A. YES. THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON THIS MORNING AT 7:45. HE BEGAN A MEETING WITH THE

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SECRETARY AT THE DEPARTMENT HERE AT 10:00 A.M., AND THE SECRETARY IS CURRENTLY HOSTING A LUNCHEON FOR FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND, AS I INDICATED, IT COULD END AS EARLY AS 1:00. I WOULD WANT TO ADD, OBVIOUSLY SINCE THE MEETING IS IN PROGRESS I HAVE NO COMMENT ON IT AND THAT ANY STATEMENT MADE ABOUT THE MEETING WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM EITHER THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND/OR THE SECRETARY.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHEN HE'LL GO BACK TO ISRAEL?

A. I'M SORRY, I HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THAT. CLARK

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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/23/91 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), PEPR, LE

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SUBJECT: RESUMPTION OF HABIB MISSION

REF: (A) KUWAIT 5357 (B) AMMAN 8481

1. [REDACTED]

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO RESUME HIS
MISSION ON LEBANON. HE PLANS TO LEAVE THE U.S. ON FRIDAY,

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NOVEMBER 27 AND WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY DAS DRAPER (NEA) AND THAYAL HALL, SECRETARY FOR THE PARTY. PLEASE NOTE THAT THEY WILL BE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAMES (INITIALS MATCH REAL NAMES): P. HARRIS, M. DAVIS AND MRS. T. HARPER.

3. FOLLOWING IS THE BASIC ITINERARY WITH WHICH WE ARE NOW WORKING. A MORE DETAILED SCHEDULE WILL BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS WE HAVE FEED-BACK FROM THE POSTS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IN ADDITION, THERE MAY BE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE SCHEDULE AS THE MISSION PROGRESSES. PLEASE NOTE THAT USAF AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED FOR ALL ME STOPS.

-- FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 27: DPT U.S. BY PAA 110

-- SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28: ARR ROME ETA 0900

-- SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 29: DPT ROME IN EARLY MORNING FOR BEIRUT BY USAF AIRCRAFT

-- TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1: LEAVE BEIRUT FOR DAMASCUS IN EARLY MORNING

-- THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3: LEAVE DAMASCUS FOR SAUDI

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ARABIA IN EARLY MORNING

-- SATURDAY, DECEMBER 5: LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA FOR AMMAN DURING EARLY MORNING

-- SUNDAY, DECEMBER 6: CROSS JORDAN RIVER BRIDGE TO JERUSALEM. (SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE FOR USAF AIRCRAFT TO FLY TO TEL AVIV TO PICK UP HABIB PARTY THERE)

-- TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8: LEAVE ISRAEL FOR BEIRUT IN EARLY MORNING; MEETING WITH SARKIS; LEAVE BEIRUT FOR ROME IN EVENING

-- WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9: DEPART ROME AT 1115 ON PAA 111; ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON AT 1645 VIA JFK.

4. APPOINTMENTS:

-- AT EACH STOP, AMBASSADOR HABIB WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH A BRIEFING BY THE AMBASSADOR AND APPROPRIATE EMBASSY OFFICERS. HE AND DRAPER WILL THEN PROCEED WITH APPOINTMENTS WITH APPROPRIATE SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

-- FOR BEIRUT: AMB. HABIB WANTS TO SEE PM WAZZAN AND

[REDACTED]

FONMIN BOUTROS DURING FIRST STOP IN BEIRUT, AND LEAVES IT TO AMBASSADOR DILLON'S DISCRETION WHETHER TO SEE THEM TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY. HIS SECOND STOP IN BEIRUT WOULD BE ONLY FOR MEETING WITH SARKIS. HE LEAVES TO YOU SCHEDULING OF APPOINTMENTS WITH OTHER LEBANESE. IF YOU BELIEVE MEETING WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL CANNOT BE AVOIDED, HE BELIEVES IT MUST BE BALANCED BY MEETING WITH WALID JUMBLATT, SAEB SALAM OR BOTH.

-- FOR DAMASCUS: YOU SHOULD ADVISE SARG OF HABIB'S TRAVEL PLANS AND SUBMIT REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ASSAD. YOU WILL, OF COURSE, WANT TO REMIND SARG THAT DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR TOLD HABIB THAT "HE WOULD ALWAYS BE WELCOME."

-- FOR JIDDA: WE REALIZE THIS SCHEDULE PUTS THE HABIB PARTY IN SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SAUDI WEEKEND. WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO WORK SOME FLEXIBILITY INTO THE SCHEDULE TO MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS.

-- FOR AMMAN: IN VIEW OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED REFTTEL, HABIB IS HOPING TO SQUEEZE IN A STOP IN AMMAN, AS NOTED IN ITINERARY PARA 3. HE AND DRAPER WILL WANT TO SEE KING HUSSEIN AND ANY OTHER OFFICIALS EMBASSY BELIEVES APPROPRIATE.

5. PASSPORT INFORMATION AND VISAS: PASSPORT DATA FOR EACH MEMBER OF PARTY (FOR GENERAL TRAVEL AND FOR ISRAEL

ONLY) WILL BE SENT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE. DRAPER AND HALL HAVE VISAS FOR EACH STOP, AND WE ARE HOPING TO OBTAIN ALL NECESSARY VISAS FOR HABIB.

-- FOR AMMAN AND TEL AVIV: PLEASE ARRANGE FOR BRIDGE CROSSING PERMITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITINERARY OUTLINED ABOVE.

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6. PRESS TREATMENT OF VISIT: IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT EXPECTATIONS NOT BE RAISED UNDULY BY RESUMPTION OF HABIB MISSION. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT, IN DISCUSSING THIS MISSION, POSTS AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION HAS BEEN "EXPANDED"; HIS PURPOSE WILL BE TO FOCUS ON ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CEASE-FIRE AND THE ORIGINAL TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR HIS MISSION. AS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE IN THE PAST, THE SPOKESMAN WILL NEITHER DIVULGE DETAILS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SCHEDULE NOR ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS MEETINGS EXCEPT AS AGREED WITH HIM.

7. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: AMBASSADOR HABIB IS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF HOSPITALITY AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR HIM AND HIS PARTY ON PREVIOUS TRIPS, AND MUST ONCE AGAIN RELY ON POSTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN CARRYING OUT HIS MISSION.

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-- ACCOMMODATIONS: FOR REASONS OF SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE, ALL THREE MEMBERS OF PARTY SHOULD BE HOUSED TOGETHER WHENEVER POSSIBLE. IF ACCOMMODATIONS ARE IN A HOTEL, THREE SINGLE ADJOINING ROOMS SHOULD BE RESERVED, IF POSSIBLE.

-- FOR ROME: PLEASE SECURE HOTEL RESERVATIONS AS DISCUSSED WITH DCM BY PHONE.

-- EQUIPMENT: WOULD APPRECIATE POSTS PROVIDING IBM SELECTRIC TYPEWRITER FOR USE BY MRS. HALL WHEREVER HER ACCOMMODATIONS ARE LOCATED. PLEASE ALSO ENSURE THAT SHE HAS SAMPLE FORMAT FOR OUTGOING EMBASSY/CONGEN/USLO CABLES, APPROPRIATE TYPING ELEMENTS AND RIBBON, AND OTHER SUPPLIES.

-- AIRCRAFT CREW: WOULD APPRECIATE THE DAO'S ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING ACCOMMODATIONS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIR FORCE CREW OF THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT. EUCOM WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH DAO'S WITH DETAILED REQUIREMENTS.

8. TRAFFIC: AS WAS ARRANGED ON PREVIOUS TRIPS, PLEASE PROVIDE HABIB AND DRAPER UPON ARRIVAL AT EACH STOP COPIES OF RELEVANT CABLES, INCLUDING NODIS AND OTHER SENSITIVE TRAFFIC. CABLES PROVIDED SHOULD COVER REGIONAL DEVELOP-

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MENTS, AS WELL AS ITEMS OF SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO THE HABIB MISSION. COPIES OF WIRELESS FILE AND LATEST NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTS SHOULD ALSO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HABIB PARTY AT EACH STOP.

9. FOR KUWAIT: IN VIEW OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED REF A, AMB. HABIB IS NOT PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO KUWAIT ON THIS TRIP.

10. SECURITY: POSTS SHOULD MAKE SAME ARRANGEMENTS FOR PARTY'S SECURITY AS WERE MADE FOR PREVIOUS TRIPS TO THE AREA BY AMB. HABIB AND HIS PARTY.

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-- FOR ROME: WE ARE SENDING A SEPARATE CABLE ON SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ROME STOPS.

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AMEMBASSY SANAA
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UNCLAS STATE 309373

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING NOVEMBER 20, 1981

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
DEAN FISCHER.

ANNOUNCEMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LEBANON-ISRAEL SITUATION HAS
REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET AND STABLE FOR MUCH OF THE TIME
SINCE THE JULY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, TENSIONS HAVE
BEEN RISING LATELY. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO REINFORCING
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THE STABILITY OF THE SITUATION AND STRENGTHENING THE
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. FOR THAT REASON, THE PRESIDENT
HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB TO RETURN TO THE REGION
TO DETERMINE HOW THE U.S. COULD BE HELPFUL IN REDUCING
TENSIONS FURTHER AND IN IMPROVING CONDITIONS, BASIC
CONDITIONS IN LEBANON. AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL LEAVE AFTER
THANKSGIVING.

Q. YOU SAY TENSIONS HAVE BEEN RISING LATELY. CAN YOU
DEMONSTRATE THAT? HOW DO YOU KNOW?

A. WELL, WE'VE GOTTEN REPORTS OF SOME INCREASE IN TENSION
AND I THINK WE ADDRESSED SOME OF THEM HERE IN THE LAST
FEW DAYS.

AMONG THE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED TENSIONS ARE THE UN
TENSION WITH THE CHRISTIAN GROUP IN LEBANON, THE HADDAD
GROUP; BUT I DON'T WANT TO SPECIFY IN TOO PRECISE A WAY
WHAT THE TENSIONS ARE THERE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF----

Q. WHAT WOULD BE HABIB'S BASIC WRIT--TO SIMPLY EXTEND
THE CURRENT STATUS QUO OR TO BROADEN IT, OR WHAT?

A. ESSENTIALLY, AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION WILL BE AS
IT HAS BEEN ALL ALONG--WHICH IS AIMED AT DEFUSING THE

TENSIONS IN LEBANON, PARTICIPATING AS BEST HE CAN IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT IN THE FULFILLMENT OF THIS MISSION HE WILL BE DOING SOME TRAVEL THROUGHOUT THE REGION BUT I'M NOT ABLE TODAY TO GIVE YOU A PRECISE ITINERARY. OF COUNTRIES HE WILL VISIT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE SAME COUNTRIES HE VISITED BEFORE. THERE MAY ALSO BE OTHERS.

Q. WHICH IS ISRAEL , SYRIA, AND SAUDI ARABIA?

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A. AND LEBANON.

Q. WELL, YOU'VE GOT THAT COLLECTION.

A. YES, BUT I'M JUST NOT IN A POSITION AT THIS POINT TO GIVE A PRECISE ITINERARY.

Q. WILL HIS MISSION ALSO INCLUDE AN EFFORT TO GET THE SYRIAN SAMS OUT OF LEBANON?

A. RATHER THAN SPECIFY A PARTICULAR OBJECTIVE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S, I'D RATHER REFER YOU TO MY STATEMENT. I'M NOT ABLE TO GET INTO DISCUSSION OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH HE MAY EXAMINE.

AS ALL OF YOU KNOW VERY WELL, AMBASSADOR HABIB LIKES TO KEEP A VERY LOW PROFILE ON HIS VISITS TO THE REGION.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON SYRIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS TOWARDS THE JORDANIAN BORDER?

A. NO, NONE THAT I CAN GIVE YOU NOW.

Q. CAN YOU TAKE THE QUESTION.

A. WE CAN LOOK INTO IT, YES.

Q. HOW ABOUT ON LEBANON? ONE OF THE CAUSES OF TENSION LATELY HAS BEEN THE ISRAELI PERCEPTION THAT THE PLO IS ARMING, REINFORCING ITS UNITS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, IN VIOLATION, AS THE ISRAELIS SEE IT, OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

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IT WOULD BE NICE TO KNOW IF THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT PROHIBITS REARMING OF FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON OR DOESN'T.

A. I THINK WE'VE ADDRESSED THAT IN THE PAST, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT ALL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION THAT CONTRIBUTE TO TENSION ARE GOING TO BE ADDRESSED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB AS PART OF HIS MISSION.

Q. HAS THE U.S. HEARD FROM EGYPT ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PRONOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY THAT JERUSALEM SHOULD BE UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY?

A. PERSONALLY I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY REACTION FROM EGYPT TO THAT STATEMENT.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY CLARIFYING STATEMENTS ON THAT STORY? IS THAT NEW U.S. POLICY?

A. NO, I WOULD EMPHASIZE VERY STRONGLY THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD JERUSALEM. ITS STATUS MUST BE SETTLED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. AND OUR POSITION WAS BEST ARTICULATED BY THE PRESIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1980, DURING THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID THEN THAT JERUSALEM IS NOW, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE, ONE CITY, UNDIVIDED WITH CONTINUING FREE ACCESS FOR ALL. HE SAID FURTHER THAT HE BELIEVED THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM COULD BE SOLVED BY MEN OF GOODWILL AS PART OF A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.

AND THE ESSENCE OF THAT 1980 STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND OUR CONTINUING POLICY IS, FIRSTLY, THAT WE BELIEVE JERUSALEM SHOULD REMAIN UNDIVIDED WITH FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY SITES. SECONDLY, THAT THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM HAS TO BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

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SO, IN SUM, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR TRADITIONAL POSITION.

Q. I NOTICE YOU WERE NOT QUOTING THE PRESIDENT FROM YESTERDAY. DOES THAT SORT OF RENDER HIS STATEMENTS YESTERDAY INVALID?

A. NO, I'M NOT ADDRESSING ANYTHING OTHER THAN TO REITERATE FOR YOU OUR POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM.

Q. THE WHITE HOUSE DID SAY THAT REAGAN HAD TOLD THE JEWISH LEADERS YESTERDAY THAT HE FAVORED A UNIFIED JERUS-

ALEM UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY. IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL VIEWS ARE DIFFERENT THAN OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY ON THIS MATTER?

A. I'M GOING TO LET THE WHITE HOUSE ADDRESS THAT. I HAVE NOTHING TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT OTHER THAN WHAT I JUST READ.

Q. ON THE SAME SUBJECT, IN THE MEETING YESTERDAY, AND IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT INCREASING TENSIONS IN THE AREA, ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS AT THAT MEETING IS A GENTLEMAN, MR. MAX FISCHER, WHO, AS I UNDERSTAND, ALSO FLEW FROM DETROIT TO WASHINGTON ON THE V. P.'S PLANE.

IS IT ADVISABLE AT THIS POINT TO DEVELOP THAT CLOSE A RELATIONSHIP WITH A MAN WHO IS NAMED IN THE JERUSALEM POST EARLIER THIS MONTH AS A KEY SUSPECT IN SKIMMING CHARITABLE FUNDS THAT WERE CONTRIBUTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING SENT TO ISRAEL.

A. I HAVE NO COMMENT. I'M NOT FAMILIAR PERSONALLY WITH ALL ON THE BACKGROUND ON IT. I SUGGEST THAT YOU ADDRESS UNCLASSIFIED

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IT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.

Q. ON THE HABIB TRIP, IS THERE ANY TIME FRAME FOR HIM?

A. WE WOULD EXPECT HE WILL REMAIN THERE FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK, BUT IT IS BASICALLY OPEN-ENDED.

Q. HAS HE SEEN THE PRESIDENT LATELY OR IS HE IN TOWN, OR WILL BE SEE HIM SHORTLY?

A. I'M NOT AWARE THAT HE IS IN TOWN AT THE MOMENT.

Q. DOES HE PLAN TO SEE THE PRESIDENT BEFORE HE LEAVES?

A. I DON'T HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THAT FOR YOU, BUT THAT HAS BEEN CUSTOMARY IN THE PAST SO I WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED.

Q. YOU SAY AFTER THANKSGIVING.

A. YES.

Q. WHO WILL GO WITH HIM?

A. MORRIS DRAPER, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AFFAIRS.

Q. THEY WILL GO COMMERCIAL TO EUROPE?

A. I DO NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THAT.

Q. IS THERE ANY ANXIETY WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THAT CEASE-FIRE THERE IS UPON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS?

A. I WOULDN'T WANT TO PUT A MELODRAMATIC CAST ON IT.
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IT HAS SHOWN SIGNS--THAT IS TO SAY, THE AREA HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF BECOMING SOMEWHAT TENSE IN RECENT DAYS AND WEEKS. BUT I WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SAY IT'S ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY SIGNS OF AN ISRAELI BUILD-UP OR SIGNS OF AN ATTACK FROM THEM?

A. NO COMMENT.

Q. IN THE MEANTIME, IN THE ABSENCE OF HABIB IN THE AREA, HAS THE STATE OR THE EMBASSIES OUT THERE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE?

A. YES, WE MAINTAIN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH ALL OF THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA AND HAVE EVER SINCE AMBASSADOR HABIB DEPARTED THE REGION.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON ANY ADDITIONAL SYRIAN MISSILES BEING DEPLOYED IN BEKAA VALLEY IN LEBANON?

A. NO.

Q. DOES THE STATEMENT YOU READ TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THERE WERE TWO MEETINGS IN SEPTEMBER BY THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE, MR. REAGAN, WITH JEWISH GROUPS IN SEPTEMBER 1980. ONE WAS ON SEPT. 3, AT WHICH TIME HE SPOKE TO B'NAI B'RITH. AND THE OTHER WAS ON SEPT. 15 AT WHICH TIME HE MET WITH THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS, AT THE SHERATON-CARLTON.

A. I'M UNFAMILIAR WITH WHAT YOU'RE ASKING ME. I SUGGEST YOU GET THE STATEMENT.
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Q. HAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOW COME FORWARD WITH A CLEAR CUT STATEMENT AS TO WHAT THE U.S. POSITION IS SO THAT IT CAN BE CIRCULATED PROPERLY?

A. ARE YOU SPEAKING ON THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM?

Q. JERUSALEM AND ALL THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DISCUSSION YESTERDAY AT THE WHITE HOUSE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND ALL JEWISH GROUPS.

A. I'LL MAKE THE STATEMENT AVAILABLE TO YOU AFTERWARDS.

Q. BUT YOU HAVE MY POINT. I ASKED ABOUT THE PLO POSITION.

. WE, AS I INDICATED YESTERDAY, STAND BY THE POSITION THAT ONCE THE PLO RECOGNIZES ISRAELIS' RIGHT TO EXIST AND ACCEPTS UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, WE WOULD THEN CONSIDER DEALING WITH THE ORGANIZATION. BUT THE MORE IMPORTANT POINT I THINK AT THIS POINT IS THAT THE PRACTICE OF TERRORISM WOULD BE INCONSISTENT, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, WITH THAT RECOGNITION, BOTH OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPROPRIATE UN RESOLUTIONS, AND CLEARLY TERRORISM IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST, NOR IS IT CONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THEREFORE, WE SEE NO DISCREPANCY.

Q. IS THAT A PREPARED STATEMENT OR IS THAT YOUR--WHAT I'M GETTING AT HERE IS THAT I'M A BIT CONFUSED AS TO--YOU'RE SAYING NOW THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THE PLO A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION?

A. I DID NOT SAY THAT. I DID SAY, I HOPE YOU HEARD, IS THAT TERRORISM IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PLO'S RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO EXIST AND ITS ACCEPTANCE
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OF THE APPROPRIATE UN RESOLUTION.

Q. WELL, WHO'S PRACTICING TERRORISM?

A. I HAVE NOTHING BEYOND WHAT I SAID.

Q. THAT'S BEEN A PROBLEM. WE HAVE VERY FEW WORDS ON THE PLO AND TERRORISM. CAN WE GET THIS--A STATEMENT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS, APPARENTLY YESTERDAY, WAS THAT THE PRECONDITION OF TREATING OR NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO WERE THREE PRECONDITIONS; AND ONE OF THE PRECONDITIONS WAS THAT THE PLO DENOUNCE OR RENOUNCE TERRORISM--THAT'S PRETTY CLEAR--WHICH IS CLEARER THAN WHAT YOU READ TODAY.

A. WHAT I READ IS WHAT I WILL STAND ON.

Q. WAS THAT CLEAR WITH THE WHITE HOUSE?

A. I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO OUR INTERNAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES. BUT SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT WHAT I'M GIVING YOU IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION.

Q. WHY HAVE YOU TACKLED ON TERRORISM TO THE SENTENCE? WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHT--PLO RECOGNIZING AND

WE WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER DEALING WITH THEM AND THEN YOU ADDED A TERRORISM SENTENCE. WHY HAVE YOU ADDED THAT?

A. BECAUSE THE SUBJECT DID ARISE. IT AROSE YESTERDAY AT MY BRIEFING AND IT AROSE APPARENTLY AT THE WHITE HOUSE AS WELL.

Q. ARE THERE ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UNCLASSIFIED

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USG AND THE PLO ON THE EXCHANGE OF RECOGNITION IF THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE SAUDI PLAN AND THE PLO MIGHT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL?

A. YOU ARE ASKING IF WE HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO?

Q. ON INDIRECT, YES?

A. NO.

Q. SUGGESTING POSSIBLE AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE SAUDI PLAN OR SUPPORT?

A. THE ANSWER IS WE'VE HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE PLO ON IT. I WILL BE GLAD TO RESTATE FOR YOU OUR OWN POLICY ON THE SUBJECT, WHICH IS THAT THE ONLY BASIS FOR ACHIEVING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED, IS THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, AND WE WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE FULL PARTNERSHIP IN THAT EFFORT.

Q. JUST TO BE CLEAR. I DON'T WANT TO PARSE THIS THING ANYMORE THAN IT OUGHT TO BE. YOU'RE NOT SAYING, IN EFFECT THAT AMONG THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE PLO IS NEED FOR THEM SPECIFICALLY TO RENOUNCE TERRORISM?

A. NO, JUST TO BE CLEAR ONCE AGAIN, I'M SAYING WHAT I SAID. I'M GOING TO STAND BY THAT.

Q. AM I CORRECT IN DRAWING THAT CONCLUSION. YOU'RE MAK-

ING A BLANKET STATEMENT OF POLICY, THAT THE PLO HAS COME UP. DOES THAT IN ANY WAY CHANGE WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID AS A CANDIDATE ON THE PLO AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

DOES IT CHANGE--YOU REVISED THE POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT SAID, AS A CANDIDATE, ON JERUSALEM. HE ALSO, UNCLASSIFIED

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IN ONE OF HIS SPEECHES, TALKED ABOUT THE PLO AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT BACKED AWAY FROM, TALKING ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF AN UMBRELLA GROUP AND SO FORTH. SINCE YOU'VE GONE BACK TO THE CANDIDATE SPEECHES, WHERE DO WE STAND ON THE PLO--THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS THAT THE PLO IS A TERRORIST GROUP?

A. THIS IS WHAT I THOUGHT I ADDRESSED JUST NOW IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION.

Q. A VERY PROMINENT NEWSPAPER REPORTER SAID THAT THE FAHD PLAN ESSENTIALLY--I QUOTE THE WORD "ESSENTIALLY" FROM THE ARTICLE, IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF A LONG STORY BY THEM--IS LIKE 242. I JUST WONDER WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THAT COMPARISON OF THE FAHD PLAN "ESSENTIALLY" IS LIKE 242, WHICH IS NONSENSE, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS.

A. I HAVE NO COMMENT. I GAVE YOU THE COMMENT I WISHED TO ON THE FAHD PLAN AND THE PLO USING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR IT. I HAVE NO OTHER COMMENT.

Q. THERE'S A COMPARISON BEING MADE HERE AND APPARENTLY THE INFORMATION CAME FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THAT ESSENTIALLY THE FAHD PLAN IS LIKE 242?

A. I CAN'T COMMENT ON WHERE IT CAME FROM BUT I THINK OUR POSITION IS CLEAR.

Q. DID YOU GET ANY OBSERVATION ON THIS POST STORY, PLO AIDE SAYING THAT IF THE U.S. WOULD ACCEPT THE FAHD PLAN, PLO WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO GET IT ENDORSED BY THE UNCLASSIFIED

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ARABS?

A. THIS IS WHAT I WAS ADDRESSING EARLIER WHEN I SAID I WOULD RESTATE OUR OWN POLICY, WHICH WAS THAT WE ARE

COMMITTED TO CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENT.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE PAKISTAN REPORTS, SINCE WE'RE IN THE SAME AREA, ABOUT THE ZIRCONIUM EXPORT?

A. ZIRCONIUM IS WHAT IS USED IN THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM. I DON'T HAVE ANY COMMENT FROM HERE ON IT BUT I WOULD SUGGEST YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH COMMERCE OR U.S. CUSTOMS ABOUT THE REPORTED SEIZURE OF THIS MATERIAL. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THIS ADMINISTRATION'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IS THE APPLICATION OF EFFECTIVE CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT WE TAKE THIS ASPECT OF OUR POLICY VERY SERIOUSLY AS IT APPLIES TO PAKISTAN, AND WE CONSIDER THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COMPLIANCE DIVISION OF THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT IN COOPERATION WITH U.S. CUSTOMS MARKS AN IMPORTANT SUCCESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY. WE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT AND EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AT THE APPARENT VIOLATION OF U.S. LAW.

Q. DOES THIS IN ANY WAY SHAKE OUR CONFIDENCE THAT THE PROVISION OF AIDE THAT WE ARE GOING TO GIVE TO PAKISTAN OVER THE NEXT SIX YEARS WILL THEN DETER THEM FROM DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY?

A. AS I SAID, WE TAKE THE ASPECT OF OUR POLICY VERY SERIOUSLY AS IT APPLIES TO PAKISTAN AND WE THINK THIS ACTION MARKS AN IMPORTANT SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT POLICY.

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Q. COULD I ASK ABOUT OUR POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF. DOES THIS ADMINISTRATION ENDORSE THE SO-CALLED CARTER DOCTRINE WITH REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE AGGRESSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF?

A. I THINK WE PREFER TO USE OUR OWN WORDS AND HAVE USED WORDS TO DESCRIBE OUR POSITION RELATING TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

Q. WHAT IS THE POSITION WITH REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE SOVIET SUBVERSION OF ANY OF THOSE COUNTRIES; DO WE HAVE A POSITION ON THAT?

A. LET ME GET YOU THE POSITION THAT WE HAVE TAKEN ON THAT RATHER THAN ME TRYING TO PARAPHRASE IT. HAIG

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/19/87 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, KU, JO

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SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT

1. [REDACTED]
2. POSTS SHORTLY WILL BE RECEIVING GUIDANCE IN OTHER CABLES CONCERNING RETURN OF PHIL HABIB TO THE AREA, PROBABLY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THANKSGIVING, DEPARTING WASHINGTON ON NOVEMBER 27. WHILE WE PREFER TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS OF HABIB'S PLANS BEFORE MAKING AN ANNOUNCE-

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MENT, FOR VARIOUS REASONS--INCLUDING LEAKS--WE MAY REPEAT
MAY HAVE TO ISSUE A STATEMENT AS EARLY AS FRIDAY NOON,
NOVEMBER 20, OR CONCEIVABLY OVER THE WEEKEND.

3. ANNOUNCEMENT (SEE TEXT BELOW) AS WELL AS CONTINGENCY Q'S AND A'S WILL DODGE THE QUESTION OF EXACT ITINERARY, SYRIAN MISSILE QUESTION, AND WHETHER SYRIA WILL RECEIVE HABIB. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS FROM ACTION POSTS BY 11 A.M. EST, NOVEMBER 20, WHETHER THERE

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WOULD BE ANY PROBLEMS IN MAKING ANNOUNCEMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 20 OR OVER THE WEEK-END. EVEN WHILE SENDING REPLY, ACTION POSTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT HABIB WOULD LIKE TO VISIT LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA AND ISRAEL ON HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP AND THAT HED HOPE TO VISIT KUWAIT AND POSSIBLY JORDAN, TIME PERMITTING. FYI: WE WILL PROBABLY ASK JIDDA TO URGE THE SAUDIS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE SYRIANS, AS THEY DID BEFORE, TO ASSURE THAT HABIB IS RECEIVED IN DAMASCUS. EMBASSY DAMASCUS SHOULD MEANWHILE NOTE THAT QADDOUR, ON BEHALF OF ASSAD, ASSURED HABIB THAT HE WOULD BE WELCOME TO RETURN AT ANY TIME. END FYI.

4. TEXT OF PLANNED ANNOUNCEMENT AND Q'S AND A'S FOLLOW:
BEGIN TEXT:

ANNOUNCEMENT (TO BE VOLUNTEERED):

THE U.S. IS PLEASED THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AREA HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET AND STABLE SINCE THE JULY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO REINFORCING THAT SITUATION. FOR THAT REASON, THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB TO RETURN TO THE REGION TO DETERMINE HOW THE U.S. COULD BE HELPFUL IN REDUCING

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TENSIONS FURTHER AND IN IMPROVING BASIC CONDITIONS IN LEBANON. HE WILL LEAVE AFTER THANKSGIVING.

IF ASKED:

Q. CAN YOU TELL US WHERE HABIB IS GOING?

A. I EXPECT THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL GO TO THE SAME COUNTRIES HE HAS VISITED BEFORE, AND THERE MAY BE OTHERS. I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU HIS ITINERARY, WHICH IN ANY EVENT HAS NOT BEEN SET.

Q. WILL HE BE DISCUSSING THE SYRIAN MISSILES?

A. I WOULD REFER YOU TO MY STATEMENT. I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET INTO DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES WHICH AMBASSADOR HABIB MAY EXAMINE ON THIS TRIP. AS YOU KNOW, AMBASSADOR HABIB LIKES TO KEEP A VERY LOW PROFILE.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHETHER SYRIA WILL RECEIVE AMBASSADOR HABIB?

A. AS I STATED EARLIER, I AM NOT GOING TO GET INTO THE QUESTION OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S ITINERARY.

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Q. HOW LONG WILL HE BE OUT IN THE AREA?

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A. HE WILL BE GONE AT LEAST A WEEK. BEYOND THAT I CANNOT SPECULATE.

Q. WILL ANYONE BE ACCOMPANYING AMBASSADOR HABIB?

A. AS USUAL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MORRIS DRAPER WILL TRAVEL WITH AMBAR HABIB. A SECRETARY WILL ALSO ACCOMPANY THEM. HAIG

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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/3/87 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, EG

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR HABIB VISIT TO EGYPT

REF: CAIRO 24314✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. YOU TOOK EXACTLY THE RIGHT LINE WITH ALI AND GHALI
IN YOUR MID-OCTOBER CONVERSATION. AMBASSADOR HABIB
WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING--EVEN SYMBOLICALLY--IN ANYTHING
RELATED TO AUTONOMY TALKS, IN U.S., ISRAEL, OR EGYPT,

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FOR REASONS YOU GAVE. HE DOES NOT RULE OUT VISIT TO
EGYPT ON HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO AREA, BUT HAS NO PRESENT
PLANS TO INCLUDE IT IN HIS ITINERARY. HAIG

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ROME FOR AMB. HABIB, JERUSALEM AND AMMAN FOR M. DRAPER

E.O. 12065:N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING OCT. 13, 1981

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS RELATING TO TRAVEL OF AMBASSADOR
HABIB AND DAS DRAPER FROM TODAY'S NOON BRIEFING:

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF THE HABIB
MISSION?

A. I DON'T HAVE ANY SPECIFIC PLANS TO GIVE YOU ON MR.
HABIB'S MISSION. IT IS OUR EXPECTATION THAT HE WILL BE
RETURNING TO THE REGION IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT NO DATE
NOR NO ITINERARY HAS BEEN SET.

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I MIGHT POINT OUT THAT DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MORRIS
DRAPER IS TRAVELING IN THE REGION. HE WILL BE VISITING ON
THIS TRIP ISRAEL, LEBANON, JORDAN, SYRIA AND I THINK IT

WOULD BE FAIR TO DESCRIBE HIS TRIP AS SOMETHING OF A
FORERUNNER, OR PRELUDE, TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S RETURN TO
THE REGION.

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Q. CAN I FOLLOW UP? WOULD AMBASSADOR HABIB, WHEN HE GOES BACK TO THE AREA, DEAL WITH THE LEBANON ISSUE ONLY OR SOME OTHER ISSUES?

A. YES, IF AMBASSADOR HABIB RETURNED IT WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESUMING THE ROLE WHICH HE HAS PLAYED UP TO NOW. THAT IS TO SAY, IT WOULD BE CONFINED TO THE LEBANON POLITICAL SITUATION.

Q. IS MR. DRAPER GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA?

A. I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR HIM TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA.

Q. DID HE GO TO SAUDI ARABIA?

A. DID DRAPER ASK TO GO?

Q. YES.

A. NOT THAT I'M AWARE OF, NO.

Q. JUST ANOTHER POINT ON THE DRAPER TRIP. IN LIGHT OF SAUDI ARABIA'S HELP ON ARRANGING THE CESSATION OF
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HOSTILITIES--WHATEVER IT'S CALLED--IN SOUTHERN LEBANON-- WHY WOULD DRAPER NOT GO TO SAUDI ARABIA, SINCE SAUDI ARABIA IS SO IMPORTANT A PARTY TO THE PEACEMAKING EFFORT IN LEBANON?

A. IT JUST WASN'T PART OF HIS ITINERARY. THIS WAS A TRIP THAT HAD BEEN PLANNED PRIOR TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S ASSASSINATION. I DON'T HAVE A REALLY GOOD ANSWER I CAN GIVE YOU AS TO WHY HE DID NOT WANT TO GO ON THIS PARTICULAR TRIP, BUT IT, OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE OUT OF CONTACT WITH THE SAUDIS. HAIG

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PAGE 01 STATE 203994 TOSEC 070009
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EO Citations

UNCLAS STATE 203994 TOSEC 070009

FOR ALAN ROMBERG FROM S/PRS

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

E.O. 12065: N/A

9302566

TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

SUBJECT: MORNING WIRE SUMMARY, AUGUST 1, 1981

NO. 2

(1) UPI, JOHN E. NEWHAGAN, "U.S. AMBASSADOR SAYS ECONOMY
KEY TO EL SALVADOR CIVIL WAR" -- US AMBASSADOR DEANE HINTON
WARNED A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF EL SALVADOR COULD OCCUR IF
SALVADORAN BUSINESSMEN DID NOT STOP FEUDING WITH THE JUNTA
AND WORK TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY'S SHATTERED ECONOMY.

MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE GUAZAPAN VOLCANO AREA, 29 MILES
NORTH OF SAN SALVADOR FRIDAY SAID AIR FORCE WARJETS POUNDED
GUERRILLA POSITIONS ON THE MOUNTAIN IN ESCALATING HARFARE.

GOVERNMENT ARTILLERY TEAMS SET UP 105 MM FIELD CANNONS IN A
SOCCER FIELD IN THE NEARBY TOWN OF SUCHITOTO, FIRING AT
REGULAR INTERVALS AT THE ENTRENCHED LEFTISTS.
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THE GUERRILLAS RESPONDED BY SHELLING GOVERNMENT TROOPS WITH
MORTARS AND MINI-CANNONS. ONE COMMANDER ON THE SCENE
REPORTED FIVE SOLDIERS KILLED AND 12 WOUNDED DURING THE PAST
TWO DAYS.

IN HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE HE ARRIVED IN EL
SALVADOR IN JUNE, HINTON WARNED THE SALVADORAN CHAPTER OF
THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN SAN SALVADOR THAT REBELS

ARE TRYING TO WRECK THE ECONOMY AND INSTALL A COMMUNIST REGIME.

'IF THE ARMED SUBVERSIVES WHO ARE AT WORK ONLY MILES FROM HERE WERE TO SUCCEED IN THEIR EFFORTS, ALL YOUR OTHER EFFORTS WOULD BE IN VAIN,' HE SAID, ALLUDING TO INFIGHTING BETWEEN BUSINESSMEN AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

CONSERVATIVE BUSINESSMEN HAVE PUBLICLY ATTACKED THE MILITARY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC JUNTA FOR REFORMS INSTITUTED DURING THE PAST YEAR, INCLUDING LAND REDISTRIBUTION AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE BANKS AND COFFEE EXPORTS.

HINTON URGED BUSINESSMEN TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO REBUILD THE MASSACHUSETTS-SIZED COUNTRY'S SHATTERED ECONOMY.

'UNLESS THE ECONOMY CAN BE TURNED AROUND, THE WAR COULD BE LOST WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES ABOUT THE IMPOSITION OF A MARXIST-LENINIST POWER STRUCTURE THAT WOULD SNUFF OUT INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, HOPE FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, AND PRIVATE BUSINESS INITIATIVE.'

HINTON PRAISED THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, SAYING 'THE
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ARMY IS FIGHTING FOR YOUR FUTURE. IT DESERVES YOUR SUPPORT AND RESPECT, JUST AS IT HAS OUR SUPPORT AND RESPECT.'

HE SAID THE MILITARY HAS SUSTAINED 'MORE THAN 1,300 CASUALTIES, INCLUDING OVER 350 KILLED IN ACTION. FLMN (GUERRILLA) LOSSES ARE BELIEVED TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER.'

BUT HE ALSO LASHED OUT AT ABUSES OF AUTHORITY BY THE MILITARY, 'WHEN THIS VIOLENCE DOES INDEED COME FROM THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY FORCES, IT NOT ONLY BESMIRCHES THE PATRIOTISM OF THE ARMED FORCES BUT ALSO STRENGTHENS THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR.' HE SAID THE REAL CAUSE OF THE VIOLENCE 'IS THE CONSCIOUS DECISION TAKEN BY COMMUNIST POWERS IN 1980 TO ARM AND TRAIN SUBVERSIVES.'
END OF UPI ARTICLE.

(2) UPI, MIKE MYERS, "SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS SAYS F-16 SUSPENSION NOT PERMANENT, -- "THE U.S. PEACE MISSION THAT PRODUCED A FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO IS TO BE EXPANDED TO SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

OF THE CHRONIC CIVIL STRIFE IN LEBANON, A TOP-RANKING OFFICIAL SAID FRIDAY.

THE SENIOR OFFICIAL TRAVELING WITH SEC HAIG ALSO SAID THE SUCCESS OF THE PRESENT CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON WOULD HEAVILY INFLUENCE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION ON WHETHER TO RESUME F-16 FIGHTER PLANE SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL.

'I DON'T THINK IT'S (F-16 SUSPENSION) FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. THE DECISION HAS NOT BEEN MADE.

'THE CRITERION WILL BE THE ENVIRONMENT,' THE OFFICIAL SAID, SPEAKING WITH REPORTERS ON THE BASIS HE NOT BE IDENTIFIED.

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THE OFFICIAL SUGGESTED WASHINGTON MAY SEEK A LARGER FORCE OF UN FORCES TO PATROL SOUTHERN LEBANON TO AVERT FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO.

HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD TRY TO STRENGTHEN THE EMBATTLED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS MILITARY FORCES AS WELL.

THE OFFICIAL SAID WASHINGTON EXPECTED ITS WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS ALSO TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT OF THE LEBANESE CONFLICT.

BUT HE PRAISED THE ASSISTANCE OF SAUDIA ARABIA, KUWAIT, SYRIA, AND LEBANON IN HELPING PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY PHILIP C. HABIB FASHION THE CEASE-FIRE AFTER LAST SPRING HELPING TO AVERT A WAR OVER SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET-MADE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES.

'THAT PROCESS INITIATED BY HABIB WILL NOW HAVE TO BE BROADENED, TO INCLUDE NOT JUST THE INITIAL ISSUES (OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES AND THE PLO-ISRAEL FIGHTING), BUT THE AREA JUST NORTH OF THE ISRAELI BORDER,' THE SENIOR OFFICIAL SAID.

'AND SO IT BECOMES A MORE COMPREHENSIVE LEBANON SETTLEMENT APPROACH.'

EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT VISITS REAGAN IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK AND ISRAELI PM BEGIN, WHO IS EXPECTED TO WIN ANOTHER TERM, IS DUE IN SEPTEMBER.

THE SENIOR OFFICIAL INDICATED THE EVENTUAL RESUMPTION OF DELIVERIES OF F-16S TO ISREAL WOULD NOT BE TIED TO BEGIN'S

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VISIT. INSTEAD THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS IN ISRAEL AND
SOUTHERN LEBANON IS THE CHIEF INFLUENCE ON THE DECISION,
HE SAYS.

'A FUNDAMENTAL REASON FOR THE SUSPENSION IN THE FIRST
PLACE WAS THE ESCALATING CYCLE OF VOILENCE AND THE
EXISTENCE OF AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD MAKE THE INTRODUCTION
OF THAT KIND OF LETHAL WEAPONRY IN THE AREA HIGHLY
INAPPROPRIATE,' THE OFFICIAL SAID. STOESSEL

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

STATE 202946

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: ERDS 1, 3, 4 7/31/91 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, XF, PEPR, US, IS, SA, UNSC, LE, SY

SUBJECT: LEBANON-ISRAEL: MESSAGE TO BEGIN FROM HABIB.

REF: STATE 200359✓

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HABIB TO
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE DATE OF THE
LETTER IS JULY 30 RPT 30.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR GOOD MESSAGE OF JULY 29.

I HAVE BEEN BUSY SINCE MY RETURN TO THE U.S.. I HAD EXTEN-
SIVE CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON, AS YOU MAY KNOW FROM
AMBASSADOR EVRON, TO WHOM I ALSO TALKED AT SOME LENGTH.
I MET TODAY WITH THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, AND WITH THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT, TO IMPRESS UPON
THEM THE NEED TO PREVENT ANY ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE CEASEFIRE WE LABORED TOGETHER

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TO ACHIEVE. ADDITIONALLY, I HAVE BEGUN TO EXPLORE WITH THEM AND WITH SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM HOW THE UNIFIL OPERATION CAN BE SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED AND HOW THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT ASSIST IN MONITORING THE SITUATION IN THE BORDER AREA. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SAUDIS AND THE LEBANESE AS WELL.

WE WILL BE KEEPING YOU INFORMED AS THESE AND OTHER EFFORTS GO FORWARD.

WITH WARM GOOD WISHES FROM YOUR FRIEND,

SINCERELY, PHILIP C. HABIB. END OF TEXT. HAIG

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*** Current Classification ***

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-----065470 010704Z /22

R 312345Z JUL 81
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7201
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

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☐ DENY IN PART

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DECAPTIONED

CARACAS FOR AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK

E.O.12065: RDS-4 7/31/01 (LICHENSTEIN, C.) OR-M
TAGS: PORG, US, XF, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HABIB'S MEETINGS IN NEW YORK

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

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2. AMB. HABIB SPENT FRUITFUL DAY IN NEW YORK JULY 30,
MEETING WITH WESTERN PERMRPTS, SC PRESIDENT (NIGER),
LEBANESE AND SAUDI FONMINS AND WALDHEIM.

3. HABIB HAD MEETING FIRST WITH UK AMB. PARSONS AND FRENCH
CHARGE, BRIEFING THEM ON HIS MISSION AND SUMMARIZING FOR
THEM HIS VIEW OF NEXT STEPS WHICH, HE EMPHASIZED, SHOULD
BE CONCENTRATED ON (A) HOW TO MAKE THE CEASEFIRE WORK (E.G.,

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EXPANDED UNIFIL PRESENCE, PERHAPS MORE FRENCH INVOLVEMENT) AND (B) HOW TO BUILD ON IT INSIDE AND OUT OF THE UN SYSTEM (E.G., GREATER UNIFIL AND/OR LEBANESE PRESENCE IN TYRE POCKET, BEAUFORT AREA AND THE GAP BETWEEN THE NIGERIAN AND GHANIAN/NIGERIAN BATTALIONS). HABIB PROVIDED LESS CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING TO SPANISH AND JAPANESE PERMREPS WHO JOINED THE MEETING LATER.

4. OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN HABIB'S ADVICE AS TO THE LEAST DANGEROUS RESOLUTION WE COULD DRAFT IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY TO PREEMPT A HOSTILE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION DESTRUCTIVE OF THE CEASEFIRE. UK AMBASSADOR WAS ALSO PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND SUFFICIENT POLITICAL TRADE-OFF TO PERSUADE THE PLO TO REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR MILITARY HEARTLAND ALONG THE TYRE, BEAUFORT, HASBAYYAH LINES, POINTING OUT THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THESE POSITIONS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE PLO LEADERSHIP IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" REALLY EXISTS.

5. PARSONS ALSO NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER EXPANSION OF UN PRESENCE ON THE GROUND IN TERMS OF BEEFING UP UNTSO PRESENCE, SINCE DISPATCH OF UNTSO OFFICERS, INCLUDING THOSE SECONDED TO UNIFIL (OGL), IS NOT SUBJECT TO

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RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE.

6. SPANISH AMBASSADOR MADE TWO POINTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST. FIRST, HE RECALLED THAT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, WHICH HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS IS NOT COVERED BY THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, IS A VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION 490, IN THAT THE OVERFLIGHTS VIOLATE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY -- THIS COULD GIVE US PROBLEMS IN WORKING OUT A PRE-EMPTIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION SHOULD WE HAVE TO DO SO.

7. SECOND, SPANISH AMBASSADOR MADE INSTRUCTIVE AND ACCURATE OBSERVATION THAT THE AFRICANS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN PRE-EMPTION. ACCORDINGLY, THEY EXERT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON SC'S AFRICAN MEMBERS TO EXPRESS AFRICAN DISTASTE FOR PRE-EMPTION IN ANY AVAILABLE FORM--ISRAELI POLICY PROVIDES AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR THIS EXPRESSION OF AFRICAN CONCERN.

8. IN HIS MEETING WITH AMB. OUMAROU OF NIGER, HABIB WAS ABLE TO EXPRESS OUR GENUINE GRATITUDE FOR HIS RESPONSIBLE GUIDANCE OF THE COUNCIL'S WORK AND THE HELP WHICH THE SC PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT HAD AFFORDED TO HABIB. OUMAROU WAS OPENLY SYMPATHETIC TO HABIB'S OBSERVATION THAT ANY ACTIVITY IN THE COUNCIL NOW WILL JEOPARDIZE THE FRAGILE CEASEFIRE AND OPEN DOORS FOR THOSE WHO SEEK THE KIND OF POLITICAL CONFRONTATION

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WHICH WOULD RENEW THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. SIGNIFICANTLY, OUMAROU EMPHASIZED HIS OWN BELIEF THAT LEBANON MUST PLAY THE PRIMARY ROLE IN DECIDING WHAT THE COUNCIL'S NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE, IMPLYING THAT AS PRESIDENT, HE WOULD NOT ACT UNLESS REQUESTED TO DO SO BY LEBANON.

9. HABIB'S MEETING WITH LEBANON FONMIN BOUTROS WAS REPORTED BY SEPTTEL (USUN 2489 NOTAL), AS WAS HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRINCE SAUD (USUN 2497 NOTAL).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7202
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
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10. HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMB. LICHENSTEIN, WAS WALDHEIM'S GUEST FOR LUNCH. URQUHART WAS ALSO PRESENT. IN A WIDE-RANGING TWO-PLUS HOUR DISCUSSION, HABIB REITERATED THE MAJOR THEMES OF HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE WESTERN PERMREPS AND THE SC PRESIDENT -- THE UNWRITTEN, UNCONDITIONAL, AND GENERALLY-UNDERSTOOD TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE; ITS FRAGILITY; THE NEED ABOVE ALL TO GIVE IT

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TIME TO TAKE FIRM HOLD, IN A CONTEXT FREE OF EXAGGERATED RHETORIC (IDEALLY, THEREFORE, IN THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL RESUMPTION OF THE SC DEBATE ON BLAME-ASSESSMENT AND THE HARSH ANTI-ISRAEL TEXT OF THE ORIGINAL LEBANESE DRAFT, NOW FURTHER "IMPROVED" BY THE NONALIGNED), CHARGE AND COUNTER-CHARGE; AND THE AVOIDANCE OF PUBLIC DEBATE THAT WOULD, AMONG OTHER RESULTS, UNDERCUT U.S. CREDIBILITY AMONG ARAB NATIONS. SYG AND URQUHART AGREED WITH HABIB IN EVERY DETAIL. THEY THEN EXCHANGED WARM COMPLIMENTS ON US AND UN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED SO FAR --

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PARALLEL EFFORTS ON STEP ONE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE REGION.

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11. URQUHART RAISED THE ISSUE OF "PROVOCATIVE" ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS AND WONDERED ALOUD IF THERE WERE ANY WAY TO CUT DOWN ON T HABIB RESPONDED (A) BY REITERATING THAT SUCH FLIGHTS WERE IN NO WAY LIMITED BY THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS, BUT THAT (B) HE HAD ALREADY MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS ON THIS ISSUE, BASING THEM ON THE PROPOSITION THAT AT VERY LEAST THE SITUATION IN LEBANON SHOULD REVERT TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND THUS TO A LESS "PROVOCATIVE" LEVEL OF OVERFLIGHTS.

12. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO NEXT STEPS, AND GOT DOWN TO HARD, PRACTICAL CASES. HABIB REPEATED TO SYG AND URQUHART WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER ABOUT EVADING DISCUSSION OF CEASEFIRE PRECONDITIONS BY STRESSING INSTEAD THE MANY WAYS IN WHICH THE CEASEFIRE MIGHT BE BOLSTERED--SOME OF THEM WITHIN UNIFIL'S PRESENT MANDATE. THE DISCUSSION WAS PRECISE AND SPECIFIC AS TO THE UPGRADING OF UN FORCES, THE EXPANSION OF UN AREAS OF INFLUENCE AND/OR CONTROL, THE THINNING OUT OF ISRAELI FORCES (ADVISORY, LIAISON, AND COMBAT) AND ISRAELI HEAVY EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE ENCLAVE,

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THE DRAWING BACK OF PLO ELEMENTS, AND THE EVENTUAL SUBSTITUTION OF GOL PRESENCE FOR UN FORCES. URQUHART RESPONDED WITH TACTICAL JUDGMENTS AS TO POSSIBILITIES AND HARD CASES. SYG BECAME QUITE EVASIVE--FULL AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THE PRACTICAL OBSTACLES WERE MANY AND SUBSTANTIAL--AND AT THE SAME TIME VERY CANDID ABOUT THE LIMITS WITHIN WHICH THE SECRETARIAT MUST OPERATE, THE DANGER OF PUSHING THESE LIMITS BY EXPLICIT EXPANSION OF THE MANDATE, AND THE EQUAL DANGER OF OPENING DEBATE ON SUCH EXPANSION, A DEBATE THAT COULD GO OFF ON UNPREDICTABLE, UNPROFITABLE TANGENTS AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR DELIBERATE "MISCHIEF" BY CERTAIN SC MEMBERS. HABIB DID NOT DISAGREE. HE URGED, HOWEVER, THAT NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY STUDIED AND READILY AGREED TO URQUHART'S SUGGESTION THAT HE, DRAPER AND USUN BEGIN SHARING IDEAS, INFORMATION, AND FUTURE PLANNING AS AN AD HOC "WORKING GROUP."

13. COMMENTBIB'S VISIT WAS UNUSUALLY USEFUL FOR SEVERAL REASONS. THROUGH HIS VARIOUS MEETINGS, WE CAN BE SURE THE WORD WILL GET OUT THAT THE USG IS NOT PLANNING TO CEASE ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, HAVING ACHIEVED THE CEASEFIRE WE HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE IMPETUS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERMINATION TO CONSOLIDATE AND BUILD UPON THE CEASEFIRE. SECOND, BY MEETING WITH SC PRESIDENT (WHO IS NON-ALIGNED, MOSLEM AND AFRICAN), WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT WE TAKE THE COUNCIL SERIOUSLY, WHICH WILL HELP IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH PRICKLY NON-ALIGNED SC MEMBERS. THIRD, OUR ALLIES WERE

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GRATEFUL TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS TACTICS IN THE COUNCIL AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICALITIES OF POSSIBLE UNIFIL/UNTSO STEPS IN SOUTH LEBANON. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANT, HABIB WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO ENLIST PRINCE SAUD AND BOUTROS IN A CRITICAL EFFORT TO PERSUADE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT NOT TO PRESS ITS COMPLAINT IN THE COUNCIL. END

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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COMMENT..

14. BEIRUT 5181 JUST RECEIVED. WE (AND OUR UK COLLEAGUES) ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT SARKIS BELIEVES HE CANNOT GO DIRECTLY TO THE SAUDIS FOR HELP BUT THAT THE USG AND PERHAPS WALDHEIM MIGHT WORK ON THEM. IN OUR VIEW, HABIB DID EXACTLY WHAT WAS APPROPRIATE WITH THE SAUDIS, AND

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ENSURED THAT THE MESSAGE WOULD GET TO FAHD. SAUD HAS NOW LEFT NEW YORK AND THERE IS NO MORE WE CAN DO HERE, NOR DOES WALDHEIM HAVE ANY LEVERAGE. PERHAPS SARKIS IS SIMPLY COVERING HIMSELF AND HE HAS ALREADY PASSED A MESSAGE TO SAUD -- WE KNOW BOUTROS SPOKE TO SAUD JULY 30, BUT WE HAD ASSUMED IT WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. HOPEFULLY, ON REFLECTION, SARKIS WILL REEVALUATE THE POLITICAL DANGER TO HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT OF MAKING A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE SAUDIS. WE REALIZE THAT THE 'ID WILL MAKE CONVERSATIONS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NEXT FOUR DAYS, BUT IF THE LEBANESE ARE UNABLE TO BRING THEMSELVES TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE SAUDIS BEFORE THE END OF THE 'ID, A SC MEETING MID-WEEK SEEMS TO US ALMOST CERTAIN.

LICHENSTEIN

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ACTION SS-30

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TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7172
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97

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EXDIS
DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON AND CHARGE PLACKE

E.O.12065: RDS-4 7/30/01 (LICHENSTEIN, C.), OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, UNSC, LE, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: KEEPING OUT OF THE UNSC

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. IN MY CONVERSATIONS IN NEW YORK TODAY, JULY 30, ALL THE WESTERN PERMREPS EMPHASIZED TO ME THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE FURTHER DELAY OF FORMAL UNSC DEBATE ON LEBANON, AND TO PREVENT INFORMAL CIRCULATION OF CONDEMNATORY DRAFT RESOLUTIONS, WILL BE FIRM OPPOSITION TO SC ACTION BY THE GOL. IF LEBANON CAN PREVAIL UPON THE ARAB GROUP TO RETRACT THEIR JULY 29 DECISION TO RECONVENE THE DEBATE, THEN NON-ARAB TROUBLEMAKERS, LIKE UGANDA AND THE USSR, WILL BE POWERLESS TO ENERGIZE THE COUNCIL. NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM SARKIS TO LEBANESE CHARGE MUST BE PROMPT, SINCE NON-ALIGNED ARE ALREADY PREPARING DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH, INTER ALIA, THREATENS ISRAEL WITH SANCTIONS IF IT CEASES TO COMPLY WITH CEASEFIRE.

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3. SINCE, AS YOU KNOW, IT REMAINS CRITICAL TO OUR EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE CEASEFIRE THAT THERE BE NO FORMAL SC ACTIVITY, I CALLED ON LEBANESE FONMIN BOUTROS TO SEEK HIS ASSISTANCE. BOUTROS' IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS POSITIVE; HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY "FROZEN" SC CONSULTATIONS DURING PREVIOUS CRISIS. HE REMAINS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT CERTAIN ARABS WISH TO MANEUVER THE U.S. INTO VETOING A RESOLUTION ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY LEBANON. BEIRUT'S INSTRU-

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CTIONS TO LEBANESE CHARGE, BOUTROS EMPHASIZED, SHOULD BE BASED ON PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS--IF THE U.S. IS FORCED TO VETO A UN RESOLUTION, IT WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO PLAY ITS PRESENT HELPFUL DIPLOMATIC ROLE. THIS, SAID BOUTROS, IS THE CRITICAL ISSUE.

4. BOUTROS NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS NOT FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE INTERPLAY OF DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON SARKIS AND WAZZAN--OBVIOUSLY, SARKIS IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT ANY GOL LEAD IN PREVENTING COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS COULD HAVE SERIOUS DOMESTIC EFFECTS. BOUTROS SAID IF THE SAUDIS WOULD HELP BY EXERTING PRESSURE ON THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS, IT SHOULD BE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THE GOL "NOT TO PRESS," AND EVEN TO OPPOSE, COUNCIL ACTION.

5. I SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THE GOL NEEDED HELP NOW FROM ITS FRIENDS. I WOULD TALK TO SAUD LATER IN THE DAY (SAUD IS IN NEW YORK), AND BOUTROS SHOULD HIMSELF GET IN TOUCH WITH SAUD AND SARKIS. AFTER ALL, GOL WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING THAT NO ACTION AT ALL BE TAKEN; ON THE CONTRARY, GOL IS ALREADY WORKING WITH THE SYG ON PRACTICAL MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE AND BUILD UPON THE CEASEFIRE. FURTHER, THIS PROCESS WILL INVOLVE NOT ONLY THE UN, BUT WILL ALSO TURN UPON SUCH NON-UN FACTORS AS THE PROGRESS OF THE BAYT AL-DIN GROUP'S

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CONCILIATION EFFORTS. BOUTROS AGREED TO TELEPHONE BOTH SAUD AND SARKIS IMMEDIATELY.

6. I PLAN TO SEE SAUD LATER IN THE AFTERNOON AND WILL URGE VIGOROUSLY THE NECESSITY OF A SAUDI PUSH TO PERSUADE SARKIS TO OPPOSE SC ACTION NOW. THIS WILL REQUIRE SAUDI DIPLOMATIC FOLLOW UP IN NEW YORK, DAMASCUS AND WITH THE PLO. I WILL REPEAT WHAT I SAID TO BOUTROS ABOUT THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF PREVENTING MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS IN THE UNSC, IF THE CEASEFIRE IS TO BE SAFEGUARDED. I WILL ALSO TELL HIM THAT IT IS MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT A BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESENT CEASEFIRE WILL BE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT TO REMEDY AND IS LIKELY TO TRIGGER A MASSIVE ISRAELI GROUND ACTION INTO SOUTH LEBANON.

7. FOR CHARGE PLACKE: I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONVEY TO FAHD MY BELIEF THAT IT IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT ANY SC ACTION. A CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION, WITH PROBABLE ATTENDAN CALL FOR A CESSATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, AS WELL AS CONTINGENCY SANCTIONS LANGUAGE, WOULD BE A DISASTER. EVEN PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE ABSENCE OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION IS LIKELY TO RAISE THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE TO A DEGREE WHICH WILL JEOPARDIZE THE CEASEFIRE. I HOPE THE SAUDIS WILL ACT PROMPTLY TO STIFFEN LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO ARGUE FORTH-RIGHTLY AGAINST ANY FURTHER FORMAL ACTION BY THE COUNCIL,

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AND WILL AFFORD THE LEBANESE THE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THAT THEY WILL REQUIRE WITH THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS. IN NEW YORK, SAUDI CHARGE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK UP IN SUPPORT OF LEBANON IN ARAB AND OTHER GROUP MEETINGS. (COMMENT: AS USUAL, THE SAUDI DELEGATE SAID NOTHING EVENING JULY 29, WHEN THE ARAB GROUP AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO ASK FOR RESUMPTION OF DEBATE. THE PROPOSAL WAS PUT FORWARD BY THE PLO AND SUPPORTED BY YEMEN, LIBYA AND JORDAN; SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, BOTH BAYT AL-DIN PARTICIPANTS, REMAINED SILENT; LEBANON AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" ON CONDITION THAT TIMING BE DETERMINED AFTER RECEIPT OF GOL VIEWS.)

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 USUN N 02489 02 OF 02 301955Z
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TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7173
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02489
EXDIS
FROM HABIB FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON AND CHARGE PLACKE

8. FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON: I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN WORKING ON
THIS PROBLEM FOR THE LAST 48 HOURS. I HOPE THAT MY
CONVERSATIONS WITH BOUTROS AND SAUD WILL HELP. BOUTROS
CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS AND IS IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR
POSITION, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE IS NOT FOREIGN
MINISTER AT THIS TIME AND CANNOT ACT OFFICIALLY.
PLEASE CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS WITH SARKIS, WAZZAN, AND TUENI.
LICHENSTEIN

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PAGE 01 STATE 196526
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TO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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PAGE 02 STATE 196526

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/24/01 (VELIOTES, N.A.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: LEBANON: CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCED

REF: STATE 193747✓

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB MADE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT IN ISRAEL AT 1300 HOURS JULY 24.

BEGIN TEXT:

I HAVE TODAY REPORTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT, AS OF 1330 JULY 24, 1981, ALL HOSTILE MILITARY ACTION BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI TERRITORY IN EITHER DIRECTION WILL CEASE.

END TEXT.

3. FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS POSTS MAY USE TO BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE CEASE-FIRE. YOU SHOULD ENSURE, HOWEVER, THAT DEFINITION OF TERMS FOR CEASE-FIRE ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE CONFIDENTIAL.

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-- ANNOUNCEMENT OF CEASE-FIRE IS WELCOME NEWS AND ALL PARTIES DESERVE CREDIT FOR THEIR RESPONSIBLE APPROACH.

-- THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ARE BASICALLY AS FOLLOWS:

- -- THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN ISRAEL, BY LAND, SEA, OR AIR;

- -- THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM ISRAEL AT TARGETS IN LEBANON, WHETHER BY SEA, LAND, OR AIR;

- -- THE SAME WILL APPLY TO HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIVITY DIRECTED INTO HADDAD'S AREA OR FROM IT.

-- THE CEASE-FIRE WAS TO TAKE EFFECT AT 1330 HOURS LOCAL TIME IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- THE SITUATION REMAINS FRAGILE. WE MUST NOW ALL THINK INTENSELY ABOUT WHAT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO SOLIDIFY THE CEASE-FIRE AND BUILD UPON IT.

-- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL

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COMMUNITY SUPPORT THIS OBJECTIVE AND ENCOURAGE ALL
PARTIES TO COOPERATE TOWARD THIS END.

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TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

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PARIS 22115

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DECAPTIONED

FOR CHARGE BROWN FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 7/25/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MESSAGE TO SHAMIR

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2 AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY, PLEASE CONVEY TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR MY APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION FOR THE CAREFUL AND SENSITIVE WAY HE HANDLED THE ISSUE OF THE ENDING OF HOSTILITIES IN HIS RADIO INTERVIEW ON FRIDAY, JULY 24. SAY TO SHAMIR THAT I READ THE TRANSCRIPT OF HIS REMARKS ON THE PLANE GOING FROM ISRAEL TO FRANCE, AND WAS IMPRESSED. HIS REMARKS WERE HELPFUL TO WHAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE.
HARTMAN

N VVZCZ

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*** Current Classification ***

Date Printed: 10/07/1996

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 S/S-O:JSTEMPEL

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TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: LE, SOPN

SUBJECT: LEBANON CRISIS--PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE FINAL BY THE
 PRESIDENT IN THE WHITE HOUSE ROSE GARDEN AT 0930 EDT, 20
 AUGUST 1982.

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2. BEGIN STATEMENT: AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS INFORMED ME
 THAT A PLAN TO RESOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS HAS BEEN
 AGREED UPON BY ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED. AS PART OF THIS
 PLAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAS REQUESTED, AND I HAVE
 APPROVED, THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES TO
 BEIRUT AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DEVELOP THIS PLAN HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY
 COMPLEX AND HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE MOST ARDUOUS

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CIRCUMSTANCES. AT TIMES, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, AND YET IT HAS BEEN REACHED.

THE STATESMANSHIP AND COURAGE OF PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DESERVE SPECIAL RECOGNITION, AS DOES THE MAGNIFICENT WORK OF AMBASSADOR HABIB. PHIL NEVER LOST HOPE, AND IN THE END HIS SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION CARRIED THE DAY. WE ALL OWE HIM A DEEP DEBT OF GRATITUDE.

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THE PARTIES WHO MADE THIS PLAN POSSIBLE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION. I EXPECT ITS TERMS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED TIMETABLE. THIS WILL REQUIRE METICULOUS ADHERENCE TO THE CEASE-FIRE. VIOLATIONS BY ANY PARTY WOULD IMPERIL THE PLAN AND BRING RENEWED BLOODSHED AND TRAGEDY TO THE PEOPLE OF BEIRUT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MUST THAT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

AS YOU KNOW, MY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE UNITED STATES FORCES IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS ESSENTIAL TO OUR SUCCESS. IN THE DAYS AHEAD, THEY AND FORCES FROM FRANCE AND ITALY WILL BE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT BUT CAREFULLY LIMITED -

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NON-COMBATANT ROLE. THE PARTIES TO THE PLAN HAVE AGREED TO THIS ROLE AND HAVE PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON THE-SAFETY OF OUR FORCES. OUR PURPOSE WILL BE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE DEPARTURE OF PLO LEADERS, OFFICERS AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY UNDER SAFE AND ORDERLY CONDITIONS. THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES ALSO WILL FACILITATE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN THE BEIRUT AREA. IN NO CASE WILL OUR TROOPS STAY LONGER THAN 30 DAYS.

THE PARTICIPATION OF FRANCE AND ITALY IN THIS EFFORT IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THOSE GOOD FRIENDS OF THE U.S.

SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS BY RESPONSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN NOW AGREED WILL SET THE STAGE FOR THE URGENT INTERNATIONAL ACTION -- REQUIRED TO RESTORE LEBANON'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OBTAIN THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY, AND HELP ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. WE MUST ALSO MOVE QUICKLY - TO RESUME OUR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT, TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN ALL ITS

ASPECTS, AS WELL AS THE OTHER UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. ONLY WHEN ALL THESE STEPS ARE ACCOMPLISHED CAN TRUE AND LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY BE ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. END STATEMENT.

3. FOLLOING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR USE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

--AFTER LONG, COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS, A PLAN TO RESOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS THROUGH THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO PERSONNEL HAS BEEN AGREED UPON.
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--CREDIT FOR THIS SUCCESSFUL EFFORT GOES TO ALL OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED, THOSE WHICH WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SOLUTION.

--AMBASSADOR HABIB DESERVES SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR HIS PERSONAL DEDICATION AND COURAGE, AS DO HIS NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, WHO OFTEN PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES AT THE RISK OF THEIR LIVES.

--FRANCE AND ITALY HAVE ALSO, THROUGH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, DEMONSTRATED A HIGH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS ENDEAVOR, AS WELL AS THEIR DEVOTION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

--WHILE WE CAN DERIVE SOME COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED, THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON REMAINS EXTREMELY DELICATE. THE PARTIES TO THE PLAN MUST ENSURE THAT NOTHING INTERRUPTS ITS COMPLETE AND TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION.

--IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE CEASE-FIRE BE MAINTAINED. FAILURE TO ADHERE TO IT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PLAN AND ENDANGER THE LIVES OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

--IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN WILL BE A COMPLEX PROCESS. IT WILL REQUIRE THE GOOD WILL AND COOPERATION OF ALL, AT EVERY STAGE, IF IT IS TO SUCCEED. THE U.S. WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO ASSIST.

--THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO MAKE U.S. TROOPS AVAILABLE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS ESSENTIAL TO
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN. THEIR DEPLOYMENT AND CONTINUED PRESENCE WILL, OF COURSE, BE DEPENDENT ON THE FULL COOPERATION OF ALL OF THE PARTIES. WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCES CONCERNING THEIR SAFETY, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY HOSTILITIES.

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--THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS DEMONSTRATES OUR DETERMINATION TO EMPLOY OUR MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR OBJECTIVES IN THIS DEPLOYMENT. OUR SOLE AIM IS TO PROMOTE THE RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS. IT IS IN THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, AND WE CAN JUSTIFIABLY BE PROUD OF OUR CONTRIBUTION.

--OUR DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IS LIMITED BOTH IN PURPOSE AND DURATION. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WILL ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE SAFE AND ORDERLY DEPARTURE OF PALESTINIAN LEADERS, OFFICES, AND COMMUNITIES IN A MANNER THAT WILL PROTECT THE SAFETY OF OTHER PERSONS IN THE AREA AND FURTHER THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON OVER THE BEIRUT AREA. WE EXPECT OUR FORCES TO DEPART WITHIN 30 DAYS, OR SOONER IF THEIR MISSION IS COMPLETED.

--IN ADDITION TO OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, WE WILL ALSO BE WORKING THROUGH U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES TO HELP RESTORE THE INFRASTRUCTURE NECESSARY TO RELIEVE THE HUMAN SUFFERING OF THE PEOPLE OF BEIRUT.

--A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS WILL SET THE STAGE FOR THE URGENT INTERNATIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO RESTORE LEBANON'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND HELP INSURE THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN

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ISRAEL.

--WE MUST ALSO MOVE QUICKLY IN THE CONTEXT OF CAMP DAVID TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, AS WELL AS THE OTHER UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. ONLY WHEN ALL THESE STEPS ARE ACCOMPLISHED CAN TRUE AND LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY BE ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

5. THE TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE, SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT 1300 EDT 20 AUGUST, WILL BE CABLED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996

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CHANNEL: n/a

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS. SHULTZ

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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STATE 233655

EXDIS FOR AMB LICHENSTEIN

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO JERUSALEM TEL AVIV
AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA WHITE HOUSE AUGUST 10

QUOTE

SECRET 490

DECAUTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, SHUM, LE, IS, SY, XF, PLO

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: US INTEREST IN LEBANESE AND PALESTINIA
PRISONERS

REFS: (A) STATE 230927 (NOTAL), (B) BEIRUT 5451 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.

2. AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING WE HAD TODAY, AUGUST 18,
WITH SARKIS, WAZZAN, AND BUTRUS, I DECIDED THAT IT
WAS IMPERATIVE TO DELIVER TODAY A MESSAGE TO
WAZZAN SIGNED BY ME AS REGARDS THE PRISONERS HELD BY
THE ISRAELIS (REFTELS). IN MY OPINION, THIS MOVE WAS
ESSENTIAL TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE PLO RETURN OF THE PILOT
AND THE NIEN BODIES. AS A RESULT, THE PROSPECTS ARE NOW BRIGHTER.

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-STATE 233655

3. WHILE THE MESSAGE AS REWRITTEN IS AWKWARD
IN MANY RESPECTS, IT SATISFIED WAZZAN, AND THAT WE
WHAT WAS IMPORTANT. THE SUBSTANCE IS UNCHANGED
FROM THAT AUTHORIZED IN STATE REFTEL.

4. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MY AUGUST 18 MESSAGE
TO WAZZAN. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR PRIME MINISTER:

IN CONNECTION WITH OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS, I
WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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HAS HELD, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD, A STRONG INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF AND THE TREATMENT OF LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PRISONERS BEING HELD BY ISRAELI FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, AND FOR FULL RESPECT FOR ALL APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH PERSONS ARE DETAINED, REFLECTING THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT THEY SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE MOST REASONABLE, HUMANE AND ORDERLY TREATMENT POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND SHOULD BE TREATED IN A WAY WHICH RESPECTS HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS.

RESPECTFULLY,

PHILIP C HABIB

EMISSARY OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HIS EXCELLENCY

SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN

PRIME MINISTER

REPUBLIC OF LEBANON END TEXT.

[REDACTED]

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DILLON

UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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NEA:C HILL
S/S-O - MROBINSON
S/S - L PAUL BREMER III

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DECAPTIONED

STATE 228797

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, PEPR, LE, IS, US, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: AUGUST 13 BEGIN REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF
AUGUST 12
ISRAELI CHARGE NETANYAHU DELIVERED REPLY TO DEPUTY
SECRETARY STOESSEL. ADAS HILL AND ISRAELI POL COUNSELOR
SABEL WERE PRESENT.

2. NETANYAHU NOTED THAT "THE CESSATION OF AN AERIAL
RESPONSE TO PLO VIOLATIONS" OCCURRED BEFORE BEGIN'S

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TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH
ISRAEL RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REACT, THEY HAD DECIDED TO
DAMPEN DOWN THEIR RESPONSE TO CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS.
THIS, NETANYAHU SAID, REFLECTS ISRAEL'S COMMON INTEREST
WITH THE U.S. TO SOLVE THE BEIRUT PROBLEM BY NEGOTIATION.

3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WOULD PASS THIS
LETTER ON TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO ALWAYS TAKES THE PRIME
MINISTER'S COMMUNICATIONS VERY SERIOUSLY. THE

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PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF AUGUST 12 UNDERLINED HIS DEPTH OF FEELING CONCERNING THE LATEST ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT OF BEIRUT. WE WERE ALL QUITE SHAKEN BY ITS EXTENT.

4. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REMARKED THAT THE BOMBARDMENT FOLLOWED HABIB'S TALKS IN JERUSALEM, WHERE HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY AGREED WITH THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN ORDER TO LET THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. WE REALIZE THAT ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO RESPOND TO CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS BUT THIS RESPONSE WAS "A SHOCKING THING," OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE VIOLATION. THERE HAD BEEN TEN PREVIOUS CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWNS. WE COULD NOT SAY WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE, BUT THE ISRAELI REACTIONS HAVE BEEN CLEARLY DISPROPORTIONATE. PHIL HABIB HAD LEFT JERUSALEM FOR BEIRUT TO TIE UP "LOOSE ENDS." THE BOMBING MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HABIB TO CONTINUE HIS WORK.

5. NETANYAHU RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION IS "CLEAR CUT." THE PLO HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERY CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION. LAST WEEK WE SAW A CHANGE IN THE PLO ATTITUDE, NETANYAHU SAID--A WILLINGNESS TO DEPART VIA A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. THAT IS WHY WE WERE SURPRISED WHEN THEY VIOLATED THE TENTH CEASE-FIRE. WE MUST DRIVE

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HOME TO THEM THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. WE MAY NOT AGREE ON THE EXTENT OF THE RESPONSE BUT WE BOTH AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE.

6. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THE PLO, THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARIES, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HOLD THE CEASE-FIRE. NETANYAHU SAID THAT THE LAST THING WE WANT IS THAT U.S. - ISRAELI DISPUTES ON BEIRUT "BROADCAST" TO THE PLO A MESSAGE THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM EXERTING PRESSURE; SUCH A MESSAGE WOULD LEAD TO PLO REFUSAL TO DEPART. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REMARKED THAT HABIB HAS RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT THE PLO WANTS TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT. ISRAEL'S BOMBING COULD LEAD THE PLO TO CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THEREFORE IT IS BETTER TO STAY AND FIGHT TO THE-END. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CEASE-FIRE MUST HOLD.

7. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY THEN BROACHED ANOTHER ISSUE. ACCORDING TO HABIB, THE IDF HAS REPLACED LEBANESE FORCES AT THE GALLERIE SIMAAN CROSSING. THIS IS PREVENTING LEBANESE NEGOTIATORS FROM MEETING WITH HABIB. FIVE WEEKS AGO WE WENT THROUGH THIS. AT THE TIME, PM WAZZAN SAID THAT HE COULD NOT USE THE CROSSING WITH THE ISRAELI FORCES IN CONTROL. THEREFORE, HE DID NOT MEET WITH

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HABIB. NOW WE FACE THE SAME SITUATION AGAIN. HE ASKED NETANYAHU URGENTLY TO ASK HIS GOVERNMENT TO REMOVE THIS IMPEDIMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS. NETANYAHU PROMISED TO DO SO...

8. AFTER MEETING ENDED, ON WAY OUT OF BUILDING, NETANYAHU MADE ADDITIONAL POINTS TO HILL:

-- FINAL PARAGRAPH IN BEGIN LETTER, REFERRING TO IDF NORTH OF JUNIYAH, IS MEANT TO CONVEY IDEA THAT ALTHOUGH IDF MAY BE PURSUING PLO UP THERE, ISRAEL IS STILL COMMITTED AS ALWAYS TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

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-- WHILE U.S. MAY REGARD IDF RESPONSE TO PLO CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AS DISPROPORTIONAL, ISRAEL REGARDS U.S. PUBLIC REACTION AS OUT OF PROPORTION AS WELL, AND FEARS THAT IT WILL HEARTEN THE PLO.

-- ALTHOUGH IT WAS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA THAT THE IDF HAD 20 KILLED IN THE AUGUST 4 OPERATIONS (TAKING THE HIPPODROME AND HENRI CHEHAB BARRACKS NORTH OF THE AIRPORT), ISRAEL IN FACT ONLY LOST THREE SOLDIERS. THE PLO KNEW THIS, NETANYAHU SAID, AND REALIZED AT THE TIME THAT THE IDF COULD GO THROUGH THE CITY "LIKE A KNIFE THROUGH BUTTER" AND WITH ACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES. THAT WAS THE FIRST MOMENT IN THE CRISIS WHEN THE PLO DECIDED TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED WAY TO DEPART RATHER THAN TO CONTINUE TO CONTRIVE A WAY TO REMAIN IN BEIRUT, NETANYAHU CLAIMED.

9. (NOTE: NEA UNDERSTANDS FROM BROWN - HILL TELCON AUGUST 14 THAT KIMCHE SAYS IDF CHECKPOINT AT GALERIE SIMAAN WILL BE DISMANTLED IMMEDIATELY.)

10. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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CHANNEL: n/a

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66011
DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:PWILCOX
APPROVED BY IO/SA:MARYAHAINES
S/S:CKENNEDY
NEA/SA:WSTANTON

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE JERUSALEM TEL AVIV
INFO AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA PARIS WHITE HOUSE AUGUST
12

QUOTE

BEIRUT 5321

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, XF, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: NEGATIVE AUGUST 12 DEVELOPMENTS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. I FIND IT VIRTURALLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THE
ISRAELIS THIS MORNING STOPPED GENERAL SAMI KHATIB AT SOFAR,
ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, FROM PROCEEDING TO DAMASCUS

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WHERE HE WAS TO HAVE TAKEN UP WITH THE SYRIANS THE
LEBANESE REQUEST THAT THE SYRIANS WITHDRAW THE ADF
AND ALL SYRIAN-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATIONS FROM BEIRUT.

3. FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE
ISRAELIS NOT RPT NOT INTERFERE ANY LONGER WITH WHAT
WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. DENYING KHATIB THE
ABILITY TO TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS HAMPERS ISRAEL'S
STATED OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE SYRIANS OUT OF BEIRUT.

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996 Doc NUMBER: 82STATE226706

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PLEASE GET BACK TO THE ISRAELIS AND URGE, IN MY NAME IN THE STRONGEST TERMS, THAT THEY ALLOW KHATIB UNHINDERED TRAVEL TO AND FROM DAMASCUS. FAILING FULL ISRAELI COOPERATION ON THIS MATTER, WE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE OBJECTIVES CONTRARY TO WHAT THEY HAVE TOLD ME.

4. ASIDE FROM THIS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT HEAVY AIRSTRIKES SINCE ABOUT 0621 LOCAL TIME THIS MORNING, CONCENTRATING APPARENTLY IN RAMLAT AL-BAYDA, SHATILA, ETC., AND NEAR HADATH (SEE MORE DETAILED SEPTTEL).

5. FINALLY, AN AGITATED FRENCH AMBASSADOR CAME BY BEFORE MY 0830 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS TO SAY THAT HE WAS COMPELLED TO REPORT TO PARIS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS. HE SAID THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS SUCCESSFULLY VETOED FRENCH MNF PARTICIPATION ON D-DAY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EVACUATION PROCESS, FRANCE WOULD NOT RPT NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE MNF AT ALL. I BELIEVE I COOLED HIM DOWN SOMEWHAT THROUGH A REVIEW OF MY TALKS WITH BEGIN YESTERDAY. I URGED HIM NOT TO BREAK THE POT PREMATURELY. I SAID I MADE NO CONCESSIONS TO THE ISREALIS ON THIS POINT, BUT WAS COMPELLED TO GO OVER WITH THE GOL AND THE PARTIES

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HERE THE POSITION BEGIN HAD TAKEN. I ASKED HIM TO COME BACK AT 12 NOON.
DILLON
UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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NEA/SA:WSTANTON

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DAMASCUS JIDDA WASHDC 11 AUG QUOTE

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EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: THE PACKAGE PLAN: ROUND FOUR

REF: TEL AVIV 12218

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY: DURING OUR AFTERNOON DISCUSSION, THE
REMAINING POINTS ON THE ISRAELI AGENDA WERE

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DISCUSSED. USING A MAP OF BEIRUT, HABIB DESCRIBED

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HOW THE ADVANCE FRENCH UNIT WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE PORT AREA IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEIR PRESENCE COULD NOT SERVE AS A SCREEN BEHIND WHICH THE PLO COULD HIDE. BEGIN WAS NOT CONVINCED, HOWEVER, AND IN RESPONSE TO HIS RENEWED REQUEST, HABIB SAID HE WOULD MAKE A REAL EFFORT TO TRY TO ADJUST THE PLAN ON THIS POINT, WITHOUT HOWEVER GIVING MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THE EFFORT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. THE ISRAELIS ARE DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF FRENCH MOTIVES, ESPECIALLY AFTER THEIR RECENT VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SHARON IS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THE FRENCH MIGHT TRY TO EXTEND THEIR STAY BEYOND THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD. WE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS BY THE END OF THE DAY, AND IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT BEGIN SAID HE NOW BELIEVES WE ARE ENTERING A PHASE OF THE "TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION" OF OUR PLAN AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INTEND TO GO (FURTHER) INTO WEST BEIRUT. BEGIN SAID TODAY'S AIR STRIKES WERE LAUNCHED BEFORE HE WAS ABLE TO ISSUE CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER, BUT DESPITE HABIB'S REPEATED EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A LIGHTENING OF THE SIEGE, THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE MUCH CHANCE OF AFFECTING ISRAELI PRACTICE UNTIL THE PACKAGE IS MORE FIRMLY NAILED DOWN. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING THE ONE HOUR LONG AFTERNOON SESSION AUGUST 11, BEGIN QUICKLY GOT DOWN TO BUSINESS. ON POINT (E) OF THE ISRAELI DOCUMENT, REFERRING TO THE TERMINATION OF THE MNF MANDATE AND ITS DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON REPEAT LEBANON IF THE DEPARTURE SCHEDULE IS HALTED, HABIB SAID THIS WAS NOT A

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PROBLEM. WITH RESPECT TO THE RETURN OF THE CAPTURED PILOT AND BODIES OF DECEASED ISRAELI SOLDIERS (POINT G), HABIB ONLY NOTED, FURTHER TO THE EARLIER DISCUSSION, THAT DRAPER HAD PUT OUR REQUEST IN WRITING REGARDING BOTH ISSUES.

4. HABIB DECIDED TO ELABORATE ON THE USE OF THE BEIRUT PORT (POINT H) IN ORDER TO SHOW BEGIN MORE PRECISELY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCE FRENCH UNIT OF 350 MEN. EXPLAINING

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THAT THE PLO HAD ORIGINALLY WANTED TO LEAVE FROM THE BAIN MILITAIRE AREA, HE POINTED OUT ON A MAP THAT, UNDER THE NEW ARRANGEMENT, THE FRENCH WOULD BE DEPLOYED AT THE PORT AND THE PORT CROSSING AREA. (HABIB, SHARON AND SAGI HAD AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER THE WESTERN PART OF THE PORT COULD BE USED BY COMMERCIAL SHIPS.) BEGIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THIS MEANT IN OTHER WORDS THE PLO WILL DEPART FROM BEIRUT HARBOR. HABIB REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE BUT THE PLO MAY NOT WANT TO USE THE PORT, SUGGESTING INSTEAD A POSSIBLE USE OF THE ST. GEORGE HOTEL MARINA BASIN. HABIB NOTED THAT THIS WAS NOT A BAD AREA, THOUGH GENERAL SAGI THOUGHT THE WATERS WERE TOO SHALLOW AND IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO EVACUATE FROM THIS BASIN. HABIB SAID THIS DID NOT CORRESPOND TO OUR INFORMATION. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SAGI SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK IF THIS AREA WAS MINED. IT WAS AGREED TO EXAMINE IT FROM THE TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT. IN SUMMING UP ON THIS POINT, HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT HE WAS ILLUSTRATING HOW THE ADVANCE FRENCH UNIT COULD BE DEPLOYED IN ORDER TO ALLAY ANY FEARS HE MIGHT HAVE THAT THE PLO COULD HIDE BEHIND FRENCH POSITIONS. THE FRENCH SIMPLY COULD NOT ACT AS A SCREEN AT THIS LOCATION. BEGIN REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH

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WANTED TO "SAVE THE PLO," AND THAT "MITTERRAND USED TO BE HIS FRIEND BUT NOW HE ADVOCATED A PALESTINIAN STATE AND SAID THE "OLP" WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE." HE REMINDED HABIB OF HIS PROMISE THIS MORNING TO DO HIS BEST TO OBTAIN A CHANGE IN THE PLAN ON THIS POINT. HABIB SAID BEGIN COULD HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE THAT HE WOULD MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT. SHARON AND OTHER ISRAELIS PRESENT INSISTED THAT EVEN UNDER HABIB'S SCENARIOS THE LAF SHOULD DO THE JOB RATHER THAN AN ADVANCE MNF CONTINGENT.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF THE MNF'S ONLY REMAINING FOR THIRTY DAYS (POINT 1), HABIB SAID HE DID NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THIS POINT. HOWEVER, SHARON, REFERRING TO THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 23 IN THE PLAN ON "D PLUS

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THIRTY," INSISTED THAT THIS PRESENTED A PROBLEM, AND HE HAD TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR THIS CLAUSE: EITHER TO OMIT THE CLAUSE ENTIRELY OR TO STATE THAT ANY EXTENSION OF THE MNF, OR ELEMENTS THEREOF, WOULD ALSO REQUIRE THE AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELIS. SHARON REPEATEDLY CAME BACK TO THIS POINT, FEARING THAT ONCE IN, THE FRENCH WOULD PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT POLICY AT THE EXPENSE OF ISRAEL. HABIB REPLIED HE COULD DROP THIS CLAUSE FROM THE PLAN AND THAT HE WOULD MERELY INFORM THE GOL OF ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THIS POINT. HABIB SAID THAT THE FRENCH COULD INDEED BE A PROBLEM, THOUGH HE WOULD CAREFULLY REVIEW THE FINAL VERSION OF THE LEBANESE LETTER TO THE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO SEE HOW THE FRENCH ELEMENT WAS TREATED. AS WE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION, IT IS INTERESTING THAT BEGIN NEVER REALLY ARTICULATED A FIRM FINAL POSITION IN SUPPORTING HIS DEFENSE MINISTER.

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6. AFTER COMPLETING THIS DISCUSSION OF THE ISRAELI RESERVATIONS ON THE PLAN, BEGIN SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION AFTER OUR MEETING THAT THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE HAD STRUCK TARGETS IN WEST BEIRUT AT 1200 LOCAL. HE SAID THIS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BEFORE HE COULD ISSUE CONTRARY INSTRUCTION IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL HABIB HAD SENT TO HIM AFTER THE MORNING MEETING. THE STRIKES WERE IN RESPONSE TO AN ATTACK SOUTH OF BEIRUT IN WHICH THREE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN WOUNDED. SHARON THEN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT DURING THE LAST TWELVE DAYS THERE HAD BEEN TWENTY-FIVE TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE BEKAA AND THAT ISRAEL HAD RESTRAINED ITSELF. LAST NIGHT, HE NOTED, A NEW AND OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT HAD OCCURRED WHEN THE SYRIANS HAD SHELLED ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE BEKAA FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A LONG WHILE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL HAD REACTED WITH RESTRAINT TO ALL OF THESE INCIDENTS THUS FAR BECAUSE ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO CREATE A PROBLEM IN USING THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES. BEGIN INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT HE WANTED ME TO TELL THE LEBANESE THAT ISRAEL WANTED "PEACE AND QUIET." HE SAID "WE DO NOT WANT TO GO INTO WEST BEIRUT, AND IN LIGHT OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, WE SHALL NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT. WE CONSIDER THIS MATTER FINISHED SINCE WE ARE NOW IN THE PHASE OF TECHNICAL REALIZATION OF THE PLAN." HOWEVER, HE WARNED THE IDF WILL HAVE TO RESPOND TO PLO ATTACKS AND "THE GOVERNMENT MUST DEFEND THE ARMY."

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7. BEGIN THEN TURNED TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF OUR PLAN WHICH DISCUSSES "LIAISON AND COORDINATION." ON THE FIRST TICK, HE SAID THAT IN THE PHRASE, "OTHER ARMED NON-ISRAELI GROUPS" THE WORD "NON-ISRAELI" SHOULD BE DROPPED. HABIB SAID HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS. ON THE SECOND TICK, HE WANTED THE THIRD SENTENCE WHICH READS "THE COMMITTEE WILL ALSO CARRY OUT LIAISON WITH THE PLO, AND OTHER ARMED GROUPS IN THE BEIRUT AREA," TO BE REVISED SO THAT IT WOULD READ "ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE, THE LAF WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT LIAISON WITH THE PLO. . . ." HABIB AGREED, SAID THIS WAS IN ANY EVENT THE INTENT OF THAT SENTENCE, AND THAT

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HE HOPED WE COULD AVOID A "LAWYER'S DISCUSSION" OF THE PLAN. BEGIN SAID THAT HIS ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD SAID THAT THE PLAN WOULD HAVE TO BE CHECKED BY THE LAWYERS SINCE IT WAS AN "INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT." HABIB AND LEWIS PROTESTED VIGOROUSLY, SAYING IT IS ONLY A PLAN AND NOT AN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT, AND WE SHOULD ACCORDINGLY AVOID QUIBBLING OVER EACH WORD AND COMMA.

8. BEGIN ASKED FOR HABIB'S READING ON BASHIR'S PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS. STRESSING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS REMARKS, HABIB SAID HE HAD RECENTLY HAD ONE-ON-ONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BASHIR, SARKIS AND ABDU. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT BASHIR HAS THE NECESSARY MAJORITY OF VOTES TO BE ELECTED, BUT THE PROBLEM WAS IN SECURING A QUORUM. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN A QUORUM IF A SUNNI ELEMENT WERE ADDED TO THE EQUATION. AT BASHIR'S REQUEST, HABIB HAD SPOKEN TO A CERTAIN SUNNI LEADER ON THE QUORUM ISSUE, BUT HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN NOT SHOWING PREFERENCE FOR ANY CANDIDATE. WORD WAS ALREADY GOING AROUND THAT HE WAS PUSHING BASHIR'S CANDIDACY. HE SAID HE WOULD CONFINE HIS EFFORTS TO TRYING TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS FOR SECURING A QUORUM BY TALKING TO VARIOUS PEOPLE AND ALSO TO ENSURING THAT WHEN THE ELECTION DAY CAME, THE PARLIAMENT AREA AND ACCESS ROUTES WOULD BE CLEARED OF ISRAELI FORCES. SHARON SAID HE HAD ALREADY TOLD BASHIR THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD LEAVE THIS AREA IN TIME FOR THE ELECTION AND DID NOT WANT TO INTERFERE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

9. PICKING UP ON THIS THEME, HABIB SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD ALREADY APPROACHED HIM ON WAYS TO GET ADJUSTMENTS IN THE ISRAELI LINES ONCE THE WEST BEIRUT PROB-

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LEM IS RESOLVED. HABIB HAD ASSURED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AT THE RIGHT TIME IT WOULD BE RAISED WITH ISRAEL. BUT HE

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WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SYRIAN POSITION AND HOW THIS MIGHT BE LINKED TO THE POSITION OF THE ISRAELIS. SHARON COUNTERED THAT IT WAS NOT ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO BE CLOSE TO BEIRUT, BUT THE ISRAELI DEPLOYMENT WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AT THE TIME. HE REFERRED TO PLANS BY THE PLO TO LEAVE 2,000 PEOPLE BEHIND UNDER COVER OF FALSE LEBANESE DOCUMENTS. HE HOPED THAT THE LAF WOULD BE ABLE TO CLEAN UP THE AREA BUT SAID, IF THE TERRORISTS DO NOT LEAVE, "DO YOU THINK FOR ONE MOMENT THAT WE WILL LIFT THE SIEGE ON WEST BEIRUT?" HE REPEATED A FAMILIAR THEME THAT DURING THE "SECOND PHASE," ISRAEL WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL ALL FOREIGN FORCES LEAVE LEBANON, STRESSING HIS INTENTION PARTICULARLY TO HOLD THE STRATEGIC BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD UNTIL THIS WAS ACHIEVED. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE "THIRD PHASE" WHEN A PEACE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE. HABIB CONFINED HIS RESPONSE TO SAYING THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVES WERE.

10. SHARON RAISED A POINT ON THE "D PLUS 12-13-14" SECTION IN PARA 23 OF OUR PLAN, SAYING THAT THE WORDING WHICH READS "REDEPLOYMENT OUT OF BEIRUT OF ALL FORCES ATTACHED TO THE ADF" COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. HE SAID HE HAD TWO POSSIBILITIES TO OFFER, EITHER NOT TO MENTION THIS POINT SPECIFICALLY OR TO CHANGE ONE WORD SO THAT THE CLAUSE WOULD READ "REDEPLOYMENT OUT OF LEBANON." AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, HABIB SAID HE WOULD SEPARATE THE TWO ELEMENTS-- THE ADF ITSELF AND THOSE FORCES "ATTACHED TO THE ADF." HE ALSO INTENDED TO SCHEDULE THE DEPARTURE OF THESE FORCES AT AN EARLIER PHASE OF THE PLAN.

11. ON THE TIMING OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE MNF--AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT A MAJORITY OF THE SYRIANS AND PLO SHOULD FIRST LEAVE-- SHARON SAID HE THOUGHT THE MNF SHOULD NOT ARRIVE ON FIXED DATES BUT RATHER

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WHEN AN ACTUAL MAJORITY OF THE PLO AND SYRIANS HAD LEFT. CALCULATING THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 8,000 PLO AND 5,000 SYRIANS, SHARON SAID WE SHOULD HALF (PLUS 1) THE 13,000 TOTAL IN DETERMINING WHEN THE MNF SHOULD ARRIVE. HABIB REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT A "MATHEMATICIAN" AND THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO WORK ON A MORE PRACTICAL BASIS. BEGIN CONFINED HIS COMMENT TO THE HOPE THAT HABIB WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE LISTS AND NUMBERS RECEIVED FROM THE PLO BY 1300 LOCAL TOMORROW SO THAT HE COULD INFORM THE KNESSET IN THE AFTERNOON. "THIS WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT," HE OBSERVED. HABIB SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DRAPER WHO INFORMED HIM THAT THE PLO'S FIRST BREAKDOWN WAS NOT ADEQUATE, NOT WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS BUT NAMES. HE HAD TOLD THE PLO THAT HE WANTED A ROSTER AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO GO TO THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN THE LISTS. LEWIS SAID WE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE LIST OF NAMES WILL INEVITABLY BE SLOPPY AT BEST AND HABIB AGREED. SAGI STATED THE PLO WAS BUSILY PREPARING NEW LISTS BUT THEY DID NOT WANT TO PROVIDE THEM TO HABIB. REFERRING AGAIN TO A POINT HE HAD MADE IN OUR MORNING DISCUSSION, HE SAID THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO HANDLE THOSE WHO WILL STAY BEHIND AND HAVE BEEN OBTAINING FORGED OR REAL LEBANESE PASSPORTS.

--
12. AT THE END OF OUR DISCUSSION, SHARON INFORMED US THAT ISRAEL HAD JUST ALLOWED THE ICRC TO BRING "A CONVOY OF FOOD AND SO FORTH" INTO WEST BEIRUT, EVEN THOUGH "IT GOES TO THE TERRORISTS, AS A DEMONSTRATION OF ISRAEL'S FLEXIBILITY."

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HABIB TOOK THE OCCASION TO SAY THAT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE SHIPMENTS WAS TO ALLOW THE ICRC TO TAKE FUEL, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE AUH AS HAD BEEN RECENTLY AGREED TO BY THE ISRAELIS. AS WE WERE GETTING SO CLOSE TO A RESOLUTION OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM, HABIB THEN SAID, HE WANTED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF RELAXING ON THE PROVISION OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT GIVE

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ANY GROUND ON ELECTRICITY, SAYING THIS WAS IMPORTANT TO VENTILATING THE PLO UNDERGROUND SYSTEM, AS WAS ALSO DIESEL FUEL. HABIB REPLIED THIS DID NOT CORRESPOND TO HIS INFORMATION AND ADDRESSED A HUMANITARIAN PLEA TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO LIGHTEN THE SIEGE ON WEST BEIRUT NOW THAT WE ARE SO CLOSE TO A RESOLUTION. BEGIN DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND TO HABIB'S REQUEST.

13. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT SEEN BY AMBASSADOR HABIB BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

14. MINIMIZE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.

LEWIS
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SHULTZ

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, XF

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON LEBANON

1. WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN LARRY SPEAKES READ THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENT AT HIS AUGUST 12 BRIEFING. POSTS WILL WANT TO
DELIVER THE TEXT TO HOST GOVERNMENTS ON AN URGENT BASIS.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

3. THE PRESIDENT WAS SHOCKED THIS MORNING WHEN HE LEARNED
OF THE NEW HEAVY ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT OF WEST BEIRUT. AS A
RESULT, THE PRESIDENT TELEPHONED PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
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CONCERNING THE MOST RECENT BOMBING AND SHELLING IN
BEIRUT. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS OUTRAGE OVER THIS
LATEST ROUND OF MASSIVE MILITARY ACTION. HE EMPHASIZED
THAT ISRAEL'S ACTION HALTED AMBASSADOR HABIB'S
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE BEIRUT
CRISIS WHEN THEY WERE AT THE POINT OF SUCCESS. THE RESULT
HAS BEEN MORE NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION AND BLOODSHED.

THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE

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CEASEFIRE IN PLACE BE OBSERVED ABSOLUTELY IN ORDER FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED. WE UNDERSTAND THE ISRAELI

CABINET HAS APPROVED A NEW CEASE-FIRE, WHICH IS IN
EFFECT. IT MUST HOLD.

4. END TEXT.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS.

SHULTZ

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7944

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DNG: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, PLO

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: AUGUST 12 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS ET AL

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: THE GOL LEADERSHIP HAS INSISTED THAT A TOTAL AND EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IS NECESSARY FOR AT LEAST 48 HOURS SO THAT THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON THE PLO DEPARTURE CAN BE PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND RESPONDED TO. THE PRIME MINISTER IMPLIED THAT IF THIS WAS NOT DONE HE WOULD NO LONGER BE WILLING TONEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO OR ON BEHALF OF THE MUSLIMS OF WEST BEIRUT. END SUMMAYR.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY DRAPER AND BARRETT, I SPENT AN HOUR AND

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A HALF WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, JOHNNY ABDU AND KHALIL HADDAD. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING WE WERE JOINED BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER TAQI-LA-DIN AL-SULH. THIS WAS THE MOST EMOTIONALLY CHARGED MEETING WE HAVE HAD. THE PM ESPECIALLY WAS HIGHLY WROUGHT UP AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE SAW VERY LITTLE UTILITY IN CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS WHILE BEIRUT WAS BEING DESTROYED AND CIVILIANS KILLED. TAQI-AL-DIN AL-SULH ALSO EXPRESSED THE SAME SENTIMENTS AND THE

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TWO MUSLIM POLITICIANS RECEIVED THE FULL BACKING AND SYMPATHY OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE FONMIN.

4. THE PM BEGAN OUR CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT DOING WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO STOP THE ATTACKS ON BEIRUT. WAZAN SAID THAT MAYBE I WAS DOING MY JOB BUT THE USG WAS NOT. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAD PLACED THEIR TOTAL RELIANCE ON THE USG TO PUT AN END TO THE PRESENT CIRSIS AND STILL THEY WERE BEING BOMBED. MAYBE THE LEBANESE SHOULD TRANSFER THEIR RELIANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. WAZZAN SAID HE HAD COOPERATED WITH US NOT ONLY TO SAVE THE PALESTINIANS BUT TO SAVE HIS CAPITAL. BUT HIS CAPITAL WAS BEING DESTROYED.

5. I SHIFTED THE CONVERSATION TO MY RECENT VISIT IN JERUSALEM AND LISTED BOTH THE MINOR AND MAJOR ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR CHANGES IN THE PLO DEPARTURE PLAN. I STRESSED THAT THE FINAL DESTINATIONS AND FIGURES MUST BE COMPLETELY CONFIRMED. I DESCRIBED MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON UN OBSERVERS, AND STATED MY CONCLUSION THAT ABOUT 35 UN OBSERVERS COULD BE PRESENT AND ACTIVE IN EAST BEIRUT DURING THE DEPARTURE PROVIDED AND WE DID NOT ASK FOR ISRAELI CONCURRENCE WHICH WOULD BE REFUSED. I CONCLUDED THAT THE PRINCIPAL POINT THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE, HOWEVER, WAS THAT

[REDACTED]

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THE ARRIVAL OF ANY PART OF THE MNF BEFORE THE DEPARTURE FO THE BULK OF THE PALESTINIANS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT LAF DEPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLO DEPARTURE. I WENT OVER IN DETAIL MY PROLONGED ARGUMENTS WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR AND SHARON ON THIS SUBJECT AND CONCLUDED THAT I HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT I WOULD SUBMIT THEIR VIEWS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE GOL AND THE PLO. I ALSO REPORTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ONCE AGAIN SAID THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE BEIRUT/PLO PROBLEM REMAINED A POSSIBILITY. AT THIS POINT, WAZZAN BURST OUT WITH HIS QUESTION CONCERNING THE UTILITY OF CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELIS SPOKE OF A MILITARY SOLUTION AS A POSSIBILITY, HE SAID, WHILE THEY ARE ACTUALLY IN THE PROCESS OF CARRYING IT OUT. HOW COULD THE GOL AND THE PLO MAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS WHILE THEY ARE BEING BOMBED AND EVEN HAD DIFFICULTY GETTING TOGETHER?

6. I AGAIN WENT OVER MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE BLOCKADE OF BEIRUT, REPORTING THAT GOI REMAINED EXTREMELY INTRANSIGENT IN THE FACE OF MY ARGUMENTS. I SAID I HAD STRESSED TO THE ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THE MILITARY PRESSURE THEY WERE EXERTING WAS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AS WE NEARED THE END OF NEGOTIATIONS, THAT THEY SHOULD NOT RESPOND DISPROPORTIONATELY TO PALESTINIAN VIOLATION. AGAIN THE PM INTERVENED

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EMOTIONALLY TO SAY THAT IDF REACTIONS WERE KILLING CIVILIANS AND THAT WE WERE IN EFFECT LETTING A WILD BEAST DO EXACTLY AS IT PLEASED. JOHNNY ABDU NOTED THAT THE PLO WAS TRYING TO ENFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE AND HAD EVEN ARRESTED SYRIAN ELEMENTS TO PREVENT THEM FROM FIRING.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7945
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

7. I ASKED THE PM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE PLO WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE LAF DEPLOY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF PALESTINIAN DEPARTURE WITHOUT ANY FRENCH. IN REPLY THE PM REMINDED ME THAT AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF HAD BEEN A REQUEST OF BOTH THE GOL AND THE PLO. FOR

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CHANNEL: n/a

HIS PART HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE LAF TO COME IN WITHOUT THE FRENCH, AND IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT LIKE THIS LET THEM COME IN AND FINISH THE JOB MILITARILY. WAZZAN POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT RESPECTING THE GOL ANYWHERE IN ANY WAY. THEY REFUSE BEIRUT WATER AND ELECTRICITY, AND HUMILIATE THE LAF AND EVEN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELI POSITION RESULTED ONLY FROM ALLERGY TO THE FRENCH AND WHETHER THE ITALIANS COULD NOT COME IN EARLY. REPLIED THAT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE, IN PART BECAUSE THE ITALIANS WOULD NOT AGREE. THE ISRAELIS

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WERE OPPOSED TO ANY FOREIGN FORCE ON D-DAY. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION WAZZAN ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT AN EARLY ARRIVAL BY AMERICANS AND I REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD NOT. BUTRUS ALSO ASKED WHETHER US GUARANTEES ON BEHALF OF THE IDF AT THE TIME OF PLO DEPARTURE WOULD ALSO APPLY IF THE MNF DID NOT COME IN UNTIL LATER. I REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD APPLY AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THEY WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE PLO'S DEPARTURE. BUTRUS REPLIED DRILY THAT HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE ONE TIME THE ISRAELIS COULD BE TRUSTED. JOHNNY ABDU CONTINUED ON THE SUBJECT OF HUMILIATION OF THE LAF BY REPORTING THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ONCE AGAIN STOPPED GENERAL SAMI KHATIB, ADF COMMANDER, FROM GOING TO DAMASCUS DESPITE THE COMMITMENTS WE HAD OBTAINED THAT THE IDF WOULD ALLOW HIM TO PASS. WAZZAN SAID THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN "DEFINITIVE" US PRESSURE EXERTED ON THE GOI.

8. THERE FOLLOWED A BRIEF ANIMATED INTERCHANGE IN ARABIC BETWEEN THE PM AND FONMIN BUTRUS. BUTRUS THEN SAID IT WAS THE PM'S VIEW, WHICH HE SHARED, THAT A DECISION ON THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE MADE UNDER THE BOMBING. AT LEAST 48 HOURS OF EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE WERE NEEDED TO ENABLE THIS DECISION TO BE MADE. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY SENT MESSAGES EARLIER THIS MORNING REGARDING THE NECESSITY TO REESTABLISH THE CEASE-FIRE AND THAT FOLLOWING THE MEETING I WOULD BE SPEAKING DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THIS SUBJECT. AT THIS POINT PM WAZZAN CAME VERY CLOSE TO SAYING THAT IF A CEASE-FIRE WERE NOT REESTABLISHED HE COULD NO LONGER PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO. HE SAID AGAIN THAT HIS TWO GOALS HAD BEEN TO SAVE THE CAPITAL AND THE LEBANESE IN IT AND SECONDLY TO GET THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT. HE WAS NOT ATTAINING THE

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FIRST GOAL AND THEREFORE HE WAS WORKING ONLY FOR THE PALESTINIAN. AS A LEBANESE HE HAD NOTHING LEFT TO WORK FOR. HE SAID I WOULD HAVE TO FIND ANOTHER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

9. THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION CONSISTED LARGELY OF A REPETITION BY ALL PRESENT OF THE NECESSITY FOR AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE TO PERMIT CONSIDERATION OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS, AND MY ASSURANCES THAT I WOULD TAKE THIS UP DIRECTLY WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. SARKIS REMINDED ME THAT THE PM MIGHT NOT HAVE ACCEPTED SO SMALL AN MNF ADVANCE CONTINGENT AS 350 FRENCH TROOPS HAD I NOT BEEN IN FAVOR OF IT; HE MIGHT HAVE INSISTED ON A LARGER NUMBER. SARKIS ASKED WHETHER THE US WAS PUSHING ITS OWN POSITION WITH ISRAEL. BUTRUS ASKED THE VERY POINTED QUESTION WHETHER MY ROLE, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE US, WAS STRICTLY THAT OF A GO-BETWEEN OR WHETHER WE WERE ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT WHILE WE HAD BEEN DOING A LOT OF INTERMEDIARY WORK, AND HAD MADE KNOWN OUR POSITION ON MANY ISSUES, THE USG WOULD ALSO HAVE ITS OWN POSITION TO ASSERT ON REMAINING ISSUES. BUTRUS WARNED THAT IF WE PUSHED THE PLO TOO HARD, BEIRUT WOULD END UP BEING DESTROYED, BECAUSE THE PLO WOULD FIGHT. THE US WOULD BE BLAMED FOR THE DISASTER.

10. I TOLD THE PM THAT IN ORDER TO ENABLE ME TO OBTAIN AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE, THE PLO WOULD HAVE TO MAKE EVERYBODY ON ITS SIDE, INCLUDING THE CRAZIES, STOP SHOOTING. WAZZAN REMINDED ME FORCIBLY THAT THE PLO AND ITS ALLIES WERE NOT A FORMAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION. HE ASKED WHY THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT CONFINE THEIR RETALIATION TO THE ACTUAL VIOLATORS SUCH AS THE SYRIANS.. THERE FOLLOWED A DISCUSSION OF THE INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF SOME OF THE ISRAELI BOMBINGS AND SHELLINGS, COMPARED WITH THE IDF CAPABILITY TO MOUNT PRECISE ATTACKS AIMED AT CERTAIN PLO INSTALLATIONS, SUCH AS THEIR DESTRUCTION BY ONLY ONE BOMB OF A

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LARGE BUILDING AT WHICH ARAFAT WAS EXPECTED.

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

11. WE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME DISCUSSING MY TALKS IN ISRAEL AND THE GOL LEADERS POINTED OUT THE ILLOGIC OF THE ISRAELI POSITION. I DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI FEARS THAT THE MNF, IF IT CAME EARLY, WOULD PROVIDE A SCREEN BEHIND WHICH THE PLO OR PART OF IT COULD TAKE REFUGE AND REFUSE TO LEAVE. BUTRUS POINTED OUT THAT THE ARRIVAL OF THE MNF AFTER HALF OF THE PLO HAD DEPARTED, AS THE ISRAELIS WANTED, WOULD NOT PREVENT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. I AGREED AND SAID THAT EVEN THE SAFE-GUARDS AGAINST THIS EVENTUALITY BUILT IN TO THE MNF'S CHARTER DID NOT SATISFY THE ISRAELIS.

12. WE WENT OVER AGAIN THE NEED TO OBTAIN FIRM DESTINATIONS FOR ALL PLO COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT. THIS WAS THE OCCASION FOR ANOTHER OTTUBURST BY WAZZAN. WHAT DID IT MATTER TO THE ISRAELIS WHERE THE PLO FORCES WERE GOING? WHAT IF THEY

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JUST WANTED TO SAIL OUT TO SEA TO DROWN THEMSELVES? HE FRANKLY THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT WANT THE PALESTINIANS TO LEAVE, THAT THEY WANTED TO KILL THEM ALL IN BEIRUT. I INFORMED THE PM THAT WHILE SOME ISRAELIS MIGHT FEEL THIS WAY, THERE WERE SERIOUS DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ISRAELI CABINET REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY OF A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE BEIRUT PROBLEM.

13. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT TAQI-AL-DIN AL-SULH ENTERED THE ROOM. HE TOOK UP WHERE WAZZAN HAD LEFT, ASKING WHAT WAS THE USE OF CONTINUING THE TALKS. HE REMINDED ME THAT, ACCORDING TO SA'B SALAM, I HAD MADE CERTAIN ASSURANCES CONCERNING THE DURABILITY OF THE LAST CEASE-FIRE, AND THAT IT HAD NOT LASTED 24 HOURS. WAZZAN NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO COUNT ON MY ASSURANCES ON THE CEASE-FIRE AND YET THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO ACCEPT USG GUARANTEES FOR THE FINAL STAGE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. TAQI-AL-DIN AL-SULH CONTINUED THAT THE LEBANESE NEEDED AT LEAST 72 HOURS OF EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MEETING ENDED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PM WOULD DISCUSS THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS WITH THE PLO WHEN A CEASE-FIRE TAKES HOLD AND THAT I WOULD WORK FOR A COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE. I AGAIN EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO RESTRAIN ALLIED ELEMENTS OF THE PLO. I SAID THAT IF THE GOL AND THE PLO DID NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS THEY SHOULD TELL ME AND I WOULD GO TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I REMINDED THEM ALSO OF THE NECESSITY OF GETTING EXACT NUMBERS AND DESTINATIONS, AS THE ISRAELIS WERE KEEPING VERY CAREFUL

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY Dacca
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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//ZFF FOR TEL AVIV ONLY//

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING AUGUST 11, 1982

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
ALAN ROMBERG.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING NEW FOR US ON THE TALKS IN
JERUSALEM - MR. HABIB?

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A. AMB. HABIB DEPARTED ISRAEL THIS MORNING AND WILL BE
ARRIVING MOMENTARILY IN BEIRUT. I WILL HOLD TO MY USUAL
PRACTICE OF NOT GETTING INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS TALKS,
BUT I WILL SAY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING WELL AND WE
REMAIN CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR THE PLO DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT WILL SOON BE
REACHED. AS I SAY, THE PLAN IS DEVELOPING WELL. NOT
EVERYTHING IS PINNED DOWN, BUT IT IS BASICALLY FALLING INTO
PLACE.

Q. DO YOU SEE ANY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE TALKS BECAUSE OF
THE CONTINUING ISRAELI ATTACKS ON PLO TARGETS IN BEIRUT?

A. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW ON THAT, THAT WE BELIEVE IT

IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT, GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS
THAT IS BEING MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT ALL SIDES
EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT
FURTHER FIGHTING CAN ONLY OBSTRUCT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
AND LEAD TO UNNECESSARY DELAY IN ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL
SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

Q. DO YOU KNOW IF THE ISRAELI CLAIM THAT THEY ARE REPLYING
TO PLO CEASE-FIRE IS CORRECT?

A. I THINK YOU CAN SAFELY ASSUME THAT OUR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, ALTHOUGH I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO SPECIFIC DETAILS REGARDING WHAT WHO MAY HAVE SAID TO WHOM. AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELIS ARE HITTING FIRST OR SECOND - I HAVE NO JUDGMENT TO OFFER ON THAT TODAY.

Q. COULD YOU CLARIFY WHETHER SYRIA HAS AGREED TO TAKE ALL THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION FORCES THAT WANT TO COME THERE? THERE'S SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THAT.

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A. I CAN'T ADDRESS THAT SPECIFICALLY. I HAVE NO REASON TO QUESTION THE STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE APPEARED FROM THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING SYRIA. BUT I'M NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THEM FROM HERE. I WILL SAY THERE IS PROGRESS BEING MADE ON THE DESTINATION QUESTION, BUT I SIMPLY CAN'T SPEAK FOR THOSE GOVERNMENTS.

Q. WOULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY OPPOSITION TO ALL OF THE PLO FORCES DEPARTING LEBANON FOR ONE COUNTRY AS OPPOSED TO SPLITTING UP AND GOING TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES?

A. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE THE PLO LEAVE AT THIS POINT. I DON'T HAVE AN OBSERVATION TO OFFER YOU ON DESTINATIONS. THAT IS NOT WHAT WE...WE'RE NOT LOOKING AT DIVISION IN THAT SENSE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO FIND PLACES FOR THEM TO GO AND A WAY FOR THEM TO LEAVE.

Q. CAN YOU DEFINE OR DESCRIBE THE TALKS THAT WERE FINISHED THIS MORNING BETWEEN HABIB AND MR. BEGIN? THERE IS AN AP REPORT THAT BEGIN IS EXPECTING EVACUATION TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK, ACCORDING TO THE AP REPORT. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THIS ATMOSPHERE OR IS THIS A CONCLUSION THAT YOU COULD DRAW WITHOUT GOING INTO THE SUBSTANCE?

A. YES, IT'S VERY HARD FOR ME TO DO THAT UNTIL WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT, OR HAVE A CONCRETE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES LOOKING TOWARD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IT. I THINK IT WOULD BE FOOLISH OF ME TO TRY TO GIVE YOU AN ESTIMATE OF THAT SORT.

Q. YOU DECLINED FOR A LONG, LONG TIME TO PINPOINT WHO IS THE VIOLATOR OF THE CEASE-FIRE. I'M NOT ASKING YOU TO PINPOINT WHO IS THE VIOLATOR OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WHETHER IT'S

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THE PLO OR ISRAEL IN THIS, BUT DON'T YOU BELIEVE THAT THIS DEAFENING SILENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION FROM NOT ASKING SPECIFICALLY ISRAEL TO COOL IT OFF AT THIS TIME OF THE SENSITIVITY OF TALKS THAT, YOU KNOW, THEY'RE NOT DRAGGING; THEY ARE SOMETHING OF SUBSTANCE BECAUSE MY UNDERSTANDING IS YOU JUST SAY THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING WELL AND I READ THE REPORTS YOU ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC.

DOES THIS SERVE THE PURPOSE OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS QUESTION FROM NOT COMING OUT AND SAYING WILL YOU PLEASE, ISRAEL, STOP THIS BECAUSE YOU ARE NOT THREATENING ONLY THE PEOPLE THERE, ALSO THE PROCESS THAT MR. HABIB IS UNDER?

A. WE HAVE CALLED ON ALL PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE AND YOU CAN ASSUME THAT OUR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE'RE SAYING PUBLICLY.

Q. DOES THE ADMINISTRATION NEED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT FOR THE USE OF U.S. FORCES?

A. THERE IS, OBVIOUSLY, A WAR POWERS RESOLUTION ELEMENT HERE, AND WE WILL COMPLY WITH THE LAW.

Q. ON JULY 22, DR. JAMES ABOUREZK, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, HEADED A DELEGATION OF ARAB-AMERICAN LEADERS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THEY MET WITH SCOTT BURKE AND LARRY ARTHUR ABOUT THE PROBLEMS AND THE NEED TO EXTEND THE WORK AUTHORIZATION AND THE VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE STATUS TO LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN TEMPORARY RESIDENTS AND STUDENTS.

ON JULY 23 THE LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ADC DELIVERED AN URGENT LETTER URGING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO DO LIKEWISE AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE HUNDREDS OF LEBANESE AND

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PALESTINIAN STUDENTS WHO CANNOT GET MONEY FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND CANNOT GET ANY ASSISTANCE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD DISCUSS THIS AND THEY WILL GIVE AN ANSWER. TO DATE ON AUGUST 11 THERE HAS BEEN NO ANSWER. I TALKED TO THE PEOPLE FROM THE ADC LAST NIGHT AND THEY TOLD ME THE STATE DEPT. COMPLETELY DID NOT TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION. I'M ASKING IF YOU CAN GET AN ANSWER TO THIS REQUEST OF THE ARAB-AMERICAN COMMUNITY THAT YOU CAN GIVE US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

A. LET ME LOOK INTO THAT.

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Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE VARIOUS SHOOTINGS AND BOMBINGS IN PARIS?

A. YES. FIRST, THE QUESTION WAS ASKED YESTERDAY ABOUT THE NAMES OF THE TWO AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO WERE KILLED IN THE PARIS BOMBING. THE DEAD ARE MRS. ANN VAN ZENTEN, AGE 30, OF ILLINOIS, AND MRS. GRACE CUTTER, AGE 66, OF SKOKIE, ILLINOIS.

AS I INDICATED YESTERDAY, THERE WERE TWO AMERICANS WHO WERE ALSO INJURED IN THAT BLAST. BOTH ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER. BUT AS I SAID, DUE TO PRIVACY ACT CONSIDERATIONS, I CAN'T GIVE YOU THEIR NAMES.

AS FAR AS THE LATEST ATTACK IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANOTHER INCIDENT, THE SIXTH IN RECENT DAYS. THIS APPARENTLY INVOLVES THE BOMBING OF A PARIS BANK, AND EARLY REPORTS INDICATE ONE PERSON WAS SERIOUSLY HURT.

WE DEPLORE THIS SERIES OF BARBARIC ACTS AGAIN;T INNOCENT
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INDIVIDUALS WHICH HAS ALREADY COST MANY LIVES. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS TAKING ALL POSSIBLE ACTION TO APPREHAND THOSE RESPONSIBLE, AND TO TRY TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER OR FUTURE INCIDENTS. SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: THE PACKAGE PLAN: ROUND ONE

WITH BEGIN PRODUCES SOME ENCOURAGEMENT

REF: A) BEIRUT 5221, B) STATE 221553, C) LEWIS/HILL

TELECONS AUGUST 9/1

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

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2. SUMMARY: HAVING GIVEN ME AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, SUBJECT HOWEVER TO IMPORTANT CONDITIONS, BEGIN CLEARLY WANTS TO WRAP UP THE PACKAGE PLAN AND IMPLEMENT A POLITICAL SOLUTION QUICKLY. AS HABIB AND WE PREDICTED, THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK REMAINS BEGIN'S ADAMANT OPPOSITION (WHICH THE CABINET WILL REINFORCE TODAY) TO AN ADVANCE MNF CONTINGENT--ESPECIALLY FRENCH--ARRIVING ON D-DAY (OR AS BEGIN INSISTS IT BE CALLED "E-DAY"). MY EFFORTS TO MOVE HIM FROM THIS POSITION THIS MORNING WERE UNAVAILING AND UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO BACK OFF, HABIB SHOULD COME HERE SOON TO HAVE IT OUT FACE-TO-FACE WITH BEGIN ON THIS PLUS THE

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ISSUES OF A PRECISE ADVANCE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL PLO EVACUEES, THE CABINET'S FORMAL REJECTION OF UN OBSERVERS, AND A DETAILED SCHEDULE FOR SYRIAN EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT. WE MEET AGAIN AT 1730 LOCAL AFTER THE CABINET SESSION FOR BEGIN TO GIVE ME A FURTHER RESPONSE IN LIGHT OF THE CABINET DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.

3. LATE LAST NIGHT, AUGUST 9, I SENT BEGIN THE PACKAGE PLAN AS AMENDED PER REF B, PLUS ONE OTHER CHANGE WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARED BY PHONE WITH HILL: THE THIRD SENTENCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 16 (TRANSIT THROUGH LEBANON) NOW READS "IN THOSE INSTANCES WHEN CONVOYS OF DEPARTING PALESTINIANS PASS THROUGH IDF POSITIONS, WHETHER IN THE BEIRUT AREA OR ELSE-

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WHERE IN LEBANON, THE IDF WILL CLEAR THE ROUTE FOR THE TEMPORARY PERIOD IN WHICH THE CONVOY IS RUNNING" (HABIB HAD RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED MY RECOMMENDATION THAT WE USE THE WORD "CLEAR" INSTEAD OF "VACATE", ON CONDITION THAT THE POINT BE MADE THAT HE WANTS TO HOLD THE ISRAELIS TO KIMCHE'S ORIGINAL AGREEMENT THAT DURING PLO TRANSIT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE "OUT OF SIGHT" ALONG THE ROAD). THE PACKAGE INCLUDED THE PLAN ITSELF, A SEPARATE PAPER LISTING THE "CHECKLIST OF SAFEGUARDS. . ." (PARA 24 OF BEIRUT 5221), AND MY COVERING TRANSMITTAL LETTER CONTAINING CERTAIN ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE PACKAGE (TEXT TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL).

4. BEGIN THEN PHONED ME AT 2330 LAST NIGHT TO SAY THAT AFTER A FIRST READING OF THE PACKAGE, HE HAD TWO IMMEDIATE TEXTUAL CHANGES TO REQUEST PHIL TO MAKE IMMEDIATELY: (A) HE REJECTED THE USE OF "PALESTINIAN" THROUGHOUT THE TEXT. HE WANTS IT TO READ "PLO." (B) HE PARTICULARLY REJECTS LANGUAGE PLACING PALESTINIANS (OR PLO) FORCES ON A PAR WITH ISRAELI OR SYRIAN FORCES, THAT IS, AS IF THEY WERE A


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REGULAR ARMY. THEREFORE, HE URGES THE USE OF TERMINOLOGY SUCH AS "PLO MEMBERS (CIVILIAN OR MILITARY)". (C) HE INSISTS ON THE SUBSTITUTION OF "E-DAY" FOR "D-DAY" THROUGHOUT THE TEXT. (D-DAY CARRIES THE CONNOTATION OF THE 1945 D-DAY, A PRELUDE TO VE DAY. BEGIN SEES "D-DAY" IN THE CONTEXT AS IMPLYING THAT PLO "V" DAY WILL FOLLOW.) BEGIN URGES THAT PHIL USE "E-DAY" FOR "EVACUATION DAY" SO AS TO AVOID UNWARRANTED SPECULATION. I AGREED TO PASS THESE TEXTUAL SUGGESTIONS ON TO HABIB. BEGIN THEN SAID HE WOULD MEET ME AT NOON TODAY AFTER THE CABINET HAD DECIDED ON A RESPONSE TO THE PACKAGE PLAN. I INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT I HAD ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY AND WISHED TO MEET HIM BEFORE THE CABINET MEETING. BEGIN AGREED. THEREFORE, THIS MORNING AT 0900, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM BROWN, I MET FOR 35 MINUTES WITH BEGIN IN HIS OFFICE. HE WAS IN PAIN FROM HIS STILL INJURED LEG BUT DETERMINED TO CARRY OUT TODAY'S IMPORTANT BUSINESS. WITH HIM WERE SHAMIR (AS ALWAYS TACITURN), SHARON (MORE SUBDUED THAN USUAL), AND AMBASSADOR ARENS WHO REPORTEDLY HAD RUSHED BACK TO CONVEY TO BEGIN THE DEPTH OF WASHINGTON'S CONCERN OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

5. I OPENED BY EXPRESSING OFFICIALLY AND PERSONALLY OUR SHOCK OVER THE ATROCIOUS TERRORIST ATTACK ON A JEWISH RESTAURANT IN PARIS YESTERDAY WHICH CAUSED SIX DEAD AND 21 WOUNDED AND FOR WHICH THE PLFP HAS REPORTEDLY CLAIMED CREDIT. (NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THIS INCIDENT AND ISRAELI ACTIONS YESTERDAY IN LEBANON HAS BEEN MENTIONED, BUT IT IS PROBABLY IN EVERYBODY'S MINDS, INCLUDING, I AM SURE, THOSE OF THE FRONTLINE MILITARY COMMANDERS.) THANKING ME FOR EXPRESSING THESE SENTIMENTS BEGIN SAID HE WANTED ME TO

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INFORM WASHINGTON THAT FROM HIS STUDY OF HISTORY "SINCE THE DREYFUS AFFAIR, THERE HAS NEVER BEEN SUCH UGLY ANTI-SEMITISM AS IS NOW MANIFESTED IN FRANCE, MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDES WITH MITTERRAND'S REFERENCE TO "ORADOURS" (REFERRING TO NAZI REPRISALS IN WW II) IN LEBANON AS WELL AS THE FRENCH MEDIA... THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IS NOW BITTERLY HOSTILE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE. "THEREFORE, WE WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY REGARDING THE FRENCH ROLE TO YOU LATER. THERE CAN BE NO OVERALL FRENCH COMMANDER OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE." (I IMMEDIATELY STRAIGHTENED HIM OUT ON WHAT WAS CLEARLY A MISUNDERSTANDING--SHARED BY SHAMIR. I STRESSED THAT THE MNF WOULD HAVE NO OVERALL COMMANDER. RATHER EACH NATIONAL UNIT WOULD HAVE ITS OWN COMMANDER. THIS EXPLANATION SEEMED TO SATISFY HIM.) I THEN WENT THROUGH SOME ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS WHICH HABIB HAD REQUESTED (VIA HILL) THAT I MAKE DURING SUCH A PRESENTATION.

6. USN ESCORT OF EVACUATION SHIPS.

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ALTHOUGH HABIB HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS TO SHARON, I SAID THERE WAS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY THAT WE WOULD BE USING CHARTERED CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL VESSELS TO EVACUATE SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THE PLO. (BEGIN IMMEDIATELY REMARKED "NO OBJECTION.") IF WE WERE ASKED TO DO SO WE MIGHT PROVIDE USN ESCORTS FOR SUCH COMMERCIAL VESSELS FROM ELEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET. AFTER A BIT OF SPARRING WITH THE RHETORICAL QUESTIONS "AGAINST WHOM WOULD SUCH ESCORTS BE SAILING? AGAINST US?", BEGIN FINALLY SAID "NO OBJECTION." SHARON QUICKLY ADDED THAT EVACUATION OPERATIONS BY SEA SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ATTEMPTS TO EVACUATE FROM BEACHES. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT WISHED TO TELL HABIB IN FRONT OF OTHERS (LEBANESE) PRESENT, THE IDF HAD MINED THE SEA APPROACHES TO SUCH BEACHES AROUND BEIRUT. WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL THEREFORE, SAID SHARON, TO INSURE THAT A SEA EVACUATION WAS EXECUTED FROM BEIRUT HARBOR.

7. SIMULTANEITY OF MNF ADVANCE GROUP ARRIVAL TOGETHER WITH PLO DEPARTURE ON D-DAY.

I SAID THAT CONTRARY TO ISRAELI INFORMATION, SARKIS HAS APPROVED, AND IN FACT DESIRES, SIMULTANEOUS INSERTION OF THE ADVANCE CONTINGENT (350 FRENCH) OF THE MNF TOGETHER WITH PLO DEPARTURE ON D-DAY. TRUE, THERE HAS NOT BEEN A FORMAL GOL CABINET DECISION ON THIS AND THE CABINET IS PERHAPS SPLIT OVER THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, SARKIS, PM WAZZAN, AND THE "INNER GROUP" NOW ALL AGREE ON THE NECESSITY OF THIS STEP. THE REASONS FOR THIS SHIFT IN SARKIS' (AND HABIB'S) VIEW ARE AS FOLLOWS. AS A RESULT OF VERY HEAVY IDF MILITARY ACTIONS OVER THE PAST MONTH WE ARE NOW IN A NEW SITUATION WHERE THE FEAR FACTOR IN WEST BEIRUT HAS COMPOUNDED GREATLY. THE PLO IS FEARFUL THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTACK IT DURING DEPARTURE. MOREOVER, THE MUSLIM

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CIVILIAN POPULATION OF WEST BEIRUT IS ALSO NOW TERRIFIED OVER THE PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK. SARKIS AND WAZZAN ARE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE ON BOTH COUNTS. SARKIS THEREFORE NOW WANTS THE ADVANCE ELEMENTS OF THE MNF TO ARRIVE ON "E-DAY." WE WERE WELL AWARE OF ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT A FOREIGN "SCREEN" FOR PLO PROCRASTINATION AND MACHINATION. HOWEVER, WE NOW HAD IMPORTANT FAIL-SAFE MECHANISMS. AS SECRETARY SHULTZ AND HABIB HAVE STRESSED, MOVEMENT WOULD BEGIN ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A PRECISE DAILY SCHEDULE WHICH IF ABUSED BY THE PLO WOULD CAUSE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE MNF MANDATE. CHEYSSON HIMSELF HAD EMPHASIZED THAT NONE OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE MNF WOULD PERMIT THEMSELVES TO BE MISUSED BY THE PLO. PART OF OUR NEW REQUIREMENT ALSO STEMS FROM THE REAL "FEAR FACTOR," AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE U.S. HAD BEEN ASKED TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THIS EVACUATION WOULD PROCEED SAFELY AND WITHOUT

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CE. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN OUR OWN CREDIBILITY, WE NEED SOME ELEMENTS OF THE MNF PRESENT FROM THE BEGINNING. THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT AND SARKIS HAD TOLD HABIB THAT HE REALLY NEEDED SUCH A SYMBOLIC ELEMENT IN PLACE ON E-DAY.

8. EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE PLO.

I SAID THAT AS I HAD MENTIONED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH KIMCHE YESTERDAY, WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO CONFIRM DIRECTLY WITH THE EGYPTIANS A PLO WRITTEN ASSERTION THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE AGREED TO TAKE AS MANY PLO FIGHTERS AS NECESSARY WITHOUT CONDITIONS. WE HAD NOT YET HEARD POSITIVELY FROM THE EGYPTIANS, BUT WERE PRESSING FOR AN ANSWER. AT THIS STAGE SHARON INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD FROM THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GENERAL SAGI THAT MUBARAK HAD NOW AGAIN SIGNALLED THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE A SINGLE PLO FIGHTER.

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9. LAST NIGHT'S MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS--DEALING WITH "BAD ACTORS."

I SAID THAT HABIB WANTED THE GOI TO KNOW THAT IN ADDITION TO OUR DEMARCHES TO THE ISRAELI SIDE HE WAS PRESSING VERY HARD UPON ALL HIS MUSLIM CONTACTS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY

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THAT THE "BAD ACTORS" AMONG THE PLO AND THEIR ALLIES, THAT IS THOSE WHO HAD INDULGED IN PROVOCATIVE MILITARY ACTIONS BOTH IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE (E.G., ALONG THE SANNIN RIDGE), MUST BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE EXTREMELY DISTURBED BY REPORTS OF VERY HEAVY IDF BOMBING, SHELLING AND OTHER MILITARY ACTION IN THE BEIRUT AREA EXTENDING LONG INTO LAST NIGHT. NOW THAT WE HAVE REACHED THIS POINT, SUCH ACTIONS ARE TOTALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE RAPID COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. SHARON'S RESPONSE WAS THAT A 130MM BATTERY WHICH HAD FIRED IN RECENT DAYS ON THE IDF FROM THE METN NEAR THE ALEY AREA WAS NOT RUN BY "EXTREMISTS" AS WE CALL THEM, BUT WAS DIRECTLY UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE FATAH. THE IDF HAD INTERCEPTED FATAH ORDERS TO UNITS OUTSIDE BEIRUT TO TAKE ACTIONS AGAINST THE IDF. THE ISRAELI PRINCIPLE REMAINED: WE WON'T SHOOT IF WE ARE NOT SHOT AT, BUT IF THEY SHOOT WE WILL GIVE

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A FULL RESPONSE.

10. DEPARTURE OF SYRIANS WITH THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HABIB HAD NOT RAISED WITH SHARON THE QUESTION OF THE DEPARTING SYRIANS TAKING THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM, HABIB FELT THIS WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS A DEFEATED ARMY. RATHER, GIVEN STRONG SYRIAN AND ARAB LEAGUE SENSITIVITIES, THEY SHOULD BE HANDLED DIFFERENTLY FROM THE PLO AND BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW WITH ALL THEIR WEAPONS WITH THEM. SHARON'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS THAT HABIB HAD INDEED ONCE RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH HIM AND SHARON HAD REJECTED THE IDEA ON THE SPOT. THE CABINET COULD DECIDE THIS QUESTION. HE REMAINED OPPOSED BECAUSE THE SYRIANS COULD THEN TURN OVER SUCH HEAVY WEAPONS TO THE PLO. AFTER WE SPARRED ON THIS WITH MY POINTING OUT THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE NO LACK OF OTHER WEAPONS WITH WHICH TO SUPPLY THE PLO, SHARON SAID IT WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. I COUNTERED THAT THERE WERE OTHER MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED AS WELL. BEGIN THEN INTERVENED, "WE'LL DISCUSS IT IN THE CABINET." THEN HE WENT FURTHER, SEEMING TO AGREE WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY (AND NOT LOATH TO OVERRULE SHARON). BEGIN THEN SAID: "LET THEM TAKE THEIR ARMS."

11. BEGIN THEN SUMMED UP. HE HAD STUDIED THE PACKAGE PLAN DURING THE NIGHT. HE WAS, OF COURSE, NOT IN A POSITION TO TELL THE CABINET WHAT TO DO, BUT HE COULD TELL ME WHAT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE. "WE HAVE A PRECONDITION. WE MUST GET THE FULL LIST OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE TO BE EVACUATED SO THAT WE ARE ASSURED THAT THOSE NUMBERS EQUAL THE NUMBERS OF THE TERRORISTS REMAINING IN WEST BEIRUT." (I INTERJECTED THAT WE TOO HAVE THE SAME PRECONDITION.) "IF THIS PRECONDITION

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IS MET," CONTINUED BEGIN, "WE ACCEPT THE PLAN IN GENERAL PRINCIPLE, BUT WE HAVE CERTAIN AMENDMENTS AND CONDITIONS:"

- --A. AS CONFIRMED BY LAST SUNDAY'S CABINET DECISION,
- ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT NO UN OBSERVERS NOR ANY REPRESENTA-
- TIVES OF THE UN ORGANIZATION WHICH IS "ABSOLUTELY
- HOSTILE TO ISRAEL." (HE EXPANDED AT SOME LENGTH ON
- THE OVERWHELMING HOSTILITY OF ALL UN ORGANIZATIONS.)
- "ISRAEL HAS HAD BITTER EXPERIENCE WITH UNIFIL. THE
- GOI HAS WRITTEN DOCUMENTS PROVING COOPERATION BETWEEN
- THE NORWEGIAN BATTALION AND THE PLO. AS FOR THE DUTCH
- BATTALION, THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY ANTI-ISRAELI." (THIS
- ATTACK ON THE UN WAS PROBABLY ALSO AIMED AT DEMON-
- STRATING ANEW THE GOI'S REJECTION OF ANY EXTENSION OF
- UNIFIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES OUTSIDE OF THE CURRENT AREA
- OF OPERATIONS.)

- --B. THE 350-PERSON FRENCH ADVANCE MNF CONTINGENT
- CANNOT ARRIVE ON "E-DAY." "WHY THE FRENCH? I HAVE
- ANOTHER PROPOSAL. LET A BATTALION OF THE LEBANESE
- ARMED FORCES COME IN ON E-DAY." I ARGUED THAT THE
- LEBANESE WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONFIDENT THAT THEY
- COULD ACCOMPLISH THE TASKS ALONE. BEGIN BRUSHED OFF
- SUCH EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN AS HAVING BEEN BROUGHT
- UP ARTIFICIALLY IN ORDER TO GET THE FRENCH IN. RETRO-
- SPECTIVELY, HE SAID, ISRAEL COULD HAVE--AND SHOULD
- HAVE--OPPOSED FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF. NOW
- THAT THE FRENCH HAD VOTED FOR A TOTAL EMBARGO OF
- WEAPONS TO ISRAEL AT SUCH A CRITICAL JUNCTURE, THEIR
- LEADERS SHOULD ALL BE CONSIDERED AS PRO-PLO INCLUDING
- MITTERRAND WHO HAD ADVOCATED A PALESTINIAN STATE AND

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- CHEYSSON "WHO WANTS TO SAVE THE PLO." WHEN I ASKED
- WHETHER HIS ATTITUDE WOULD BE DIFFERENT SHOULD THE
- ADVANCE CONTINGENT BE ITALIAN, BEGIN HESITATED, THEN
- SAID ISRAEL HAD A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE TOWARD ITALY.
- HOWEVER, HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD
- NOT ACCEPT THE ARRIVAL OF ANY FOREIGN POWER CONTINGENT
- (NOT EVEN AMERICAN) ON THE FIRST DAY. "WE HAVE REA-
- DOPTED HABIB'S POSITION ADVANCED EIGHT WEEKS AGO THAT
- AN LAF BATTALION SHOULD DO IT. WHY REJECT THIS NOW?"
- I REBUTTED BY REPEATING THE ARGUMENTS MADE EARLIER
- ABOUT CHANGED CONDITIONS IN WEST BEIRUT.
- --C. BEGIN THEN STRESSED VERY STRONGLY THAT HE WANTED
- THE LANGUAGE OF THE PACKAGE PLAN ADJUSTED TO STATE THAT
- SHOULD THE PLO FAIL TO MEET ITS SCHEDULE OR OTHERWISE
- VIOLATE THE PACKAGE PLAN, NOT ONLY WOULD THE MANDATE
- IMMEDIATELY TERMINATE BUT "MNF UNITS WILL LEAVE BEIRUT."
- I HAD SPOKEN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IT WAS
- TERRIBLY IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICALLY THAT THE PLO UNDER-
- STAND THAT SHOULD THEY TRANSGRESS THE TERMS OF THE
- PLAN THEY WOULD BE DEALING IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY

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- WITH THE IDF.
- --D. REGARDING THE SYRIANS DEPARTURE, THERE WAS NO
- SCHEDULE THUS FAR. THE GOI WANTED TO KNOW PRECISELY
- WHEN AND HOW THEY WOULD LEAVE. HERE SHARON JUMPED IN
- TO STATE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ASSURANCES THAT NUMBERS
- OF SYRIANS LEAVE FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY WITH DEPARTING
- PLO ELEMENTS. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, HE SAID, TO LET
- THE SYRIANS REMAIN IN BEIRUT UNTIL THE LAST DAY.
- ELABORATING, SHARON SAID THAT APART FROM 9,000 PLO
- "TERRORISTS," THERE WERE ANOTHER 4,000 PEOPLE WHO
- BELONGED TO THE SYRIAN FORCES IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER.
- THE GOI ALSO BELIEVED, SHARON SAID, THAT THE MNF SHOULD
- NOT COME IN BASED ON A TIMETABLE WHICH WAS IN TURN
- BASED ARBITRARILY ON E-PLUS 5, 6 AND SO FORTH. RATHER,
- THE TIMETABLE SHOULD SPECIFY HOW THE MNF WOULD ENTER
- IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF PLO MEMBERS AND SYRIANS
- WHO HAD DEPARTED, OTHERWISE WE WOULD HAVE A SITUATION
- IN WHICH ON E-PLUS 5-6 THE MNF ENTERED BUT AN UNACCEPT-
- ABLE NUMBER OF PLO AND SYRIANS REMAINED IN BEIRUT. I,

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- OF COURSE, RESPONDED THAT HABIB'S PLAN WOULD NOT PERMIT
- THIS.

12. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE IN WHICH BEGIN AND SHARON INSISTED THAT NO PLO OFFICE REMAIN IN BEIRUT AND I ASSURED THEM THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT IN THE PLAN AT ALL, BEGIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING TO HABIB: IF HE ACCEPTED THESE CHANGES, "HE HAD A DEAL" (SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CABINET MEETING WHICH WAS ABOUT TO CON- VENE). IF THESE CHANGES WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE, "I ASK HIM TO COME TO JERUSALEM SOON TO TALK TO ME. OF COURSE, HE SHOULD ALSO TALK WITH MY COLLEAGUES, BUT I WANT TO SPEAK WITH HIM ESPECIALLY MYSELF." WE THEN AGREED I WOULD CALL

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ON BEGIN AT 1730 LOCAL TODAY AFTER THE CABINET MEETING AND HIS BRIEF AFTERNOON REST PERIOD.

13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP: BEHRNMAN
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NEA: JWTWINAM
NEA/ARP: RHPELLETREAU
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TO AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
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STATE 220844

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E.O. 12356:DECLASSIFY: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, XF
SUBJECT: USG EFFORTS TO RESOLVE LEBANESE CRISIS

PAGE 02 STATE 220844

REF: (A) SANAA 4706 (NOTAL), (B) KUWAIT 3651 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. REFTEL (A) REPORTS YARG DEMARCHE ON LEBANON SITUATION
MADE TO AMBASSADOR AUGUST 4. REFTEL (B) TRANSMITS TEXT
OF A LETTER FROM KUWAIT FOREIGN MINISTER SHAIKH SABAH
AL-AHMED. DEPARTMENT HAS PREPARED TALKING POINTS IN

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PARA. 3 FOR RESPONSE. SANAA SHOULD DELIVER THIS MESSAGE ORALLY REPEAT ORALLY TO ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER SHAHATI. KUWAIT SHOULD PRESENT THIS ORALLY TO SHAIKH SABAH AS THE SECRETARY'S RESPONSE TO THIS LATEST LETTER. OTHER ACTION ADDRESSES MAY USE TALKING POINTS AS THEY DEEM APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

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3. BEGIN TEXT: PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE US ADMINISTRATION SINCERELY SHARES THE YARG'S DEEP CONCERN REGARDING THE TRAGIC ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT AUGUST 3-4. THE US IS WORKING CEASELESSLY TO DEAL WITH THIS CRITICAL SITUATION.

THROUGH AMBASSADOR HABIB, AND IN DIRECT CONTACTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, WE HAVE WORKED DILIGENTLY TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH WILL PERMIT THE PLO TO WITHDRAW WITH HONOR FROM WEST BEIRUT AND LEBANON UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PRESERVE ITS POLITICAL ROLE.

THE PRESIDENT, THE USG, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SHOCKED AND OUTRAGED BY THE NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION OF INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES IN BEIRUT. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE THIS CLEAR FIRMLY AND DIRECTLY TO PRIME MINISTER

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BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, AND THE GOI, AND HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT STRESSING "THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF REESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A STRICT CEASEFIRE."

THE USG IS WORKING STRENUOUSLY TO RESTORE A SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND IN LEBANON WHICH WILL PERMIT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND SUCCESSFULLY. WE HAVE INDICATED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THERE ARE CLEAR AND DEMANDING HUMANITARIAN REASONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A CEASEFIRE AND THE RESTORATION OF WATER, POWER, AND SHIPMENTS OF FOOD AND MEDICINE TO WEST BEIRUT. IN ADDITION, THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRES ATTENTION TO THESE VITAL CONCERNS.

WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PEACEFULLY THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS IN BEIRUT ARE PART OF A BROADER EFFORT TO RESTORE AND EXPAND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN LEBANON HAVE MADE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE UNDERTAKE RENEWED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT SUCH A PEACE MUST ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. END TEXT.

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4. FOR SANAA: IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE, YOU MIGHT USE THIS OCCASION TO STRESS TO SHOHATI THAT WE AND MOST ARAB LEADERS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSITY FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. WE NOTE THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF YEMENI VOLUNTEERS PRESENTLY IN THAT COUNTRY, AND TRUST THAT THE YARG, IN THE SPIRIT THAT WE ALL RECOGNIZE IS NECESSARY FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE BEIRUT TRAGEDY, IS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING WAYS TO EFFECT THE RETURN OF ITS NATIONALS.

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5. FOR KUWAIT: IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE TEXT (PARA. 3), YOU SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING TO ADDRESS SHAIKH SABAH'S

PROPOSAL THAT BOTH THE GOI AND PLO ACCEPT MUTUAL RECOGNITION THROUGH THE VEHICLE OF A UNSC RESOLUTION: WE CLEARLY RECOGNIZE THAT RECOGNITION BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OF ONE ANOTHER'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE AND OTHER LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IS CENTRAL TO ACHIEVING ANY LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE. THIS IS NOT SOMETHING, HOWEVER, THAT CAN BE IMPOSED BY THE UNSC. ANY FORMULA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AND ISRAEL IS SELF DEFEATING, SINCE IT GIVES ISRAEL, WHICH WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE PLO, A DE FACTO VETO. SHULTZ

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NSC:RMC FARLANE
S/S:JBREMER

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TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

STATE 217471

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, XF

SUBJECT: WEST BEIRUT SITUATION: MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY

1. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD CONVEY THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNEL THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING FAHD, KING HUSSEIN, PRESIDENT ASSAD AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. IN DOING SO JIDDA SHOULD INDICATE THAT THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO THE KING'S MESSAGE OF CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT CONVEYED TO US THROUGH PRINCE BANDAR AUGUST 4 AND REPORTED BY SAUDI MEDIA THAT DAY.

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2. BEGIN TEXT: UNDERSTANDING FULLY YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE TRAGIC VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT AUGUST 3-4, A CONCERN WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE US ADMINISTRATION DEEPLY SHARE, I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO YOU WHAT THE US IS DOING TO DEAL WITH THIS CRITICAL SITUATION.

THROUGH AMBASSADOR HABIB, AND IN DIRECT CONTACTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, WE HAVE WORKED DILIGENTLY TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION

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WHICH WILL PERMIT THE PLO TO WITHDRAW WITH HONOR FROM WEST BEIRUT AND LEBANON UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PRESERVE ITS POLITICAL ROLE. THE US CLEARLY RECOGNIZES

THAT A FIRM CEASEFIRE IN WEST BEIRUT IS ESSENTIAL TO PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT, HIS ADMINISTRATION, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SHOCKED AND OUTRAGED BY THE NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION OF INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES IN BEIRUT. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE ATTITUDE OF OUR GOVERNMENT WAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WITH MANY IN WASHINGTON AUGUST 2. THE FIRMNESS OF THE US POSITION WAS INDICATED IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT ISSUED ON THAT DATE WHICH STATED AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE WORLD CAN NO LONGER ACCEPT A SITUATION OF CONSTANTLY ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN LEBANON. YET THE VIOLENCE DID ESCALATE AUGUST 3 AND AUGUST 4 AND OUR GOVERNMENT IN ITS URGENT DELIBERATIONS ON HOW BEST TO BRING AN END TO THE FIGHTING TOOK FULL NOTE OF THE FACT THAT OUR CLEAR EXPRESSION TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE US POSITION HAD NOT RESULTED IN ISRAEL'S REFRAINING FROM FURTHER VIOLENCE. ON AUGUST 4 THE PRESIDENT COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER

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BEGIN. I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT US INSISTENCE ON AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND MAINTENANCE OF THAT CEASEFIRE WAS MOST FIRMLY EXPRESSED. AGAIN ON THAT DATE THE WHITE HOUSE ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT STRESSING "THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF REESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A STRICT CEASEFIRE". WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE INTEND THAT THAT CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE AT THE LINES OF THE OPPOSING FORCES AS OF AUGUST 1.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS WORKING CEASELESSLY TO RESTORE A SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND LEBANON WHICH WILL PERMIT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY. THE CONTINUED EFFORT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE THE PROMPT DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON AND THEIR ACCEPTANCE IN ARAB COUNTRIES IS CRITICAL TO THIS EFFORT AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOU. AS YOU KNOW, OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS IN BEIRUT PEACEFULLY ARE PART OF A BROADER EFFORT TO RESTORE ORDER AND TRANQUILITY IN LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT IN APPROACHING THIS TASK IT WILL BE IMPERATIVE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH A RENEWED EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT SUCH A PEACE MUST ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. END TEXT.

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3. FOR BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB: YOU MAY SHARE THIS

MESSAGE WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS AND INDICATE YOU ARE DOING
SO IN RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE OF AUGUST 4 TO THE
PRESIDENT, STRESSING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED
SARKIS' MESSAGE, IS DEEPLY MOVED BY THE TRAGEDY OF BEIRUT
AND GRAVELY CONCERNED BY THE LATEST ESCALATION OF THE
FIGHTING AND THAT THE US IS WORKING URGENTLY TO BRING
ABOUT AN END TO THE VIOLENCE AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
WHICH WILL BE IN THE INTEREST OF LEBANON. SHULTZ

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NEA:CHILL

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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FOIA Exemptions
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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, XF

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON ISRAELI ACTION

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1. THE WHITE HOUSE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT AUGUST 4:

2. BEGIN TEXT.

3. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

4. LAST NIGHT ISRAELI FORCES MOVED FORWARD ON SEVERAL
FRONTS FROM THEIR CEASEFIRE LINES AROUND BEIRUT. THESE
MOVEMENTS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY ISRAELI SHELLING AND
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CAME ONLY A DAY AFTER I HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT, IN MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR,
THAT THE U.S. PLACED GREAT IMPORTANCE ON THE SUSTAINED
MAINTENANCE OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE -- TO AVOID FURTHER
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND TO SECURE THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF
THE PLO FORCES IN BEIRUT.

THIS IS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP TOWARD OUR GOAL OF
RESTORING THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, A

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DOC_NUMBER: 82STATE216968

CHANNEL: n/a

GOAL AMBASSADOR HABIB IS EARNESTLY WORKING TOWARD WITH THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

THROUGH GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO, I HAVE EXPRESSED MY STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE PLO MUST NOT DELAY FURTHER ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. AT THE SAME TIME I HAVE EXPRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF REESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A STRICT CEASEFIRE IN PLACE SO THAT THIS MATTER CAN BE PROMPTLY RESOLVED.

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5. END TEXT.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS. SHULTZ

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

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STATE 217365

E1 DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL 8/4/88
TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: WEST BEIRUT SITUATION

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SEPTTEL CONTAINING TEXT OF STATEMENT
ISSUED BY WHITE HOUSE IN NAME OF PRESIDENT ON AUGUST 4
AFTER INTENSIVE EMERGENCY WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS IN WAKE OF
ESCALATED HOSTILITIES IN WEST BEIRUT.

2. YOU SHOULD BRING THIS STATEMENT URGENTLY TO THE
ATTENTION OF APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DRAWING
PARTICULARLY ON THE LAST TWO SENTENCES.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE LAST SENTENCE "AT THE SAME TIME I
HAVE EXPRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE ABSOLUTE

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NECESSITY OF REESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A STRICT
CEASEFIRE INPLACE SO THAT THIS MATTER CAN BE PROPERLY
RESOLVED" YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE HAVE URGENTLY AND
FIRMLY COMMUNICATED US CONCERNS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
IN A WAY THAT WILL LEAVE NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER OF US INSIS-
TENCE ON REESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A CEASEFIRE.

4. AT THE SAME TIME YOU SHOULD POINT TO THE NEXT TO THE
LAST SENTENCE. STRESSING THAT FIRM INDICATION OF THE PLO'S
READINESS TO WITHDRAW PROMPTLY FROM LEBANON IS CRITICAL TO

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OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE AND YOU SHOULD URGE
HOST GOVERNMENT TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN-PROS-
PECTS FOR PROMPT PLO WITHDRAWAL.

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5. YOU SHOULD FURTHER IMPRESS UPON HOST GOVERNMENT THAT
THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT AUGUST 3-4 IS OF THE GREATEST
CONCERN TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF USG AND THAT WE ARE BEND-
ING EVERY EFFORT TO STOP THE VIOLENCE AND PERMIT AMBASSADOR
HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED IN AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE
TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS CRISIS.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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*** Current Classification ***

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
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NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/30/88 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: IDF RADIO ANNOUNCES CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN

REFS: A) HILL/BROWN TELECON 7/30/82 B) TEL AVIV 11547V

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

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2. IDF RADIO ANNOUNCED AT 1655 LOCAL THAT THE IDF
"BEGAN SHELLING TERRORIST OBJECTIVES IN BEIRUT ABOUT
AN HOUR AGO." THE REPORT WENT ON TO REFER TO MORTAR
FIRE FROM PALESTINIAN POSITIONS IN BEIRUT YESTERDAY
AND CONTINUED ARTILLERY, KATYUSHA AND LIGHT ARMS FIRE
DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES JULY 30, AND CLAIMED
THAT THE ISRAELI DECISION TO OPEN FIRE WAS IN REACTION
TO THE PALESTINIAN VIOLATIONS.

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3. THE IDF RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN IS THE LATEST OF SEVERAL POSSIBLY RELATED EVENTS TODAY. FIRST OF ALL, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THERE WAS A MINISTERIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETING THIS MORNING. SECOND, THE ISRAELI DECISION TO RENEW THE FIRE AGAINST BEIRUT COMES NOTWITHSTANDING MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT 12:20 AND 12:40 THIS AFTERNOON IN WHICH I PASSED ON TO HIM PHIL HABIB'S ASSNT THAT THINGS SEEMED TO BE MOVING FORWARD ON THE NEGOTIATING TRACK (REF B). FINALLY, A MEETING WHICH THE DATT AND I HAD THIS AFTERNOON WITH MGEN SAGI, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, WAS CUT SHORT AT 1530 LOCAL BECAUSE SAGI HAD TO ATTEND A MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF.

4. AS THIS WAS BEING DRAFTED, MGEN SAGI CALLED DATT TO REPORT THAT PALESTINIAN FIRING HAD RESUMED IN BEIRUT AND KATYUSHA ROCKETS AS WELL AS ARTILLERY SHELLS HAD FALLEN ON DAMOUR. AS A RESULT, ISRAELIS WERE RETURNING FIRE. WE UNDERSTAND BEIRUT RADIO IS REPORTING ISRAEL AIRSTRIKES AND NAVAL ARTILLERY FIRE IN PROGRESS IN BEIRUT. DETAILED I.R. BEING PREPARED BY

[REDACTED]

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DATT AND WILL FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

5. PER REF TELCON I PROPOSED TO BAR-ON AT 1810 LOCAL THAT CEASE-FIRE BE REINSTITUTED AT 2000 LOCAL. AT 1820 BAR-ON CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT BEGIN WANTED TO KNOW FROM HABIB WHETHER THE CEASE-FIRE WOULD BE MUTUAL AND ABSOLUTE AS HE HAD EARLIER STIPULATED DURING THEIR JULY 27 CONVERSATION. I ASSURED BAR-ON THAT THIS WAS HABIB'S INTENTION. BAR-ON SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THAT TO BEGIN. HE CLOSED BY SAYING THAT BEGIN HAD WANTED TO REMIND PHIL THAT IF THE PLO FIRED "WE WILL HIT BACK HARD."

6. BAR-ON CALLED ME BACK AT 1840 LOCAL TO CONFIRM A CEASE-FIRE FOR 2100 LOCAL REPEAT 2100 LOCAL. COMMENT. NOTHING NEFARIOUS SHOULD BE READ INTO THIS DEVELOPMENT. BAR-ON SAYS HE UNDERSTOOD ME TO SAY 2100. THE WHEELS HAVE BEEN SET IN MOTION AT THIS END AND ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN ACCORDINGLY. END COMMENT.

7. PLEASE ADVISE.

8. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS. BROWN

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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: AUGUST 3 MEDIA REACTION

9302566

1. THE FIRST OF TWO MAJOR STORIES IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS IS CONTINUING CLASHES AND ISRAELI ADVANCES IN THE SUBURBS OF BEIRUT. "INVADING FORCES VIOLATE THE CEASE-DIRE AND ADVANCE IN THE SUBURBS," SAYS THE BANNER HEADLINE IN LEFTIST AS-SAFIR. PHLANGE ORGAN AL-AMAL CARRIES A BANNER HEADLINE: "ISRAELI ADVANCE IN THE SUBURBS AND (TROOP) CONCENTRATIONS IN BEIRUT AND THE BEKAA."

2. THE SECOND MAJOR STORY CONCERNS AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE THE BEIRUT CRISIS. AN-NAHAR'S HEADLINE IS "AN AMERICAN CONCEPT FOR THE EXIT (OF THE PALESTINIANS) ACCEPTED BY THE ISRAELIS AND AWAITING PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT." L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, IN ITS HEADLINE, IS MORE SPECIFIC ON THE ORIGIN OF THE PROPOSALS: "NEW HABIB PROPOSITION."

3. AN-NAHAR'S STORY SAYS THAT HABIB MET YESTERDAY AT YARZE WITH THE HEAD OF THE LEBANESE SIDE OF THE JOINT LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN MILITARY COMMITTEE, NABIL UNCLASSIFIED

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KRAITEM, AND "GAVE HIM AN AMERICAN CONCEPT ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL FOR THE EXIT OF THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS FROM BEIRUT AND ITS SOUTHERN SUBURBS." THE AN-NAHAR PIECE ATTRIBUTES TO A "WELL INFORMED SOURCE" THE INFORMATION THAT AMERICAN "CONCEPT" CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS "FROM WEST BEIRUT AND ITS SUBURBS WITHIN 15 DAYS." ON THE BASIS OF THREE POINTS: (1) "LAND WITHDRAWAL OVER THE INTERNATIONAL ROAD TO DAMASCUS AND FROM THERE TO

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OTHER DESIGNATED PLACES, OR SEA WITHDRAWAL ON SHIPS CARRYING THE REBCROSS FLAG, OR WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH MEANS." (2) "THE WITHDRAWAL OF A LARGE NUMBER OF THE FIGHTERS WITH ONLY THEIR INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO THE CAPITAL AND ITS SOUTHERN SUBURBS, AND THEN THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE FORCE, PROVIDED THAT THE PLO LEADERS WILL WITHDRAW WITH THE LAST GROUPS OF EVACUEES," AND (3) "ADJUSTMENT OF THE ISRAELI LINES AROUND THE CAPITAL WILL BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. XV REGARDING THE LEBANESE POSITION ON THE "CONCEPT," AN-NAHAR SAYS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE PALESTINIAN POSITION IS NOT YET ARTICULATED, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT "INSISTS THAT THE PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CAPITAL AND THE ENTRY OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTO IT MUST BE COMPLETED AT THE SAME TIME." OTHER PAPERS CARRY SIMILAR ACCOUNTS OF THE LATEST AMERICAN PROPOSALS..

4. ALL LEADING DAILIES CARRY WIRE SERVICE REPORTS ON A STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WASHINGTON MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. LEFTIST AS-SAFIR NOTES DOUBTS EMERGING IN WASHINGTON REGARDING

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CONTINUATION OF THE HABIB MISSION, IN LIGHT OF CONTINUOUS CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND SAYS THAT, AFTER THE REAGAN-SCHULTZ-SHAMIR MEETING, THE SPOKESMAN SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN "RENEWED THIS CONFIDENCE IN HABIB AND IN THE NECESSITY OF CONTINUING HIS MISSION UNTIL HE HIMSELF DECIDES TO RETURN." THE SPOKESMAN IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE NOTED THAT "THE HABIB MISSION IS PASSING THROUGH A EXTREMELY CRITICAL STAGE, BECAUSE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE IT IF THE CEASE-FIRE IS NOT RESPECTED."

5. AN INSIDE-PAGE STORY IN MODERATE AN-NAHAR PROVIDES A PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT FROM A "MINISTERIAL SOURCE:" "HABIB DID NOT SUCCEED IN HIS TOUR OF THE CAPITALS OF THE ARAB STATES, IN SPITE OF THE WORDS HE HEARD IN THESE CAPITALS ABOUT THEIR READINESS TO RECEIVE THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS, BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS WHICH WERE IMPOSED HAVE UNDERMINED THE IDEA FROM ITS BASIS.....THE HABIB MISSION DID NOT ACHIEVE ANY PRACTICAL RESULT.... THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FIND A PLACE TO RECEIVE THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IS NOT LEBANESE OR AMERICAN; IT IS ARABIC. HABIB TOLD OFFICIALS THAT HIS MISSION IS NOT TO STOP FIGHTING AND THAT HE IS NO LONGER ABLE TO BE SATISFIED WITH THE

MISSION OF PLAYING THE ROLE OF A FIREMAN AND WITH SPENDING THIS TIME TRANSPORTING GASOLINE AND FOOD SUPPLIES TO WEST BEIRUT, BECUASE HIS MISSION IS TO DIND A SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT PROBLEM...."

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6. IN ANOTHER AN-NAHAR STORY APPEARS THE OBSERVATION THAT "AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPRESSED HIS ANNOYANCE OVER THE CONTINUOUS DIFFICULTIES IMPEDING HIS MISSION, CONSIDERING THAT EVERYONE ATTEMPTS TO CRIPPLE IT, ESPECIALLY ISRAEL. HE INDICATED THAT HE IS TIRED AND SAID THAT HE MIGHT FIND HIMSELF FORCED

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TO LEAVE LEBANON AFTER A WHILE IF HIS EFFORTS ARE NOT CROWNED WITH SUCCESS. BUT IT SEEMS THAT PRESIDENT SARKIS AND FOREIGN MINISTER BUTROS WISHED HIM TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORT BECAUSE HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE COUNTRY IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD MEAN THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE WORST WHICH WOULD LEAVE NOTHING ALIVE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE BEIRUT."

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7. AN-NAHAR ALSO QUOTES ISRAELI RADIO AS SAYING THAT ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN MET JACK ANDERSON YESTERDAY AND THAT, AFTER THE MEETING, ANDERSON SAID THAT "HE (ANDERSON) DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN ENVOY PHILIP HABIB WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE (PALESTINIAN) DESTROYERS FROM BEIRUT."

8. AN-NHAR CARRIED A PIECE SAYING THAT FORMER LEBANESE PRESIDENT RAYMOND EDDE CALLED ON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO BOYCOTT THE HABIB MISSION BECAUSE OF "THE SILENCE OF AMERICA ON THE KILLING OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN, WOMEN AND ELDERLY PEOPLE, THROUGH BESIEGING THEM."

9. EDITORIALY, AN-NAHAR'S COLUMNIST EMILE KHOURY OBSERVES: "SOME SAY THAT, WITHOUT AMBASSADOR HABIB, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE INVADDED WEST BEIRUT A LONG TIME AGO. BUT WHAT WEST BEIRUT SUFFERS IN THE WAY OF SIEGE AND INSANE SHELLING IS MORE PAINFUL AND DAMAGING THAT INVASION ITSELF. THE BEIRUTIS DIE EVERY DAY AND EVEN EVERY HOUR, AND NOW PREFER QUICK DEATH TO LIVING IN DANGER, INSECURITY AND SUFFERING. THEY ARE NOT A LABORATORY FOR TESTS, AND BEIRUT, LIKE LEBANON IS NOT FOR SALE OR RENT."

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

NO. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 7/24/92 (MURPHY, RICHARD W.) OR-M

AGS: PINT, MILI, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, SA

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JULY 24 MEETING WITH KING FAHD

(S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

SUMMARY: I CALLED ON KING FAHD AT 1300 HOURS

JULY 24 FOR ONE HOUR, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR MURPHY,

AS DRAPER AND NEWTON. SINCE I HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED

THE BACKGROUND AT SOME LENGTH WITH SAUD, I CONCENTRATED

WITH FAHD ON A DISCUSSION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CURRENT

UNRESOLVED ISSUES, STRESSING THE NEED FOR SAUDI SUPPORT

IN RESOLVING THEM, PARTICULARLY AT THE TUNIS MEETING. I

SAID THAT I NEEDED SAUDI ASSENT THAT PLO SHOULD ASSEMBLE

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IN WEST BEIRUT AND LEAVE DIRECTLY FOR OTHER COUNTRIES,

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OUTLINED PRACTICAL NEED FOR SAUDI URGING THAT ASSAD AGREE TO ADF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CITY, AND FOR SAG ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON NAILING DOWN THE DETAILS OF THE PLO PULLOUT. FAHD IN TURN STRESSED THE ISSUE OF THOSE FIGHTERS WHO HAD TIES TO LEBANON, WHICH I RESPONDED MUST BE DEALT WITH IN PRACTICAL WAY CONSISTENT WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SOVEREIGNTY. FAHD ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GUARANTEES OF PALESTINIAN SAFETY IN THE WITHDRAWAL; I OUTLINED THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED AND ASSURED HIM THAT BOTH I AND THE GOL ARE CONVINCED THAT WITHDRAWAL CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN A WAY THAT WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE THE PALESTINIZNS. FAHD PLEDGED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT WITHIN ITS ABILITY TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION AND WOULD CONTINUE ITS DISCUSSION WITH SYRIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WITH TIES TO LEBANON. END SUMMARY.

3. I OPENED BY SKETCHING TO FAHD MY CURRENT PLAN OF ACTION. I STRESSED THAT WE OF COURSE ALWAYS WELCOMED SAUDI PARTICIPATION, ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE. I OUTLINED MY TWO STAGE APPROACH WITH PRIORITY TO BEIRUT. MY AIM IN THIS STAGE WAS TO LIFT THE SIEGE, ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES, AND ALLOW THE GOL TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY OVER BEIRUT. THE SECOND STAGE WOULD BE THE REASSERTION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. ALTHOUGH FOR A LONG TIME THE GOL HAS NOT EXERCISED THIS CONTROL, AS A RESULT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WE NOW HOPE THAT IN THE END THE GOL WILL ONCE AGAIN BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THIS AUTHORITY. FAHD INTERJECTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE LEBANESE PEOPLE HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE GOL'S ABILITY TO CONTROL ITS OWN

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LAND. I WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE THAT AT PRESENT AND AS A RESULT OF THE SAUD-KHADDAM VISIT TO WASHINGTON, A SENSE OF DIRECTION HAS DEVELOPED WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF BEIRUT. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT AND WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE PLO TO WITHDRAW ITS COMBATANTS FROM THE CITY. THE PLO HAS SOUGHT CERTAIN GUARANTEES, WHICH THE USG IS WILLING TO SUPPLY, INCLUDING EVEN THE USE OF U.S. FORCES. THESE GUARANTEES INVOLVE PARTICULARLY THE SAFETY OF THE FORCES WITHDRAWING AND OF THE PALESTINIAN NON-COMBATANTS REMAINING. THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE

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ALREADY DISCUSSED SOME DEPARTURE DETAILS WITH THE PLO; THE KEY QUESTION IS WHERE PLO ELEMENTS WILL GO. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT NO SINGLE COUNTRY WILL TAKE THEM ALL AND I AM NOW TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT WELCOME THEY WILL RECEIVE IN A NUMBER OF ARAB COUNTRIES.

4. I CONTINUED THAT I HAD VISITED SYRIA TO MEET WITH KHADDAM AND ASSAD. I HAD BEEN WELL-RECEIVED AND THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN VERY BUSINESSLIKE. THEY HAD SAID THAT SYRIA COULD NOT TAKE ALL PLO ELEMENTS BUT WOULD ACCEPT THE LEADERSHIP, THE PLO OFFICES AND THE PLAN WHICH I ESTIMATE TO TOTAL ABOUT 2,600 PERSONS. ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF A TEMPORARY STOP IN THE BIQA' HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, THIS DID NOT NOW SEEM PRACTICAL TO MYSELF OR TO SARKIS. I HAD THEREFORE TOLD SARKIS AND WAZZAN THAT DURING MY CURRENT TRIP I WOULD TRY TO RESOLVE THE BEIRUT WITHDRAWAL ISSUE ON THE BASIS THAT THE PLO ELEMENTS WOULD BE CONSOLIDATED IN WEST BEIRUT AND WOULD LEAVE DIRECTLY FROM THERE FOR THEIR DESTINATIONS WITHOUT STOPPING ANYWHERE ELSE IN LEBANON. ASSAD HAD AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE, ALSO RECOGNIZING THAT AN INTERMEDIATE STOP WAS NOT PRACTICAL FROM A GOL STANDPOINT. FAHD SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST ON THIS POINT AND I CONFIRMED THAT ASSAD WOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO CONSOLIDATE IN SYRIA AND AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD ALSO NOT CONSOLIDATE ANYWHERE ELSE IN LEBANON OUTSIDE OF BEIRUT. I NOTED THAT AS SOON AS WE HAD A

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CLEAR IDEA WHERE THEY COULD GO, THEY COULD LEAVE ANY WAY THEY WISH -- BY LAND, SEA, OR POSSIBLY EVEN BY AIR.

5. I TOLD FAHD THAT I HAD ALSO DISCUSSED IN SYRIA THE PROBLEM OF PLO UNITS WHICH HAD COME FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS THAT THEY SHOULD RETURN TO THOSE COUNTRIES. THE SYRIANS WERE WILLING TO TAKE BACK UNITS THAT HAD ORIGINATED FROM SYRIA AND WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE VIEW THAT OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO TAKE BACK SUCH UNITS. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE SEEING HUBARAK TOMORROW ON EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SOME COMBATANTS AND WILL CONTINUE ON TO LONDON TO SEE KING HUSSAIN. I EXPRESSED TO FAHD THE STRONG HOPE THAT I WILL BE SUPPORTING AN ARAB INTEREST AND EVEN AN ARAB RESPONSIBILITY JOINTLY HELD TO SEE THAT THESE ELEMENTS ARE WELCOMED IN THE APPROPRIATE ARAB COUNTRIES. SAUD HAD TOLD ME THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN TUNIS

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ON TUESDAY. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT WE WILL GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT THERE WHICH I KNOW WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MY EFFORT AND THAT I HOPED THAT THE NUMBERS AGREED UPON BY THE VARIOUS ARAB STATES WILL MATCH THE NUMBERS OF PLO NEEDING TO LEAVE BEIRUT. I CONTINUED THAT AFTER SEEING KING HUSSAYN I WOULD GO TO ISRAEL TO SETTLE SOME DIFFERENCES WITH THE ISRAELIS OVER THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS; THEN I WOULD RETURN TO BEIRUT TO BEGIN THE DETAILED PLANNING FOR A SAFE-WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER BEIRUT. ONCE THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED, I WILL MOVE ON THE LARGER SECOND STAGE OF LEBANON.

6. I THEN SKETCHED FOR FAHD CERTAIN SUBJECTS WHICH REMAIN TO BE CONFIRMED IN A FINAL SENSE AND ON WHICH I WILL NEED ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE FROM SAG AND ALL RESPONSIBLE ARAB ELEMENTS:

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(A) I NEED TO CONFIRM THAT THE PLO COMBATANTS WILL GO DIRECTLY FROM BEIRUT WITHOUT STOPPING IN THE BIQA'. I SAID THAT FAHD'S ASSENT AND THAT OF THE SYRIANS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN MY VIEW. FAHD DID NOT DEMUR.

(B) WE HAVE NOT YET RESOLVED THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN ARMY FORCES IN WEST BEIRUT AS PART OF THE ADF. ASSAD HAD TOLD ME THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE GOL TO WORK OUT WITH THE ALE AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. I HAD RESPONDED THAT IF WE WERE TO SUCCEED IN LIFTING THE SIEGE ON THE CITY AND RESTORING GOL AUTHORITY, OBVIOUSLY ALL EXTERNAL FORCES SHOULD LEAVE BEIRUT, ALTHOUGH AS PART OF THE ADF SYRIAN FORCES WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE LEBANON ENTIRELY. THIS IS NEEDED AS A PRACTICAL MATTER SO THAT WE CAN LIFT THE SIEGE AND BRING IN THE MNF AND THE LAF. I REALIZE THAT THE ADF HAD SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS AND COULD GO ANYWHERE ELSE IN LEBANON OR RETURN TO SYRIA, ALTHOUGH I HAD SUGGESTED TO ASSAD THAT PRACTICALLY SPEAKING THEY NEEDED TO RETURN TO SYRIA FOR RE-EQUIPPING.

(C) WE STILL NEED TO WORK OUT THE FINAL EXACT DETAILS WITH THE PLO ON WITHDRAWAL. THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PLO THROUGH THE GOL, BUT NO PRECISE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED. WHEN THE PLO IS READY, WE WILL NEED TO EXECUTE THE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAYS.

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7. FAHD THANKED ME FOR MY PRESENTATION AND RESPONDED THAT THE PROBLEM IS CLEAR AND WELL-KNOWN. HE IDENTIFIED TWO PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FACTORS:

(A) IN HIS VIEW THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IS THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS IN WEST BEIRUT. HE SAW NO PROBLEM WITH THE RETURN OF THOSE WHO HAD ORIGINATED IN OTHER COUNTRIES RETURNING TO THOSE COUNTRIES, BUT HE FELT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THEM WERE RESIDENTS OF LEBANON. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT THIS MAY BE TRUE OF LEBANON AS A WHOLE.

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BUT I THOUGHT THAT PLO ELEMENTS IN WEST BEIRUT WERE MAINLY NOT FROM LEBANON. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE GOL AND THAT IT APPEARED REASONABLE TO ACCEPT SOME WITH SPECIAL TIES WHO COULD LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND "DISAPPEAR" INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY, BUT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE NUMBER NOT BE TOO GREAT OR THAT THIS BE USED AS A SUBTERFUGE TO KEEP INDIVIDUAL COMBATANTS OR UNITS IN THE CITY. THEY WOULD ALL HAVE TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND COME FULLY UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY. THIS WAS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM WHICH NEEDED TO BE DEALT WITH IN A PRACTICAL WAY. FAHD RESPONDED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WITH TIES TO LEBANON; IT WOULD CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR A SOLUTION.

(B) FAHD ASKED HOW WOULD THE PALESTINIANS LEAVE BEIRUT AND WHAT WOULD BE THE GUARANTEE THAT WOULD CONVINCE THE PALESTINIANS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE HARMED AS THEY LEFT? I REPLIED THAT WE HAD MADE SOME VERY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THE LEBANESE WHICH I HAD DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH SAUD. I OUTLINED BRIEFLY THE PROPOSED TIME TABLE AND THE ROLE FOR THE ICRC, U.N. OBSERVERS, AND THE MNF, ETC. I SAID THAT I BELIEVED THIS COULD BE DONE IN A WAY WHICH WAS BOTH EFFICIENT AND DID NOT JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE PALESTINIANS. THAT, I STRESSED, IS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE LEBANESE. FAHD OBSERVED THAT IN HIS VIEW NO ONE COULD MAKE SUCH GUARANTEES UNLESS THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES AGREE. WHO COULD GUARANTEE ISRAELI BEHAVIOR? I REPLIED THAT NO GUARANTEE IS PERFECT. WHEN I RETURN TO BEIRUT AND KNOW WHERE THE PALESTINIANS WILL GO, MY FIRST TASK WILL BE ARRANGING THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT OF THE PLO. IT WAS OF COURSE DIFFICULT TO GET SUCH DETAILS

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WORKED OUT UNTIL WE KNEW WHERE THE PUO ELEMENTS WOULD BE
RECEIVED. IT IS ALSO A LITTLE SLOW TO WORK THROUGH OTHER

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PARTIES, BUT I AM CONFIDENT AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED.
IN ANY CASE, I EMPHASIZED THAT IT WILL HELP TO MAKE
AGREEMENT EASIER WHEN EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE ARAB
COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE SUPPORTS THIS PROCESS.
8. IN CLOSING, FAHD REAFFIRMED THAT THE SAG WOULD DO
WHATEVER WAS IN ITS POWER TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION AND
TO KEEP THE PROBLEM FROM REACHING A CRITICAL STAGE. I
RESPONDED THAT, ON THAT GENERAL PRINCIPLE, I ALSO PLANNED
TO HOPE FOR AND WORK WITH THE EFFORTS NOT ONLY OF SAUDI
LEADERS BUT WITH OTHERS WITH WHOM I WILL TALK. THE
STATEMENTS I HAD HEARD FROM THE SAUDI AND SYRIAN GOVERN-
MENTS HAD REASSURED ME THAT ARAB EFFORT WILL BE EXERTED
IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY. WITHOUT IT, I DID NOT THINK THAT
I COULD SUCCEED. MURLHY UNQUOTE STOESEL

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EXDIS - FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/23/92

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN LEBANON

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2. AS YOU ALL KNOW, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON NOW SHARPLY FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE OF WEST BEIRUT. PHIL HABIB'S EFFORTS, AND OURS HERE WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE GOL AND THE PLO TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY THE GOL, THROUGH THE LEBANESE ARMY, EXTENDS ITS AUTHORITY INTO WEST BEIRUT, AND THE PLO AGREES TO A SMARTLY PACED PHASEOUT OF ITS ARMAMENTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL STATUS IN BEIRUT AND LEBANON. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ALSO WILL INCLUDE THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP. I REALIZE THAT BOTH YOU AND YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS INEVITABLY ARE LEARNING OF EVENTS WELL AFTER THE FACT AND IN ONLY FRAGMENTARY FASHION. THIS IS UNAVOIDABLE NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS FAST MOVING, BUT ALSO BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN WORKING LARGELY WITH THE ISRAELIS DIRECTLY HERE AND OVER SECURE PHONE LINK WITH PHIL HABIB AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE OUTSIDE BEIRUT. OUR CHANCERY THERE IS CLOSED, AS YOU KNOW. THE LATEST CEASEFIRE IS FRAGILE, ALREADY BEING VIOLATED AND, DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS, CAN WELL BREAK DOWN ALTOGETHER IF THE BREAKTHROUGH IS DELAYED.

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3. THE LEBANON WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD WILL BE FULLY SOVEREIGN IN ALL ITS TERRITORY--FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ALMOST A DECADE--AND ITS AUTHORITY WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE PRESSURES OF FOREIGN FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE BEGIN BY SECURING LEBANON'S CAPITAL, BEIRUT, NOT ONLY FROM ISRAELI ATTACK BUT ALSO FROM THE PRESENCE THERE OF PLO AND SYRIAN ARMED FORCES. IF WE CAN SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING GOL AUTHORITY IN BEIRUT IN THE DAYS JUST AHEAD, WE CAN THEN BEGIN ARRANGING, IN PARALLEL, THE PHASED EXPANSION OF GOL AUTHORITY AND THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN TROOPS FROM ALL OF LEBANON. ONCE WE ARE WELL LAUNCHED ON THIS COURSE--AND SUCCESS IS BY NO MEANS ASSURED--WE CAN AGAIN TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH MORE THAN EVER REQUIRES OUR BEST AND MOST URGENT EFFORTS.

4. THE JOB YOU HAVE TO DO WITH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS IS BOTH TO CONVINCE THEM THAT, FIRST. OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT FURTHER BLOODSHED AND TO STRUCTURE A SECURE FUTURE FOR A FULLY SOVEREIGN LEBANON ARE GOALS THEY SHOULD SUPPORT. THIS IS BEING DONE IN FULL AGREEMENT AND COOPERATION WITH THE GOL. SECOND, THE PLO MUST FACE THE NEW REALITIES OF THE GROUND AND QUICKLY MAKE THE NECESSARY DIFFICULT DECISIONS. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN PALESTINIANS CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR CAUSE IN THE FUTURE.

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5. SINCE THE ISRAELI INVASION, WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING WE COULD DO TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE AND NOW WE ARE TRYING TO ASSURE THAT THE CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO THIS TRAGEDY ARE NOT RECREATED. WE ARE COMMITTED TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THERE MUST ALSO BE AN END TO AND WITHDRAWAL OF PLO MILITARY PRESENCE AND ITS STATUS AS A "STATE WITHIN A STATE" IN LEBANON. THERE MUST BE WITHDRAWAL AS WELL OF SYRIAN FORCES AND THE EXTENSION OF GOL AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT LEBANON, INCLUDING HADDAD'S ENCLAVE.

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6. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS NOT RPT NOT DELUDE THEMSELVES THAT THE WEST BEIRUT SITUATION HAS BECOME ONE IN WHICH THERE IS ROOM FOR MUCH, IF ANY, SUBTLE POLITICAL MANEUVERING. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A FEW DAYS, IF NOT HOURS. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE THUS FAR KEPT THE ISRAELIS FROM ASSAULTING THE CITY SHOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED BY THE PLO OR ARAB GOVERNMENTS INTO A BELIEF THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL ALLOW PROLONGED HAGGLING. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE HEARD FROM SOME ARAB AND EUROPEAN SOURCES THAT THE PLO MAY BELIEVE, AS MAY SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS, THAT SOME KIND OF SIMPLE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE GOL MAY ESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY IN WEST BEIRUT WILL IN ITSELF SUFFICE TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE PLO MIGHT AGREE TO DISARM FULLY AND ACCEPT GOL AUTHORITY ONLY AFTER ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM WEST BEIRUT OR, IN SOME VERSIONS, FROM LEBANON. THIS WILL NOT WASH. THERE MUST BE, AND QUICKLY, AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO A DETAILED PLAN FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY TO TAKE CONTROL IN WEST BEIRUT AND TO BEGIN TO COLLECT PLO ARMS AND TO ARRANGE SAFE PASSAGE OUT OF THE CITY, AND IN MANY CASES, OUT OF THE COUNTRY, FOR PLO FIGHTERS AND LEADERS. ONLY WITH THIS AGREEMENT IN HAND CAN WE CREDIBLY DEMAND ISRAELI COOPERATION IN RELIEVING PRESSURE ON WEST BEIRUT AND ACHIEVE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

7. THIS IS AN HISTORIC MOMENT FOR LEBANON AND FOR THE PLO. THOSE HOST GOVERNMENTS WITH INFLUENCE ON THE PLO SHOULD USE IT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT A MASSIVE ISRAELI ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT DEPENDS ON PLO'S RAPID DECISION TO ACCEPT THIS NEW REALITY AND REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL, INCLUDING ON THE MODALITIES NECESSARY

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TO IMPLEMENT AGREEMENT. IT IS OUR BEST JUDGMENT THAT THIS MUST BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT 24 TO 30 HOURS IF A FURTHER TRAGEDY IS TO BE AVERTED.

8. INFO ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING AS APPROPRIATE.

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STATE 195659

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E.O. 12065: RDS 7/14/02 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, PLO, SY, LE, IS, XF, US
SUBJ : LEBANON: GUIDANCE FOR BRIEFING HOST
GOVERNMENTS

REF: STATE 187116✓

1. [REDACTED]

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2. POSTS MAY DRAW UPON THE GUIDANCE BELOW TO RESPOND TO
HOST GOVERNMENT QUERIES ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND
THE STATUS OF AMB. HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, NEA
POSTS SHOULD ALSO DRAW UPON MIDDLE EAST PORTIONS OF
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SHULTZ' TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (SEPTEL).

3. SITUATION IN LEBANON:

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--A CEASEFIRE IS HOLDING IN LEBANON AS OF JULY 14, ALTHOUGH VIOLATIONS CONTINUE TO RECUR. THE CROSSING

POINTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT ARE OPEN TO TRAFFIC, BUT THE FLOW OF FOOD SUPPLIES TO THE BELEAGUERED WESTERN PART OF THE CITY IS STILL SUBJECT TO INTERRUPTION. POWER AND WATER HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO WEST BEIRUT.

--THE INTENSE ISRAELI SHELLING ON JULY 9-10 OF THE ENVIRONS OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE PALESTINIAN REPRISALS INTO EAST BEIRUT AND UPON ISRAELI POSITIONS INDICATE THE DANGER THAT WILL HANG OVER BEIRUT UNTIL THE PROBLEM OF THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT IS SOLVED.

--THE U.S. CONTINUES TO DO THE UTMOST TO ASSURE SCRUPULOUS OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE PROVISION OF PROMPT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO LEBANON'S INHABITANTS.

4. HABIB MISSION:

--THE U.S. REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM, AS THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN OUR BROADER EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE

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GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES TOWARD: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON; A PERMANENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON; RESTORATION OF CONTROL BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; AND FORMATION OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON TO ASSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

--PHIL HABIB'S ENERGIES REMAIN FULLY ENGAGED IN PUTTING TOGETHER A PACKAGE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PLO THAT WOULD ENTAIL THE WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT OF THE PLO LEADERS AND FIGHTERS. THE GENERAL SHAPE OF THIS PACKAGE IS ESSENTIALLY IN PLACE, BUT THE DETAILS STILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT.

--LET ME MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT OUR GOAL TO HUMILIATE OR ELIMINATE THE PLO LEADERSHIP, BUT TO RESOLVE THE THREAT TO WEST BEIRUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS GOAL IS THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE-TO CONTRIBUTE U.S. FORCES TO A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (MNF) FOR BEIRUT.

--THE MODALITIES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MNF, INCLUDING ITS NUMBER, PLACEMENT AND TIMING, WILL BE PART

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OF THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR A PLO DEPARTURE FROM WEST BEIRUT. THE FORCE WOULD BE IN PLACE NO LONGER THAN 30 DAYS; THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE. DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE ON THE

NECESSARY CONDITIONS TO BE MET PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE.

--A CENTRAL PROBLEM THAT HAS ARISEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THREATENS THEIR PROGRESS IS DETERMINING A DESTINATION FOR THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND FIGHTERS WHO WILL

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LEAVE BEIRUT AND LEBANON.

--THE U.S. HAS BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY TO OVERCOME THIS OBSTACLE. NO RECIPIENT STATE HAS YET BEEN FOUND, EITHER AS A LONG-TERM OR TEMPORARY SAFEHAVEN FOR THE PLO. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS WITH THE COOPERATION OF KEY ARAB STATES.

--THIS ESSENTIAL POINT MUST BE SOLVED SOON. ISRAELI IMPATIENCE IS GROWING, INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE TO END THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM. WE FIND IT A PARADOX THAT THE U.S. IS DOING ALL IT CAN TO TRY TO FIND AN HONORABLE MEANS FOR THE PLO IN BEIRUT TO DEPART LEBANON IN SAFETY, YET THE ARAB STATES THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION WHICH ADDRESSES THE PLIGHT OF THE PLO, NOT TO MENTION THE THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE WHO SHARE WEST BEIRUT WITH THE PLO.

5. FOR TUNIS: SUGGEST THAT YOU USE THE ABOVE IN YOUR MEETING WITH ARAB LEAGUE SEC GEN KLBI.

6. BEIRUT, DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. STOESSEL

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BEIRUT 5992

EXDIS

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW UP: IDF ADVANCE IN SOUTHERN
SUBURBS

REF: BEIRUT 5989N

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. THIS MORNING, IDF LIAISON COL. ABU FARHAT INFORMED ME
THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD OFFERED TO TURN OVER TOMORROW TO THE

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LAF THE HENRI SHAHAB BARRACKS IN OUZAI AREA. THE IDF HAD "OFFERED"
ALSO TO CLEAR THE STREETS NORTH OF THIS AREA, FORMING A
ROUGH TRIANGLE. THE IDF HAS ALSO PROPOSED SENDING TROOPS
TEMPORARILY UP TO THE VICINITY OF SPORT CITY, OSTENSIBLY
TO PROTECT THOSE CARRYING OUT THE MINE-CLEARING OPERATION.3. I TOLD ABU FARHAT HE SHOULD NOT ALLOW IDF TROOPS UP
THERE; IT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.
I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS ONLY GOING THROUGH

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THE MOTIONS OF PROTESTING TO THE IDF, ALTHOUGH HE WAS CLEARLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI MOTIVES. SINCE RETURNING TO THE RESIDENCE AT ABOUT 1500, I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE IDF, ALTHOUGH ONLY RELATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. DRORY AND BARAK LEFT FOR ISRAEL EARLIER TODAY. PRESIDENT SARKIS CALLED ME AT 3:15 TO URGE THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FROM THE PLACES THEY ARE NOW OCCUPYING, SAYING IT COULD CAUSE A CRISI. JOHNNY ABDU SAID THAT ARMED MILITIAS, AS WELL AS AMAL, HAD GOTTEN TERRIBLY EXCITED AND WERE COMING OUT INTO THE STREETS WITH ARMS AGAIN. THIS COULD DESTROY ALL THEIR CONFIDENCE IN WAZZAN'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL TAKEOVER OF WEST BEIRUT BY THE LAF/ISF. TO TOP IT ALL, A NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBED THE PRESENCE OF WHAT WERE CLEARLY IDF TROOPS AT A KEY CROSSING POINT.

4. I FIND IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ON THE VERGE OF A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE INTO THE CAMPS, BUT THIS IS THE WAY IT IS BEING INTERPRETED AMONG MANY LEBANESE. GOING WHERE THEY APPARENTLY HAVE GONE TODAY CONSTITUTES THE OUTFLANKING OF A MAJOR PALESTINIAN CAMP. IT MAY TURN OUT TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN A PROBE TO SEE WHAT THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH OR WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE USEFUL PRESSURE AT THIS MOMENT. WHATEVER THE

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MOTIVATION, IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY MOVE BACK QUICKLY TO THE POSITIONS THEY PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED (WE CAN SORT OUT THE QUESTION OF MINE CLEARING OPERATIONS LATER). I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT THE LINE TO TAKE IS THAT WHICH I JUST GAVE TO THE MOST SENIOR IDF OFFICER PRESENT AT IDF HEADQUARTERS AT ABOUT 1520 LOCAL: --WE HAVE A RELIABLE EYEWITNESS REPORT OF IDF TROOPS FURTHER NORTH IN THE OUZAI'I AREA THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN BEFORE.

--THEIR PRESENCE IS CAUSING PANDEMONIUM AND ALARM IN WEST BEIRUT. THIS COULD UPSET EVERYTHING WE ARE TRYING TO DO AT A CRITICAL MOMENT TO TAKE OVER PEACEFULLY WEST BEIRUT.

--SARKIS JUST CALLED US TO URGE THAT THE IDF TROOPS WITHDRAW TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS. THIS SHOULD BE CONVEYED AS AN OFFICIAL GOL REQUEST OF ISRAEL.

--PEOPLE WILL LOSE CONFIDENCE IN WAZZAN'S ABILITY TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL NEUTRALIZATION OF WEST BEIRUT. THIS IDF MOVEMENT COULD NOT OCCUR AT A WORSE MOMENT.

--THEREFORE (I SAID), PLEASE PASS A MESSAGE TO THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE OFFICER SO THAT A QUICK DECISION CAN BE MADE TO PULL BACK IDF TROOPS INSTANTLY TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS. WE CAN TALK ABOUT THIS ISSUE LATER, BUT IT IS URGENT THAT THEY BE PULLED BACK RIGHT AWAY.

--THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.

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--(THE IDF LIEUTENANT SAID THE IDF COLONEL GAL (SIC)
HAD BEEN SENT TO THE SCENE TO CHECK ON WHAT WAS
HAPPENING BUT IDF HEADQUARTERS HAD NO CLEAR IDEA.)
DILLON
UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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FROM DRAPER

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, XF, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW UP: SCORE SHEET OF LEBANESE-
ISRAELI DEVELOPMENTS IN BEIRUT AREA1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. ONE KISS DOES NOT MAKE A ROMANCE, BUT THE PRESENT SITU-
ATION IN THE BEIRUT AREA HAS MORE PROMISING TRENDS THAN
NEGATIVE ONES. SOME ARE NOTED BELOW:-- DESPITE THE SEPTEMBER 4 TURMOIL CAUSED BY WVHE IDF'S MINE-
AND ROAD-CLEARING OPERATION, IT APPEARS THAT THE LAF WILL BE

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ABLE TO MOVE TODAY INTO ADDED KEY AREAS, INCLUDING THE HENRI
SHIHAB BARRACKS, AT THE SCENE OF YESTERDAY'S INCIDENTS.-- THE LAF AND ISF ARE MAKING REASONABLE PROGRESS
IN OPENING UP WEST BEIRUT AND IN NEUTRALIZING DANGEROUS
ELEMENTS. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CARRIED OUT SOME CAREFUL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MURABITUN, THE PARTISANS OF THE
REVOLUTION, AND OTHERS IN A CAPACITY TO CAUSE REAL TROUBLE,
AND THE ISF AND LAF HAVE BEEN MOVING INTO KEY SPOTS --
PROBABLY STILL TOO HESITANTLY -- UNDER THE CAUTIOUS**UNCLASSIFIED**

DIRECTION OF WAZZAN. BUT THE MOOD OF THE LEBANESE IS OPTIMISTIC AND GOOD SPIRITED ON THE WHOLE. A MASSIVE CLEAN-UP OF WEST BEIRUT IS WELL UNDERWAY. EVEN SOME WHO HAVE BEEN BITTER TOWARD THE U.S. HAVE BEEN GIVING US KUDOS. PEOPLE ARE ALREADY STARTING TO REPAIR THEIR DAMAGED PROPERTIES WHICH FOR SOME WILL BE THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME.

-- LEBANESE CITIZENS ARE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE ARMY, THE ISF, AND G-2 INTELLIGENCE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ARMS CACHES AND TROUBLEMAKERS.

-- THE PLO TURNED OVER AT THE END FIVE IMPORTANT ARMS STORAGE AREAS, FOUR OF WHICH ARE UNDERGROUND. FOUR ARE IN THE FAKHANI AREA AND ONE IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SABRA PALESTINIAN CAMP ITSELF. VIRTUALLY ALL THAT HAS BEEN RECOVERED SO FAR FROM ONE DEPOT (15 TRUCKLOADS) IS AMMUNITION, INCLUDING 23MM AND 37MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT SHELLS. THE 15 TRUCKLOADS, WE WERE TOLD, ARE ONLY A SMALL BEGINNING IN THIS ONE DEPOT. MINES, 120MM AND 81MM MORTAR SHELLS HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER, ALONG WITH 15 TONS OF 160MM SHELLS, AND TWO TRUCKS MOUNTED WITH MULTIPLE KATUSHA ROCKET LAUNCHERS.

-- LAF LIAISON TELLS US ALSO THAT THE PALESTINIANS IN THIS AREA HAVE WELCOMED THE LAF PRESENCE AND, FOR THAT REASON, THE LAF MAY MOVE MORE RAPIDLY INTO THESE PALESTINIAN CONCENTRATIONS THAN THEY THOUGHT POSSIBLE A FEW DAYS AGO.

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-- AIRPORT: THE IDF AND LAF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH WORKING LEVEL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES (AND PERHAPS EVEN WITH MEA AND OTHER AIRPORT USERS) HAVE COME TO A "PRAGMATIC AGREEMENT" ON THE IDF TURNOVER OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO THE LEBANESE. THIS PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDING ALLOWS AN ISRAELI PRESENCE. -- FOR LIGHT MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND AN OCCASIONAL C-130 -- WITH THE TAXIWAYS AND PARKING AREAS LOCATED AT A LITTLE-USED AREA AT THE END OF ONE RUNWAY. THE OTHER EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIVE LEBANESE USE OF THE AIRPORT WOULD BE THE PRESENCE OF AN ISRAELI AIR CONTROLLER, TO DEAL WITH ISRAELI PILOTS WHO DO NOT USE ENGLISH. OTHERWISE, THE PERIMETERS OF THE AIRPORT AND ALL ENTRANCES WOULD BE SECURED BY THE LAF AND ISF. ACCESS TO THE LIMITED AREA THE IDF WOULD USE WOULD BE THROUGH A LAF CHECKPOINT. PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, HOWEVER, HAS REJECTED THIS PRAGMATIC AGREEMENT, IN PART BECAUSE HE WORRIED THAT THIS KIND OF ISRAELI FOOTHOLD MIGHT COMPLICATE A NEAR-TERM PULLBACK FROM BEIRUT, AND IN PART BECAUSE HE BELIEVES ARAB COUNTRIES WILL NOT DO BUSINESS WITH CARRIERS OPERATING FROM AN AIRPORT WHERE ISRAELIS ARE PRESENT. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT PRESSURE FROM COMMERCIAL USERS COULD CAUSE HIM TO CHANGE HIS MIND. THE AIRPORT COULD BE READY FOR FULL COMMERCIAL USE WITHIN FOUR DAYS, AFTER A FINAL AGREEMENT.

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3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE MAY BE NEW COMPLICATIONS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. GENERAL DROURY YESTERDAY TOLD ME BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR CONSULTATIONS IN ISRAEL THAT HE COULD FORESEE THE MOMENT WHEN ORDINARY ISRAELIS MIGHT WANT TO WALK AROUND WEST BEIRUT AND SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING. (HE DOES NOT USE ENGLISH EASILY, BUT THE IMPLICATION OF WHAT HE WAS SAYING WAS THAT -- IF CONDITIONS IN WEST BEIRUT SETTLE DOWN THE GOL ASSERTS ITS AUTHORITY -- THERE SHOULD BE NO REAL BARRIER TO ISRAELIS GOING FREELY INTO WEST BEIRUT JUST LIKE OTHER VISITORS.)
DILLON
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SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 20143

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, US, FR, IT

SUBJECT: HABIB'S DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALIAN OFFICIALS,
- SEPTEMBER 2

REF: ROME 20044

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB MET SEPTEMBER 2 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO AND SEPARATELY WITH MFA SECRETARY GENERAL Malfatti. COLOMBO EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR HABIB'S SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS; HABIB IN TURN EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE WORK OF THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT AND THE ITALIAN MNF CONTINGENT. COLOMBO TOLD HABIB THAT THE ITALIANS WERE STUDYING THE PRESIDENT'S

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NEW MIDDLE EAST PROPOSALS WHICH HE THOUGHT WENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION; THEY WOULD GIVE US A FULL REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ON LEBANON, Malfatti ASSURED HABIB THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO DO THEIR FULL SHARE.
END SUMMARY.

3. HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR RABB AND DCM, CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO ON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 2. COLOMBO AND HABIB ALSO MET JOINTLY WITH THE PRESS, WHICH

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GAVE AMPLE COVERAGE. COLOMBO EXPRESSED TO HABIB THE DEEPEST APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE FOR HABIB'S SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS, WHICH WERE DUE IN GREAT PART TO HABIB'S PERSEVERANCE, ABILITY AND FAITH. HABIB REPLIED THAT NONE OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THESE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS, INCLUDING THE ITALIAN OFFICIALS AT BEIRUT, HAD EVER BEEN OTHER THAN OPTIMISTIC, ALTHOUGH THINGS HAD COME NEAR TO A MAJOR HUMAN CATASTROPHE FAR GREATER THAN THE LOSS OF LIFE WHICH HAD OCCURRED. HABIB RECALLED THAT ON HIS PREVIOUS VISIT TO ROME HE HAD TALKED OF THE NEED TO END THE FIRST PHASE, THE BEIRUT CRISIS, IN ORDER TO GO ON TO THE SECOND PHASE, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND RESTORATION OF UNITED LEBANON. THE SECOND PHASE HAD NOW BEGUN, AND AS THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES BEGAN TO ASSERT AUTHORITY IT APPEARED THAT OUR MNF CONTINGENTS COULD DEPART IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME. AS REPORTED REFTEL, HABIB INDICATED THAT WE WERE THINKING ABOUT AN MNF DEPARTURE DATE OF SEPTEMBER 10, AND COLOMBO AND MALFATTI SEPARATELY INDICATED THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD WANT TO LEAVE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE AMERICANS.

4. HABIB NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WERE STILL NERVOUS AND LEANING ON US FOR MAINLY MORAL SUPPORT. WE HOPE TO GET THE ISRAELI FORCES TO DISENGAGE FROM THE

[REDACTED]

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BEIRUT AREA BEFORE THE NEW GOVERNMENT CAME INTO OFFICE. (HABIB NOTED THAT HE HOPED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S INAUGURATION.) HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, WHO WANTED THE MNF TO STAY LONGER, THAT IF THE LEBANESE MOVED QUICKLY TO ASSERT THEIR AUTHORITY, THEY WOULD NOT NEED THE MNF. HABIB EMPHASIZED TO COLOMBO THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO ARRANGE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. HE ASSURED COLOMBO THAT WE WOULD NOT ABANDON LEBANON ONCE THE JOB WAS FINISHED.

BOTH POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR REUNITED LEBANON AND THE RECONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, AND HABIB HOPED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD DO ITS PART. AT THE SAME TIME, IF FOREIGN FORCES LEFT THE COUNTRY, THE LEBANESE WITH THEIR CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES WOULD BE ABLE TO DO MUCH OF THE REBUILDING THEMSELVES. COLOMBO NOTED THAT THE ITALIANS HAD ALREADY PROVIDED FOOD, MEDICAL AID, AND TENTS, AS WELL AS AN AIR BRIDGE FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 15 BILLION LIRE (OVER 10 MILLION DOLLARS).

5. HABIB CONTINUED THAT WE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO HAVE ITALIAN COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW INITIATIVE. COLOMBO, NOTING SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LETTER TO HIM, SAID THAT THE ITALIANS WERE NOW STUDYING THE PRESIDENT'S

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PROPOSALS AND WOULD GIVE US A FULL REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, HE COULD SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE PROPOSALS WENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND THAT SOME ELEMENTS COINCIDED WITH ITALY'S EXISTING POSITION. HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD AFTER VERY CAREFUL DISCUSSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ALSO

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 20143

EXDIS
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SOME GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA. HE EMPHASIZED THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH THESE PROPOSALS; THEY WERE BASED ON A VERY REALISTIC JUDGMENT OF WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT. HABIB FELT THAT THE LEBANESE SITUATION HAD UNDOUBTEDLY REFOCUSSED ATTENTION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. COLOMBO AGREED THAT IT WAS A CASE OF STRIKING WHILE THE IRON WAS HOT, TO AVOID STAGNATION.

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6. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF LEBANON, MINISTER COLOMBO SAID THAT THE ITALIANS HAD BEGUN TO FEAR THAT THE END OF ONE GAME COULD LEAD TO THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER--A NEW CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. HABIB AGREED; WE NEEDED TO QUESTION HOW TO BRING ABOUT A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS, TAKING CARE NOT TO EQUATE THE ISRAELI PRESENCE WITH THAT OF THE SYRIANS, WHO INSISTED THEY WERE LEGALLY IN THE COUNTRY. BEGIN HAD TOLD HABIB PRIVATELY THAT HE ACCEPTED THE

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CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL; SHARON HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE SAME CONCEPT. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELIS WOULD REMAIN WORRIED ABOUT THEIR NORTHERN BORDER AND SO SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WOULD PRESUMABLY STILL BE NEEDED AS A BUFFER. BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA HAD A SIMILAR INTEREST IN SEEING THE OTHER LEAVE; WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A MEDIATOR. THERE WAS ALSO THE ADDED PROBLEM OF THE RESIDUAL PALESTINIAN COMBAT FORCE IN THE NORTH, NUMBERING TEN TO TWELVE THOUSAND ARMED MEN; A SIZEABLE GROUP EVEN IF SOME FADED AWAY. (COLOMBO SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THESE.)

7. HABIB CONTINUED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WANT THE SYRIAN FORCE TO REMAIN; THE PROBLEM WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITHIN THE ARAB LEAGUE. COLOMBO NOTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND GULF STATES HAD BEEN PAYING FOR THE FORCE, AND PERHAPS THOSE WHO HELD THE PURSE STRINGS COULD PUT ON PRESSURE. HABIB NOTED OTHER STIMULI--THE ISRAELI FORCES WERE ONLY 25 MILES FROM DAMASCUS--AND ASSAD HAD TOLD HIM THAT SYRIAN INFLUENCE IN LEBANON DID NOT DEPEND ON A SYRIAN TROOP PRESENCE. PERHAPS THE SYRIANS COULD BE BROUGHT TO WITHDRAW BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

8. HABIB NOTED THAT THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS LIKELY TO BE MUCH MORE FRIENDLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. AT THE SAME TIME, HABIB HAD BEEN WARNING THE ISRAELIS NOT TO SMOTHER GEMAYEL, AND HAD BEEN WARNING GEMAYEL TO LOOK TO HIS ARAB TIES. A HASTY ISRAELI MOVE TOWARD A PEACE TREATY COULD BE VERY WORRISOME. AS REGARDED MAJOR HADDAD, WE FELT HIS FORCES MUST BE DISPERSED AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE MELDED INTO THE LEBANESE FORCES; PRESUMABLY SOME SETTLEMENT COULD BE MADE WITH HADDAD. GEMAYEL HAD

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INDICATED TO HABIB THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO LEAVE A SEPARATE ELEMENT OVER THE LONG TERM IN THE SOUTH. HOWEVER, FOR THE MOMENT HE HAD MORE URGENT PROBLEMS WITH HADDED, E.G. HIS RELATIONS WITH THE MOSLEMS.

9. COLOMBO ASKED FOR HABIB'S VIEWS ON THE FRENCH-EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, IN THE WAKE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. HABIB SAID THAT AT TIMES HE HAD FELT THE NEED FOR A CEASE-FIRE ON RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR THE MOMENT, FRANCE AND EGYPT HAD AGREED TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION. WE ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE MORE CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

10. HABIB THEN CALLED ON SECRETARY GENERAL MALFATTI, WHO TOLD HABIB THAT HE THOUGHT HABIB'S WORK HAD LED TO THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN 30 YEARS. HE FELT THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES, AND ONLY HABIB, COULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS. IT HAD BEEN A GREAT VICTORY FOR PEACE, AND FOR THE WEST. MOREOVER, ISRAEL HAD OBTAINED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT, AND OWED THE U.S. A BIG DEBT. BEYOND THIS, THE BEIRUT SETTLEMENT HAD AVOIDED A CONSIDERABLE DANGER TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SOVIETS COULD SUFFER ONE DEFEAT, BUT PERHAPS NOT TWO. IF ISRAEL HAD ATTEMPTED TO TAKE OVER ALL LEBANON AND WAR WITH SYRIA HAD ENSUED, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL HAVE REACTED FORCEFULLY. HABIB COMMENTED THAT THE RISK OF ESCALATION HAD BEEN SO EVIDENT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD REALIZED THEY NEEDED TO STOP--BUT ONLY AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR.

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EXDIS

11. Malfatti thought that the Palestinians could hardly accomplish the same things dispersed among six or seven countries that they had done while at Beirut. Even as terrorists, much of their strength had lain in their ability to blackmail, which was now gone.

12. Habib, in response to a question, described Gemayel as a young, impressionable man who wanted links basically with Western Europe and the United States. Habib thought that if we all gave Gemayel the proper treatment, he could succeed. If he did not, the probable alternative was partition, in which case we might have a sick man in the Middle East forever.

13. Malfatti assumed that Western Communists would be leading a strong campaign in Western countries against Gemayel, with help from the Soviets.

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14. Malfatti also thought that the United States should pressure the Vatican about the PLO. Arafat would certainly try to see the Pope, and it was important for us to warn the Vatican of the dangers in this. Malfatti also noted the upcoming IPU meeting in Rome; the PLO would be present and would undoubtedly lobby foreign parliamentarians. The President of the PLO National Council would have liked to see President Pertini and Prime Minister Spadolini, but their doors would be closed to him.

15. Malfatti said that he agreed with Habib that the likely alternatives for Lebanon were either a boom or

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PARTITION AND CIVIL WAR. HE HOPED THAT HABIB WOULD STAY ON THE JOB UNTIL THE CHANCE OF SUCCESS WAS CLEARER. HABIB SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO RETURN FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION, BUT NOT BEYOND THAT. MALFATTI CONTINUED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS SOMEWHAT WORRISOME, IN PART BECAUSE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SOMETIMES FELT IT NEEDED TO GIVE A SOP TO THE LEFT ON AREAS LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST IN RETURN FOR ITS STRONG NATO STAND. HOWEVER, MALFATTI WOULD BE SEEING ATTALI NEXT WEEK AND WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH HIM. HABIB REPEATED TO MALFATTI THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD THE PRESS, THE ITALIAN EFFORTS IN BEIRUT HAD BEEN MAGNIFICENT. THIS INCLUDED THE EFFORTS OF THE BERSAGLIERI THEMSELVES, OF THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, AND OF LIAISON COLONEL GUELI AND MNF COMMANDER LT. COL. TOSETTI. HABIB URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES, ITALY, AND FRANCE CONTINUE A COORDINATED EFFORT, THROUGH CONTINUED MEETINGS IN BEIRUT OF THE THREE AMBASSADORS. IT WAS DIFFICULT IN A PLACE LIKE LEBANON TO MANAGE THINGS FROM ABROAD.

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16. MALFATTI SAID IN CONCLUSION THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE HABIB THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD DO THEIR SHARE. THEY KNEW IT WAS A VITAL ISSUE. THERE MIGHT BE OTHER AREAS IN WHICH ITALY COULD NOT DO MUCH, BUT IN LEBANON IT COULD AND WOULD.

17. THIS CABLE WAS NOT SEEN BY AMBASSADOR HABIB PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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ACTION SS-25

BEIRUT 06003 031939Z

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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PA Exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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BEIRUT 6003

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW UP: IDF ADVANCE IN SOUTHERN SUBURBS
(1930 LOCAL)

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 13356 (NOTAL) (B) BEIRUT 5992 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. USING THE IDF PRESS OFFICE BECAUSE OF ITS DIRECT
TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS WITH ISRAEL, I WAS IN TOUCH IN THE
EARLY EVENING WITH IDF LIAISON OFFICER COL. CHENEIDER,

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06003 031939Z

WHO IN TURN WAS CONSULTING WITH NORTHERN FRONT COMMANDER
GENERAL DRORY ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THE IDF ADVANCE IN THE
SOUTHERN SUBURBS IN THE KUWAITI CIRCLE AREA. IN THE PROCESS,
I BELIEVE I HAVE GOTTEN A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF
EXACTLY WHAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE DOING. FOLLOWING ARE
THE KEY ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION:

--A) THE IDF WILL WITHDRAW "MOST" OF ITS MEN AND
EQUIPMENT FROM THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED TODAY,

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CHANNEL: n/a

OSTENSIBLY TO CLEAR MINES; HOWEVER, THEY WILL LEAVE BEHIND ONE OR TWO PATROLS, WHICH MAY BE IN PLATOON STRENGTH, OSTENSIBLY TO PREVENT NEW MINES FROM BEING PLANTED IN THE AREA THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CLEARED (I STILL AM NOT SURE THAT ANY MINES WERE CLEARED TODAY).

-- B) TOMORROW IS SHABAT AND I WAS ASSURED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO VISIBLE IDF ACTIVITY. (I CANNOT DO ANY MORE TONIGHT ON THIS MATTER BUT I WILL TAKE IT UP AGAIN TOMORROW).

-- C) I ASKED SCHNEIDER TO CONVEY TO APPROPRIATE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS ILL-ADVISED IDF ACTION TODAY, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ITALIANS, FRENCH AND AMERICANS TO CONSULT TOMORROW, SATURDAY, WITH THE GOL AND BOUT A PROJECTED MNF WITHDRAWAL. TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO COOL TEMPER AND PASSIONS THAT HAD BEEN AROUSED BY TODAY'S IDF MOVEMENT (SINCE THE ISRAELIS ARE INCREDIBLY EAGER TO SECURE AN EXACT READING ON MNF WITHDRAWAL, THIS IS A GOOD ARGUMENT).

--D) I BRIEFED GENERAL KURAYTIM, FUAD BUTRUS, AND SA'B SALAM ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND SAW TO IT THAT WAZZAN, SARKIS, AND OTHERS WERE INFORMED. IN EVERY INSTANCE, WE MADE CLEAR THAT THE IDF WILL NOT HAVE WITHDRAWN COMPLETELY.

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--E) ACCORDING TO SCHNEIDER, GENERAL DRORY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH MY PROPOSAL THAT NOTHING FURTHER BE DONE AS REGARDS MINE CLEARING OR THE TURNOVER OF HENRI SHIHAB BARRACKS TO THE LAF UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN LEBANESE-ISRAELI-US AGREEMENT ON NEXT STEPS AND AFTER THE SITUATION HAD COOLED SOMEWHAT. THIS MEANS A TURNOVER OF THE BARRACKS AT THE EARLIEST ON MONDAY, AND I TOLD FUAD BUTRUS THIS SPECIFICALLY.

--F) I WILL MEET WITH GENERAL DRORY AT SDE DOV AIRPORT IN TEL AVIV AT 0800 SUNDAY MORNING TO DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER MATTERS, BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE REST OF MY SCHEDULE IN ISRAEL (SEE SEPTTEL).

--G) AT MY 1600 MEETING WITH ITALIAN AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS AND THEIR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES, I REVIEWED WHAT WE WERE DOING WITH REGARD TO THIS IDF ADVANCE. THE FRENCH WERE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS THAT THE IDF ADVANCE, OSTENSIBLY FOR MINE CLEARING, WAS A PRETEXT FOR SOMETHING MORE SINISTER.

--H) I LEARNED SUBSEQUENTLY FROM KURAYTIM THAT WAZZAN MAY ORDER THE LAF INTO TWO POSITIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE FURTHEST IDF ADVANCE TODAY. I TOLD KURAYTIM THAT I THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE RISKY, AND THAT WAZZAN SHOULD LET MATTERS COOL A BIT FURTHER. KURAYTIM INDICATED THAT WAZZAN MIGHT FEEL HE HAD TO DO THIS TO SHOW THAT THE LAF WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT EVEN THE

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IDF, SINCE A GREAT DEAL OF WEST BEIRUT CONFIDENCE IN
WAZZAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN LOST TODAY. I SAID THIS WAS
ALL THE MORE REASON TO BE CAREFUL. WE DO NOT WANT THE
LAF TO WITHDRAW FROM ANY POSITION IT OCCUPIES.
DILLON

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BEIRUT FOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OTRA (DRAPER, MORRIS)
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: DRAPER TRAVEL

REF: BEIRUT 5927 ✓

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. WE WELCOME YOUR RETURN TO ISRAEL AND ARE HAPPY TO HEAR THAT INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN ON ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF RESUPPLYING IDF FORCES ALONG THE BEIRUT/DAMASCUS HIGHWAY APPEAR PROMISING. WHILE WE AGREE THAT IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH EITAN, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A FIRM CONCLUSION WITHOUT MEETING WITH SHARON. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE AT LEAST ADVISABLE TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH SHARON. IF HE WISHES TO DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITY ON THIS MATTER, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

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3. UNFORTUNATELY, DAVID KZMCHE WILL BE OUT OF TOWN STARTING TOMORROW. DAVID WILL ASK HANAN BAR-ON TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS, AND SUGGESTS YOUR POSSIBLY ALSO MEETING WITH TAMIR AND SAGI AT

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THE WORKING LEVEL. DAVID ALSO BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT YOU SHOULD MEET FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. WE AGREE THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER NOT TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN THIS TIME AROUND, THOUGH WE WILL INDICATE YOU ARE QUITE WILLING TO MEET WITH BEGIN IF HE SO WISHES.

--
4. AS TO TRAVEL PLANS, EITHER A SATURDAY AFTERNOON OR SUNDAY MORNING ARRIVAL IS FINE, ALTHOUGH BECAUSE OF THE REGULAR CABINET SESSION SUNDAY MORNING THE EARLIEST MEETING TIME WOULD PROBABLY BE SUNDAY AFTERNOON. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL WORK ON APPOINTMENTS.

5. BRANDON WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU STAY AT THE RESIDENCE IF YOU CHOOSE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, WE CAN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOU IN TEL AVIV. PLEASE ADVISE.

6. THIS MESSAGE COORDINATED WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM.

7. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED.
LEWIS

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification ***

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AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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BEIRUT 5982

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECCL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, LE, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW UP: FUTURE STATUS OF THE "PLO OFFICE"
IN BEIRUT

REF: BEIRUT 5937✓

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE A PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDING UNDER WHICH SHAFIQ AL-HUT WILL HEAD A SMALL PLO OFFICE IN

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BEIRUT DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD PRIOR TO THE INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT BASHIR GEMAYEL. THE GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLO TO HANDLE THE HUMANITARIAN, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY HERE. WHEN BASHIR GEMAYEL TAKES OVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT ANY SUCH RELATIONSHIP WILL BE LESS VISIBLE. BASHIR HAS TOLD US THERE WILL BE NO PALESTINIAN FLAGS AND PROBABLY NO SIGNS INDICATING THERE IS DE FACTO "PLO OFFICE". THERE MAY BE SOMETHING

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ENTITLED "OFFICE OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS". ABOVE ALL, BASHIR SAID, THERE WILL BE NO PALESTINIAN ARMED GUARDS IN FRONT OF SUCH AN OFFICE.

3. A WESTERN DIPLOMAT SAW SHAFIQ AL-HUT YESTERDAY. AL-HUT IS OPERATING OUT OF HIS OLD OFFICE ON CORNICHE AL-MAZRA'A WEST OF THE MUSEUM. A TATTERED PALESTINIAN FLAG FLIES IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING; THERE ARE NO GUARDS. AL-HUT SAID THAT HIS OFFICE HAS THE SAME STATUS AS PLO "EMBASSIES" IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HE CONSIDERS HIMSELF THE EQUIVALENT TO AN AMBASSADOR. HE DESCRIBED HIS PRINCIPAL CONCERN AS KEEPING ESSENTIAL SERVICES GOING FOR PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON SUCH AS THE PALESTINE RED CRESCENT SOCIETY, HOSPITALS, AND SCHOOLS.

4. THE DIPLOMAT DESCRIBED AL-HUT AS EXHAUSTED AND DEPRESSED, EQUALLY BITTER TOWARD THE US FOR ITS SUPPORT OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES FOR ABANDONING THE PLO. AL-HUT SAID THAT HIS OFFICE WAS THE ONLY PLO PRESENCE LEFT IN BEIRUT AND THAT THE ORGANIZATION HAD NO INTENTION OF USING LEBANON AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE (THE DIPLOMAT GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM AL-HUT THAT THE PLO DID NOT EXPECT TO HAVE FORCES IN THE BIQ'A OR NORTH LEBANON MUCH LONGER).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05982 031149Z

5. AL-HUT SAID THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF HIS OFFICE WAS THE RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE GOL. HOWEVER, IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE AGREEMENT ONLY APPLIED TO THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT. WHEN BASHIR BECOMES PRESIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 23, THE PLO WILL HAVE TO WORK OUT A NEW ARRANGEMENT WITH HIM. AL-HUT SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONTACT WITH BASHIR ON THIS SUBJECT.

DILLON

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH
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INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATEDEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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FROM DRAPER

9302566

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW UP: IDF ADVANCE IN SOUTHERN
SUBURBS

REF: BEIRUT 5989N

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. THIS MORNING, IDF LIAISON COL. ABU FARHAT INFORMED ME
THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD OFFERED TO TURN OVER TOMORROW TO THE
LAF THE HENRI SHAHAB BARRACKS IN OUZAI AREA. THE IDF HAD "OFFERED"
ALSO TO CLEAR THE STREETS NORTH OF THIS AREA, FORMING A
ROUGH TRIANGLE. THE IDF HAS ALSO PROPOSED SENDING TROOPS
TEMPORARILY UP TO THE VICINITY OF SPORT CITY, OSTENSIBLY
TO PROTECT THOSE CARRYING OUT THE MINE-CLEARING OPERATION.3. I TOLD ABU FARHAT HE SHOULD NOT ALLOW IDF TROOPS UP
THERE. IT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.

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I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS ONLY GOING THROUGH
THE MOTIONS OF PROTESTING TO THE IDF, ALTHOUGH HE WAS
CLEARLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI MOTIVES. SINCE RETURNING
TO THE RESIDENCE AT ABOUT 1500, I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH
WITH THE IDF, ALTHOUGH ONLY RELATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICERS
ARE PRESENT. DRORY AND BARAK LEFT FOR ISRAEL EARLIER
TODAY. PRESIDENT SARKIS CALLED ME AT 3:15 TO URGE THAT THE
ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FROM THE PLACES THEY ARE NOW OCCUPYING,
SAYING IT COULD CAUSE A CRISIS. JOHNNY ABDU SAID THAT**UNCLASSIFIED**

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ARMED MILITIAS, AS WELL AS AMAL, HAD GOTTEN TERRIBLY EXCITED AND WERE COMING OUT INTO THE STREETS WITH ARMS AGAIN. THIS COULD DESTROY ALL THEIR CONFIDENCE IN WAZZAN'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL TAKEOVER OF WEST BEIRUT BY THE LAF/ISF. TO TOP IT ALL, A NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBED THE PRESENCE OF WHAT WERE CLEARLY IDF TROOPS AT A KEY CROSSING POINT.

4. I FIND IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ON THE VERGE OF A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE INTO THE CAMPS, BUT THIS IS THE WAY IT IS BEING INTERPRETED AMONG MANY LEBANESE. GOING WHERE THEY APPARENTLY HAVE GONE TODAY CONSTITUTES THE OUTFLANKING OF A MAJOR PALESTINIAN CAMP. IT MAY TURN OUT TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN A PROBE TO SEE WHAT THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH OR WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE USEFUL PRESSURE AT THIS MOMENT. WHATEVER THE MOTIVATION, IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY MOVE BACK QUICKLY TO THE POSITIONS THEY PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED (WE CAN SORT OUT THE QUESTION OF MINE CLEARING OPERATIONS LATER). I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT THE LINE TO TAKE IS THAT WHICH I JUST GAVE TO THE MOST SENIOR IDF OFFICER PRESENT AT IDF HEADQUARTERS AT ABOUT 1520 LOCAL:
--WE HAVE A RELIABLE EYEWITNESS REPORT OF IDF TROOPS FURTHER NORTH IN THE OUZAI'I AREA THAN THEY HAVE EVER

PAGE 03 -BEIRUT 05992 031425Z

BEEN BEFORE.

--THEIR PRESENCE IS CAUSING PANDEMONIUM AND ALARM IN WEST BEIRUT. THIS COULD UPSET EVERYTHING WE ARE TRYING TO DO AT A CRITICAL MOMENT TO TAKE OVER PEACEFULLY WEST BEIRUT.

--SARKIS JUST CALLED US TO URGE THAT THE IDF TROOPS WITHDRAW TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS. THIS SHOULD BE CONVEYED AS AN OFFICIAL GOL REQUEST OF ISRAEL.

--PEOPLE WILL LOSE CONFIDENCE IN WAZZAN'S ABILITY TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL NEUTRALIZATION OF WEST BEIRUT. THIS IDF MOVEMENT COULD NOT OCCUR AT A WORSE MOMENT.

--THEREFORE (I SAID), PLEASE PASS A MESSAGE TO THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE OFFICER SO THAT A QUICK DECISION CAN BE MADE TO PULL BACK IDF TROOPS INSTANTLY TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS. WE CAN TALK ABOUT THIS ISSUE LATER, BUT IT IS URGENT THAT THEY BE PULLED BACK RIGHT AWAY.

--THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.

--(THE IDF LIEUTENANT SAID THE IDF COLONEL GAL (SIC) HAD BEEN SENT TO THE SCENE TO CHECK ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING BUT IDF HEADQUARTERS HAD NO CLEAR IDEA.)
DILLON

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FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DCM FLATEN FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OTRA (DRAPER, MORRIS)

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: DRAPER TRAVEL

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WHILE I AM STILL IN THE AREA, WE HOPE TO GET STARTED ON GETTING AGREEMENT TO LIMITED IDF DISENGAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS. THESE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE LINKED TO THE SUCCESS OR RELATIVE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION NOW UNDERWAY TO ASSERT LEBANESE AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT WEST BEIRUT. INITIAL PROGRESS REPORTS LOOK FAIRLY GOOD.

3. PHIL AND I TALKED OVER WITH GENERAL EITAN TWO DAYS AGO AT LUNCH WHAT COULD BE A FEASIBLE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE IDF STATIONED ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY COULD BE SUPPLIED THROUGH ROUTES OTHER THAN THROUGH BEIRUT. EITAN DREW A MAP AT THE TABLE OUTLINING HIS CONCEPT. IF IT HOLD, IT WOULD BE BETTER THAN WE ANTICIPATED.

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05927 020938Z

4. SINCE THEN, WE HAVE SECURED THE AGREEMENT OF SARKIS THAT AN LAF SENIOR GENERAL SHOULD HAVE FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS WITH EITAN AND OTHER IDF LEADERS TO WORK OUT PRACTICAL DETAILS. I AM SEEING OPERATIONS CHIEF GENERAL HAMDAN TODAY ABOUT THIS MATTER AND, DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THESE AND OTHER INITIATIVES, WOULD LIKE TO COME TO ISRAEL ON LATE SATURDAY AFTERNOON OR SUNDAY MORNING. EITAN WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE MAN TO TALK TO, BUT YOU MAY HAVE ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE. DURING MY TIME

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IN ISRAEL I WOULD, OF COURSE, ALSO WISH TO SEE DAVID KIMCHE AND OTHERS WHO MAY BE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN STAGE TWO. THIS I LEAVE TO YOU. GIVEN THE PRESENT MOOD IN ISRAEL IN CONNECTION WITH OUR NEW MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE, IT MIGHT NOT BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR ME TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IN ANY EVENT MIGHT STILL BE ON VACATION, OR SHARON, BUT I OF COURSE LEAVE THAT TO YOUR JUDGMENT.

5. IF YOU COULD GET BACK TO ME BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS TODAY, SEPTEMBER 2, I WILL THEN PUT IN FINAL FORM HELICOPTER TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SATURDAY AFTERNOON OR SUNDAY MORNING, OR WHENEVER YOU THINK BEST UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. (JOCK COVEY AND MARY LOU PUSZCZEWICZ WILL BE WITH ME.)
DILLON

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996

DOC NUMBER: 82STATE244559

CHANNEL: n/a

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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// ZFF FOR TEL AVIV O N L Y //

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING AUGUST 30, 1982

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.

Q. CAN WE START WITH LEBANON? CAN YOU TELL US IF THE
SITUATION WITH THE LEFTIST PHALANGISTS IN ANY WAY VIOLATES
THE TERMS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY PHILIP HABIB?
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A. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT VIOLATES THE TERMS.. OBVIOUSLY
ALL THE PARTIES ON THE GROUND ARE WORKING HARD TO ENSURE
THAT THIS DOES NOT JEOPARDIZE THE DEPARTURE PROCESS FOR
BEIRUT, WHICH IS GOING WELL. THERE SEEMS TO BE NO SUGGES-
TION THAT IT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AT THE MOMENT, BUT THIS
IS BASICALLY A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

Q. ,LL IT DELAY IN ANY WAY PHILIP HABIB'S RETURN TO THE
UNITED STATES, OR IS THAT STILL OPEN-ENDED?

A. I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK THAT'S OPEN-ENDED. THE
PROCESS IS GOING QUITE WELL AND I WOULDN'T SEE ANY REASON
WHY HE WOULD NEED TO DELAY HIS RETURN.

Q. SPEAKING OF THE PROCESS, HOW MANY EVACUEES HAVE RE-
TURNED? DO YOU KNOW?

A. I DON'T HAVE A TOTAL, BUT IT'S GOING ALONG VERY WELL.
TODAY ON THE SHIP THAT WENT OUT FOR CYPRUS FOR ONWARD
TRAVEL TO ALGERIA THERE WERE 600 ON BOARD, AND 2,000 SYRIAN
TROOPS ASSIGNED TO THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE LEFT BEIRUT
TODAY BY LAND CONVOY.

Q. THE REASON I ASK IS THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS I SEEM

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TO RECALL PHILIP HABIB USED A FIGURE OF 7,100 GUERRILLAS, AND I'VE SEEN FIGURES AS HIGH AS 9,000 OR 10,000 HAVING BEEN EVACUATED ALREADY. DO YOU HAVE ANY EXPLANATION FOR THAT CONTRADICTION?

A. I DON'T HAVE ANY EXPLANATION FOR THAT, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WOULD BE MOVING WELL IN THE DIRECTION TO RELIEVING FEARS ABOUT A SUBSTANTIAL RESIDUE OF PLO BEING LEFT BEHIND.

Q. DOES THE UNITED STATES APPROVE OF THE MURABITOUN TAKING OVER THE ARMAMENTS AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PLO WHICH THEY UNCLASSIFIED

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ARE DOING, AND HAVE STATED THEY INTEND TO KEEP ON DOING?

A. I THINK IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF OUR APPROVAL. BASICALLY THAT IS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO SETTLE.

Q. DO WE THINK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS STRONG ENOUGH TO SETTLE THAT AT THIS POINT?

A. THE PRESIDENT-ELECT HAS BEEN MAKING GOOD STATEMENTS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IS GOING FORWARD WELL, ALTHOUGH HE HASN'T ASSUMED OFFICE - BUT WE HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE PROCESS WE HAVE RECOMMENDED, THE RETURN TO THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, IS MOVING FORWARD RATHER WELL.

Q. DO WE CONCUR WITH GENERAL SHARON'S FIGURES YESTERDAY THAT 2,000 OF THE PLO WILL REMAIN BEHIND?

A. THAT'S AN INTERESTING QUESTION THAT'S ALREADY BEEN RAISED, AND IF MORE ARE GOING OUT THAN HAVE BEEN SPECULATED WERE THERE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IS ADDRESSING ITSELF TO THAT QUESTION OF THE RESIDUE.

Q. THERE ARE REPORTS IN ISRAEL SAYING THAT DURING THE DISCUSSIONS OF MINISTER SHARON HERE, IT WAS SUGGESTED BY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION THAT A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINIAN STATE WON'T HINDER ISRAEL. IT WON'T PUT ISRAEL IN DANGER.

WHAT'S THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THAT?

A. I THINK YOU WERE REFERRING TO THE REPORTS THAT ISRAEL HAS REJECTED A U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINE UNCLASSIFIED

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AN STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND IN THE GAZA STRIP, AND THE FACT IS THAT WE HAVE MADE NO SUCH PROPOSAL AND DID NOT MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL DURING GENERAL SHARON'S VISIT HERE.

Q. DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGREE WITH GENERAL SHARON THAT THE ISRAELI INVASION OF AND OCCUPATION OF LEBANON HAS STRENGTHENED AMERICA'S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. I DON'T THINK WE WOULD WANT TO CHARACTERIZE THAT STATEMENT AT ALL.

Q. THERE ARE NEWS REPORTS WHICH SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT GOES ALONG WITH SHARON'S IDEA FOR A PALESTINIAN PROVINCE OUT OF JORDAN WHICH WILL ISSUE PALESTINIAN PASSPORTS AND CREATE AN ENTITY BUT NOT A PALESTINIAN STATE. WHAT DO YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

A. I DON'T THINK I NEED GO BEYOND WHAT I'VE SAID BEFORE ON THIS QUESTION OF HOW WE VIEW JORDAN. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, SUPPORTS THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY AND THE UNIQUE AND ENDURING CHARACTER OF JORDAN, AND WE DO NOT AGREE THAT JORDAN IS A PALESTINIAN STATE.

Q. IS THE WEST BANK PART OF JORDAN?

A. I'M GOING TO STAND ON THE LANGUAGE WE HAVE OFFERED AND THE LANGUAGE THAT THE SECRETARY HAS OFFERED ABOUT THE WEST BANK ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS - QUITE RECENTLY, IN FACT.

Q. WOULD THERE BE ANY OFFICIAL FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT ACCOMPANYING SEC. WEINBERGER IN HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. I CAN'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION, BUT NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

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Q. CAN YOU TAKE THE QUESTION?

A. YES, WE'LL TAKE THE QUESTION.

Q. GENERAL SHARON SAID YESTERDAY THAT, IF REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, ISRAEL WOULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE. DOES THAT AGREE WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THIS THING SHOULD BE RESOLVED?

A. ARE YOU REFERRING TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT ISRAEL MIGHT TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY AFTER A BEIRUT WITHDRAWAL?

Q. THERE WAS THAT QUESTION, AND ALSO IF BASHIR GEMAYEL RAN INTO DIFFICULTIES IN ASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY, WOULD YOU ASSIST, AND THE ANSWER TO THAT WAS, IF ASKED, WE WOULD ASSIST.

A. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY THAT ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI, SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Q. AN AP REPORT THIS MORNING SAYS THAT THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CASPAR WEINBERGER, TO ISRAEL IS A FENCE-MENDING VISIT. WHY FENCE-MENDING? YOU CONSIDER THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL HAVE BEEN STRAINED TO THE POINT THAT YOU HAVE TO GO FENCE-MENDING?

A. NO, NOT SPECIFICALLY ON THAT. YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASK SEC. WEINBURGER ABOUT THAT, BUT AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE AND AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, ISRAEL IS A TRUE AND VALUED FRIEND.

Q. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE REPORT THAT THE WASHINGTON POST UNCLASSIFIED

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PUBLISHED TODAY THAT RAFAEL EITAN, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ISRAELI ARMY, SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LEBANESE GROUP CALLED MURABITOUN EXPELLED FROM LEBANON?

A. NO. AS I MENTIONED IN AN EARLIER REFERENCE, THAT'S A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO DETERMINE. SHULTZ



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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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ECARTIONED

FOR HABIB, DRAPER, AND CHIEFS OF MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, XF
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON

REF: (A) STATE 242767 (B) STATE 243164

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO HOW WE
CAN WORK TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON FOLLOWING THE
PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. THIS IS A GOOD TIME FOR
MUTUAL STOCKTAKING IN HOUSE AS WE PREPARE RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE SECRETARY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ASAP

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O WE CAN MOVE THE PROCESS ALONG. PLEASE SLUG FOR S/S

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AND NEA ONLY.

3. AN NEA MEMO TO THE SECRETARY ON STRATEGY FOR LEBANON PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING GOALS:

(1) DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES--PALESTINIAN, ISRAELI AND SYRIAN--COUPLED WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER.

(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF STRONG CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING A REVITALIZED ARMY AND POLICE, TO EXTEND THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

(3) RESTORATION OF SECURITY TO HELP LEBANON'S FREE MARKET ECONOMY MOBILIZE LOCAL CAPITAL AND ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

(4) REBUILDING OF LIFE-SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGED IN THE WAR.

(5) PROVISION OF URGENT, HUMANITARIAN AID TO LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN VICTIMS OF THE WAR.

(6) INTERNATIONALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEBANESE SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION.

4. WORK TOWARD ALL OF OUR GOALS MUST PROCEED TOGETHER TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, CANNOT WAIT UNTIL CONDITIONS OF TOTAL POLITICAL STABILITY PREVAIL. IN FACT, OUR GOALS ARE MUTUALLY

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REINFORCING; PROGRESS ON ONE WILL ENCOURAGE PROGRESS ON OTHERS. NOR CAN WORK TOWARD SOLUTIONS TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS BE DELAYED UNTIL THERE IS A RESOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. THE ARGUMENT THAT IF ONLY THE PALESTINIANS HAVE A HOMELAND ELSEWHERE THE LEBANESE WILL EASILY SORT OUT THEIR PROBLEMS, IS A RECIPE FOR CONTINUED CHAOS. THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS IS THAT NEW INITIATIVES TO MAKE PROGRESS ON AUTONOMY AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE CAN NOT WAIT FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON OR THE HAPPY END OF ALL OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS.

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AS CONCERNS LEBANON, THE TASK IMMEDIATELY BEFORE US IS HOW TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM IN LEBANON ESTABLISHED BY THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT AND THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT.

5. WE PLACE GREAT STRESS ON AN EFFORT TO INTERNATIONALIZE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEBANON. THE USG WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE, BUT OTHER PARTIES MUST ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE BURDENS OF PEACEMAKING, POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

6. ISRAEL WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON EXCEPT AS PART OF A PLAN INVOLVING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE WITHDRAWAL OR DISARMING OF PLO FIGHTERS IN THE NORTH AND CONVINCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. NOR DO WE EXPECT SYRIA UNILATERALLY TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. OVER THE LONG TERM, WE WILL LOOK TO A STRENGTHENED LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE BOTH INTERNAL SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND REASSURANCES TO ISRAEL AND SYRIA THAT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS ARE NOT ATENED. BUT WE MUST BEGIN WORKING FOR WITHDRAWAL NOW, IN PART BECAUSE EVEN PARTIAL PULLBACKS WOULD HELP RESTORE CREDIBILITY TO THE GOVERNMENT AND GIVE ALL PARTIES--BOTH THE LEBANESE AND THEIR

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NEIGHBORS--CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE.

7. WHERE CAN WE BEST FOCUS OUR IMMEDIATE EFFORTS? AN ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT AWAY FROM THE CITY OF BEIRUT WOULD HAVE A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. SHARON TOLD THE SECRETARY ON AUGUST 28 THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO EFFECT SOME KIND OF WITHDRAWAL (UNDEFINED). IT COULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL TO BASHIR GEMAYEL IN THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT WITH SUNNI MUSLIM SUPPORT IF HE COULD POINT TO SUCH EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI GOOD FAITH AND HIS INFLUENCE AND DEDICATION TO LEBANESE GOALS. ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT PRIOR TO THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT WOULD GIVE BASHIR STRONG CARDS TO PLAY IN SEEKING SUMMIT ENDORSEMENT OF EVENTUAL ADF (SYRIAN) WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THE REHABILITATION OF GOL PRESTIGE WILL, IT SEEMS TO US, BE MOST FAVORABLY AFFECTED BY A TURNOVER TO THE LAF OF ISRAELI POSITIONS

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SOUTH AND EAST OF THE CITY, ESPECIALLY INCLUDING THE AIRPORT AND THE ENVIRONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD ASSURE THE RETURN OF SAUDI AMBASSADOR ALI SHAIR, NOW DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE FEZ SUMMIT. FOR BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV: WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A REDEPLOYMENT AND HOW MIGHT WE ENCOURAGE IT.

8. WE CONTINUE TO BE GRAVELY CONCERNED BY THE CONFRONTATION OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES ALONG THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT HIGHWAY AND IN THE BEKAA. THE CHANCES OF A MISCALCULATION ARE OBVIOUS AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ONLY PARTIAL INFLUENCES ON THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN IRREGULARS WHICH MIGHT DRAW THEIR ALLIES INTO A VIOLENT CLASH. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THINKING AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF A MUTUAL DISENGAGEMENT. WHAT EVENTS WOULD BE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES? WOULD UNTSO OBSERVERS HAVE A POSSIBLE ROLE TO PLAY?

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9. THE PRESENCE OF PLO MILITARY UNITS IN THE BEKAA VALLEY AND IN NORTH LEBANON IS AN URGENT AND THORNY PROBLEM. WHAT DOES BASHIR SEE AS THE SHORT TERM ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM? WOULD THESE GROUPS BE VIABLE FOLLOWING A WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS?

10. THE UPCOMING ARAB SUMMIT MAY PROVIDE THE GOL AND PRESIDENT-ELECT AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET A MANDATE FOR EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN FORCES IN RETURN FOR A PLEDGE TO RID SOUTH LEBANON OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE. WE SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY WITH GOL, OFFERING OUR GOOD OFFICES WITH OTHER ARAB MODERATES IN SUPPORT OF A SOUNDLY CONCEIVED LEBANESE PLAN. FOR DAMASCUS: WE NEED YOUR VIEWS ON SYRIAN BOTTOM LINE REQUIREMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR OWN TROOPS BUT DO NOT WISH YOU TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH SARG AT THIS POINT. KEY QUESTION IS HOW DO WE GET ANY EARLY AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR "SYNCHRONIZED" ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS.

11. FOR DRAPER: WE WANT TO GET MAXIMUM LEVERAGE FROM YOUR ABILITY TO CONVEY TO INTERESTED PARTIES OUR THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-PLO WITHDRAWAL TIMEFRAME. WE SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER AN ITINERARY WHICH

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WOULD INCLUDE DAMASCUS, JIDDA, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, ROME (FOR BOTH GOI AND VATICAN) AND PARIS. FOLLOWING WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS WE MIGHT THEN CONSIDER THE NEED FOR DISCUSSIONS IN THE U.N. PRIOR TO A RETURN TO THE AREA. SECRETARY ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY YOUR CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT TO LEAD OUR EFFORTS ON LEBANON. SUCH A TOUR WOULD, INTER ALIA, GIVE CREDENCE AND VISABILITY TO YOUR ROLE.

12. REF B POSES THE IDEA OF AN EXPANDED UNIFIL. WE BELIEVE SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL BE

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NECESSARY TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN AN IDF WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESTORATION OF FULL GOL AUTHORITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. ISRAEL PROBABLY PREFERS TO RELY ON LOCAL MILITIAS ITS CONTROL, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD REGARD AN INTERIM UN PRESENCE AS MORE COMPATIBLE WITH LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. IS THIS ALSO BASHIR'S VIEW?

13. ISRAEL DISLIKES THE NOTION OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE UNDER UN AUSPICES. WE WONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER CONTRIBUTORS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL COULD BE FOUND FOR A NON-UN FORCE. WOULD APPRECIATE THE VIEWS OF BOTH EMBASSIES TEL AVIV AND BEIRUT ON THIS POINT, BEARING IN MIND THAT ANY FURTHER PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS IN SOUTH LEBANON IS NOT REPEAT NOT AN OPTION.

14. ULTIMATELY, WE WOULD ENVISAGE A TOTAL TAKEOVER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BY THE GOL. THIS WILL REQUIRE MANY INTERIM STEPS, NOTABLY THE REBUILDING OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, A SUBJECT ADDRESSED IN REF A. WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS OF EMBASSIES BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV ON THE

POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE GOL TO RESUME FULL AUTHORITY IN THE SOUTH. CAN A REVITALIZED ILMAC FUNCTION AS AN INTERIM MEASURE? WOULD UNTSO OBSERVERS BE ACCEPTABLE TO ENSURE A GREATER MEASURE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE? WILL THE GOL ACCEPT ANY RESIDUAL ROLE FOR THE HADDAD MILITIAS?

15. THE TASK OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IS LARGELY ONE

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FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE LEADERS OF OTHER GROUPS.

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BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO EXERCISE OUR INFLUENCE IN WAYS WHICH EMBASSY BEIRUT DEEMS USEFUL. WE RECOGNIZE THE VALUE OF SYMBOLISM AND WILL BE GUIDED TO A GREAT EXTENT BY THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS OF HOW TO REINFORCE DESIRABLE TRENDS. WE WANT THE EMBASSY TO CONSIDER THE HANDLING OF HIGH LEVEL ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL VISITS IN THIS LIGHT. WE BELIEVE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE RECENT VISIT BY SENATOR PERCY WERE VERY USEFUL IN ENCOURAGING BOTH BASHIR AND THE SUNNI LEADERS TO WORK TOGETHER. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE T OF A MOVE BACK INTO THE CHANCERY IN WEST BEIRUT WILL BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT. WITHOUT CEDING THE PRIORITY WE MUST GIVE TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, WE ENCOURAGE THE EMBASSY TO SEEK THE GOL'S VIEW OF HOW THIS MOVE CAN BE BEST MANAGED FOR POLITICAL EFFECT. BEHIND THE SCENES, WE ARE READY TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND ASK THE EMBASSY TO BEAR THIS POSSIBILITY IN MIND. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SAUDI AMBASSADOR SHAIR WILL PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

16. THE SECRETARY HAS AGREED TO MEET WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE UNGA. WE REALIZE THAT IT MAY BE EARLY TO SPECULATE ON BASHIR'S CABINET CHOICES, BUT THE EMBASSY SHOULD ASK BASHIR WHETHER HE PLANS TO SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO NEW YORK AND GET AN IDEA OF THE TIMING OF SUCH A VISIT. AS THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EVOLVES WE WILL WANT TO SEEK A VARIETY OF WAYS TO ENHANCE ITS LEGITIMACY, AND THE EMBASSY SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS. IN ANY NEW UN CONSIDERATION OF THE LEBANON PROBLEM, WE WILL WANT TO ASSURE THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE PERMREP IN NEW YORK. WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TUEINI MIGHT BE REASSIGNED TO THE POST, THE EMBASSY SHOULD CONVEY TO BASHIR THE VERY GREAT USEFULNESS OF HAVING A STRONG PERSONALITY WHO WILL ENJOY HIS (AND OUR) CONFIDENCE IN THE KEY JOB.

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17. BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, WE ARE RAPIDLY MOVING AHEAD ON THE TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION. AID DIRECTOR MCPHERSON HAS ALREADY SPOKEN WITH IBRD

OFFICIALS AND WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH THE LEBANESE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO INVOLVE THE WORLD BANK IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS. WE ARE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF CLEARING A CABLE TO KEY CAPITALS URGING THAT THEIR FINANCE MINISTERS SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT AT THE IBRD CONFERENCE IN TORONTO. WE APPRECIATE THAT THE GOL MAY PREFER TO DEAL BILATERALLY WITH SOME OF THE WEALTHY ARAB STATES. BUOLE FOR THE BANK IS KEY TO OUR STRATEGY OF INVOLVING A WIDER GROUP OF POTENTIAL DONORS. WE HAVE ST ED HIS RECENTLY WITH VISITING SENIOR SAUDI OFFICIALS. FURTHERMORE, NEITHER THE BANK NOR OTHER DONORS ARE LIKELY TO BE PREPARED TO PUT MAJOR FUNDS INTO AREAS OCCUPIED BY FOREIGN TROOPS OR OTHERWISE NOT SUBJECT TO GOL AUTHORITY. THIS COULD BE GOOD APOLITICAL INTERNATIONAL LEVER ON ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. KEY DATES IN MOVING FOWARD ARE MCPHERSON'S CURRENT VISIT TO LEBANON WHERE HE WILL TRY TO CONVINCE GOL TO REQUEST IBRD UMBRELLA, SEPT. 6 LUNCHEON IN TORONTO AND DISCUSSIONS AT IBRD AND IMB MEETINGS.

18. IN A SIMILAR VEIN, UNRWA AND THE ISRAEUS APPEAR TO BE REACHING INTERIM SOLUTIONS TO THE URGENT NEEDS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF RELIEF EFFORTS HAS BEEN ESSENTIAL TO OBTAINING PRACTICAL MEASURES ON THE GROUND. NONETHELESS, WE CANNOT ALLOW THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO DUCK ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AREA. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION WITH WHICH MCPHERSON WILL HAVE WITH SENIOR

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LEBANESE OFFICIALS, WE WILL APPRECIATE THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON HOW THE GOL INTENDS TO APPROACH THE DELICATE ISSUES OF SHELTER AND OTHER SERVICES FOR PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN THE SOUTH.

19. THE VITALITY OF THE LEBANESE PRIVATE SECTOR APPEARS TO BE A VERY IMPORTANT ASSET FOR THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. MCPHERSON WILL BRIEF YOU ON HIS PROPOSAL TO FORM A CONSORTIUM OF U.S. BUSINESS LEADERS, INCLUDING LEBANESE-AMERICANS, TO STIMULATE PRIVATE SECTOR

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INVOLVEMENT FROM ABROAD. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF THIS CONCEPT ALONG WITH ANY OTHER IDEAS AS TO WHAT THE USG CAN DO, BEYOND AIDING THE GOL IN PROVIDING BASIC SECURITY, TO ENCOURAGE PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT.

20. FINALLY, THERE IS THE TROUBLESOME ISSUE OF AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE PEACE TREATY. IN ALL OF OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH ISRAEBASSY, THE TREATY FEATURES PROMINENTLY. THIS WAS ALSO THE CASE IN SHARON'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. IT IS CLEAR ISRAEL IS ALSO DOING SPADEWORK WITH FRIENDS OF ISRAEL TO

SUPPORT A QUICK TREATY. WE ARE CONCERNED THEY WILL PRESS BASHIR HARD FOR TREATY AND TRY TO MAKE THIS A PRECONDITION FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF LEBANESE RECONSTRUCTION, PARTICULARLY THE KEY FACTORS OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY DELIVERED STRONG CAUTION TO SHARON NOT TO TRY TO IMPOSE TREATY AGAINST THE WILL OF THE LEBANESE. HOW AND WHEN SHOULD WE ENGAGE WITH ISRAEL AND BASHIR ON THIS ISSUE? WE ASSUME THAT OTHER ARABS AT THE LEAGUE SUMMIT WILL PRESS BASHIR TO PROMISE NO QUICK MOVE TOWARDS TREATY. THIS SEEMS LIKELY MINIMUM PRICE FOR ARAB RECOGNITION OF HIS ELECTION AS WELL AS ARAB POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS TO REBUILD LEBANON.

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21. WE REALIZE THIS IS A LONG LIST OF THOUGHTS, BUT WE PROBABLY HAVE MISSED SOME KEY ELEMENTS. WE HOPE THEY WILL STIMULATE YOUR OWN IDEAS. BEIRUT 5815 JUST RECEIVED, BUT WE WOULD STILL LIKE TO HAVE PHIL HABIB'S THOUGHTS ON THE FOREGOING.

22. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED SHULTZ

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PAGE 01
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STATE 245408

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S/S-O:CGSMITH

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TEL AVIV

AUGUST 29

QUOTE

BEIRUT 5814

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/6/97

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

TS author:

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/29/88

TAGS: PSDC

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MESSAGE FOR THE SECRETARY

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. UNLESS YOU WISH OTHERWISE, I PLAN TO LEAVE BEIRUT ON SEPTEMBER 2. THE LAST PLO DEPARTURE IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 31. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE FOR ME TO HANG AROUND BEIRUT AFTER THAT. INSTEAD, I WILL TAKE A FEW DAYS REST IN ROME AND POSSIBLY PARIS ON MY WAY HOME. AS

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INSTRUCTED, I WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 8.

3. GIVEN THE SPATE OF VISITORS TO ISRAEL, IT WOULD APPEAR BETTER FOR ME TO LET DRAPER GO THERE FOR A FEW DAYS TO GIVE AN IMPETUS TO HIS NEXT MISSION AND TO ALLOW HIM TO BEGIN TO PREPARE THE WAY. HE CAN THEN JOIN ME ON THE WAY HOME SO THAT BOTH OF US ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 8.

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4. IF, AS I HOPE, DRAPER AND I WILL BE NAMED TO THE DELEGATION FOR GEMAYEL'S INAUGURATION ON SEPTEMBER 23, WE COULD AFTERWARD BOTH PROCEED TO ISRAEL TO MEET WITH BEGIN AND HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES. FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND, SAM LEWIS THINKS THIS WILL BE A GOOD PROCEDURE.

5. IF YOU CONCUR, I WILL PROCEED AS PROPOSED.

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UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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*** Current Classification ***

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996

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PAGE 01
ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

DGI WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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FROM HABIB

DAMASCUS SEE ACTION REQUEST PARA 4

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, PGOV, LE, IS, PLO, XF, SY, SA

ZIBJ: HABIB MISSION: MILITARY MEETINGS- AUGUST 25

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1. (CQENZIER ANMTTPD

OWPKNOD

H?WPJS FROM THE RY GP ARE THE MAIN POINTS
ADDRESSED IN MILITARY MEETINGS TODAY.

3. DRAPER ATTENDED THE MEETING THIS MORNING AT 0700
BETWEEN GENERAL DRORY AND THE FRENCH COMMANDER IN

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WHICH IT WAS DECIDED THAT:

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--THE FRENCH WOULD DEPLOY IN THE FOREST OF PINES AND HIPPODROME AREA MINUS A SMALL CHUNK AT THE SOUTHERN EXTREMITY PLUS BUILDINGS JUST NORTH OF THE HIPPODROME ACROSS AVENUE YAFI WHERE THE FRENCH WILL PROBABLY MAKE THEIR HEADQUARTERS.

--NO PLO OR PLA WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA;. DRORY PROPOSED THAT IF THE PLO DECLINED ; ZEAVSON THE FRENCH COULD BIVOUAC IN THE EMPTY SPACES EAST OF JUSTICE CIRCLE. THE FRENCH COMMANDER SAID THAT IF THE PLO WOULD NOT LEAVE, HE WOULD TAKE HIS FORCE AND DEPART (IN FACT, ALL PLO HAD DEPARTED THE AREA BY EARLY AFTERNOON).

4. AT 0800 US, IDF, AND ITALIAN REPS MET AT BAABDA, ALSO TO DISCUSS DEPLOYMENT. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD DEPLOY IN THE VICINITY OF GALERIE SIMAAN, FROM HAZMIYAH JUNCTION TO ST MICHEL CHRUCH. OTHER ISSUES:

--THE ITALIANS AGREED TO PROVIDE ESCORT SERVICE FOR CONVOYS DEPARTING BEIRUT, TAKING SYRIAN UNITS

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AS FAR AS SOFAR, AND PLO AND PLA ALL THE WAY TO MAASNA', ON THE SYRIAN FRONTIER.

--CONVOYS PASSING THROUGH SOFAR WOULD STICK TO THE MAIN ROAD, INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE DETOUR CARVED OUT BY ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS ON THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES OF THE BARRICADE. THE ISREALIS UNDERTOOK TO CLEAR OBSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR SIDE OF THE CONFRONTATION LINE, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIANS BE ASKED TO DO THE SAME ON THE OTHER SIDE. NOTE: EMBASSY DAMASCUS PLEASE TREAT THIS AS ACTION REQUEST.

--ISRAELI COMMANDO CARS (BUT NOT RPT NOT COMBAT VEHICLES) WILL CONDUCT A ROAD RECEE OF THE ENTIRE ROUTE BEFORE CONVOYS, OUT OF SIGHT OF CONVOYS.

--LAF/ISF WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE CONVOYS IN PROGRESS.

--DRORY RAGGED THE ISSUE OF HEAVY WEAPONS, COMPLAINING THAT AUGUST 22 WAS LONG PAST, THAT THE LAF HAD TAKEN DELIVERY OF NO HEAVY WEAPONS, AND WUS UNABLE TO SAY WHEN SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE TURNED IN.

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5. AT 0900, KHATIB MADE A STRONG PLEA FOR TOMORROW'S TRUCK CONVOY WHICH THE IDF HAD REJECTED. IN DETAILED CONVERSATION, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT GETTING IN 60 VEHICLES THE DAY BEFORE THE HITTING WITHDRAWAL WAS ESSENTIAL TO GETTING THE HITTING OUT PROMPTLY ON AUG 27, IN A SINGLE MOVE. DRAPER AGREED TO GO BACK TO THE IDF. OTHER ISSUES:

--KHATIB ALSO MADE A VERY STRONG PITCH FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF ALONG THE GREEN LINE AS AN ESSENTIAL FACE-SAVING STEP TO GET THE HITTING AND QADDISIYYAH OR IGADDES TO BEGIN THE WITHDRAWAL. DRAPER PROBED RE-

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GARDING A TEMPORARY MNF ARRANGEMENT. IT WOULD NOT EVEN BE NECESSARY, HABIB SAID, FOR THE ORQ TO OKK Y MORE THAN EIGHT DAYS, ONCE THE IJUE AND ADF HAVE WITHDRAWN, HE SAID, THE MNF COULD RETURN TO ITS VARIOUS MAIN DEPLOYMENT AREAS.

--KHATIB PROPOSED BRINGING IN A TOTAL OF 80 CARRIERS, EXPLAINING THAT THE SYRIANS WISHED TO TAKE OUT A NUMBER OF BATTLE-DAMAGED TANKS. DRAPER SAID THIS WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS BECAUSE THIS THE ISRAELIS WERE AWARE OF AND HAD AGREED TO A SMALLER NUMBER OF TANKS BEING REMOVED AND URGED KHATIB TO

NOTE BY OC/T: MESSAGE AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE IMMEDIATE
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

PRESS THE ADF TO RETURN TO THE EARLIER FIGURE.
KHATIB UNDERTOOK TO DO SO (AND WE LEARNED LATER IN
THE DAY THAT THE ADF HAD AGREED).
-- KHATIB PROVIDED DRAPER WITH A REVISED LIST
OF VEHICLES HE HOPES TO BRING IN TO SUPPORT PLA AND
ADF WITHDRAWALS (THE FULL LIST APPEARS AT THE
END OF THIS CABLE).

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6. AT 1300, THE DAILY MEETING OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND LIAISON COMMITTEE WITH THE IDF TOOK PLACE. THERE WAS EXTENSIVE (AND AT TIMES SHARP) DISCUSSION OF SAMI KHATIB'S PROPOSED VEHICLE CONVOY ON THURSDAY/26. BARAK PROPOSED. AND DRAPER STRONGLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT THAT THE SYRIAN CIVILIAN TRUCK CONVOY NOT COME IN UNTIL THE PLO STARTED DELIVERING HEAVY WEAPONRY. IN THE END, BARAK AGREED TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH DRORY. HABIB MADE A FURTHER EFFORT WITH DRORY, WHO APPROVED THE CONVOY, BUT WE LATER WERE TOLD THAT DRORY WENT BACK TO THE ORIGINAL POSITION: NO SYRIAN TRUCKS UNLESS HEAVY WEAPONRY WAS DELIVERED BY PLO TO LAF. (DRAPER AND HABIB HAVE TALKED TODAY TO EVERY RESPONSIBLE, AVAILABLE LEBANESE, FROM PRIME MINISTER THROUGH HAMDAN AND KURAYTIM ABOUT NEED TO TURN OVER HEAVY WEAPONS.) OTHER ISSUES:

-- THE FRENCH HAVE AGREED TO INSPECT THE INCOMING SYRIAN TRANSPORT CONVOY ON THURSDAY/26. THEREAFTER THE ITALIANS WILL HANDLE BOTH ESCORT AND INSPECTION DUTIES FOR THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROUTE.

-- BARAK AGAIN LAID VERY HEAVY STRESS ON THE LAF'S FAILURE TO TAKE DELIVERY OF ANY HEAVY WEAPONS. LAPSING INTO SARCASM, BARAK BRUSHED ASIDE ALL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DELAY. BARAK TOOK NOTE THAT THE LAF HAD DESIGNATED A BARRACKS-SECURE AREA NEAR THE UNESCO BUILDING WHEN THE TURN-IN ACTUALLY GETS UNDERWAY.

-- DRAPER NOTED FOR THE RECORD HOW DEEPLY DISTURBED THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAS AT IDF REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE MNF TO DEPLOY ALONG THE GREEN LINE, BUT AGREED WITH BARAK THAT THE PLACE TO TREAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE IN THE MEETING BETWEEN SHARON AND HABIB NOW SCHEDULED FOR 1700 THIS AFTERNOON IN TEL AVIV.

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-- DRAPER MADE CLEAR THAT THE IDF MUST WORK OUT WITH THE ICRC WHATEVER CONDITIONS SHOULD COVER THE EVACUATION OF WOUNDED ABOARD THE SHIP "FLORA." THE USMC WOULD NOT TURN BACK WOUNDED CHILDREN, HE SAID. WHEN BARAK IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED, DRAPER STRESSED FOR THE RECORD THAT MFA DEP DIRGEN BAR-ON HAD LONG SINCE BEEN APPROACHED ON THE MATTER, THAT THE ICRC HAD REQUESTED ISRAELI COOPERATION IN POSSIBLE ICRC ACTIVITIES, AND THAT THE U.S. HAD ADVISED ISRAELI (BAR-ON) TO PROVIDE A GENERAL ASSURANCE OF COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY FOR HELPING THE WOUNDED. BARAK SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO DRORY A PRIORITY SCHEME IN WHICH FIRST CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO WOUNDED PLO COMBATANTS; SECOND, TO SICK PLO COMBATANTS; THIRD, TO WOUNDED OR SICK CHILDREN. BUT UNTIL HE HAD AGREEMENT, BARAK INSISTED, THE SHIP FLORA SHOULD NOT RPT NOT DOCK. MFA REP LAMDAN WAS CHARGED WITH

WORKING ALL OF THIS OUR WITH ICRC REP DE SALIS (LATE NOTE: EVERYTHING IS NOW OKAY).

-- ITALIAN DEPLOYMENT IN SAN MICHEL AND HADATH WERE APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE, PENDING THE DELIVERY TO THE IDF OF A DETAILED MAY SHOWING THE PRECISE DEPLOYMENT AREAS.

-- THE FRENCH PROPOSED THAT WHEN THE REMAINDER OF THEIR FORCE ARRIVES TOMORROW, AUG. 26, THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT AREA AT THE FOREST OF PINES BE EXPANDED, EITHER TO THE NORTH, EAST, OR TO THE SOUTH. OTHERWISE, THE FRENCH WILL NOT DISEMBARK.

7. FOLLOWING IS ADF COMMANDER SAMI KHATIB'S PROPOSED SCENARIO FOR BRINGING IN SYRIAN TRANSPORT TO SUPPORT WITH WITHDRAWAL OF PLA AND ADF UNITS.

--THURSDAY/26 AUGUST: 60 LARGE CARGO TRUCKS (CIVILIAN) AND TWO 10,000 LITER GASOLINE TANK TRUCKS (FULL).

--FRIDAY/27 AUGUST: 45 HEAVY TRUCKS AND ONE FULL 10,000 LITER GASOLINE TANKER.

--SATURDAY/28 AUGUST:

6 BUSES (FOR WOUNDED), 6 AMBULANCES, 3 HEAVY WRECKERS, 3 VEHICLE REPAIR TRUCKS, 20 TANK CARRIERS (NB), 50 CIVILIAN CARGO TRUCKS.

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--SUNDAY/29 AUGUST: 50 CIVILIAN CARGO TRUCKS, 30 TANKER CARS (NB), TWO VEHICLES REPAIR TRUCKS.

--MONDAY/30 AUGUST: 50 CIVILIAN CARGO TRUCKS, 30 TANK CARRIERS (NB), 2 VEHICLE REPAIR TRUCKS.

8. FOLLOWING IS KHATIB'S REVISED LIST OF VEHICLES DEPARTING BEIRUT:

--FIRDAY/27 AUGUST -HITTIN BRIGADE: 60 CIVILIAN CARGO TRUCKS, 3 PICK-UP TRUCKS, 100 MILITARY TRUCKS, 3 MOBILE WORKSHOPS, 2 CHEMICAL VEHICLES (SIC), 14 JEEPS, 3 AMBULANCES, 6 SEDANS, 2 MICRO-BUSES, 2 WATER TANKERS, 1 RADIO VAN, 3 RADIO JEEPS. VEHICLE TOTAL - 198.

--SATURDAY/28 AUGUST - QADDISIYYAH BRIGADE: 45 CIVILIAN CARGO TRUCKS, 70 MILITARY TRUCKS, 4 MICRO-BUSES, 5 AMBULANCES, 19 JEEPS, 3 WATER TANKERS, 6 SEDANS, 1. RADIO VAN, 2 PICK-UPS. VEHICLE TOTAL - 155.

-- 29/30/31 AUGUST - ADF: KHATIB IS TO PROVIDE DETAILS AT LEAST 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF MOVEMENT.

9. (NB: TOTAL NUMBER OF TANK CARRIERS TO BE BROUGHT IN WILL NOW FALL BACK TO 28, THE TOTAL PROPOSED BY KHATIB IN THE FIRST PLACE.)

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INFORMATION EXCHANGE, CABINET MEETINGS, MILITARY PLANS, INTER
PEACEKEEPING FORCES

TAGS= SOPN, PGOV, MOPS, MILI, PEPR, IS, LE, US, PLO, (BEN-MEIR, YEHUDA),
(BAR-ON, HANAN)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR *ed* Date: 11/6/97
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PAGE 01 TEL AV 14188 211854Z
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SOPN, PGOV, MOPS, MILI, PEPR, IS, LE, PLO
SUBJECT: MNF IN BEIRUT: ISRAELI VIEWS

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1. ~~REDACTED~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CHARGE SPOKE WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YEHUDA BEN-MEIR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL HANAN BAR-ON FOLLOWING CABINET MEETING TODAY. CABINET COMMUNIQUE AND SOME ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING TELEGRAPHED TO AMBASSADOR ARENS IN WASHINGTON.

3. BEN-MEIR DESCRIBED CABINET DISCUSSIONS IN

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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VERY POSITIVE TERMS. HE SAID THE CABINET WELCOMED THE REAGAN PROPOSAL FOR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, THAT THE CABINET DECISION TO ACCEPT THE MNF WAS UNANIMOUS. HE SAID THE ISRAELI ARMY IS READY TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT AND THEIR DESIRE IS TO WORK IT ALL OUT AND MAKE THE ENTRY OF THE FORCE SMOOTH AND COORDINATED. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE WHICH WAS PROPOSED IN THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE, BEN-MEIR SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WAS WAITING FOR SUGGESTIONS ON COORDINATION FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. BAR-ON SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THINKING ON COORDINATION WAS PERHAPS TO REESTABLISH THE LIAISON COMMITTEE AS IT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE PREVIOUS MNF IN BEIRUT. BAR-ON FELT THAT THIS COULD BE COORDINATED BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER, THAT GENERAL DRORY WOULD PERHAPS BE THE ISRAELI CANDIDATE TO BE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE, THAT A FOREIGN MINISTRY PERSON WOULD ALSO BE ASSIGNED TO WORK FROM THE ISRAELI SIDE. HE SAID HE ASSUMED THAT THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND LEBANESE WOULD BE REPRESENTED AS THEY WERE IN THE PAST. BAR-ON SAID THAT IN ANY EVENT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A LIAISON GROUP OR COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEET PRIOR

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TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE MNF SO THAT THE ARRIVAL WOULD BE SMOOTH AND WELL COORDINATED.

4. BEN-MEIR SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION OF ARRIVAL COORDINATION, THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES IN SUCH A COMMITTEE WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR ASSURING THAT THE STOCKS OF WEAPONS THAT HAVE BEEN LEFT BEHIND BY THE TERRORISTS WOULD BE CLEANED UP. HE SAID HE FELT THAT AT THIS STAGE WITH THE MARINES INVOLVED IN WEST BEIRUT, THE UNITED STATES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14188 211854Z

WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST EQUAL TO THAT OF ISRAEL IN MAKING SURE THAT WELL-ARMED MILITIAS NOT CONTINUE TO ROAM THE STREETS.

5. CHARGE SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR THOUGHTS AND PROPOSALS ON THE MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION OF THE MNF.

6. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED BEIRUT 6453. ✓ THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH BAR-ON'S THOUGHTS ON A COORDINATING COMMITTEE EXCEPT FOR THE LACK OF A MENTION OF AN INTERFACE WITH THE ISRAELI FORCES. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT AND DRAPER IDEAS ON MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION WITH IDF AND GOI.

7. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. FLATEN

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PAGE 01 STATE 237229
ORIGIN SS-10

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/GR/IR

Date: 11/6/97

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EO Citations

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DRAFTED BY:UNA:AMBFELDMAN
APPROVED BY:IO/SA:MHAINES
S/S-O:GBERRY
NEA:BSTANTON

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

() CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

STATE 237229

EXDIS FOR AMB FELDMAN

FOLLOWING TEL AVIV 12774 DTD AUG 22 SENT ACTION BEIRUT
STATE INFO JERUSALEM BEING REPEATED TO YOU

QUOTE:

TEL AVIV 12774

DECAPTIONED

FOR THE SECRETARY AND HABIB FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: IDF REFUSAL TO ALLOW TODAYS
SHIP DEPARTURE TO TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE PLO
JEEPS ARE UNLOADED

REFS: A) BEIRUT 5599, B) TEL AVIV 12768, C) NUMEROUS
HILL/LEWIS TELCONS AUG 22

PAGE 02 STATE 237229

1. ENTIRE TEXT:

2. I HAVE SPOKEN AT LENGTH WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND
TWICE FOR EXTENDED PERIODS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON
SUNDAY AFTERNOON TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO PERMIT
TODAYS SHIP DEPARTURE TO GO FORWARD WITH THE 13 JEEPS
ABDARD. I'M SORRY TO SAY THAT I CANNOT MOVE EITHER BEGIN

Page 1
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OR SHARON TO ANY FLEXIBILITY. IF THE SHIP IS TO SAIL, THE JEEPS MUST BE DISEMBARKED.

3. FIRST WITH SHARON, THEN WITH BEGIN, THEN AGAIN WITH SHARON I HAVE PUT FORWARD EVERY ARGUMENT EITHER CHARLIE HILL OR I COULD THINK OF WITHOUT AVAIL. BEGIN AND SHARON RSSERT FIRMLY THAT THE SUBJECT OF PLO VEHICLES WAS NEVER AT ANY TIME EITHER DISCUSSED WITH THEM OR AGREED TO BY THEM AS LEGITIMATE ITEMS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF BEIRUT. THEY STRESS THE WORDING OF ARTICLES 17 AND 18 OF THE DEPARTURE PLAN AS BINDING. THEY INSIST THAT JEEPS ARE CERTAINLY NOT IN THE CATEGORY OF "INDIVIDUAL SIDE WEAPONS" UNDER ANY DEFINITION, AND THAT JEEPS ARE "MILITARY EQUIPMENT" IN ANYONE'S DEFINITION SINCE THEY ARE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES AND OFTEN MOUNTED WITH VARIOUS KINDS OF WEAPONS.

4. IN BOTH MY CONVERSATIONS WITH SHARON HE HAS STRESSED THE DISTINCTION ISRAEL HAS MADE THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EQUIPMENT PERMITTED TO BE TAKEN BY PLO FORCES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE TAKEN BY THE SYRIAN FORCES. THE ISRAELIS HAD ACCEPTED HABIB'S FORMULA THAT THE SYRIAN ARMY WAS IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM THE PLO AND MUST BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE IN A DIGNIFIED FASHION WITH ALL OF ITS HEAVY WEAPONS AND VEHICLES. SHARON SAID THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION IN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BEIRUT YESTERDAY WITH HABIB HE HAD IMMEDIATELY AGREED TO HABIB'S PROPOSAL THAT THE SYRIANS BE PERMITTED TO BRING IN ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT VEHICLES AND TANK TRANSPORTERS TO HELP CARRY OUT THEIR HEAVY EQUIPMENT. BUT THE SUBJECT OF PLO VEHICLES NEVER CAME UP, AND IF IT HAD COME UP SHARON SAYS HE WOULD HAVE REFUSED TO CONSIDER GOING BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PLO BEING PERMITTED ONLY THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS. I USED A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DISRUPTING THE SENSITIVE DEPARTURE SCHEDULE, THE HARMLESSNESS OF THE JEEPS THEMSELVES ON ROUTE TO TUNISIA AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAD BEEN CAREFULLY INSPECTED BY THE FRENCH TO MAKE SURE THEY HAD NO WEAPONS IN THEM, MY ASSUMPTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HABIB AND THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THE QUESTION OF VEHICLES WHICH NOW HAD SURFACED AT A MOMENT IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS SHOULD EXERCISE FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPROMISE THE DEPARTURE SCHEDULE, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER ARGUMENNS. I URGED SHARON TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION FOR THIS SHIPMENT AND THEN TO HAMMER OUT CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT VEHICLES OR OTHER AMBIGIOUS ITEMS WITH HABIB. SHARON WAS CONCILIATORY IN TONE AND SEEMED ANXIOUS TO STRESS THAT HE WOULD REALLY LIKE TO BE HELPFUL IN THIS CASE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A "NEW ERA" OF CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HABIB HAD BEEN INITIATED DURING THE MEETING YESTERDAY. BUT, HE INSISTED, WITH

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GREAT REGRET HE COULD NOT ACCEPT MY PLEA.

5. SHARON'S RIGIDITY SEEMS GROUNDED IN PART IN THE DEEPENING WORRY HERE THAT THE PLO IS EVADING ANY LAF VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND GOING AHEAD STEADILY WITH ITS PLANS TO "CHEAT" ON THE AGREEMENT BY LEAVING A COUPLE OF THOUSAND FIGHTERS BEHIND UNDER COVER. (I RELAYED SHARON AND BEGIN'S MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT IN AN EARLIER CABLE TODAY -- TEL AVIV 12766.) HE SAYS THAT WE ARE AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS AND IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT EVERYONE LIVE UP TO THE LETTER OF THE AGREEMENT ON WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE TAKEN OUT. TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FOR THE JEEPS TODAY WOULD BE IN HIS MIND "VERY DANGEROUS", AND HE JUST "CANNOT DO IT".

6. WHEN I REALIZED FINALLY I COULD NOT MOVE HIM WITH ANY ARGUMENTS I ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD CONSIDER GOING TO BEIRUT HIMSELF THIS AFTERNOON TO SEE IF HE COULD NOT WORK OUT SOME COMPROMISE ON THE SPOT. AGAIN HE DECLINED REGRETFULLY, SAYING THAT IF HE WENT UP HE COULD ONLY REAFFIRM HIS ORDERS THAT THE JEEPS MUST BE REMOVED FROM THE SHIP. THEREFORE HE DID NOT THINK A TRIP WOULD BE OF ANY USE. HE ASKED SEVERAL TIMES WHY THE SIMPLE SOLUTION OF DRIVING THE JEEPS OFF THE SHIP AND BACK TO WEST BEIRUT WAS NOT FOLLOWED. I USED EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED TO ME BY CHARLIE HILL WITHOUT ANY APPARENT IMPACT.

7. IN BETWEEN MY TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH SHARON I SPOKE FOR ABOUT TEN MINUTES BY TELEPHONE WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. AFTER DESCRIBING THE SITUATION WITH THE JEEPS I APPEALED TO HIM TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION FOR THE SHIP THIS AFTERNOON IN ORDER TO AVOID RISKING ANY BREAKDOWN IN THE TIGHT EVACUATION SCHEDULE. I STRESSED THE NON-SECURITY ASPECT OF THE JEEPS, THE FACT THAT THEY COULD BE NO CONCEIVABLE THREAT TO ISRAEL IN TUNISIA, AND MADE A GREAT DEAL OF WHAT I CHARACTERIZED AS A "GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING" BETWEEN US ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF VEHICLES IN THE BAGGAGE OF THE PLO MEN LEAVING. I URGED HIM WITH ALL PERSUASIVE POWERS AT MY COMMAND TO BE FLEXIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE AT LEAST AND ALLOW THINGS TO PROCEED, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE PHIL HABIB ATTACHED TO NOT INTERRUPTING THE DEPARTURE ANY LONGER OVER THIS ISSUE AND THE FACT THAT HABIB HAS BEEN CONVINCED ALL ALONG THAT VEHICLES OF THIS KIND WERE PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE FOR INCLUSION IN THE SHIPMENTS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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8. BEGIN WOULD HAVE NONE OF IT. HE BACKED UP SHARON'S POSITION COMPLETELY, SAID HE WOULD NOT OVERRULE SHARON ON MILITARY MATTERS IN ANY CASE AND IN THIS CASE HE AGREED COMPLETELY WITH SHARON THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD TO BE FOLLOWED. BEGIN STRESSED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE DETAILS HIMSELF MANY TIMES WITH HABIB AND THAT THE SUBJECT OF VEHICLES GOING OUT WITH THE PLO HAD NEVER BEEN RAISED. HE WOULD NEVER HAVE AGREED TO IT HAD IT BEEN RAISED. BEGIN HIMSELF HAD MADE THE PROPOSAL IN THE KNESSET THAT THE PLO MEN BE PERMITTED TO TAKE WITH THEM THEIR "PERSONAL WEAPONS", WHICH HE ANALOGIZED TO THE HONORABLE DEPARTURE OF MEDIEVAL SOLDIERS WITH THEIR SWORDS. HE ASKED ME RHETORICALLY HOW I COULD SUGGEST THAT MILITARY VEHICLES LIKE JEEPS WERE ANALOGOUS TO SWORDS. (HE ALSO ANGRILY REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT SOME PLO FIGHTERS HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO LEAVE WITH RPG'S WHICH HE AGAIN INSISTED WAS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND COULD NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS "SIDE ARMS", SINCE THEY ARE USED TO ATTACK TANKS. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY INTERPRETATIONS SUPPORTING THE THESIS THAT RPG'S COULD BE CONSIDERED AS INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, BUT I DID NOT INSIST ON THIS ARGUMENT FOR FEAR OF CREATING YET MORE COMPLICATIONS THIS AFTERNOON. I SHOULD POINT OUT HOWEVER THAT BEGIN MAY MAKE MORE OF AN ISSUE OVER THE RPG'S THAN SHARON HAS THUS FAR DONE.) MY CONVERSATION WITH BEGIN ENDED WITH HIM TELLING ME THAT HE WOULD MAKE NO CHANGE IN SHARON'S DECISION, WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS EXACTLY CORRECT. THERE WAS A SIMPLE SOLUTION, SAID BEGIN, MERELY REMOVE THE JEEPS FROM THE SHIP. IF SHARON WANTED TO MAKE ANY OTHER DECISION, THAT WAS HIS BUSINESS. BEGIN LEFT IT ENTIRELY IN SHARON'S HANDS.

9. I HAVE STRUCK OUT HERE WITH BOTH BATTERS. I SEE NO SOLUTION BUT TO REMOVE THE JEEPS AND GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 06 STATE 237229

10. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. LEWIS UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

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CONCEPTS= TROOP DEPLOYMENT, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT, MILITARY PLAN
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES, MILITARY LOGISTICS

TAGS= MOPS, MILI, PEPR, XF, IS, LE, SY, FR, IT, US

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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☐ DENY IN PART

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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06464 212212Z
ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE

COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPEC EXCLUSIVE

FROM DRAPER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TOAG: MOPS, MILI, XF, IS, LE, SY, FR, IT, PEPR

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: GEARING UP FOR THE MNF: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, WE HAVE IN EFFECT RECONSTITUTED OUR MNF

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06464 212212Z

COORDINATION AND LIAISON COMMITTEE AT BOTH THE POLITICAL OR AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AND AT THE MILITARY LEVEL, AND HAVE MET WITH THE COMBINED GROUPS TWICE TODAY, SEPTEMBER 21. IN ADDITION, WE (THE US SIDE) HAVE HAD A GOOD SESSION WITH GENERAL HAMDAN AND HIS MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PLANNING STAFF, AND THEREFORE HAVE A GOOD IDEA OF THE STAGED WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT PROPOSED BY THE IDF STRETCHING THROUGH AT LEAST TO THE END OF SEPTEMBER 26 ONLY FOR THE NORTH HALF OF WEST BEIRUT (ABOVE THE CORNICHE MAZRA'A). COMBINING THE COLLECTIVE FACTS AND IMPRESSIONS WE HAVE DEVELOPED FROM THESE MEETINGS, FOLLOWING ARE THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS WE FORESEE:

--A. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HERE IS FRANTICALLY DETERMINED THAT AN ITALIAN UNIT -- OF ANY SIZE -- COME WITH THE FIRST WAVE OF THE MNF, SO THAT THE ITALIANS ARE SUBJECTED TO THE KIND OF CRITICISM THAT FACED THEM PREVIOUSLY ON THE FIRST MNF OPERATION WHEN THEY ARRIVED LATE.

-- B. THE FRENCH ON THE OTHER HAND ARE PREPARED TO SEND THE INITIAL 350-MAN UNIT TO BEIRUT AS EARLY AS THE AFTERNOON OF THURSDAY, SEPT. 23. EVERY TIME THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR MENTIONS THIS POSSIBILITY, THE ITALIAN ALMOST EXPIRES FROM RAGE. COMMENT: HIS FEAR IS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE ITSELF IN TIME TO BRING A UNIT INTO BEIRUT EVEN IF A COMMON ARRIVAL DATE IS SET FOR, TO TAKE AN EXAMPLE, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26.

--C. OUR COMMITTEE AGREED FINALLY THAT EACH MEMBER WOULD TAKE A POSITION WITH HIS RESPECTIVE CAPITAL THAT

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- 1) THERE SHOULD BE REPRESENTATION FROM EACH OF THE THREE NATIONAL UNITS ON THE FIRST DAY OF ARRIVAL OF THE MNF;
- 2) THE MNF SHOULD, HOWEVER, ARRIVE AS EARLY AS FEASIBLE; AND
- 3) WE SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY QUESTIONS OF STRICT PROPORTIONALITY. (IN OTHER WORDS, A COMBINATION OF 350 FRENCH, 100 ITALIANS AND 200 AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BOTHER ANYONE.)
- D). WE SHOULD TRY, HOWEVER, TO SET A TENTATIVE ARRIVAL TIME FOR THE FIRST UNITS AT MEETINGS TOMORROW IN BEIRUT. WE WILL BE PRESSED BY THE LEBANESE FOR INFORMATION, AND THE LAF NEEDS TO COMMENCE DE-

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06464 212212Z

TAILED PLANNING WITH US. SPEAKING FOR THE US SIDE, WE BELIEVE THAT SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, OR THE FOLLOWING DAY, WOULD NOT BE A BAD TARGET. THIS PRESUMES THAT WE CAN BE ADEQUATELY HELPFUL TO THE ITALIANS IN ENSURING THAT SOME OF THEM COME ASHORE THE SAME DAY.

- E. TO ENSURE THAT MATTERS ARE SATISFACTORILY COORDINATED HERE, WE WILL NEED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE SEPTEMBER 21 ISRAELI COMMUNIQUE REALLY MEANS. HAVE THE ISRAELIS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AIRPORT? WITH OR WITHOUT CONDITIONS? FROM EAST BEIRUT? (ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE.)
- F. PARA 1B OF THE ISRAELI CABINET COMMUNIQUE PROPOSES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN MNF FROM LEBANON, ISRAEL AND THE THREE MNF PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. (ACTION REQUESTED: WE NEED GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER AS WELL.)
- G. TODAY'S MEETING BETWEEN THE LAF AND THE IDF WAS REPRESENTED ON THE IDF SIDE BY GENERAL AMOS SINCE DRORY WAS RECALLED TO ISRAEL FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS. AMOS URGED THAT THE LEBANESE REJECT THE MNF EVEN AFTER HE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ACCEPTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN MNF. AMOS, HOWEVER, PRESENTED A PLAN WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE IDF APPEARS TO BE SERIOUS IF SLOW IN ITS WITHDRAWAL PLANS. IN ESSENCE, DAY BY DAY UP THROUGH SEPTEMBER 26, THE IDF WOULD EVACUATE ALL OF WEST BEIRUT NORTH OF THE MAZRA'A CORNICHE. APPARENTLY, PART OF THE DELAY WOULD BE CAUSED BY THE IDF WISH TO REMOVE ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM SOME 110 CACHES IN THIS AREA. THEY DO NOT WANT TO SHARE ANY OF IT WITH THE LAF AND HAMDAN FRANKLY HAS NO REAL ENTHUSIASMS FOR ACQUIRING IT. (IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE LAF ESTIMATES THAT IT WILL REQUIRE FIFTY (50) DAYS, USING 40 TRUCKLOADS A DAY TO DRAW DOWN ONE SINGLE

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LARGE ARMS CACHE IN THE BURJ AL-BARAJINAH AREA, A MONUMENTAL JOB FOR THE LAF. WHILE IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE CACHES HELD BY THE LAF ARE SMALLER, IT SOUNDS TO US THAT THERE MAY STILL BE A LOT OF MUNITIONS TO BE REMOVED.)

—H. WHILE WE HAVE ENCOURAGED HAMDAN TO ENCOURAGE THE IDF TO ACCELERATE THEIR ARMS REMOVAL SCHEDULE, AND TO COME TO A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION WITH THE LAF ON THE DISPOSITION OF THEIR ARMS, IT MAY BE THAT IT IS IN THE COMMON INTEREST -- OF LEBANON, THE MNF, AND THE ISRAELIS -- THAT MOST OF THESE ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS BE REMOVED PRIOR

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[REDACTED]

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TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE MNF. THIS IS A MATTER THAT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY.

—I. IF THE ISRAELIS ARE STILL OCCUPIED IN WEST BEIRUT AND IN THE AREA OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 26 RE USING THE AIRPORT AS A MARSHALLING AREA IN THE WAY THEY DO NOW, WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE PLANS TO BRING THE MNF INITIAL UNITS IN THOUGH THE PORT AND FAN OUT FROM THERE, RATHER THAN USING THE AIRPORT FROM THE FIRST DAY.

3. THE FOREGOING IS NOT PAINTED IN BLACK AND WHITE.

A LOT OF CONSULTATION IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED, WITH THE LAF AND IDF, IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD AND THE RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS IN ISRAEL COULD CAUSE COMPLICATIONS IN MAKING POLITICAL DECISIONS. BARRETT

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SUBJECT= HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= n/a

TAGS= OTRA, LE, (HABIB, PHILIPC.), (HABIB, PHILIPC)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/GR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06459 211404Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8789

-----BEIRUT 6459

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PARIS: PASS HABIB FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OTRA (HABIB, PHILIPC.) LE

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSED ROUGH SCHEDULE (EXACT TIMES ARE SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT):

WEDNESDAY, SEPT 22

--1430 LOCAL (1230Z) DEPART LARNACA VIA LAF HELICOPTER

--1520 LOCAL (1320Z) ARRIVE JUNIYAH

--1600 LOCAL ARRIVE RESIDENCE AT YARZE

--1830 LOCAL CALL ON SARKIS, WAZZAN AND BUTRUS AT PALACE

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06459 211404Z

--EVENING FREE

THURSDAY, SEPT 23

--0900 MEETINGS WITH FRENCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES, AND STAFF

--1100 INAUGURAL CEREMONY AT LAF MILITARY ACADEMY IN FAYYADIYAH

--1230 LUNCH WITH COL AND MRS JOHNNY ABDU

--1500 DEPART JUNIYAH FOR LARNACA

--1550 LOCAL (1350Z) ARRIVE LARNACA. TAKE SPAR 85 AIRCRAFT TO BEN GURION

--1635 LOCAL (1535Z) ARRIVE BEN GURION

--1715 ARRIVE CONGEN RESIDENCE

--2000 SUGGEST YOU AND I HOST A DINNER FOR KIMCHE, THE BAR-ONS, BENSURS, BRANDON GROVE, CHARGE FLATEN, ETC.

FRIDAY, SEPT 24

--1000 MEETING WITH BEGIN (PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED BY ISRAELIS)

--1200 POSSIBLE SEPARATE MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND

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SHARON (AT THEIR REQUEST)

--2000 DINNER WITH THE SHARONS AT THEIR FARM

SATURDAY, SEPT 25

--0900 DEPART BEN GURION

--1030 (APPROX) ARRIVE DAMASCUS. APPOINTMENTS
WITH QADDOUR AND ASSAD (KHADDAM WILL BE IN
NEW YORK)

SUNDAY, SEPT 26

--0900 DEPART DAMASCUS

--1000 ARRIVE AMMAN. MEETINGS WITH KING HUSSEIN,
BADRAN, MARWAN KASIM

3. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WILL CLOSE DOWN COMPLETELY
DURING THE LAST 10 DAYS OF THE MONTH AND MURPHY ADVISED
ME EARLIER THAT IT WILL BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SET
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06459 211404Z

UP A SATISFACTORY MEETING. I PERSONALLY THINK THAT YOU
SHOULD TRY FOR MEETINGS IN CAIRO, BUT WE CAN DISCUSS
THIS ON YOUR ARRIVAL.

4. YOUR STAY IN BEIRUT IS A SHORT ONE UNDER THE FORE-
GOING SCHEDULE. IF YOU WISH, WE COULD DEFER YOUR TRAVEL
TO ISRAEL UNTIL EARLY IN THE MORNING FRIDAY, SEPT 24,
AND ASK BEGIN TO MOVE THE MEETING WITH HIM TO, SAY,
11100. I AM TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT
REALLY STARTS TO CLOSE DOWN ABOUT 1300 THAT DAY, AND I
THINK YOU SHOULD DO YOUR BEST TO GET TO BEGIN FAIRLY EARLY.
TO MAKE A 10 AM APPOINTMENT IN JERUSALEM WITH BEGIN,
YOU WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO LEAVE THE RESIDENCE AT YARZE
NO LATER THAN ABOUT 6:45 AM

5. I WOULD PLAN ON GOING WITH YOU AT LEAST THROUGH THE
AMMAN STOP. OUR SECRETARY, MISS BUERLE, WOULD BE WITH
US, BUT I PROBABLY WOULD LEAVE CHRIS ROSS AND COL GAUCHER
TO HOLD THE FORT IN BEIRUT.

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6. LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.BARRETT

[REDACTED]

NNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 PARIS 32361 01 OF 03 211848Z
ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/6/97

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IN PART

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

TS authority to
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____

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SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 32361

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, FR, US, LE, IS

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MEETING WITH CHEYSSON

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~2. SUMMARY: DURING LUNCHEON WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON SEPTEMBER 21, HABIB DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF PLANNING FOR MNF. SPECIFIC ISSUES DISCUSSED ARE OUTLINED BELOW.
END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH CONTINGENT; CHEYSSON EXPLAINED THAT FRENCH PLAN TO SEND IN ABOUT 1,000 TROOPS FROM FRANCE. IN ADDITION ABOUT 300-400 TROOPS WOULD BE TAKEN FROM THE FRENCH UNIFIL CONTINGENT, IF REQUIRED. THIS ARRANGEMENT

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WOULD GIVE FLEXIBILITY PLUS A DE FACTO LINK WITH THE UN. (CHEYSSON NOTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD OFFERED THE LEBANESE HELP IN CLEARING MINES. THE PERSONNEL FOR SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD ALSO BE DRAWN FROM THE FRENCH UNIFIL CONTINGENT AND THUS WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL DE FACTO LINK WITH THE UN.)

4. THE FRENCH FORCES ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN LANDING IN THE BEIRUT AREA BY THURSDAY NIGHT, SEPTEMBER 23RD. THE

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FIRST 350 WOULD BE LANDED ON THURSDAY BY SHIP. AN ADDITIONAL 200 WOULD LAND ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON, POSSIBLY AT THE AIRPORT. A FURTHER 550 WOULD BE LANDED BY HELICOPTER FROM THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOCH ON MONDAY. VEHICLES AND LIGHT APC'S WOULD BE LANDED BY FERRY ON MONDAY. CHEYSSON SPECIFIED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PROVIDE A LIAISON OFFICER AT US CINCEUR HEADQUARTERS IN STUTTGART. HABIB ASKED IF WASHINGTON HAD AGREED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD GO IN ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM BEING READY TO GO IN ON THAT DAY. THE ACTUAL TIME OF ENTRY WOULD DEPEND ON FIRM ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW AND HABIB WANTED TO SEE THE EXACT TERMS OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE. HABIB ALSO NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ITALIANS NOT COME IN LATE.

5. MNF MISSION: CHEYSSON AGREED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MNF SHOULD GENERALLY PARALLEL THOSE PREVIOUSLY USED. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT LEBANESE CHAIRMANSHIP OF COORDINATION COMMITTEES WAS A GOOD IDEA SINCE IT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE MNF IS TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. CHEYSSON STRESSED THAT THE MNF MISSION NOW IS QUITE DIFFERENT. BEFORE IT WAS TO PERMIT PLO EVACUATION; NOW IT IS TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

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6. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE MISSION WAS NOT THAT DIFFERENT, IN THE SENSE THAT THE MNF WOULD PROVIDE A PRESENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF. CHEYSSON ACCEPTED THE UTILITY OF A COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE MNF WITHOUT NECESSITY FOR A CHAIRMAN AFTER HABIB NOTED THAT PREVIOUSLY THE LEBANESE PREFERRED SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. THE U.S. IS RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE IN A PATROL FUNCTION SINCE THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE A POLICE ROLE, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO OUR CONCEPT OF THE MNF. HABIB THOUGHT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE HANDLED THROUGH ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS TO THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE MNF ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT. OUR MARINE UNIT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A SPECIFIC AREA AND WOULD OPERATE WITHIN THAT AREA, E.G. THE AIRPORT. THEY COULD NOT BE SPLIT UP. CHEYSSON INDICATED THAT THE FRNCH UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE US ROLE AND ALSO THE US PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THE TIME LIMITATION FOR DEPLOYMENT IN BEIRUT. HE AGREED THAT SPECIFIC MISSIONS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN BEIRUT. IF THE US CONTINGENT CANNOT PATROL THEN THE OTHER UNITS WILL HAVE TO DO SO, IN VIEW OF THE MISSION FOR PROTECTING CIVILIANS. SUCH PATROLS WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY. CHEYSSON BELIEVED THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCOMPANY THE LEBANESE ARMY EVEN IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS.

7. HABIB INDICATED HIS PRELIMINARY THINKING THAT THE

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FRENCH COULD TAKE CONTROL OF THE AREA FROM THE MUSEUM
SECRET

NORTH TO THE WATER. THE ITALIANS COULD BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE EASTERN FRINGE AND THE US CONTINGENT COULD OCCUPY
THE AIRPORT AND RUN IT. HABIB SPECIFIED THAT WE WANT TO

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CONTROL THE AIRPORT AND NOT LEAVE IT IN ISRAELI HANDS.
THE QUESTION, SAID HABIB, IS HOW FAR INTO THE POPULATED
AREA OF WEST BEIRUT THE PATROLS WOULD GO. HE AGREED
THAT THE FRENCH COULD PATROL WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH
THEY HAD SHOWN THEY COULD DO.

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8. CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION OF MISSION: CHEYSSON REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE ON THE TERMINATION OF THE MISSION. FRANCE WANTS TO INCLUDE A PROVISION INDICATING THAT DEPARTURE WILL DEPEND ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE MNF COUNTRIES AND WITH THE LEBANESE. CHEYSSON SAID THE FRENCH WERE PUT ON THE SPOT THE LAST TIME BY THE FACT THAT THE US WAS ABLE TO DECIDE UNILATERALLY WHEN IT WISHED TO LEAVE. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER ON THIS POINT WAS SATISFACTORY BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN PUT ON PAPER. THOUGH HE HAD NOT SPOKEN DIR-

[REDACTED]

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ECTLY TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS POINT, CHEYSSON SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE SECRETARY HAD AGREED THAT THE TERMINATION OF THE MNF MANDATE WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE THREE MNF POWERS PLUS LEBANON.

9. WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM BEIRUT: HABIB SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE FRENCH HAD INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL "IN DEPTH". ("BEIRUT ET SES ALENTOURS.") HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FROM THE BEIRUT AREA AND NOT JUST FROM WEST BEIRUT. HABIB MENTIONED THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF ISRAELI TROOPS TO THE NORTH OF BEIRUT. THESE WOULD NOT WITHDRAW AT THE SAME TIME AS WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEM, THE ISRAELI SHOULD MOVE THEIR SUPPLY LINES EASTWARD. HABIB SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS FIRST WITH THE COORDINATING GROUP IN BEIRUT AND THEN WITH THE ISRAELIS.

10. FUTURE PLANS: CHEYSSON SAID THAT BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IN BEIRUT THE FRENCH WOULD BE "BLINDLY BEHIND" US EFFORTS TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. THE FRENCH CONSIDERED THIS A TOP PRIORITY WHICH NEEDED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE REAGAN MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE COULD MOVE FORWARD. HABIB SAID THE ORDER OF US PRIORITIES FOR LEBANON WAS CLEAR: FIRST, BEIRUT MUST BE SECURE. SECOND, LEBANON MUST HAVE A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THIRD, THERE MUST BE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL

FORCES FROM LEBANON. ALL THIS NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME SO THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE COULD BE PURSUED ON AN ACCELERATED BASIS.

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11. HABIB SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THIS SET OF PRIORITIES AND THAT TO ACCOMPLISH IT HABIB WOULD NOT CONFINE HIS DISCUSSIONS TO LEBANON BUT WOULD ALSO VISIT ISRAEL, SYRIA, JORDAN AND PERHAPS SAUDI ARABIA. HABIB SAID HE WOULD BEGIN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. HABIB NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE SYRIANS ASSERT THAT THEIR FORCES ARE NOT ILLEGAL AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE EQUATED TO ISRAELI FORCES IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL. MEANWHILE THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE SETTING A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL WHICH APPEAR TO BE IRRELEVANT. ONE PROBLEM WOULD BE TO AVOID EQUATING SYRAIN PRSENCE WITH ISRAELI PRESENCE OTHERWISE THE SYRIANS WILL BALK. HOWEVER, THE SYRIANS DO WANT TO GET OUT OF LEBANON UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THEY RECOGNIZE IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHICH MEANS THAT WE SHOULD SEEK CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL.

12. CHEYSSON STRESSED THE FRENCH DESIRE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE US AND INDICATED THAT FRANCE COULD BE HELPFUL BECAUSE IT HAS A SEPARATE VOICE AND INFLUENCE WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. HE REGRETTED THAT THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MITTERRAND AND BEGIN HAD BROKEN OUT INTO THE OPEN AT THIS TIME SINCE HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE THE WHOLE SITUATION FORWARD. HABIB SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH LEBANON WILL BE INDEPENDENT AND NOT DIVIDED OR SIMPLY AN ISRAELI PROTCTORATE. HEYSSON INDICATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HABIB AGAIN IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS TO REVIEW WHERE THINGS STAND. HABIB SAID HE WOULD ONLY STAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A SHORT TIME ON TH
IS VISIT BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE

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RETURNING TO THE AREA LATER IN THE YEAR AND WOULD PLAN TO
CONSULT IN PARS AT THAT TIME. MEANWHILE AMBASSADOR
DRAPER WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE US
PROPOSALS FOR LEBANON.

13. LATER IN THE DAY, HABIB HAD A TWENTY MINUTE MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING WHICH HE COVERED MANY OF
THE SAME POINTS. HABIB OUTLINED FOR HIM HIS MISSION AND
MITTERRAND EXPRESSED FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE
FULLY. MITTERRAND SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE MANNER IN
WHICH FRANCE AND US COOPERATION HAD BEEN CONDUCTED PRE-
VIOUSLY. HABIB ASSURED HIM WE WILL CONTINUE IN THE SAME
SPIRIT. THE FRENCH PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT
HABIB SHOUD CONTINUE TO PERSIST IN HIS EFFORTS

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14. EMBASSY COMMENT; MITTERRAND MADE A BIG POINT OF
EXTOLLING THE PERSONAL SUCCESS HABIB HAS HAD IN THIS
AFFAIR AND WAS GENUINELY PLEASED TO KNOW HIM. GALBRAITH

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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
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 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
 AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
 AMEMBASSY Dacca
 AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SOPN
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 20, 1982

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.

Q. WHAT'S YOUR LATEST ASSESSMENT ABOUT WHO IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE MASSACRE IN THE FIRST PLACE?
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A. WE DO NOT HAVE SUCH AN ASSESSMENT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHO
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRE.

Q. ARE WE CONDUCTING ANY INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION ON THAT?

A. I THINK WE WOULD CONTINUE TO GATHER INFORMATION BEFORE
OUR ASSESSMENT.

Q. A COUPLE OF ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS SAID TODAY THAT THE
ISRAELI ARMY APPARENTLY WAS TOLD THAT THE MASSACRES WERE
BEGINNING WEDNESDAY EVENING, BUT DID NOTHING TO END THEM FOR
AT LEAST 24 HOURS AND POSSIBLY LONGER. DO WE HAVE ANY IN-
FORMATION ON THAT, AND HOW DO WE CHARACTERIZE THE ISRAELI
RESPONSE TOWARD ENDING THE MASSACRES?

A. NO, WE DON'T HAVE A RESPONSE. WE HAVE SEEN THOSE
REPORTS AND THERE ARE REPORTS BACK AND FORTH; THERE HAVE
BEEN SOME CONFLICTING REPORTS IN THE ISRAELI PRESS AND
FROM VARIOUS SPOKESMEN, BUT WE HAVE NO ASSESSMENT OF THAT.

Q. A SENIOR OFFICIAL SAID ON SATURDAY THAT THE FIRST
REPORT HE RECEIVED WAS AROUND SEVEN O'CLOCK EASTERN TIME,
FRIDAY. IN LIGHT OF WHAT WE'VE BEEN LOOKING INTO, CAN WE
CONFIRM THAT THE MASSACRE MAY HAVE BEGUN BEFORE THAT AND,

IF SO, WHEN?

A. NO, I DON'T THINK WE CAN CONFIRM IT. THE SENIOR OFFICIAL MADE THAT PLAIN. I THINK THAT WHAT HE WAS SAYING WAS THAT HIS FIRM INDICATIONS WERE RECEIVED LATE FRIDAY EVENING, BUT I DON'T THINK WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM WHEN THEY TOOK PLACE.

Q. HAS THE SECRETARY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ANY ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN ISRAEL - THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN?

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A. NO, HE HAS NOT.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THE PARTY, THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION AGREEING TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE FIFTY U.N. OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT?

A. WE VOTED FOR THAT RESOLUTION.

Q. DO YOU SUPPORT THE CALL OF FORMER ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN THIS MORNING ON ABC THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE BEIRUT AND HAND IT BACK TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT?

A. YES, THAT IS OUR POSITION. THAT HAS BEEN OUR POSITION.

Q. IS ISRAELI GUILTY OF COMPLICITY, IN THE ESTIMATION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION?

A. I THINK WE WOULD SIMPLY REST ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON SATURDAY.

Q. CAN YOU COMMENT ON REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS REQUESTED MR. DRAPER TO MEDIATE, TO BRING ABOUT THE ENTRY OF THE LEBANESE FORCES, THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO THE CAMPS, BUT THAT HE REFUSED TO DO SO?

A. I THINK MR. DRAPER'S MISSION CONSISTENTLY HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES TO TAKE MILITARY CONTROL OF BEIRUT, AND HE HAS PRESSED THAT PERSISTENTLY. THAT HAS BEEN HIS MANDATE, AND THERE'S CERTAINLY BEEN NO FOOT-DRAGGING ON HIS PART. HE HAS MOVED CONSISTENTLY ALONG THOSE LINES TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO ASSUME CONTROL.

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Q. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT AMB. HABIB'S PLANS ARE NOW, AND WHAT AMB. DRAPER'S PLANS ARE?

A. YES. AMB. HABIB FLEW IN LAST NIGHT FROM SAN FRANCISCO, MET WITH THE SECRETARY AND ATTENDED SOME OF THE MEETINGS AT THE WHITE HOUSE. I THINK HE WAS OVER THERE AGAIN THIS MORNING.

HIS PLANS, AS YOU KNOW, HAD BEEN TO ATTEND THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION IN BEIRUT, AND I THINK THOSE PLANS REMAIN THE SAME ALTHOUGH THERE'S A LITTLE CONFUSION, OBVIOUSLY, AS TO EXACTLY WHAT IS HAPPENING AND DATES AND SO FORTH. BUT IT IS HIS INTENTION TO TRAVEL TO LEBANON. I CAN'T TELL YOU EXACTLY WHEN THAT WILL BE.

Q. DOES IT HAVE TO DO WITH THE ELECTION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT OR WILL IT HAVE TO DO WITH THE ONGOING MISSION OF MR. DRAPER?

A. I THINK IF HE WERE IN THE AREA HE MIGHT WELL MAKE SOME OTHER CALLS IF THAT WERE IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND IN SUPPORT OF AMB. DRAPER'S MISSION. AMB. DRAPER IS CHARGED WITH THE LEBANESE MISSION NOW.

Q. COULD WE GO BACK TO THE DRAPER THING FOR A MOMENT? DRAPER HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY UNNAMED OFFICIALS IN ISRAEL OF HOLDING BACK THE ISRAELIS FROM THE CAMPS, THUS PREVENTING THEM FROM CARRYING OUT SOME PROTECTIVE FUNCTION AND THUS MAKING THE UNITED STATES RESPONSIBLE IN SOME WAY FOR WHAT HAPPENED. COULD YOU BE A LITTLE MORE DETAILED IN SAYING THAT THE U.S. IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAPPENED; AND, SIMILARLY, COULD YOU ADDRESS THAT - IF MR. DRAPER COULD PREVENT THE ISRAELI ARMY FROM GOING INTO THE REFUGEE CAMPS?

A. AS I UNDERSTAND THE THRUST OF THE EARLIER QUESTION,
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IT WAS ASKED WHETHER MR. DRAPER HAD IN SOME WAY IMPEDED THE LEBANESE FORCES FROM ASSUMING CONTROL, AND THE ANSWER TO THAT IS NO. CERTAINLY, I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY SUGGESTING ALONG THE LINES YOU NOW MAKE ABOUT HOLDING BACK THE ISRAELI FORCES.

Q. BUT DRAPER NEVER TOLD ISRAEL THAT THEY SHOULD NOT GO INTO THE CAMPS, THAT THEY DIDN'T BELONG IN THE CAMPS?

A. I'M JUST NOT AWARE OF THIS SPECIFIC POINT. LET ME TAKE A LOOK.

Q. IT'S BECOMING OLD HISTORY, BUT WAS THE U.S. AWARE OF ANY PLANS BY MR. GEMAYEL BEFORE HIS DEATH TO SEND HIS MILITIAS TO CLEAR THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN WEST BEIRUT?

A. NO, ABSOLUTELY NOT

Q. THE AMERICAN MEDIA THIS MORNING, PARTICULARLY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST - ARE SAYING THAT AMERICAN DIPLOMATS CONTACTED THE NEW PRESIDENT-ELECT'S BROTHER, AMIN GEMAYEL, AND THAT HE CONFIRMED THAT HIS TROOPS WERE IN THE CAMPS AND HE TOLD THOSE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN SOON. CAN YOU CONFIRM THESE THINGS?

A. IT SEEMS TO ME ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME INTERCHANGE. MR. DRAPER IS THERE AND I'M SURE IS TALKING TO A WIDE VARIETY OF LEBANESE LEADERS, BUT I'M NOT AWARE OF THE SPECIFICS OF THAT CONVERSATION.

Q. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS THIS MORNING SAID THAT HE HAS SOME EVIDENCE SAYING THAT THE
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COMMANDERS OF THE GROUP IN THE CAMP WERE ISRAELIS. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUCH INFORMATION?

A. I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THAT.

Q. DID THE ISRAELIS OFFER SOME SECRET PAPERS THEY MIGHT HAVE TAKEN FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY SHOWING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE RUSSIANS?

A. NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Q. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT YOU HAVE, OR THE DEPARTMENT HAS, THAT HADDAD OR ANY OF HIS MEN HAD TAKEN ANY PART WHATSOEVER IN THIS TRAGEDY IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS?

A. WE'VE SEEN THE SAME REPORTS YOU HAVE, SUGGESTING THAT BOTH PHALANGE AND HADDAD FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, BUT THEY'RE NOT CONFIRMED. WE'VE SEEN THE REPORTS AND LISTENED TO THE VERSIONS OF WHO WAS IN THOSE CAMPS BY SURVIVORS.

Q. YOU HAVE NO EVIDENCE. THE QUESTION I HAVE RELATED TO ALL THIS IS, WHY WEREN'T THE LEBANESE TROOPS IN THESE CAMPS EARLIER THAN THIS WEEKEND?

A. I ASSUME THAT HAS A BEARING ON THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS MOVED INTO WEST BEIRUT.

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Q. NO, I'M TALKING ABOUT THE CAMPS; THEY'RE QUITE APART
FROM THE CITY ITSELF.

A. I THINK MY ANSWER IS PERTINENT TO THAT, TOO. SHULTZ

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IMMEDIATE Date: 11/6/97
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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, XF

SUBJECT: TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ANNOUNCING INTRODUCTION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN
LEBANON

9302566

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
DELIVERED AT 5:00 EDT, SEPTEMBER 20, ON THE SITUATION IN
LEBANON

2. BEGIN TEXT: THE SCENES THAT THE WHOLE WORLD
WITNESSED THIS PAST WEEKEND WERE AMONG THE MOST
HEARTRENDING IN THE LONG NIGHTMARE OF LEBANON'S AGONY.
MILLIONS OF US HAVE SEEN PICTURES OF THE PALESTINIAN
VICTIMS OF THIS TRAGEDY. THERE IS LITTLE THAT WORDS CAN
ADD. BUT THERE ARE ACTIONS WE CAN AND MUST TAKE TO BRING
THAT NIGHTMARE TO AN END.

IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR US TO VIEW THIS AS SOME REMOTE EVENT
IN WHICH WE OURSELVES ARE NOT INVOLVED. FOR OUR FRIENDS
IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL; FOR OUR FRIENDS IN EUROPE AND
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ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; AND FOR US AS
AMERICANS--THIS TRAGEDY, HORRIBLE AS IT IS, REMINDS US OF
THE ABSOLUTE IMPERATIVE OF BRINGING PEACE TO THAT
TROUBLED COUNTRY AND REGION. BY WORKING FOR PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, WE SERVE THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE, AND THE
FUTURE OF MANKIND.

FOR THE CRIMINALS WHO DID THIS DEED NO PUNISHMENT IS
ENOUGH TO REMOVE THE BLOT OF THEIR CRIME. BUT FOR THE

REST OF US THERE ARE THINGS THAT WE CAN LEARN AND THINGS THAT WE MUST DO:

-- THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON MUST HAVE LEARNED THAT THE CYCLE OF MASSACRE UPON MASSACRE MUST END. CHILDREN ARE NOT AVENGED BY THE MURDER OF THE OTHER CHILDREN.

-- ISRAEL MUST HAVE LEARNED THAT THERE IS NO WAY IT CAN IMPOSE ITS OWN SOLUTIONS ON HATREDS AS DEEP AND BITTER AS THOSE THAT PRODUCED THIS TRAGEDY. IF IT SEEKS TO DO SO, IT WILL ONLY SINK MORE DEEPLY INTO THE QUAGMIRE THAT LOOMS BEFORE IT.

-- THOSE OUTSIDERS WHO HAVE FED THE FLAMES OF CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON FOR SO MANY YEARS NEED TO LEARN THAT THE FIRE WILL CONSUME THEM TOO IF IT IS NOT PUT OUT.

-- AND WE MUST ALL REDEDICATE OURSELVES TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. I REEMPHASIZE MY CALL FOR EARLY PROGRESS TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND REPEAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS WHICH ARE NOW EVEN MORE URGENT.

FOR NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR TALK ALONE. NOW IS A TIME FOR ACTION. TO ACT TOGETHER TO RESTORE PEACE TO BEIRUT;
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TO HELP A STABLE GOVERNMENT EMERGE THAT CAN RESTORE PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE TO ALL OF LEBANON; AND TO BRING A JUST AND LASTING RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, ONE THAT SATISFIES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE ALL TOO OFTEN ITS VICTIMS.

OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON HAVE NOT CHANGED, FOR THEY ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF LEBANON THEMSELVES. FIRST AND FOREMOST, WE SEEK THE RESTORATION OF A STRONG AND STABLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THAT COUNTRY, BROUGHT INTO BEING BY ORDERLY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. LEBANON ELECTED A NEW PRESIDENT TWO SHORT WEEKS AGO ONLY TO SEE HIM MURDERED EVEN BEFORE HE COULD ASSUME HIS OFFICE. THIS WEEK A DISTRESSED LEBANON WILL AGAIN BE ELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT. MAY GOD GRANT HIM SAFETY AS WELL AS THE WISDOM AND COURAGE TO LEAD HIS COUNTRY INTO A NEW AND HAPPIER ERA.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN REASSERTING AUTHORITY OVER ALL OF ITS TERRITORY. FOREIGN FORCES AND ARMED FACTIONS HAVE TOO LONG OBSTRUCTED THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON'S SECURITY FORCES. WE MUST PAVE

THE WAY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

THE PLACE TO BEGIN THIS TASK IS IN BEIRUT. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MUST BE PERMITTED TO RESTORE INTERNAL SECURITY IN ITS CAPITAL. IT CANNOT DO THIS IF FOREIGN FORCES REMAIN IN OR NEAR BEIRUT. WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND, I HAVE CONSULTED WITH OUR FRENCH AND ITALIAN ALLIES. WE HAVE AGREED TO FORM A NEW MULTINATIONAL FORCE SIMILAR TO THE ONE WHICH SERVED SO WELL LAST MONTH, WITH THE MISSION OF ENABLING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO RESUME FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS CAPITAL, ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR UNCLASSIFIED

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EXTENDING ITS CONTROL OVER THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF ITS PEOPLE, REQUESTED THIS HELP. FOR THIS MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO SUCCEED IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT. WITH THE EXPECTED COOPERATION OF ALL PARTIES, THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WILL RETURN TO BEIRUT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME. ITS PURPOSE IS NOT TO ACT AS A POLICE FORCE, BUT TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE LAWFUL AUTHORITIES OF LEBANON TO DISCHARGE THOSE DUTIES FOR THEMSELVES.

SECRETARY SHULTZ, ON MY BEHALF, HAS ALSO REITERATED OUR VIEWS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THROUGH ITS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. UNLESS ISRAEL MOVES QUICKLY AND COURAGEOUSLY TO WITHDRAW, IT WILL FIND ITSELF EVER MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PROBLEMS THAT ARE NOT ITS OWN AND WHICH IT CANNOT SOLVE.

THE PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN FORCES IN BEIRUT WILL AGAIN BE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD. BUT I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THEIR RETURNING TO LEBANON IF THAT COUNTRY IS TO HAVE A CHANCE TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET.

PEACE IN BEIRUT IS ONLY A FIRST STEP. TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON, WE SEEK THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY. THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAS BEEN WIDELY ENDORSED BY ARAB AS WELL AS OTHER STATES. ISRAEL AND SYRIA HAVE BOTH INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN LEBANON AND ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW. IT IS NOW URGENT THAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES BE AGREED UPON. UNCLASSIFIED

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THIS MUST HAPPEN VERY SOON. THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF NEIGHBORING STATES, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE SAFETY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN POPULATION, MUST BE PROVIDED FOR, BUT THIS IS NOT A DIFFICULT TASK IF THE POLITICAL WILL IS THERE. THE LEBANESE PEOPLE MUST BE ALLOWED TO CHART THEIR OWN FUTURE; THEY MUST RELY SOLELY ON LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, WHO ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO BRING SECURITY TO THEIR COUNTRY. THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO DO SO--AND THE SOONER THE BETTER.

AMBASSADOR DRAPER, WHO HAS BEEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN LEBANON, WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA TO WORK FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROPOSAL. AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL JOIN HIM, WILL REPRESENT ME AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT OF LEBANON AND WILL CONSULT WITH THE LEADERS IN THE AREA. HE WILL RETURN PROMPTLY TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TO ME.

EARLY IN THE SUMMER OUR GOVERNMENT MET ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP RESOLVE A SEVERE CRISIS AND TO RELIEVE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE OF A CRUSHING BURDEN. WE SUCCEEDED. RECENT EVENTS HAVE PRODUCED NEW PROBLEMS AND WE MUST AGAIN ASSUME OUR RESPONSIBILITY.

I AM ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO END THE AGONY OF LEBANON BECAUSE IT IS BOTH RIGHT AND IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. BUT I AM ALSO DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD ON THE BROADER EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. THE EVENTS IN BEIRUT OF LAST WEEK HAVE SERVED ONLY TO REINFORCE MY CONVICTION THAT SUCH A PEACE IS DESPERATELY NEEDED AND THAT THE INITIATIVE WE UNDERTOOK ON SEPTEMBER FIRST IS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEED. WE WILL NOT BE DISCOURAGED OR DETERRED IN OUR EFFORTS TO SEEK PEACE IN LEBANON AND A JUST AND LASTING PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST.

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ALL OF US MUST LEARN THE APPROPRIATE LESSONS FROM THIS TRAGEDY AND ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT IT IMPOSES UPON US. WE OWE IT TO-OURSELVES AND TO OUR CHILDREN. THE WHOLE WORLD-WILL BE A SAFER PLACE WHEN THIS REGION WHICH HAS KNOWN SO MUCH TROUBLE CAN BEGIN TO KNOW PEACE INSTEAD.

BOTH OUR PURPOSE AND OUR ACTIONS ARE PEACEFUL AND WE ARE TAKING THEM IN A SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. SO, TONIGHT, I ASK FOR YOUR PRAYERS AND YOUR SUPPORT AS OUR COUNTRY CONTINUES ITS VITAL ROLE AS A LEADER FOR

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 82STATE264548

CHANNEL: n/a

WORLD PEACE--A ROLE THAT ALL OF US, AS AMERICANS, CAN BE
PROUD OF.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06414 201403Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
INRE-00)/025 W

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O 201340Z SEP 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8760
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ DENY IN PART EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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BEIRUT 6414

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI PRESS ALLEGATIONS

REF: USIS TEL AVIV 14055WIR

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I WAS INTERESTED IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA ALLEGATIONS-
CITING MILITARY SOURCES-THAT I HAD THWARTED DIRECT CONTACTS
BETWEEN THE IDF AND LAF. THIS IS PRETTY RICH. I CAN SAFELY
SAY THAT HABIB AND I HAVE DONE MORE TO PROMOTE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY

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CONTACTS THAN ANY NON-ISRAELI OR NON-LEBANESE CITIZEN, BEGIN-
NING WITH MY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FIRST-EVER SUBSTANTIVE
MEETING BETWEEN A SENIOR LEBANESE GENERAL AND IDF GEN. DRORY
AND HIS STAFF MANY WEEKS AGO.

3. IN RECENT DAYS:

--I IGNORED SHARON'S POSITION THAT NOTHING COULD BE
WORKED OUT IN AN IDF/LAF DIALOGUE UNTIL MONDAY MORNING.
ON FRIDAY NIGHT AND SATURDAY, AFTER MY RETURN FROM ISRAEL,

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I URGED AND COACHED LAF OFFICERS FROM GEN. HAMDAN ON DOWN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE WITH THEIR IDF COUNTERPARTS TO GET PRACTICAL ON-THE-GROUND ARRANGEMENTS GOING RIGHT AWAY, DESPITE THE RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS. PRACTICAL IDF WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE IN FACT MADE AS A RESULT.

--AT EVERY STEP ALONG THE WAY I HAVE GOTTEN LEBANESE POLITICAL APPROVAL FOR IDF/LAF DIALOGUE WHENEVER NEEDED.

--GOING WELL BACK INTO THE HABIB MISSION DAYS, I HAVE BEEN GETTING "POLITICAL APPROVAL" IN EFFECT ON BEHALF OF THE GOL WHEN LAF CHIEF OF STAFF KHOURY REQUESTED IT, INCLUDING LAST SATURDAY.

--I PRESSED THE LAF ON SATURDAY TO GO INTO THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS "ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS", EVEN IF THE IDF HAD NOT PULLED BACK AS HOPED FOR EARLIER ON THAT DAY.

--IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY FOOT DRAGGING ABOUT IDF/LAF CONTACTS, IT HAS BEEN ON SHARON'S PART. BARRETT

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 (AS-01
NSAE-00)/025 W

-----241175 201407Z /16

O 200920Z SEP 82

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8749

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☒ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☒ CLASSIFY as ☒ S or ☒ C Sec.
☒ DOWNGRADE TS to ☒ S or ☒ C

SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6403

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DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PROV, PINT, LE

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHAMOUN, SEPT. 19

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I MET WITH PRESIDENT CHAMOUN AT HIS RESIDENCE FOR JUST UNDER AN HOUR SEPTEMBER 19 ACCOMPANIED BY CHARTE BARRETT AND ROSS. PRESENT WITH PRESIDENT CHAMOUN WAS HIS SON DORY.

3. ALTHOUGH WE TOUCHED ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION, MOST OF OUR MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO A REVIEW OF LABANON'S FUTURE. ON HIS CANDIDACY, PRESIDENT CHAMOUN SIMPLY OBSERVED THAT, HAVING BEEN IN POLITICS FOR 50 YEARS, HE COULD NOT LIVE WITHOUT

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PARTICIPATING IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. HIS SON, DORY, STATED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS PRESIDENT CHAMOUN WAS RUNNING WAS BECAUSE OF AMIN'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MASSACRES AT THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. HAD BASHIR BEEN ALIVE, DORY ASKED, WOULD SHARON HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOBILIZE 1400 PHALANGE FIGHTERS INTO THE CAMPS? THE ANSWER WAS NO. HE HAD, HOWEVER, MANAGED TO CONVINCE AMIN IN THE COURSE OF A LONG MEETING, AND THIS HAD LED TO THE RESULTS WE HAVE NOW SEEN. THESE ARE SIGNIFICANT,

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DORY SAID, FOR THIS IS HOW AMIN WILL RUN LEBANON IF HE SUCCEEDS IN BEING ELECTED. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE MEETING, PRESIDENT CHAMOUN SAID IN SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTIONARY FASHION THAT LEBANESE POLICY WOULD BE THE SAME WHICHEVER OF THE TWO CANDIDATES WAS ELECTED, SINCE BOTH BELONGED TO THE LEBANESE FRONT.

4. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN CLEARLY BLAMED THE PHALANGE FOR THE MASSACRES. HE REJECTED MY STATEMENT THAT A GOOD DEAL OF EVIDENCE POINTED TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF SA'AD HADDAD'S FORCES. HIS SON, DORY, ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT HADDAD'S FORCES HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SOME SKIRMISHES AROUND HADATH. WHEN I ASKED WHY THERE SHOULD BE ANY HADDAD FORCES IN THE AREA, DORY SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS ISRAEL DID NOT WANT THE COUNTRY TO RETURN TO NORMAL, BUT WANTED TO IMPLICATE THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS IN ALL OF THE "DIRTY JOBS" IT WANTED PERFORMED. HOW ELSE, DORY SAID, COULD ONE EXPLAIN THE STRIKING EASE WITH WHICH FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED ADMISSION TO THE CAMPS? WHILE THEIR REPORTING MIGHT MAKE ISRAELI LOOK BAD, IT WOULD MAKE THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS LOOK EVEN WORSE.

5. ON THE FUTURE OF LEBANON, PRESIDENT CHAMOUN FORESAW SEVERAL PROBLEMS, AMONG THEM THAT OF OBTAINING SYRIAN AND



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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THAT OF LEBANON'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I BRIEFED HIM ON OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT AND FROM THE VICINITY AND TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SFGUAN AND ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF DISARMING OF PLO FIGHTERS IN THE NORTH AND THE BAAKAA. I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED THAT THE IDF TODAY HAD BEGUN TO MOVE OUT OF AREAS IN WEST BEIRUT AND THAT THE LAF HAD BEEN ABLE TO MOVE TO AREAS AROUND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND THE BANKS.

6. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THE IDF AND SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW ANY TIME SOON. I COUNTERED THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO PERMIT LEBANON TO REBUILD. THE SYRIANS MAY IN FACT BE READY TO LEAVE, BUT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO SO WAS LINKED TO ISRAELI BEHAVIOR. IT WAS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT THE IDF PULL OUT OF WEST BEIRUT AS A PRELUDE TO A WITHDRAWAL TO DAMOUR. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN COUNTERED IN TURN THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THE IDF WOULD STAY THROUGH THE COMING WINTER. THUS, IT APPEARED THAT BOTH THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS WOULD BE HERE FOR A LONG TIME.


7. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN SAID THAT, EVEN IN THOSE AREAS OUT OF WHICH THE IDF MIGHT WITHDRAW, THE LAF WOULD BE

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UNABLE TO SHOULDER ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SOME TIME.
THREFORE, LEBANON NEEDED AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO
MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT LEBANON UNTIL
THE LAF COULD SO SO. TO UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY
RECRUITMENT, REEQUIPMENT AND TRAINING WOULD TAKE TWO
YEARS AT A MINIMUM. DURING THE PERIOD, A FULLY EQUIPPED
INTERNATIONAL FORCE OF SOME 10,000-15,000 WOULD BE
NEEDED. HIS SON, DORY, INTERJECTED THAT ISRAELI
OPPOSITION TO A STRONG LAF ONLY MADE THINGS WORSE.



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 (AS-01
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O 200920Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8750
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 6403

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IN HIS VIEW, ISRAEL WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS WITH WHICH IT ENJOYED CLOSE RELATIONS AND HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CHAMOUN THIS JUST TWO DAYS AGO. THIS IS WHY, DORY SAID, ISRAEL WAS BACKING AMIN GEMAYEL FOR PRESIDENT. I RESPONDED THAT A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE OF THAT SIZE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CREATE AND THAT LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO BUILD UP ITS OWN ARMY.

8. ON RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, PRESIDENT CHAMOUN SAID HE WAS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON THE SIGNATURE OF A PEACE TREATY, SEEKING TO BOLSTER THE POSITION OF THE PHALANGE/LEBANESE FORCES, PART OF WHICH HAD BEEN TRAINED IN ISRAEL, AND WORKING TO PREVENT CLOSE LEBANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS. TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS,

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THEY WERE PREPARED TO EXERT ANY KIND OF PRESSURE, SUCH AS THREATS TO OCCUPY PARTS OF LEBANON THROUGH THE COMING WINTER AND REFUSING TO RELINQUISH THE AIRPORT. THEY WERE CLEARLY HOSTILE TO A STRONG LAF. THIS ANALYSIS, CHAMOUN SAID, WAS NOT SPECULATION. IT WAS BASED ON CONVERSATIONS HE HAD HAD IN RECENT TIMES WITH THE ISRAELIS.

9. I ASKED PRESIDENT CHAMOUN ABOUT A RECENT TV INTER-


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VIEW OF HIS THAT HAD ATTRACTED MUCH ATTENTION IN ISRAEL BECAUSE OF HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT A PEACE TREATY, BUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS INSTEAD. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN CONFIRMED HE HAD SAID THIS, INDICATING THAT, WHILE HE THOUGHT HE MUST CONCEDE SOMETHING TO THE ISRAELIS TO GET THEM OUT OF LEBANON, HE DID NOT THINK A PEACE TREATY COULD BE SIGNED AT THIS TIME. THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD THEN BOYCOTT LEBANON AND CAUSE LEBANON'S BANKRUPTCY AND, IN ANY CASE, HALF THE POPULATION WOULD BE OPPOSED AND NO MUSLIM PRIME MINISTER WOULD SIGN IT. INSTEAD, PRESIDENT CHAMOUN HAD PROPOSED THE SIGNATURE OF A "SECURITY AGREEMENT" IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD AGREE TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE OTHER AND PREVENT THE USE OF ITS TERRITORY FOR ATTACKS ACROSS THE BORDER. THIS KIND OF AGREEMENT, HE SAID, WAS NORMAL BETWEEN TWO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SEEKING UNTRoubLED RELATIONS. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN RECOGNIZED THAT THIS INTERVIEW HAD MADE BEGIN FURIOUS, AS BEGIN HIMSELF HAD TOLD BASHIR GEMAYEL AT THEIR MEETING NAHARIYA.

10. AS THE MEETING WAS ENDING, I SUMMED UP OUR POLICY TOWARD LEBANON FOR PRESIDENT CHAMOUN BY STRESSING THAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDED THE PROBLEM OF



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LEBANON TO BE TREATED SEPARATELY FROM THE PROBLEMS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION, THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT HE WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT LEBANON, ITS INDEPENDENCE, AND ITS NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING THE ARMY.

11. PRESIDENT CHAMOUN RESPONDED THAT LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO BASE ITS POLICY ON A REAL SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE US. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH LEBANON AND THE US THAT THERE BE STABLE REGIMES ENJOYING STABLE RELATIONS WITH THE US IN THE REGION. NO ONE COULD PREDICT THE FUTURE, BUT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ONE DAY BE IN A POSITION AGAIN TO START TROUBLE. LEBANON, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND PERHAPS IRAQ COULD BECOME THE COUNTRIES ON WHICH THE US COULD RELY FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION.

12. AS CHARGE BARRETT SAID GOOD-BYE TO PRESIDENT CHAMOUN, HE INDICATED THIS WAS HIS FAREWELL CALL AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK HIM FOR ALL OF HIS ASSISTANCE IN THE DAVID DODGE KIDNAPPING CASE. I REITERATED OUR APPRECIATION AND PRESIDENT CHAMOUN REPLIED THAT IT WAS A FAMILY DUTY FOR HIM TO ASSIST, SINCE THE DODGE FAMILY AND HIS HAD BEEN CLOSE EVER SINCE WORLD WAR II. BARRETT

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
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SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 06803

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, LE, SY, US. XF

SUBJECT: PRESENTATION OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO SYRIAN
- FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR

REF: STATE 262428 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. SUMMARY: CHARGE PRESENTED SECRETARY'S LETTER

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM TO DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER QUADDOUR 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER 18.
CHARGE ALSO REVIEWED U.S. POSITION ON UNSC RESOLUTION
520 AND OFFICIAL U.S. STATEMENTS ON NEED FOR ISRAELI

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WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT. CHARGE PRESSED QADDOUR FOR
INFORMATION ON SYRIAN POSITIONS CONCERNING PHASE II
NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANON. QADDOUR UNDERTOOK TO PASS
LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND LISTENED CAREFULLY
TO ENTIRE PRESENTATION. MAIN POINT OF SYRIAN POSITION

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IS DEMAND THAT AS FIRST STEP IN ANY RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IDF MUST LEAVE BEIRUT; SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WILL BE "NO PROBLEM" BUT ISRAEL MUST ALSO WITHDRAW. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE OPENED DISCUSSION BY READING ENTIRE TEXT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LETTER (REFTEL). CHARGE THEN POINTED OUT THAT U.S. HAD SUPPORTED A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION 520, NOTING THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ACTION AND THE DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM WEST BEIRUT. CHARGE ALSO DREW ATTENTION OF QADDOUR TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPOKESMAN'S SEPTEMBER 16 STATEMENT THAT IDF ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT WAS CONTRARY TO ASSURANCES GIVEN TO THE U.S. AND WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.

4. CONTINUING, CHARGE NOTED SEPTEMBER 17 SYRIAN PRESS REPORT THAT SYRIAN MINDEF TLAS HAD ACCUSED THE U.S. OF "PLANNING" THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO BEIRUT, AND SAID HE HOPED THE SARG VIEW OF THIS SITUATION HAD BEEN CORRECTED. HE ALSO CITED THE FAILURE OF SYRIAN PRESS TO REPORT EITHER U.S. SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OR STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, STRESSING NEGATIVE IMPACT OF ILLFOUNDED OR BIASED SYRIAN REPORTING.

5. IN RESPONSE, QADDOUR FIRST ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE SECRETARY'S LETTER AND SAID HE WOULD PASS IT ON PROMPTLY TO THE MINISTER. HE NOTED THE APPOINTMENT FOR KHADDAM AND SHULTZ TO MEET ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND SAID

[REDACTED]

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KHADDAM WOULD BE ABLE TO RESPOND AT THAT TIME TO THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR HIS VIEWS.

6. TURNING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LETTER, QADDOUR OPENED BY CLAIMING THAT ISRAEL HAD JUST ANNOUNCED DECISION TO BUILD "4 SETTLEMENTS" IN THE TYRE-SIDON AREA OF LEBANON. QADDOUR THEN CAREFULLY REVIEWED TEXT OF U.N. RESOLUTION, ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS STRONGLY WORDED, BUT THEN POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL HAD ALREADY REJECTED IT. QADDOUR SAID SARG'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION WAS AS FOLLOWS. ISRAEL BEGAN FIRST ITS ATTACK OF LEBANON, CLAIMING IT SOUGHT ONLY A 40 KILOMETER ZONE, THEN FULLY OCCUPIED SOUTHERN LEBANON, THEN BESEIGED BEIRUT, AND THEN AFTER 2 MONTHS OF HABIB NEGOTIATIONS THE PLO AND SYRIA AGREED TO EVACUATE BEIRUT SO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ENTERED BY ISRAELI FORCES. THE PLO LEFT, BUT IN THE END ISRAELI FORCES ENTERED ANYWAY. THE ISRAELIS HAD EXPLOITED

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HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS TO ALLOW THEIR ENTRY INTO THE CITY WITHOUT HEAVY CASUALTIES. PARTICULARLY SINCE SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES HAD ALREADY DEPARTED, THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS ACTION. QADDOUR UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. HAD A COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL NOT TO ENTER THE CITY AND SAID THAT ALL U.S. PRESTIGE WAS TIED TO KEEPING THE ISRAELIS OUT. THE WAY TO RECOVER U.S. PRESTIGE AND TO MOVE TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES MUST BEGIN BY IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 520.

6. CHARGE CONFIRMED THAT ISRAELI ENTRY INTO BEIRUT VIOLATED AN UNDERSTANDING, BUT THE FACT REMAINED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD WORKED AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT SIDES AND HIS AGREEMENT HAD IN FACT SAVED A GREAT MANY HUMAN LIVES. IT IS NOW IMPORTANT TO GO TO THE NEXT STAGE: FIRST, TO MOVE THE IDF OUT OF WEST BEIRUT; AND, SECONDLY, TO SUPPORT AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
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-----222566 182350Z /72

O 181804Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8348
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 06803

EXDIS

EFFORTS ON RESOLVING PHASE TWO OF THE LEBANON CRISIS. UNDER PHASE TWO, WE EXPECT THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES WILL LEAVE LEBANON, THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BE STRENGTHENED, AND THE PLO SHOULD EITHER LEAVE LEBANON OR LAY DOWN ITS ARMS. THE U.S. LOOKS TO SYRIA TO BE HELPFUL AND SUPPORT THE PHASE TWO NEGOTIATIONS.

7. QADDOUR CONCEDED THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO DENIGRATE AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORT TO SAVE HUMAN LIFE, AND THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT ISRAELI ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT IS CONTRARY TO U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY BUT HE TURNED ASIDE THE IMMEDIATE PURSUIT OF PHASE TWO BY SAYING THATS ISRAELI ENTRY INTO BEIRUT PUTS US BACK INTO PHASE ONE. THERE IS, HE SAID, ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ISRAELI ACTION, AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETELY DEPEND ON RESPECT FOR THE COMMITMENT ALREADY UNDERTAKEN. THE U.S. MUST CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORT ON REMOVING THE IDF

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FROM BEIRUT. SEVERAL TIMES QADDOUR RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION HAD NO JUSTIFICATION. HE ASKED WHO GAVE BEGIN AND SHARON THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THAT LEBANON WAS UNABLE TO POLICE ITS OWN CAPITOL, AND ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER IN TEN DAYS ISRAEL MIGHT DECIDE THAT THE SYRIANS COULD NOT POLICE DAMASCUS, AND COME IN HERE. SUCH AN IMPERIALIST ATTITUDE IS NOT, HE SAID, ACCEPTABLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY, BY ANY STANDARDS. ISRAEL MUST PAY A PENALTY FOR BEHAVING IN THIS WAY.

8. CHARGE RETURNED TO THE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH PHASE TWO. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL PARTIES COOPERATE IN HELPING TO STRENGTHEN THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN REGAINING CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY, BEGINNING IN BEIRUT. THE U.S. HAS TALKED DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL ABOUT REMOVING ISRAELI FORCES FROM WEST BEIRUT. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS CLEARLY UNHAPPY WITH U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH IN THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN A SORT OF PENALTY (QADDOUR AGREED). THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAD SOME SUCCESS IN MOVING ITS FORCES INTO WEST BEIRUT. WE HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL ACT AT THIS TIME TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND NOT ALLOW THE CURRENT TENSE SITUATION TO DETERIORATE.

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9. IN CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ON LEBANON, CHARGE ASKED QADDOUR ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE FEZ CONFERENCE DECLARATION REFERRING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ADF FROM THE LEBANESE TERRITORY. QADDOUR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE DISAGREEMENTS AT FEZ OVER THE LEBANESE SITUATION WERE BETWEEN THE PLO AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS. THE SYRIANS HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH THE POSITIONS TAKEN. QADDOUR THEN REPEATED VERBATIM IN ARABIC THE FEZ TEXT OF THE DECISION CALLING FOR LEBANESE/SYRIAN AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND HE

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STRESSED THAT ALL FORCES, NOT JUST SYRIAN FORCES, MUST WITHDRAW. ASKED IF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S SUGGESTION OF A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPATIBLE WITH THE FEZ DECLARATION, QADDOUR SAID THE STEPS FOR WITHDRAWAL ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION, BUT THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS THE NEED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. ALL EFFORTS MUST BE CONCENTRATED ON THIS POINT. ASKED IF SARG HAD BEGUN TALKS WITH THE GOL ON ADF WITHDRAWALS, QADDOUR SAID NO. COMMENT: QADDOUR ATTENDED THE FEZ CONFERENCE HIMSELF AND HE SPEAKS AUTHORITATIVELY FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HE GAVE ALL INDICATIONS THAT SARG IS WILLING TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON AFTER NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOL, AND AS LONG AS ISRAELI FORCES DO NOT STAY IN LEBANON. BUT SARG CLEARLY BELIEVES THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, BEFORE SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS ARE DISCUSSED, IS ISRAELI EVACUATION OF BEIRUT.

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RUGH

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ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 INRE-00 /026 W-----221131 181752Z /44
O 181650Z SEP 82 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8719

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART
FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6369

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: LE, IS, PINT, MOPS, SY

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LOOKING AHEAD: SEPTEMBER 18, 19 AND 20

REF: BEIRUT 6353

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO SUMMARIZE WHERE WE
STAND ON THE MOST IMMEDIATE PRESSING ISSUES.3. DEVELOPMENTS HAVING THE MOST SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE US POSITION AND US OBJECTIVES:--A. THE IDF'S GOING INTO WEST BEIRUT WAS BAD ENOUGH,
BUT NOW ONE OF THE MOST FEARED EVENTS HAS TRANSPIRED. A

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MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN
HAS OCCURRED AT THE SHATILA CAMP AT A TIME WHEN THE
IDF COULD FULLY CONTROL ALL ACCESS TO WEST BEIRUT AND
THE CAMPS. IN ANALYZING THIS SITUATION, I RECOMMEND THAT
WE USE AS A BASELINE ONLY THE REPORT OF OUR RELIABLE AMERICAN
EYE-WITNESS OF THE MASSACRE OF THE PALESTINIANS (REFTEL).
THERE ARE OTHER REPORTS OF OTHER MASSACRES, KID-
NAPPINGS, RAPES, ETC. COMMENT: FOR THE TIME BEING
WE ARE NOT FORWARDING THESE REPORTS UNLESS WE ARE

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CONFIDENT OF THE AUTHENTICITY AND THE RELIABILITY OF THE WITNESSES.

--B. THE MASSACRES DOUBTLESS OCCURRED AT THE HANDS OF THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" DOMINATED BY THE PHALANGE OR BY HADDAD'S FORCES, OR BOTH. IT IS BARELY CONCEIVABLE THAT THE "LEBANESE FORCES" MAY NOT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE, HOWEVER DOUBTFUL THIS APPEARS IN THE FACE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. NEVERTHELESS, THE COLD FACT REMAINS THAT THE MASSACRE MUST HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT THE HANDS OF GROUPS WITH WHICH THE IDF HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY. THE IDF COULD HAVE PREVENTED THESE GROUPS FROM COMING INTO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS, AND ISRAEL CONSEQUENTLY MUST ACCEPT SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED.

--C. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH AN IMPORTANT PHALANGE REPRESENTATIVE CLOSE TO AMIN GEMAYEL TO URGE THAT THE "LEBANESE FORCES" STAY STRICTLY OUT OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE CAMPS, WITH NO EXCEPTIONS. I HAVE REQUESTED THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE HERE TO URGE THE IDF TO REMOVE THE LEBANESE FORCES AND HADDAD FORCES FROM WEST BEIRUT AND CAMP AREAS, AS WELL AS THE AIRPORT, WHERE A SUBSTANTIAL UNIT OF THE LEBANESE FORCES HAVE BEEN MARSHALLED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THE MFA REP CONFIRMED THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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KEEP OUT THE LEBANESE FORCES AND HE PROMISED AT 1330 TO URGE THE SAME TREATMENT FOR HADDAD'S MEN.

--D. THE INTERRELATED SERIES OF OBLIGATIONS, COMMITMENTS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES INCORPORATED IN THE HABIB MISSION ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN GRAVELY DAMAGED. LEBANON IS BLAMING THE PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF--WHICH WAS TO HELP ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PALESTINIANS REMAINING BEHIND IN BEIRUT--AS A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE TO THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. PLO FIGHTERS WHO HAD LEFT BEIRUT MAY ACCUSE THE US OF RENEGING ON ITS PROMISES. THE LAF'S FUTURE CREDITIBILITY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED SINCE THERE WAS NOT EVEN TOKEN OPPOSITION TO THE ENTRY OF THE IDF. (THE LAF MAY RECOVER SOME OF THIS CREDIBILITY IF IT MOVES QUICKLY INTO THE CAMPS. SEE BELOW) THERE MAY BE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTER-COMMUNAL DECISIONS WITHIN LEBANESE SOCIETY ITSELF ALTHOUGH THIS IS HARD TO ASSESS NOW.

--E. CLEARLY, THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE LAF WITHDRAW FROM WEST BEIRUT AND THE CAMP AREA AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE

4. PROSPECTS OF IDF DISENGAGEMENT FROM WEST BEIRUT:

--A. THE LEBANESE LEADERS--INCLUDING EVEN WAZZAN--WERE DESPERATELY READY TO ACCEPT THE RELATIVELY LITTLE

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I BROUGHT BACK FROM MY TALKS IN ISRAEL. THERE ARE NO FURTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF THE LAF ANYWHERE, INCLUDING IN THE CAMPS. LAF GENERAL HAMDAN, AT MY URGING, IS TRYING TO WORK OUT WITH THE IAF ON-THE-GROUND ARRANGEMENTS EVEN TODAY TO NEUTRALIZE THE CAMPS, IF THE IDF CAN BE INDUCED SOMEHOW TO PULL BACK A

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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O 181650Z SEP 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8720
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM DRAPER

RELATIVELY SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE CAGE THEY HAVE CONSTRUCTED AROUND THE AREA, AND DESPITE SHARON'S INSISTENCE THAT NOTHING SERIOUS COULD BE DONE UNTIL MONDAY MORNING. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE LAF WILL GO INTO THE CAMPS EVEN WITHOUT THE SLIGHT IDF PULLBACKS;

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DOC NUMBER: 82BEIRUT06369

CHANNEL: n/a

INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ABDU TOLD ME HE THOUGHT THIS ORDER WOULD BE GIVEN FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS ALONE, AND I URGED HIM TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO PRESS SUCH A MOVE, BUT SUGGESTED THAT INDEPENDENT DETACHED OBSERVERS ACCOMPANY THE LAF AS IT GOES IN TO DOCUMENT WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED PREVIOUSLY.

--B. AT ABOUT 1130 TODAY, I RECEIVED WORD FROM ABDU THAT ISRAELI TROOPS MAY HAVE "ENTERED" CERTAIN BANKS ALONG BEIRUT'S "STREET OF BANKS". HE WAS CAREFUL TO SAY HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE TROOPS WERE TRYING

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TO BREAK INTO THE SECURE AREAS. I ASKED THE MFA LIAISON OFFICER TO MAKE SURE THROUGH THE IDF THAT THERE WAS NO IDF VIOLATION OF THESE PROPERTIES; I WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED BY THE MFA LIAISON OFFICER THAT THE IDF WAS PROTECTING THE AREA AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ENTRY INTO BANKS AT THE VERY MOMENT THAT WE RECEIVED WORD FROM THE LAF--WHICH HAD SINCE SENT ADDED TROOPS TO THE AREA--THAT THE IDF HAD BROKEN INTO TWO BANKS, ONE SAUDI OWNED AND ONE FRENCH OWNED. WE WILL FOLLOW UP.

5. MOVING TO THE REAL "STAGE TWO".

--A. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE WANT US TO GET STARTED WITH THE SYRIANS ON STAGE TWO--INVOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON--AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. WAZZAN TODAY, HOWEVER, COMMENTED THAT IT WAS VIRTUALLY USELESS TO TALK TO THE SYRIANS ABOUT THE SPECIFICS OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WHILE THIS RAMPAGE WAS GOING ON IN WEST BEIRUT. WHILE I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AT LEAST A QUICK TRIP TO DAMASCUS TO SEE KHADDAM BEFORE HE GOES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE LEBANESE LEADERS BELIEVE I SHOULD STAY HERE THROUGH THE NEXT TWO DAYS, SUNDAY AND MONDAY. I ALSO FEEL THAT I DO NOT WANT TO TALK TO THE SYRIANS UNTIL THE IDF HAS AT LEAST STARTED DISENGAGING FROM WEST BEIRUT.

6. ISRAEL'S (OR SHARON'S) REAL OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON:

--A. SHARON HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO KEEP THE IDF THROUGHOUT BEIRUT, INCLUDING WEST BEIRUT, THROUGH AT LEAST THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT, AND THROUGH THE PERIOD IN WHICH HE SAYS HE AND THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NEGOTIATE FACE

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TO FACE WITH THE PRESIDENT OR HIS REPRESENTATIVES. HE WILL ALSO DO ALL HE CAN TO FORESTALL ANY LEBANESE RELIANCE ON THE US. WHILE HE HAS APPARENTLY ACCOMMODATED HIMSELF SOMEWHAT TO CABINET PRESSURES BY AGREEING FINALLY TO BEGIN IDF WITHDRAWALS FROM WEST BEIRUT, HE IS NOT GOING TO LET UP THE PRESSURE ELSEWHERE. CONSEQUENTLY THERE WILL BE NO REAL IDF DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE CITY AS OUTLINED ALONG THE LINES PHIL HABIB AND I THOUGHT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE AT THE END OF THE EVACUATION, WHEN THE ATMOSPHERICS WERE SO GOOD.

--B. SHARON ALSO HAS BEEN TELLING US THAT HE HAD EXTRACTED A COMMITMENT FROM BASHIR GEMAYEL BEFORE HIS DEATH TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS BY ABOUT SEPT 15 ON A PEACE TREATY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT BASHIR LET HIM THINK THAT A PEACE TREATY WAS POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH MY JUDGMENT IS THAT BASHIR WAS PLAYING A LEBANESE BARGAINING GAME OF SORTS, BASED ON BASHIR'S TALKS WITH ME EARLIER AND MY TALKS SUBSEQUENTLY WITH ABDU WHO HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE LAST SHARON-BASHIR GEMAYEL MEETING). TO PUT THIS INTO PERSPECTIVE, IT IS CLEAR BASHIR EXTRACTED FROM SHARON SOME MAJOR ISRAELI CONCESSIONS AT THE LAST MEETING INCLUDING FREEING UP THE AIRPORT FOR EXCLUSIVE LEBANESE USE, AND HE PROBABLY GAVE CONCESSIONS IN RETURN.

--C. WHATEVER THE REALITIES OF THE LAST SHARON-BASHIR GEMAYEL MEETING, SHARON IS NOT LIKELY TO SEEK ANYTHING LESS FROM A NEW PRESIDENT, AND PARTICULARLY IF THE NEW PRESIDENT IS AMIN GEMAYEL. THE RISKS OF THE CREATION OF AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE IN LEBANON ARE CONSEQUENTLY VERY HIGH. BARRETT

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*** Current Classification ***

REFERENCE= n/a

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CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority _____
PA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SECURITY, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, OCCUPATION FORCES, TE

TAGS= PEPR, MOPS, PSDC, LE, SY, US, IS, BEIRUT, (KHADDAM, ABD AL-HALIM),
(SHULTZ, GEORGE P)

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PAGE 01 STATE 262428
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
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APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
NEA/ARN:DLMAC
NEA:NAVELIOTES
S/S-O:RWERDMAN
P:LSEAGLEBURGER
S/S:LPBREMER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO SYRIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER KHADDAM

1. ~~[REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY
TO FONMIN KHADDAM ASAP.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. MINISTER:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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I KNOW YOU, AS WE, ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE
EVENTS IN LEBANON THESE LAST TWO DAYS, AND I WANT TO
SHARE WITH YOU OUR THOUGHTS AND SEEK YOUR VIEWS.

WE ARE GREATLY CONCERNED THAT THE PEACEFUL
RESTORATION OF LEBANESE UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
INDEPENDENCE TAKES PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND WE ARE
CONFIDENT THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT SHARES THIS
CONCERN. WE WERE SHOCKED BY THE DESPICABLE AND COWARDLY
ACT WHICH TOOK THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT-ELECT BASHIR GEMAYEL

AND THAT OF SO MANY OTHERS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND PEOPLE CONDEMN SUCH TERRORISM.

WE BELIEVE THE FUTURE OF LEBANON DEPENDS ON THE FIRM
COMMITMENT OF ALL RESPONSIBLE LEADERS TO PRESERVE
LEBANESE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND TO SUPPORT THE
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN FOLLOWING THIS PATH IN SELECTING

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A NEW PRESIDENT. THE UNITED STATES IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF RESTORING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY TO ALL PARTS OF LEBANON, AND THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS TOWARD THAT GOAL. THESE ADVANCES MUST BE PRESERVED, AND ABOVE ALL, THIS TRAGIC ACT OF TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO TRIGGER A RETURN TO THE BLOODSHED AND CHAOS WHICH WE ALL HOPED WERE AT AN END. RENEWED CONFLICT IS NOT THE ROAD TO SOLUTION. WE ALL MUST WORK TO ENSURE THAT LEBANON REMAINS ON THE PATH TOWARD PEACEFUL RECONCILIATION OF ITS MANY COMMUNITIES, A GOAL WE KNOW YOU SHARE. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES AND ACCEPTS ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK TOWARDS THAT GOAL, AND WE LOOK TO SYRIA TO EXERCISE THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP WHICH CHARACTERIZED SYRIA'S

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DECISION TO AID THE CAUSE OF PEACE DURING THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS.

I ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT WAIVER IN ITS COMMITMENT TO ASSIST IN THE NEGOTIATION OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, A PREREQUISITE FOR THE FULL RESTORATION OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SAME DETERMINATION ON OUR PART APPLIES TO THE CURRENT ISRAEL PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. WE WILL BE SEEKING YOUR VIEWS AND ASSISTANCE AS WE ALL CONTINUE THE EFFORTS TO ENSURE LEBANON'S FUTURE AS A PEACEFUL, STABLE, AND CONSTRUCTIVE MEMBER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING IN NEW YORK DURING THE UPCOMING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ END TEXT

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4. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED.

SHULTZ

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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ACTION SS-25

BEIRUT 06367 181824Z

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
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O 181615Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8717
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PM WAZZAN, SEPT 18

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY. I BRIEFED PM WAZZAN SEPT 18 ON RESULTS OF MY TALKS IN ISRAEL. WAZZAN'S CONCERNS WERE TWOFOLD: HUMILIATING BEHAVIOR OF IDG IN WEST BEIRUT AND ISRAEL'S BLATANT VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND ASSURANCES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT, AS "GUARANTOR" OF PLO'S DEPARTURE, US HAD CLEAR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO MODERATE IDF BEHAVIOR IN SHORT RUN AND GET IT OUT OF WEST BEIRUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF THIS DID NOT HAPPEN WITHIN 48 HOURS, GOL MIGHT BE FORCED TO REQUEST NEW

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MNF. WAZZAN REITERATED HEADINESS OF LAF/ISF TO MOVE INTO ALL PARTS OF WEST BEIRUT AND ASKED THAT U.S. CONTINUE ITS PRESSURE DURING NEXT 48 HOURS, WHICH HE SAW AS CRITICAL, NOT LEAST OF ALL FOR ELECTORAL PROCESS. I REPLIED WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD, BUT THAT SUCCESS WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN THE SHORT RUN. END SUMMARY.

3. AT 1030 SEPT. 18 ACCOMPANIED BY BARRETT AND ROSS, I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL. FOREIGN MINISTER BUTROS JOINED US HALFWAY THROUGH

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THE MEETING. I OUTLINED ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO BEGIN MILITARY-TO-MILITARY DISCUSSIONS AND WITHDRAWALS, BUT NOTED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELIS, THE RELI HOLIDAY OF ROSH HASHONAH WOULD PREVENT ISRAELI "POLITICAL DECISION" ON CONCRETE MEASURES BEFORE MONDAY. HOWEVER, I URGED THAT THE LAF TRY TO WORK OUT PRACTICAL, LIMITED DISENGAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS EVEN TODAY.

4. WAZZAN'S FIRST CONCERN WAS WITH THE BEHAVIOR OF THE IDF IN WEST BEIRUT, WHICH HE SAID CAUSED HIM GREAT ANGER AND BITTERNESS. ACCORDING TO WAZZAN, THE ISRAELIS ARE ENTERING HOMES, FORCING THE INHABITANTS INTO THE STREET, HUMILIATING THEM BY MAKING THEM SIT ON THE GROUND, AND CONDUCTING SEARCHES FOR ARMS. WAZZAN SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO BEING HUMILIATING, THIS BEHAVIOR WENT FAR BEYOND THE AGREEMENTS AND ASSURANCES WORKED OUT BY AMBASSADOR HABIB. POLICING THE CITY OF BEIRUT WAS A LEBANESE REPEAT LEBANESE AFFAIR, THE LAF/ISF WERE READY TO DO IT. IDF ACTION HAS ENGENDERED STRONG ILL FEELINGS. BEIRUT IS A CAPITAL CITY AND MANY IMPORTANT PEOPLE LIVE THERE. IT IS IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT MINISTERS AND DEPUTIES BE TREATED "LIKE VILLAGE FOLK." ACCORDING TO A PRELIMINARY REPORT, THE IDF THIS MORNING TOOK PEOPLE TO THE SANDY AREAS AROUND THE SPORTS STADIUM AND FORCED THEM TO WALK THROUGH MINE FIELDS TO CLEAR THEM.

5. WAZZAN WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED ABOUT ISRAEL'S BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENTS AND ASSURANCES WORKED OUT BY AMBASSADOR HABIB.

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IN HIS MIND, THIS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED VIOLATION STRENGTHENED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE MNF SHOULD HAVE STAYED IN BEIRUT A FULL MONTH. WAZZAN INDICATED THAT, IF THE IDF DID NOT LEAVE WEST BEIRUT WITHIN 48 HOURS, THE GOL MIGHT BE FORCED TO REQUEST A NEW MNF.

EVERYONE, HE SAID, FELT BETRAYED. A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN CARRIED IN TODAY'S PRESS, ALLEGEDLY JUSTIFYING THE ISRAELI ACTION, MADE IT DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THAT THE US IN TURN HAS BEEN BETRAYED BY ISRAEL. ASKED ABOUT THE STATEMENT, I RESPONDED WE DID NOT HAVE AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, AND I THEREFORE COULDN'T COMMENT. ANY CASE, I SAID, THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG POSITION OF OPPOSITION TO THE ISRAELI ACTION WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR AND HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY COMMUNICATED TO AMBASSADOR ARENS. (SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING, WE TRANSMITTED TO WAZZAN THE AMPLIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT PROVIDED TO US BY THE DEPARTMENT, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ONLY QUOTING THE ISRAELI POSITION, NOT STATING HIS OWN.)

6. WAZZAN NOTED THAT YESTERDAY, FOLLOWING CHARGE BARRETT'S DEMARCHE, HE HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT (IMPLICITLY TO CORRECT THE RECORD) EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE ITS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. YET THE US ITSELF APPEARED TO BE MAKING UNHELPFUL STATEMENTS. WAZZAN STATED THAT ANY CLARIFICATION WOULD BE USEFUL. (AS NOTED ABOVE, WE HAVE PROVIDED THIS.)

7. WAZZAN THEN RETURNED TO THE BEHAVIOR OF THE IDF IN WEST BEIRUT AND STRESSED THAT NOT ONLY SHOULD I CONTINUE BY PRESSURE FOR AN

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IMMEDIATE BEGINNING TO THE IDF WITHDRAWAL, BUT I SHOULD ALSO SEEK TO CORRECT ISRAELI BEHAVIOR. PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE IMPENDING ELECTION, THE NEXT 48 HOURS WERE CRITICAL, AND I MUST CONTINUE MY MISSION. THE QUESTION OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS SEPARATE FROM THAT OF ISRAELI BEHAVIOR. THE HUMILIATIONS HAD TO STOP. IT WAS PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE SERVICE THE ISRAELIS HAD IMPOSED A CURFEW AND RESTRICTED MOVEMENT JUST AS THE LEBANESE POLITICAL ELITE WAS ATTEMPTING TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATION NECESSARY TO PREPARE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. HOW COULD THE ISRAELIS CLAIM THEY COULD UNDERTAKE NO CONCRETE ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL DUT TO

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RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS AND YET HAVE NO DIFFICULTY CONTINUTIN THIS HUMILIATION? SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE. I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE DOING OUR BEST TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION, BUT -- TO BE HONEST-- I DOUBTED IF WE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN MODERATING ISRAELI BEHAVIOR IN THE SHON.

8. COMMENT:ALTHOUGH BOTH WAZZAN AND BOUTROS SPOKE IN CALM TONES OF SORROW AND DISAPPOINTMENT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT WZZZAN IN PARTICULAR WAS

PROFOUNDLY UPSET BY BOTH THE BETRAYAL HE FELT OVER ISRAEL'S VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENTS AND ASSURANCES WORKED OUT BY AMBASSADOR HABIB AND BY THE HUMILIATION THE POPULATION OW WEST BEIRUT WAS SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF THE IDF. HE FELT STRONGLY THAT, AS GUARANTORS" OF THE PLO'S DEPARTURE, WE HAVE A CLEAR MORAL OBLIGATION TO GET THE ISRAELIS FIRST TO MODERATE THEIR BEHAVIOR AND THEN TO GET OUT OF WEST BEIRUT. WHILE HE THANKED US FOR OUR MOST RECENT UNSC VOTE, HE STRESSED THAT DEEDS, NOT WORDS, WERE WHAT COUNTED. BOTH WAZZAN AND BOUTROS FELT THAT AS LONG AS WEST BEIRUT REMAINED UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION, IT WOULD BE FUTILE TO ATTEMPT PHASE TWO OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE THE ARABS WOULD FEED THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD BE FULLY JUSTIFIED IN REMAINING THE BEKKAA AND THE GOL WOULD NOT PRESS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE. ENCOURAGING AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, WERE A) THAT WAZZAN REITERATED THE READINESS OF THE LAF/ISF TO NEUTRALIZE ALL OF WEST BEIRUT, INCLUDING THE CAMPS, AND B) THAT WAZZAN DID NOT PREDICT THAT THE DEPUTIES OF WEST BEIRUT WOULD BOYCOTT AN ELECTION IN THE EVENT THE IDF WAS NOT OUT BY TUESDAY. BARRETT STAYED BEHIND TO DESCRIBE TO WAZZAN WHAT WE WERE DOING TO KEEP ANY OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS FROM ENTERING THE PALESTNIAN CAMPS AGAIN. BARRETT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97

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TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, XF

SUBJECT: IDF IN BEIRUT: SHARON/DRAPER MEETING
- SEPTEMBER 161. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY. DRAPER'S BASIC MESSAGE WAS THAT ISRAEL -- AS WELL AS LEBANON AND THE U.S. -- WOULD BE BEST SERVED IF THE IDF WITHDREW TO ITS POSITIONS OF TWO DAYS AGO. HE TOLD SHARON THAT ALL OF LEBANON'S LEADERSHIP WAS ASTONISHED BY THE IDF ACTION YESTERDAY, BECAUSE THEY HAD THOUGHT THE LAF AND IDF WERE WORKING OUT PROBLEMS COOPERATIVELY. THE LEBANESE WERE DETERMINED TO PROCEED WITH THEIR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 23 AND TO HANDLE THEIR SECURITY PROBLEMS IN BEIRUT THEMSELVES.

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ABOVE ALL, THEY BELIEVED THEY HAD BEEN ASSURED BY THE U.S. THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT ENTER WEST BEIRUT. THEY WANTED THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW TO POSITIONS HELD TWO DAYS AGO, AND THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS POSITION. SHARON REVEALED THAT LAST SUNDAY EVENING HE HAD SPENT THREE-AND-A-HALF HOURS TALKING SECURITY FOLLOW-UP WITH BASHIR. WHEN HE LEARNED OF BASHIR'S DEATH THE PM AND HE DECIDED THAT UNLESS THE IDF MOVED IMMEDIATELY THEY

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WOULD FIND BEIRUT ONCE AGAIN DIVIDED AND THE TERRORISTS REORGANIZING. WHEN CHALLENGED THAT THIS VIOLATED EARLIER ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ENTER WEST BEIRUT, SHARON SAID ANGRILY "IT WAS NOT WE WHO VIOLATED, IT WAS THE TERRORISTS WHO CHEATED US ALL BY KEEPING WEAPONS UNDERGROUND IN BEIRUT." HE SAID THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED COMPLETELY WITH THE DEATH OF BASHIR. HE SAID THE IDF DOES NOT WISH TO STAY IN BEIRUT AND WILL WITHDRAW AS SOON AS THEY CAN MAKE SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR THE CONTINUING SECURITY IN BEIRUT WITH A NEW GOVERNMENT OR PRESIDENT-ELECT IN LEBANON. DRAPER SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS ACTING LIKE LEBANON'S PERMANENT POLICEMAN AND THAT ISRAEL OUGHT TO LET LEBANON HANDLE THE REMAINING BEIRUT SECURITY PROBLEMS, HOWEVER SERIOUS. DRAPER NUDGED SHARON INTO AGREEING THAT THE IDF DID NOT REALLY WANT TO ENTER THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. HE ALSO AGREED THAT IF THE LAF COULD MOVE INTO THE CAMPS, THE IDF WOULD BOTH ENCOURAGE AND HELP. THIS OFFERS A SMALL OPPORTUNITY FOR DRAPER TO WORK TOWARDS SOME PRACTICAL IDF-LAF ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, BOTTOMLINE IS ISRAELI REJECTION OF U.S. POSITION URGING WITHDRAWAL TO EARLIER POSITIONS IN BEIRUT. END SUMMARY.

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3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DCM, AND DATT, AMBASSADOR DRAPER MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON FOR TWO HOURS SEPTEMBER 16. CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN AND SENIOR ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WERE PRESENT. THE MEETING WAS LARGELY FRIENDLY BUT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT.

4. DRAPER SAID HE HAD BEEN TO BASHIR'S FUNERAL, AND HAD MET WITH SARKIS AND OTHERS. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT KEY SUNNI MUSLIMS HAD ATTENDED THE FUNERAL. HE SAID THEY WERE ALL DETERMINED TO HAVE AN ELECTION AND HE BELIEVES THE DEATH OF BASHIR MAY HAVE SHOCKED THE LEBANESE INTO A DETERMINATION TO PULL TOGETHER TO HAVE ELECTIONS BEFORE THE 21ST. THE SIGNS OF GREATER SUNNI MUSLIM-MARONITE UNITY ARE THERE, BUT IDF ACTIONS COULD DAMAGE IT. IN THIS CONTEXT HE SAID THE LEBANESE LEADERS WERE ASTONISHED BY THE IDF ACTION GOING INTO BEIRUT, SARKIS BECAUSE HE HAD FELT THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE LAF AND THE IDF. THE LEBANESE HAD STARTED TO FEEL THAT THEY COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM AND THEY WERE ASTONISHED BECAUSE DRAPER HAD TOLD THEM IN

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MESSAGES SENT FROM JERUSALEM YESTERDAY THAT THE ISRAELI ACTIONS WERE INTENDED TO BE "STRICTLY LIMITED PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES." WAZZAN HAD ACCUSED THE U.S. IN A HIGHLY CRITICAL PUBLIC STATEMENT TODAY OF SUPPORTING ISRAEL AND ISRAEL OF VIOLATING ITS AGREEMENTS MADE WITH PHIL HABIB. DRAPER SAID

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THE LEBANESE WANT THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW TO THEIR POSITIONS OF TWO DAYS AGO AND THAT IS THE AMERICAN POSITION ALSO.

5. SHARON SAID HE IS GLAD THAT DRAPER HAD BEEN THERE BUT NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE ALSO TALKING DIRECTLY TO THE LEBANESE. HE SAID THAT EARLY ON

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SEPTEMBER 15 HE HAD GONE TO BEIRUT, HE HAD MET WITH THE COMMANDERS OF THE PHALANGE, AND WITH PIERRE GEMAYEL. THEY AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WAS SERIOUS. SHARON SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE LAF MOVES WERE INADEQUATE, AND HE SCOFFED AT THEIR PERFORMANCE, NOTING THAT EVERY STEP THEY HAD MADE THEY HAD DONE ONLY WITH THE ISRAELIS RIGHT BEHIND THEM.

6. SHARON THEN SAID THAT LAST SUNDAY HE HAD

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SPENT THREE-AND-A-HALF HOURS WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL AT GEMAYEL'S HOME. HE HAD GONE OVER IN DETAIL THE NEXT STEPS IN CLEANING OUT BEIRUT, AND PROVIDING FOR SECURITY OF BEIRUT AND OF LEBANON. HE SAID THEY HAD PLANNED TOGETHER THAT SHAMIR AND SHARON WOULD START NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACE TREATY WITH BASHIR ON SEPTEMBER 15, AND CHOSE DELEGATES TO REPRESENT EACH SIDE. UNDER BASHIR'S TIMETABLE, BEIRUT WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE A SECURE AND "OPEN TOWN" BY MID-OCTOBER THROUGH LAF ACTION ALONE.

7. WITH BASHIR'S DEATH THE SITUATION WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, SHARON SAID. HE HAD ALWAYS KNOWN THAT THE PLO WOULD LEAVE BEHIND TWO OR THREE THOUSAND BUT HAD NOT KNOWN THEY AND THE OTHER MILITIAS WOULD BE USING TANKS AND MORTARS AS THEY DID YESTERDAY. IMMEDIATELY UPON NOTIFICATION OF BASHIR'S DEATH, THE PRIME MINISTER DECIDED IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE THE KEY POINTS OR THEY WOULD AGAIN FIND A DIVIDED CITY. SHARON SAID THE IDF HAD SAVED THE SITUATION. ONLY THE IDF COULD DO IT. ONLY AFTER MOVING IN DID THEY REALIZE HOW SERIOUS HAD BEEN THE VIOLATIONS OF THE HABIB/WAZZAN AGREEMENTS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

8. SHARON SPOKE PROUDLY OF THE BRILLIANT OPERATION UNDERTAKEN BY THE IDF UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN. HE SAID IT WAS DONE WITHOUT ARTILLERY OR AIR FORCE AND BY 10:30 THIS MORNING ALL THE KEY POSTS WERE IN GOI HANDS. TWO THOUSAND TERRORISTS WERE SURROUNDED WITHIN THE CAMPS AND THE IDF IS TALKING TO THEM OVER LOUDSPEAKERS TO ASK THEM TO SURRENDER.

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9. SHARON THEN ASKED WHAT TO YOU WANT US TO DO? DO YOU WANT US TO LEAVE THEM THERE NOW WITH THEIR GUNS AND THEIR MORTARS? IS THAT IN THE INTEREST OF LEBANON? AFTER WITNESSING THE VIOLATIONS OF THE HABIB ACCORDS BY THE TERRORISTS (E.G., REGARDING HEAVY WEAPONS) HE SAID, ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTIONS, YOU CAN'T EXPECT THE ISRAELIS TO SIMPLY WITHDRAW. FURTHERMORE THE PHALANGE HAS SAID THAT IT WELCOMED THE IDF PRESENCE. WHEN QUESTIONED LATER, SHARON SAID THAT HE WOULDN'T QUITE SAY THAT THE PHALANGE HAD AGREED BUT HE SAID BASHIR HAD BRIEFED HIS FATHER AND HIS BROTHER ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN BASHIR AND SHARON.
10. SHARON THEN ADDRESSED THE U.S. PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT IF OTHERS ACCUSE YOU OF COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL, YOU HAVE SIMPLY TO DENY IT. HE SAID THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT MISLEAD BUT RATHER RELIED ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WAS MADE AT 9:05 ON SEPTEMBER 15 WHICH SAID THAT ISRAEL FORCES HAD GONE INTO BEIRUT TO HOLD KEY POINTS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR.
11. SHARON RETURNED TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID WHAT IS THE LEBANESE POSITION? WHO DEFINES IT? SARKIS AND WAZZAN ARE LEAVING OFFICE. BASHIR IS DEAD. HE SAID THERE IS NO REAL LEBANESE POSITION. EVEN IF WAZZAN INSTRUCTS HIS UN AMBASSADOR, THAT IS NOT A LEBANESE POSITION. IF BASHIR WERE ALIVE, HE SAID, THERE WOULD BE NO SC VOTE; DRAPER AGREED, BUT SAID THAT WAS BECAUSE BASHIR WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED THAT THE IDF GO INTO WEST BEIRUT.
12. DRAPER SAID THE LEBANESE WHO WANT THE IDF TO LEAVE
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ARE THE VERY PEOPLE WHO PRIVATELY WELCOMED WHAT ISRAEL HAD DONE UP UNTIL NOW. BUT, DRAPER INSISTED, THEY WANT TO DO THE REST THEMSELVES. SOME IN THE LAF HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF WAZZAN WHO WAS BEING SLOW IN GIVING THE LAF ADEQUATE LEEWAY TO MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT MORE RAPIDLY. THESE PEOPLE, SAID DRAPER, ARE THE FUTURE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL. WHEN WE TOLD THESE PEOPLE THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT, THEY HAD FINALLY BELIEVED US, DESPITE SUSPICIONS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD FIND PRETEXTS TO MOVE. THEY NOW FELT DECEIVED.

13. SHARON SAID THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED. DRAPER REPEATED THAT THE LEBANESE WANTED TO TAKE CARE OF WEST BEIRUT THEMSELVES, AND VIGOROUSLY. ISRAEL SHOULD GIVE THEM THE CHANCE. SHARON REPEATED THAT WAS BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR. DRAPER SAID THAT, AMONG OTHER EXAMPLES HE COULD CITE, LAF GENERAL HAMDAN TOLD HIM LAST

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NIGHT HE WANTED TO DO IT. EITAN REPLIED THAT "I KNOW HAMDAN BETTER THAN YOU; I KNOW THAT THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT CAPABLE OF DOING THE JOB." EITAN DESCRIBED THE SLOW COURSE OF LAF OPERATIONS DURING RECENT DAYS, AND SAID THAT THE IDF WAS TALKING EVERY DAY TO GENERAL HAMDAN IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE DAY'S ACTIVITIES, WHILE LEADING THE LAF BY THE HAND TO DO THE THINGS THAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. ISRAEL'S PROBLEM IN LEBANON NOW, EITAN INSISTED, IS DEFINED BY THE FACT THAT "LEBANON IS FACING AN EXPLOSION OF REVENGE AND NOBODY ELSE CAN DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. I TALKED YESTERDAY WITH MANY PHALANGISTS AND I CAN SEE IT IN THEIR EYES." WHEN THIS EXPLOSION OCCURS, THE LAF WILL DISINTEGRATE INTO VARIOUS FACTIONS. HE INSISTS

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THAT "THERE IS NO ONE WITHIN THE RANKS OF PRESENT LAF LEADERSHIP STRONG ENOUGH TO KEEP THIS ARMY TOGETHER." EITAN FEELS THAT WHAT HE DESCRIBES AS "THIS SMALL AND IN-EFFECTIVE ARMY" CANNOT CLEAN OUT WHAT THE IDF HAS NOT YET CLEARED. EITAN SAID THE PLO INFRASTRUCTURE THAT WAS LEFT BEHIND WAS RELATIVELY INTACT, INCLUDING COMMAND POSTS AND WEAPONS. IN EITAN'S WORDS, "THE PLO HAS TAKEN YOU AND US FOR A RIDE." ACCORDING TO EITAN, THERE ARE 1,000-1,500 ARMED MEN REMAINING BEHIND WHO BELONG TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THEY HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL ALL THEIR AMMUNITION DUMPS, BUNKERS AND MANY HEAVY WEAPONS. THE MURABITUN HE SAID NUMBERS ABOUT 2,000. THE IMPORTANT THING TO NOTE, EITAN SAID, WAS THAT ALTHOUGH THE IDF HAD INTELLIGENCE WHICH INDICATED THAT THESE INFRASTRUCTURES AND FORCES WERE INTENDING TO REMAIN IN PLACE, IT WAS ONLY AFTER GOING IN AND DISCOVERING THE ARMS CACHES, EQUIPMENT AND ARMED PERSONNEL THAT THEY REALIZED THE EXTENT OF THE PLO FORCES REMAINING AND THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS SITUATION. THE IDF'S REASON TO ENTER BEIRUT, EITAN SAID, "WAS NOT THIS BUT IF THE IDF HAD NOT ENTERED ABOUT 5,000

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TERRORISTS AND THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE AND WEAPONS WOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT UNTOUCHED FOR THE LAF TO ENCOUNTER AT SOME POINT." EITAN SAID THAT IDF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING HIMSELF HAD BEEN MEETING WITH LEADERS OF THE MURABITUN SINCE YESTERDAY MORNING. THESE LEADERS THINK THEIR FATE IS SEALED. ACCORDING TO EITAN THEY ARE AFRAID THAT THEY WILL BE DESTROYED; IF NOT BY THE IDF, IT WILL BE THE THE PHALANGISTS OR SOME OTHER GROUP. EITAN SAID THAT HE SUGGESTED TO THE MURABITUN LEADERS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IDF TRANSFERRING THEM TO ANOTHER PART OF LEBANON ALONG WITH THEIR FAMILIES TO AVOID BEING KILLED. EITAN DESCRIBED THIS AS A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM OF THE FIRST ORDER. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED WHAT THE MURABITUN LEADERSHIP'S ANSWER WAS TO EITAN'S OFFER. EITAN RESPONDED THAT THE LEADERS WERE AFRAID THAT THE IDF COULD NOT STAND BY ITS PROMISE BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE TRANSPORTED THROUGH CERTAIN OTHER CHRISTIAN AREAS.

14. EITAN DESCRIBED THE PHALANGE AS STILL IN A STATE OF

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SHOCK. HE SAID THAT THEIR MAJOR MOTIVATION NOW IS REVENGE FOR THE DEATH OF BASHIR. "YOU MUST KNOW THEM VERY WELL TO KNOW THE MEANING OF VENGEANCE IN THEIR TERMS," HE SAID. OVERCOMING THIS KIND OF PROBLEM, EITAN INSISTED, IS NOT A JOB FOR THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES; THEY CANNOT DO IT. THERE IS NO LEBANESE PERSONALITY WHO CAN RALLY PEOPLE AROUND HIM LIKE BASHIR DID OR BE ABLE TO BLOCK THE BLOOD FEUDS WHICH ARE GOING TO BE GENERATED.

15. DRAPER THEN SAID HE WAS CONCERNED BY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE REMARKS. DOES ISRAEL INTEND TO POLICE LEBANON

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FOREVER? HE ADDED: WE ALL KNEW THERE WERE ARMS AND MEN LEFT BEHIND, BUT BY MOSSAD'S OWN ADMISSION THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT THIRD ECHELON PLO LEADERS LEFT BEHIND, AS HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. WE KNEW THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM GETTING RID OF THE REMAINING TERRORISTS AND MILITIAS, AND THEIR WEAPONS. BUT THE LEBANESE BELIEVED THEY COULD DO

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IT THEMSELVES. AND ISRAEL TOLD US THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT AND DID NOT WANT TO GO IN. DRAPER CONCLUDED: WE RELIED ON THAT ASSURANCE AND TOLD OTHERS. OUR CREDIBILITY WAS DAMAGED. ISRAEL'S "WORD" WAS SUPPOSED TO BE GOOD.

16. SHARON AT THIS POINT GOT QUITE AGITATED. HE SAID "DO NOT TRY TO SAY THAT WE VIOLATED." THEY CHEATED US. THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED. WE DIDN'T WANT TO GO IN. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF BEING IN LEBANON ANY LONGER THAN IS NECESSARY. SHARON SAID ISRAEL IS DEFENDING ITS INTERESTS SO THAT IT WON'T HAPPEN AGAIN. ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO BE A POLICEMAN.

17. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE? DRAPER ADDED WHY NOT STOP NOW AND LET THE LEBANESE ARMY COMPLETE THE WORK. SHARON TREATED THIS REMARK WITH DERISION. BE SERIOUS, HE SAID. THE LEBANESE ARMY NEVER ENTERED A SINGLE BUILDING UNLESS WE HELD THEIR HAND. DRAPER REPEATEDLY URGED SHARON TO LET THE LEBANESE TRY, TO LET THEM GROW UP, TO LET THEM WALK BY THEMSELVES. SHARON REPLIED ALL WE WANT IS A BEIRUT THAT IS OPEN AND SECURE.

18. AMBASSADOR LEWIS THEN ASKED LET US ASSUME THAT THERE ARE ELECTIONS HELD WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK, WHAT HAPPENS THEN? CAN YOU THEN MOVE OUT IMMEDIATELY AND GO BACK TO THE POSITIONS OF A WEEK AGO? SHARON REPLIED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH BASHIR ON SUNDAY, AND BASHIR HAD SAID "DON'T YOU DARE LEAVE BEIRUT." HE WENT ON THAT WHEN THERE IS A NEW PRESIDENT OR A NEW PRESIDENT ELECT IN LEBANON, ISRAEL WILL DEAL WITH THAT PERSON THE SAME WAY THEY DEALT WITH BASHIR. IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO STAY AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE. SHARON SAID WE WANT TO LEAVE BEIRUT AND WILL DISCUSS THIS DEPARTURE WITH THE

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NEW PRESIDENT OF LEBANON OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. LEWIS PROBED FURTHER: IF THE LEBANESE DON'T CARE ABOUT BEIRUT AS AN OPEN CITY, IS IT STILL ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO CLEAN OUT BEIRUT? SHARON REPLIED WHEN THE TERRORISTS ARE NOT

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ABLE TO REGROUP AND REGAIN THE CITY, WE WILL LEAVE. THIS IS IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS AND LEBANON'S INTERESTS AND U.S. INTERESTS.

19. DRAPER SAID THAT DURING THE LONG NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE THEY ALWAYS TOLD HABIB THAT YOU CAN'T TRUST THE ISRAELIS. THEY TOLD HABIB THAT AS SOON AS THE PLO WAS OUT THE ISRAELIS WOULD GO INTO BEIRUT. HABIB HAD SAID THAT YOU COULD TRUST THE ISRAELIS; THEY DON'T WANT TO GO IN AND THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT JUST THE CREDIBILITY OF PHIL HABIB. THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THE ASSURANCES GIVEN TO US BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO GO INTO WEST BEIRUT.

20. DRAPER APPEALED AGAIN FOR THE IDF TO LET THE LAF MAKE AN EFFORT TO HANDLE WEST BEIRUT, AND ABOVE ALL THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. SHARON SAID LET THEM GO IN, THE DOOR IS OPEN. THE IDF IS NOT BLOCKING THE ROADS FROM GALERIE SIMAAN. THEY CAN GO TO SHATILA, BURJ AL-BURAJINAH, OR LET THEM CLEAR OUT FAKHANI. WE'LL BE HAPPY TO LET THEM DO IT SINCE IT WOULD COST US A LOT OF BLOOD. SHARON SAID THE IDF WOULD NOT INTERFERE WHEN THE LAF DECIDES TO MOVE. THEY WILL SUPPORT THEM FULLY, HE SAID, BY SHARING INTELLIGENCE AND GIVING ANY HELP THEY WANT. SHARON AGREED TO DRAPER'S SUGGESTION THAT DRORY BE AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH HAMDAN. DRAPER THEN SUGGESTED

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

THAT HE SIT IN WITH DRORY AND HAMDAN. SHARON SAID THAT DRORY COULD NOT OPERATE WITH A "POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE" IN THE ROOM, BUT THAT PERHAPS HE AND DRAPER WILL SIT WITH THE GENERALS AND "WE'LL MEET TOGETHER AND WORK IT OUT." DRAPER SAID HE WOULD WORK ON THE PROBLEM.

21. COMMENT FROM DRAPER: WHILE SHARON'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IDF ACTIONS WERE MADE FORCEFULLY, I FOUND THEM ASTONISHINGLY WEAK IN SUBSTANCE. BY SHARON'S OWN ADMISSION, BASHIR GEMAYEL HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE LAF AND ISF -- ACTING ALONE -- COULD SATISFACTORILY RESOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT SECURITY SITUATION "BY OCTOBER 15." THE THRUST OF SHARON'S ARGUMENTS IN THIS CONNECTION WAS THAT NO LEBANESE PRESIDENT OTHER THAN BASHIR WOULD HAVE THE MOXIE TO ENSURE THAT THE LAF AND ISF WOULD REALLY TACKLE THE WEST BEIRUT SECURITY PROBLEM. MOREOVER, THE IMPLICATION IN SHARON'S AND EITAN'S REMARKS THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AT THE

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AMOUNT OF HEAVY WEAPONRY STILL IN WEST BEIRUT AND AT THE EXISTENCE OF PALESTINIAN "STAY BEHINDS" FLIES IN THE FACE OF THE INFORMATION WE AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN SHARING ALL ALONG. IN EARLIER EXCHANGES WITH THE ISRAELIS PHIL HABIB AND I FRANKLY ADMITTED THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS BUT THAT THEY OUGHT TO BE HANDLED BY THE LEBANESE, ACTING ALONE. AFTER ALL, THE U.S. GOT SOME 15,000 PALESTINIANS AND SYRIANS OUT OF BEIRUT, WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE BEEN PLEASED WITH 13,000, AND THAT MADE THE REMAINING SECURITY PROBLEM EASIER TO SOLVE. END COMMENT.

22. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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DRAFTED BY NEA:CHILL:CF
APPROVED BY NEA:THE SECRETARY
NEA:NAVELIOTES
S/S :APADAMS
S/S-O:GUSREY
S:EEDELMAN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 11/15/97 Date: 11/6/97
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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS LE IS PEPR XF
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR
ON IDF MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. THE SECRETARY CALLED IN ARENS WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON TO
TAKE UP REPORTS THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAVE MOVED INTO
~~REDACTED~~

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CONTROL OF KEY AREAS AND INTERSECTIONS THROUGHOUT WEST
BEIRUT. ARENS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SABEL. VELIOTES AND
HILL WERE PRESENT.

3. SECRETARY SAID THAT OUR INFORMATION, CONFIRMED BY
OTHER SOURCES, IS THAT THE REACTION OF THE LEBANESE TO
THE TRAGEDY OF BASHIR'S ASSASSINATION HAS BEEN TO COMPOSE
THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RALLY TO THE IDEA OF A MORE
UNIFIED LEBANON. RATHER THAN USING THIS TERRIBLE EVENT

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TO TOUCH A TORCH TO INTERCOMMUNAL TENSIONS, AS MANY FEARED, THEIR TENDENCY HAS BEEN A POSITIVE ONE AND VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE TREND THAT WAS EMERGING UNDER BASHIR'S LEADERSHIP.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE IDF MOVES, WHICH WERE DESCRIBED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO

AMBASSADOR DRAPER THIS MORNING AS LIMITED AND PRECAUTIONARY, NOW APPEAR TO BE FAR MORE EXTENSIVE. THIS PRESENTS US WITH A DIFFICULT SITUATION AS WE HAVE THROUGHOUT THE DAY BEEN ANSWERING THOSE WHO HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS WITH US BY CITING THE PRIME MINISTER'S ASSURANCES. WE URGED THAT IDF MOVES NOT BE MISINTERPRETED AND LET IT BE KNOWN THAT WE BELIEVED ISRAEL WAS SEEKING TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

5. AT THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST, HILL THEN DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT AS CONVEYED BY DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON TO DCM FLATEN AND AS REPORTED BY THE IDF SPOKESMAN ON ISRAELI RADIO -- I.E. THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAVE MOVED INTO ALL KEY AREAS AND ROAD INTERSECTIONS, THEREBY TAKING MILITARY CONTROL OF WEST BEIRUT. THIS, THE SECRETARY SAID, IS BEING SEEN AS A VERY DISTURBING DEVELOPMENT.



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IT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE TO CONTINUE THE CURRENTLY POSITIVE TREND TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE KIND OF POST-BASHIR POLITICAL OUTCOME BOTH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. WANT TO SEE. THE ISRAELI MOVEMENTS OF THE LAST 24-HOURS THEREFORE SEEM VERY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE SITUATION RAISES PROBLEMS FOR US:

-- FIRST, WHEN IN THE PAST THE PRIME MINISTER HAS GIVEN US ASSURANCES IT HAS USUALLY MEANT THE END OF THE MATTER. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO POINT TO SUCH STATEMENTS WHEN OTHERS HAVE RAISED COMPLAINTS. PEOPLE HAD CONFIDENCE WHEN WE SAID WE HAD TALKED TO THE ISRAELIS AND HAD RECEIVED A DENIAL OR A RATIONALE. UNFORTUNATELY THAT ABILITY IS NOW BEING LOST; THE CREDIBILITY THAT ISRAELI ASSURANCES CARRIED IN THE PAST IS BEING ERODED.

-- SECOND, WE WANT TO GET AWAY FROM THE RECENT PATTERN OF ALWAYS SEEMING TO BE IN AN ARGUMENT WITH ISRAEL. WE HAVE PLAYED THIS CURRENT SITUATION VERY SOFTLY. SOME LIMITED MOVES BY THE IDF COULD WELL HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE FOR THE SECURITY SITUATION, BUT THE REPORTS THAT WE HAVE AT PRESENT INDICATE THAT ISRAELI MOVES HAVE BEEN FAR MORE WIDESPREAD THAN WE THOUGHT WOULD BE THE CASE. WE WANT TO SEE IN PLACE WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID WOULD BE THE CASE REGARDING ISRAEL'S DEPLOYMENTS.

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OTHERWISE WE WILL HAVE TO BE CRITICAL IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, SOMETHING WHICH WE DO NOT WANT.

-- THIRD, AND MOST IMPORTANT, THE CHANCES FOR THE KIND OF POLITICAL OUTCOME WE BOTH SEEK IN LEBANON IS NOW BEING IMPAIRED BY THIS IDF ACTION. THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN MOVING TO REACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THIS TRAGEDY.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN WEST BEIRUT LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WORKS AGAINST THAT OBJECTIVE.

[REDACTED]

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6. ARENS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HIS DEFENSE ATTACHE HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE SITUATION ON HIS WAY TO THE DEPARTMENT. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT AT THE MOMENT, ARENS SAID, THE IDF HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF POINTS UP TO BUT NOT NORTH OF THE CORNICHE MAZRAA ROAD. ARENS SAID HE HAD READ THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DRAPER AND IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT SUCH DEPLOYMENTS WERE NOT AT ALL INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THAT DISCUSSION. HE COULD SAY WITH COMPLETE CONVICTION THAT THERE WAS NO DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO MISLEAD US. INDEED THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN EXTREMELY HURT BY PAST INSINUATIONS THAT HE HAD KNOWINGLY MISLED THE PRESIDENT. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED BY STRESSING THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING ANY ATTEMPT AT DELIBERATE DECEPTION. WITH THE BEIRUT SITUATION THE WAY IT IS NOW, ARENS CONTINUED, IT IS EASY TO HAVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT FACTS. THE AREA TO THE SOUTH OF THE CORNICHE MAZRAA IS A RELATIVELY SMALL AREA AND NOT BY ANY MEANS THE ENTIRETY OF WEST BEIRUT. DRAPER AND SHARON WILL MEET TOMORROW, HE NOTED, AND MAY BE ABLE TO STRAIGHTEN THIS OUT BETWEEN THEM. ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THESE MOVES BECAUSE THEY FELT IT WAS WISE TO DO SO. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT ISRAEL HAS NO AMBITIONS IN BEIRUT OR IN LEBANON. WHILE THE U.S. AND ISRAEL HAVE DIFFERENCES ON MATTERS SUCH AS THESE FROM TIME TO TIME, THEY REALLY ARE RELATIVELY MINOR TACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS TO PREVENT SUCH DISAGREEMENTS FROM BECOMING PUBLIC SO THAT WE DO NOT UNDERCUT OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE THE LARGER GOALS THAT WE SHARE.

7. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE CLEARLY HAVE A DIFFERENCE IN OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AND THEIR

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MEANING. THE ISRAELI MOVEMENT INTO WEST BEIRUT HAS A POTENTIALLY LONG-TERM EMOTIONAL AND SYMBOLIC IMPACT. WE

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WORKED FOR THE EVAC4ATION OF THE PLO IN LARGE PART SO THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT GO INTO THE CITY PROPER. THE OCCUPATION OF AN ARAB CAPITAL BY ISRAEL IS A POLITICAL MISTAKE. IT IS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US, THE SECRETARY SAID, NOT TO STATE IN PUBLIC WHAT WE THINK OF THIS BY TOMORROW. OUR INSTINCT THIS MORNING WAS TO KEEP OUR COMMENTARY DOWN BUT THE REALITY HAS BEEN MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE AND PROVOCATIVE THAN WE EXPECTED. IT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE TO PUT THE PIECES TOGETHER POLITICALLY. QUITE SIMPLY, ISRAEL'S ACTIONS TODAY ARE NOT HELPFUL.

8. THE SECRETARY ASKED ARENS TO CONVEY OUR BELIEF THAT ISRAEL SHOULD EXAMINE THIS SITUATION CAREFULLY AND ASK ITSELF IF THE IDF SHOULD NOT PULL OUT. THE LEBANESE MUST HANDLE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL FOR THEMSELVES. OUR PEOPLE IN BEIRUT AS WELL AS ARAB SOURCES TELL US THAT LEBANESE ATTITUDES ARE FAVORABLE FOR A POSITIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. BASHIR'S FUNERAL WAS ATTENDED BY A WIDE RANGE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS LEBANESE FACTIONS; THE FUNERAL WAS ITSELF AN ACT OF RECONCILIATION. WITH SUCH POSITIVE SIGNS ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO BE IN THE POSITION OF OBSTRUCTING THE TREND. THIS COUNSELS, IT SEEMS TO US, A PROMPT ISRAELI PULLBACK FROM WEST BEIRUT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED ISRAEL TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THIS MATTER AND TO LET US HEAR THE RESULTS. WE WANT TO WORK HAND-IN-GLOVE WITH ISRAEL. WE DO NOT ENJOY BEING AT ODDS OVER SUCH MATTERS. THIS IS, HOWEVER, A FAST MOVING SITUATION. BY TOMORROW WE WILL HAVE TO BE MUCH STRONGER IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. SHULTZ

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BEIRUT FOR DRAPER

MIL ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE, SY, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION -- CONVERSATION WITH PRIME
- MINISTER BEGIN SEPTEMBER 151. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~2. SUMMARY. ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT-ELECT
BASHIR AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF LEBANONPage 1
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DOMINATED DRAPER'S MEETING WITH BEGIN. THE PRIME MINISTER OBSERVED THAT BASHIR'S PASSING HAD TAKEN THE LEADING PERSONALITY FROM THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE JUST AS IT APPEARED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE ON THEIR WAY TO A NEW UNITY. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT SINCE 5:00 THIS MORNING ISRAELI FORCES HAD MOVED INTO WEST BEIRUT IN ORDER TO INSURE PEACE AND TRY TO PREVENT EFFORTS TO AVENGE BASHIR'S DEATH FROM GETTING OUT OF CONTROL. DRAPER UNDERScoreD THE NECESSITY FOR THE IDF TO MOVE WITH CAUTION, SO AS NOT TO UNDERMINE THE CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVED REPUTATION THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP TO DATE. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WAS TO ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, AND AFTER THAT HE EXPLAINED THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED FIRST WITH THE REMOVAL OF PLO FORCES IN TRIPOLI AND THE BEKA'A AND THEN SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE ACCEPTS THE FACT THAT IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO SOLVE THE LEADERSHIP PROBLEM, BUT BELIEVES THAT ONCE IT IS SOLVED, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S, SHOULD MOVE VERY QUICKLY. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ASKED AMBASSADOR DRAPER TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE SIX MISSING ISRAELI SOLDIERS WITH THE SYRIANS

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WHEN HE WAS IN DAMASCUS. DRAPER AGREED. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ASKED DRAPER IF THE TIMING OF THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE PROPOSALS WITH THE END OF THE PLO EVACUATION IN WEST BEIRUT MEANT A DEAL HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND THE U.S. DRAPER SAID THERE WAS NO SUCH DEAL. END SUMMARY.

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3. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING HIS DEEP PERSONAL REGRET AT THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT-ELECT BASHIR, CALLING BASHIR'S DEATH A "GREAT TRAGEDY" FOR LEBANON. HE OBSERVED THAT WITH BASHIR'S DEATH THE LEADING PERSONALITY ON THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE HAD DISAPPEARED JUST AS IT APPEARED LEBANON WAS ON ITS WAY TO A NEW UNITY. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED DRAPER WHAT WE EXPECTED WOULD HAPPEN NEXT IN LEBANON. DRAPER REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR SELECTING A SUCCESSOR TO PRESIDENT SARKIS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OBSERVED THAT MUCH DEPENDS NEXT ON HOW THE LEBANESE PEOPLE REACT TO BASHIR'S DEATH. HE NOTED THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE PHALANGE MILITIA HAD SURVIVED YESTERDAY'S BOMBING ATTEMPT, AND WAS SO FAR ORDERING HIS FORCES TO REMAIN CALM. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD DRAPER THAT AS OF 5:00 THIS

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MORNING ISRAELI FORCES HAD MOVED INTO WEST BEIRUT WITH THE OBJECT OF KEEPING THINGS QUIET AND INSURING THAT THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS TO MAR THE PEACE. HE INDICATED THAT IF THINGS REMAINED QUIET ISRAEL WOULD BE TAKING A LOOK AT READJUSTING ITS FORCES. HE REITERATED THAT ISRAEL HAS NO

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INTENTION OF REMAINING IN WEST BEIRUT OR FOR THAT
MATTER IN LEBANON INDEFINITELY.

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4. DRAPER REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE
IDF CONTINUE TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY IN ANY

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DEPLOYMENT IN WEST BEIRUT. HE NOTED THAT THE
LEBANESE ARMY IS GAINING A REPUTATION FOR TAKING
ACTION AND IN DOING SO IS BUILDING ITS OWN
CONFIDENCE. IT IS IMPORTANT AT THIS CRITICAL
STAGE THAT NOTHING BE DONE TO DAMAGE EITHER THE
REPUTATION OR THE CONFIDENCE THAT IS BUILDING UP
IN THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THE PRIME MINISTER
AGREED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD BEEN IMPROVING
BUT HE ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO REPORTS RECEIVED
SINCE YESTERDAY, THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD NOT TAKEN
ACTION IN THE WAKE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR
TO KEEP PEACE IN BEIRUT. "THEY JUST WEREN'T ON THE
STREETS."

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5. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED DRAPER WHAT WE DO NOW
ABOUT THE TWO KEY ISSUES REMAINING NOW THAT THE
PLO HAS BEEN EVACUATED FROM WEST BEIRUT.
SPECIFICALLY, WHAT ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF THE
PLO IN THE REMAINING PARTS OF LEBANON AND THE
WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON? HE
ADDED THAT WE SHOULD BEGIN TO WORK ON A SCHEDULE
FOR THE EVACUATION OF BOTH THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS
IN LEBANON, STRESSING THAT THE FIRST ORDER OF
BUSINESS SHOULD BE EVACUATION OF PLO FORCES.
THE EVACUATION OF THE SYRIAN AND BY EXTENSION
ISRAELI FORCES WOULD FOLLOW. COMMENT. THE
PRIME MINISTER'S VIEW OF THE ORDER OF EVACUATION
DIFFERS FROM WHAT DRAPER HEARD IN HIS MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. SEE SEPTTEL. END COMMENT.
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN SAID THAT AT A RATE OF 6000
EVACUATED PER WEEK, ALL SYRIAN FORCES COULD BE
EVACUATED IN FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS.

6. AMBASSADOR LEWIS OBSERVED THAT AT THE PRESENT

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MOMENT THE MOST CRITICAL NEED IS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF A LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AGREED THAT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WAS IN FACT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF A CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THEN, HE SAID, WE SHOULD START TO WORK OUT A SCHEDULE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO AND THEN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIANS FROM LEBANON. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAELIS CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS, EXCHANGING INFORMATION IF POSSIBLE EVERY DAY. HE UNDERScoreD THE CRUCIAL NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS AS WE MOVE FORWARD TO DRAW UP A TIMETABLE FOR PLO AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. DRAPER AGREED THAT WE NEED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AS WE GO FORWARD. CLOSE CONSULTATIONS HAD BEEN CRUCIAL FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS THAT AROSE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TIMETABLE FOR AND THE ACTUAL EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL AS WE MOVE FORWARD FROM THIS POINT.

--
7. AS THE MEETING DREW TO A CLOSE, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ASKED AMBASSADOR DRAPER TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI POWS WITH THE SYRIANS WHEN HE WENT TO DAMASCUS. STRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE OF THE ISSUE, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD ASKED FOR RED CROSS ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING THE SYRIANS, AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD SENT A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO SEE ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU AND SEEK ROMANIAN HELP AS WELL. AMBASSADOR LEWIS TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE HAD RAISED THE POW ISSUE SEVERAL TIMES WITH THE SYRIANS. THEIR ANSWER

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NGEN IMMEDIATE

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SO FAR HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT THE QUESTION OF POWS
IS A RED CROSS ISSUE, AND BY RAISING IT WITH THEM,
WE WERE POLITICIZING THE ISSUE. PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR U.S. EFFORTS

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SO FAR, BUT ASKED IF DRAPER WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE
ONCE AGAIN. DRAPER REPLIED THAT WE WANTED VERY
MUCH TO BE HELPFUL ON THIS ISSUE, AND THAT HE WOULD
RAISE IT WHEN HE ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS.

8. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN RAISED A QUESTION
CONCERNING THE COINCIDENTAL TIMING OF PRESENTATION
OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING THE
U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS WITH THE LAST STAGES OF THE
EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT. HE SAID
THAT THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE JUST AS
THE EVACUATION WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE RAISED THE
POSSIBILITY OF A SECRET DEAL BETWEEN THE UNITED

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STATES AND THE ARABS CONCERNING THE TWO EVENTS.
DRAPER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH CONNECTION.

9. THE PRIME MINISTER RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE REMNANTS OF THE SYRIAN BRIGADE EVACUATED FROM WEST BEIRUT, AND NOW LOCATED IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. HE RECALLED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE BRIGADE WOULD BE OUT OF LEBANON IN A FEW DAYS OR IN A SHORT TIME -- "HE USED BOTH PHRASES WITH ME." ISRAEL HAD INFORMATION THAT THE BRIGADE WAS NOW BEING REARMED AND REINFORCED. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED DRAPER IF PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD GIVEN HABIB A COMMITMENT TO PULL THE BRIGADE BACK TO SYRIA. DRAPER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO COMMITMENT TO HABIB, BUT THERE WAS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND PRESIDENT ASSAD THAT THE BRIGADE WOULD BE REMOVED FROM LEBANON. THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERSCORED ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT "THE REMNANTS OF THE BRIGADE MUST BE TAKEN OUT OF LEBANON." DRAPER ASSURED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT

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THE EFFORTS TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON WOULD REMAIN OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR THE UNITED STATES. BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ BELIEVE THAT THIS MUST BE DONE. LEWIS

10. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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FOIA Exemptions

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JERUSALEM 02944

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PINS, SY, LE, IS, US, JO, SA

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: REVISED TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, SEPT. 24 ONWARDS (0800, SEPT. 24 VERSION)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. FOR REASONS THAT WILL BECOME CLEAR FROM SEPTELS REPORTING OUR MEETING WITH SHARON ON SEPTEMBER 23, FOLLOWING ARE REVISED TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AS OF 0800, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24:

-- A. DRAPER WILL RETURN AS PLANNED TO BEIRUT VIA IDF TRANSPORT ON THE LATE AFTERNOON OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24.

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FOR BEIRUT: IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL THAT DRAPER MEET WITH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING ARRIVAL. 1900 APPEARS SAFE AT THIS JUNCTURE OR THEREAFTER; HOWEVER, IF DRAPER CAN GET AWAY FROM JERUSALEM IN THE MID-AFTERNOON, THIS WILL PROVIDE MORE LEEWAY. SEPTTEL WILL PROVIDE EXACT TRAVEL SCHEDULE.

-- B. HABIB MUST REPEAT MUST MEET WITH SHARON ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, BEGINNING AT 1100 AT SHARON'S

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FARM, TO CONCLUDE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA AND THE MAJOR MNF ENTRY INTO BEIRUT ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26. DRAPER EITHER WILL GO BACK TO ISRAEL FOR THIS MEETING OR WILL SEND CHRISTOPHER ROSS; WHOEVER GOES WILL RETURN ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON BEIRUT VIA IDF TRANSPORT.

-- C. ACCORDINGLY, HABIB WILL TRAVEL BY CAR TO AMMAN OVER THE ALLENBY BRIDGE ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26. THE BRIDGE CROSSING IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR 0900. PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY AMMAN FOR HIS MEETINGS THERE SHOULD STICK (AMMAN 8076). HABIB'S PASSPORT INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- HABIB, PHILIP C., DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO. X173216, ISSUED IN WASHINGTON JUNE 1, 1982, DATE OF BIRTH FEB. 25, 1920, NEW YORK. PASSPORT DOES NOT REPEAT NDT CONTAIN JORDANIAN VISA.

-- D. HABIB WOULD GO BY SPAR USAF AIRCRAFT FROM AMMAN TO DAMASCUS, DEPARTING AMMAN AT 0900, MONDAY, SEPT. 27. THE VISIT TO DAMASCUS DEPENDS ON SECURING AN APPOINTMENT WITH ASSAD AT HIS VACATION RETREAT.

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-- E. DEPART DAMASCUS AT 1500, TUESDAY, SEPT. 28, FOR JIDDA, IN PREPARATION FOR WEDNESDAY MEETING WITH KING FAHD.

-- F. WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 29, MEETING WITH FAHD, AND POSSIBLE DEPARTURE FOR LARNACA OR CAIRO.

-- G. FROM THAT POINT, HABIB WILL MAKE DECISIONS ON BASIS OF NEED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT FOR FINAL GO-ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO RETURNING TO WASHINGTON. GROVE

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O.12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, PGOV, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: IDF MILITARY ACTIONS IN BEIRUT SEPT. 15

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. I WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED TO DISCOVER AFTER MY ARRIVAL IN LEBANON TODAY, SEPTEMBER 15, THAT THE IDF WAS MAKING MAJOR MILITARY ADVANCES INTO WEST BEIRUT DESPITE THE ASSURANCES GIVEN ME AT 0615 LOCAL THIS MORNING AND LATER BY BEGIN HIMSELF THAT ONLY "STRICTLY LIMITED PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES"

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HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN. I WAS MADE AWARE OF THESE FACTS AS I WAS DRIVING WITH CHARGE BARRETT TO BASHIR GEMAYEL'S FUNERAL. I HAD THE CAR TURNED AROUND AND WENT TO IDF HEADQUARTERS IN ALAY, WHERE I ESSENTIALLY COULD GET ONLY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND PAP TO THE EFFECT THAT "EVERYTHING IS FINE, THE LAF IS HAPPY WITH WHAT WE ARE DOING, THERE ARE NO SERIOUS MILITARY PROBLEMS," ETC. GENERAL DRORY AND HIS IMMEDIATE STAFF WERE NOT THERE AND I WAS TOLD I COULD NOT GET IN TOUCH WITH THEM EASILY BECAUSE THEY WERE

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AT THE FRONT LINES. REGULAR EFFORTS MADE SINCE THEN TO MEET WITH DRORY HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, AND IT IS NOW 2200 LOCAL.

3. PRESIDENT SARKIS HAS INFORMED ME THAT PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN IS FURIOUS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND HAS THREATENED TO USE A PRESS CONFERENCE TO DIVULGE -- AMONG OTHER THINGS -- THE TEXT OF OUR AUGUST 19 LETTER OF ASSURANCES ABOUT THE GOOD BEHAVIOR OF THE ISRAELIS. SARKIS URGED THAT WE GET THIS SITUATION TURNED AROUND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

4. CONFIRMING OUR SECURE TELECON WITH HILL, I AM RECOMMENDING THAT WE INSIST TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY END ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY IMMEDIATELY AND WITHDRAW FROM THE POSITIONS THEY HAVE OCCUPIED TODAY. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND USED IN OUR DEMARCHES:

- SHARON AND BEGIN REPEATEDLY HAVE ASSURED US THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT.
- TODAY'S MOVE WAS IN ANY EVENT UNNECESSARY. THE DEMONSTRATIONS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN SPARKED OFF BY NEWS OF BASHIR'S ASSASSINATION COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED BY THE LAF AND ISF, IN COMBINATION WITH WAZZAN'S SO FAR SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL MOVES TO NEUTRALIZE THE POTENTIAL OPPOSITION.
- THE LAF AND ISF HAVE BEEN DOING A REASONABLY GOOD

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JOB IN NEUTRALIZING WEST BEIRUT, AND HAVE EVEN BEEN WELCOMED BY THE PALESTINIANS IN SOME CASES. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN WILLING TO TAKE CASUALTIES, WHEN CHALLENGED. THE GRAVE RISK IN THE IDF MOVES THROUGH LAF POSITIONS IS THAT THE LAF WILL NOW HAVE LOST CREDIBILITY AMONG THE WEST BEIRUT PEOPLE. IT HAS BEEN THE RECOLLECTION OF AN INCIDENT IN THE PAST, WHEN THE LAF REFUSED TO STAND UP TO A CHALLENGE, THAT HAS MADE IT SO DIFFICULT POLITICALLY UP TO NOW TO GET THE LAF IN FRONT IN TAKING CONTROL OF WEST BEIRUT.

-- WAZZAN IN PARTICULAR HAD LONG PREDICTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD MOVE IN MILITARILY INTO WEST BEIRUT JUST AS SOON AS THE MNF DEPARTED. THIS HAS NOW COME TO PASS, AND HE CHARGES THAT THE U.S. HAS NO REAL CREDIBILITY WHEN MAKING PROMISES OF ISRAELI GOOD BEHAVIOR.

-- THIS SENTIMENT COULD REAROUSE FEELINGS AMONG BEIRUTIS THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL ARE IN COLLUSION.

-- HABIB AND I HAD PREVIOUSLY ASSURED WAZZAN THAT IMPLICIT IN ANY REASONABLE SUCCESSFUL LEBANESE EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE WEST BEIRUT WOULD BE STRONG EFFORTS ON OUR PART TO BRING ABOUT A LIMITED IDF DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA. WAZZAN HAS BEEN AWARE THAT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING SUCH DISENGAGEMENT BUT NOW SEES THAT THE PRACTICAL COUTCOME HAS BEEN AN IDF ADVANCE INSTEAD OF DISENGAGEMENT.

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-- IN SHORT, THE U.S. HAS BEEN PUT IN A VIRTUALLY INDEFENSIBLE POSITION BY THE LATEST ISRAELI ACTIONS. TO ACQUIESCE IN SUCH ACTIONS WILL ONLY UNDERMINE OUR FUTURE EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE SITUATION. WE SPENT NEARLY THREE MONTHS TRYING TO PREVENT THE ISRAELIS FROM GOING INTO WEST BEIRUT MILITARILY, AND THE RETURNS FROM THAT INVESTMENT WILL BE LOST OVERNIGHT IF WE DO NOT MOVE QUICKLY.

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5. AFTER I DICTATED THE ABOVE, LAF OPERATIONS CHIEF BRIG GEN HAMDAN WAS IN TOUCH WITH DCM PUGH AND ME ABOUT THE LATEST IDF OVERTURES. IN SHORT, THE IDF IS PROPOSING THAT IT REMAIN IN POSITIONS ALREADY SECURED IN

TODAY'S FIGHTING, WHILE THE LAF MOVES FORWARD TO TAKE THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF WEST BEIRUT UNDER FULL CONTROL. HAMDAN IS A STRAIGHTFORWARD MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT -- FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW -- HE MIGHT BE CONTENT TO LET THE IDF REMAIN WHERE IT IS WHILE HIS FORCES MOVE FORWARD AS SUGGESTED BY THE IDF. IN THE LIGHT OF OUR EARLIER TALKS TODAY WITH SARKIS, I WAS COMPELLED TO SAY TO HAMDAN THAT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT WAZZAN - WOULD NOT BE CONTENT WITH MERELY LETTING THE IDF

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STAY WHERE IT IS; HE WOULD WANT THE IDF TO WITHDRAW AND TO HAVE THE LAF TAKE OVER THESE POSITIONS. I SUGGESTED THAT HE CLARIFY THIS POSITION WITH WAZZAN BEFORE REACHING ANY CONCLUSIONS WITH THE IDF.

COMMENT: THIS EXCHANGE ILLUSTRATES THE POINT MADE IN OUR SECURE TELECON WITHH CHARLIE HILL, NAMELY, THAT SOME LAF OFFICERS -- DEEPLY INTERESTED IN NEUTRALIZING WEST BEIRUT -- MIGHT IN FACT BE WILLING TO ACQUIESCE IN THE RECENT IDF MOVES EVEN THOUGH THE POLITICIANS WOULD NOT. THE POINT OF THIS COMMENT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE SANDBAGGED BY ISRAELI ARGUMENTS THAT (SOME OF) THE LAF MAY HAVE WELCOMED IDF MOVES, BUT WE SHOULD INSTEAD UNDERLINE THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS PROMISED THEY WOULD NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT AFTER WE GOT THE PLO AND SYRIANS OUT. BARRETT

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESIDENT, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE PLANS

TAGS= PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, XF, (SARKIS, ELIAS), (GEMAYEL, BAHIR)

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BEIRUT 6125

DECAPTIONED

FROM AMBASSADOR DILLON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS, SEPTEMBER 8

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. PRESIDENT SARKIS CALLED ME TO THE PALACE THIS MORNING, SEPTEMBER 8, AT VERY SHORT NOTICE HE HAD JUST COMPLETED A

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CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT BASHIR GEMAYEL AND WISHED TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI PRESSURE ON GEMAYEL. FOREIGN MINISTER BUTRUS WAS PRESENT FOR THIS PART OF OUR TALK.

3. SARKIS SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE "RETURNING TO THE CHARGE" ON BASHIR. THEIR PRESSURE WAS VERY DANGEROUS AND THREATENED TO SPLIT THE COUNTRY. HE ASKED THAT THE UNITED STATES APPEAL TO THE ISRAELIS TO GIVE GEMAYEL SOME BREATHING ROOM SO THAT HE COULD UNIFY THE COUNTRY. I TOLD SARKIS THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT VERY WELL, THAT IN FACT BOTH DRAPER AND AMBASSADOR SAM LEWIS HAD URGED THE ISRAELIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TO LAY OFF BASHIR. I NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAELI FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EVEN MILITARY PROFESSIONALS UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION, AT A POLITICAL LEVEL THERE APPARENTLY IS A DETERMINATION TO PRESS GEMAYEL TO THE LIMIT.

4. SARKIS SAID THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY BOTHERED BY RE-NEWAL OF PUBLIC ISRAELI PRESSURE ON BASHIR FOR A PEACE TREATY. SUCH A TREATY WOULD NOT ONLY ISOLATE LEBANON IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT WOULD SPLIT THE COUNTRY. HE NOTED THAT THE MORNING NEWSPAPERS CARRIED A STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE TO SEE ISRAEL CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON BUT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE TIED IN ANY WAY TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, INCLUDING THOSE OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA. I INTERJECTED THAT I HAD EXPLAINED TO GEMAYEL THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THE UNITED STATES COULD PUBLICLY OPPOSE A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL WHEN IN FACT PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS WAS ONE OF OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA. SARKIS WENT ON, STRONGLY SECONDED BY BUTRUS, THAT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION, OUR STATEMENT WAS TOO "ENTHUSIASTIC" AND THEREFORE EMBARRASSING TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT. SARKIS THEN ASKED BUTRUS TO SUGGEST LANGUAGE.

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5. BUTRUS THOUGHT SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING WOULD BE USEFUL: "THE UNITED STATES WOULD WELCOME TREATIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL ARAB COUNTRIES. AS FOR A TREATY WITH LEBANON, ONE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS LINKED TO A NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE SITUATION INSIDE THE COUNTRY".

6. I SAID THAT I WOULD TRY TO GET WASHINGTON TO MODIFY ITS PUBLIC GUIDANCE ON THE SUBJECT, BUT THAT I WAS UNCERTAIN THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO REFER

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TO THE "SITUATION INSIDE THE COUNTRY" BECAUSE THAT WAS SUCH A DIRECT REFERENCE TO MUSLIM OPPOSITION IN LEBANON TO A TREATY.

7. BUTRUS THEN LEFT US ALONE AND SARKIS CONTINUED THE CONVERSTATION DESCRIBING HIS EFFORTS TO HELP GEMAYEL UNIFY LEBANON. IN PARTICULAR, HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE INVITING GEMAYEL AND SA'B SALAM TO LUNCH ON FRIDAY. EACH COULD BRING ONE OR TWO FRIENDS IF HE WISHED (HE THOUGHT SA'B SALAM WOULD WANT TO BRING TAKIEDDINE SOLH). THE MEETING WOULD ENABLE THE TWO SIDES TO AIR DIFFERENCES PRIVATELY AND WOULD, HE HOPED, GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A PUBLIC RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE NEW PRESIDENT AND THE SUNNI COMMUNITY.

8. ACTIONS REQUESTED:

A. ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, REMAIN PUBLICLY ON RECORD AS FAVORING PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING LEBANON, I RECOMMEND THAT WE MODIFY OUR GUIDANCE (HERE WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN WHAT THAT GUIDANCE IS; OUR ONLY CLUES ARE IN THE LOCAL PRESS). PERHAPS WE COULD GO BEYOND SAYING A TREATY SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO TROOP WITHDRAWALS, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUCH A TREATY WOULD TAKE TIME TO WORK OUT, THAT THE NEW GOL WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE IN ITS NEGOTIATION, AND THAT IN THE END IT IS A

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MATTER FOR DECISION BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.
DILLON

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IS, LE
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON LEBANON-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY

1. A) STATE 252944^{NR} B) STATE 252943^{NC} C) BEIRUT 6125[✓]1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. REF A AND B CONTAIN FULL TEXT OF DEPARTMENT
SPOKESMAN'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON LEBANON-ISRAEL
PEACE TREATY. YOU MAY WISH TO PROVIDE PRESIDENT SARKIS

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AND FON MIN BOUTROS FULL TEXT OF ACTUAL LANGUAGE USED BY
SPOKESMAN. YOU MAY ALSO WANT TO PROVIDE TEXT OF Q'S AND
A'S OF AMB. HABIB ON WHITE HOUSE LAWN SEPT. 8 FOLLOWING
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, PROVIDED TO YOU OY USINFO.
IN ADDITION, YOU SHOULD TELL SARKIS AND POUTROS (AND
BASHIR, IF YOU WISH) THAT WE HVE DRAFTED NEW PRESS
GUIDANCE TO FURTHER CLARIFY U.S. VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT,
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION GOL CONCERNS EXPRESSED REF C.

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3. NEW PRESS GUIDANCE AS FOLLOWS, PREPARED FOR USE BY SPOKESMAN ON SEPTEMBER 9 BUT NOT USED AS THERE WAS NO NOON BRIEFING:

QUOTE: Q: CAN YOU CLARIFY FOR ME THE U.S. POSITION ON A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL?

A: IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN NEGOTIATION OF A PEACE TREATY AND THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OF ISRAELI FORCES. THE SAME APPLIES TO ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN A PEACE TREATY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BUFFER ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE UNITED STATES WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, S IT WOULD WELCOME ANY PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ANY OTHER STATE. IT IS OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR SUCH A TREATY MUST BE ENTERED INTO FREELY--AS SHOULD BE THE CASE BETWEEN TWO FULLY INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS--AND SHOULD ENJOY BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 13424

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NEA FOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, US, IS, LE, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: DRAPER-SHAMIR MEETING, SEPTEMBER 5

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SHAMIR AGREED WITH DRAPER'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST BEIRUT. AS WITH THE EARLIER MEETING WITH SHARON, SHAMIR APPEARED TO BE WAITING FOR THE INSTALLATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL BEFORE ENGAGING IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ON VARIOUS "POLITICAL" ISSUES. WHILE BASICALLY POSITIVE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SECOND STAGE, SHAMIR PROVIDED NO NEW INFORMATION ON ISRAEL'S NEGOTIATING POSITIONS DURING THE NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE ONE-HOUR MEETING WAS HELD AT SHAMIR'S OFFICE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 5. PRESENT ON THE ISRAELI SIDE IN ADDITION TO SHAMIR WERE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL HANAN BAR-ON, DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S BUREAU YOSSEF BEN-AHARON AND DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION EITAN BENTSUR. ACCOMPANYING DRAPER WERE AMBASSADOR LEWIS, POLITICAL COUNSELOR HARE, COLONEL SEHULSTER AND POLOFF

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HADLEY (NOTETAKER).
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4. DRAPER DESCRIBED THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN BEIRUT. HE EXPLAINED TO SHAMIR, AS HE HAD EARLIER WITH SHARON, THE DEPARTURE TIMETABLES FROM BEIRUT FOR THE U.S., ITALIAN AND FRENCH MNF CONTINGENTS. SHAMIR LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND OBVIOUSLY WAS PLEASED WITH DRAPER'S ASSESSMENT, WHICH FOR THE MOST PART CLEARLY SQUARED WITH HIS OWN. HE DESCRIBED THE ONGOING NORMALIZATION PROCESS IN BEIRUT AS "VERY GOOD"-- AN ATTITUDE OBVIOUSLY SHARED BY THE OTHER ISRAELIS IN THE MEETING. SHAMIR DID ASK IF THE FRENCH TROOPS WOULD LEAVE BEIRUT ON SCHEDULE. DRAPER NODDED AFFIRMATIVELY.

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5. SHAMIR ASKED DRAPER FOR INFORMATION ON THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS IN LEBANON AIMED AT GAINING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINING SYRIAN TROOPS AND PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS FROM LEBANON. DRAPER EMPHASIZED THAT MUCH COULD DEPEND ON SETTING A "CONDUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE" FOR THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE DIFFICULT. TO THIS END, DRAPER AGAIN BROACHED THE POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAEL AGREE TO CERTAIN MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS AROUND BEIRUT AND DO SOMETHING TO MEET PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN'S POSITION HALFWAY ON THE ISSUE OF REOPENING BEIRUT AIRPORT

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TO LEBANESE CIVILIAN FLIGHTS. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT HE SAW THESE AS ISSUES THAT COULD BE ADDRESSED "IN A MATTER OF WEEKS," NAMELY ATER BASHIR GEMAYEL'S ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE ON SEPTEMBER 23.

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6. SHAMIR THEN ASKED FOR DRAPER'S ASSESSMENT ON GEMAYEL'S PROSPECTS TO FORM A BROADLY-BASED GOVERNMENT. DRAPER STRESSED THAT GEMAYEL--LIKE MOST OF THE OTHER KEY LEBANESE LEADERS, INCLUDING MUSLIMS--HAD BEEN "TRANSFORMED" BY THE PLO'S DEPARTURE AND NOW WERE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM ALREADY GAINED IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDER TO PROMOTE FURTHER STABILIZATION IN BEIRUT AND THROUGHOUT LEBANON. WHEN SHAMIR SAID HABIB WAS "PES-SIMISTIC" ABOUT THE FUTURE, DRAPER STRESSED THAT ON THE CONTRARY HABIB WAS "VERY OPTIMISTIC, VERY CONFIDENT" ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS FOR RECONCILIATION AND STAGE TWO NEGOTIATIONS. CONTINUING, DRAPER SAID THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE IN PROMOTING RECONCILIATION CONCERNED THE SUNNI AND MARONITE COMMUNITIES. IN THIS RESPECT SA'AB SALAM WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT, SINCE HE WAS WIDELY RESPECTED AS A COURAGEOUS AND INTELLIGENT SUNNI LEADER. DRAPER HOPED THAT AS BEIRUT BECAME MORE OPEN, THIS WOULD FACILITATE DISCREET CONTACT BETWEEN SUNNI AND

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MARONITE LEADERS AND THEREBY PROMOTE THE PROSPECT OF

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NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

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7. AS FOR BASHIR'S IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES, DRAPER SAID HE WAS BUSY LOOKING AT HOW HE WOULD STRUCTURE AND STAFF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. DRAPER THOUGHT BASHIR WOULD HIMSELF ASSUME THE POST AS FORMAL

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COMMANDER OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND APPOINT SOME TOUGH NON-MARONITE OFFICERS TO THE TOP POSITIONS, WHO COULD WEED OUT INCOMPETENT AND CORRUPT OFFICERS. IN RESPONSE TO SHAMIR'S QUESTION, DRAPER SAID WE ARE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, CITING OUR RAPID RESPONSE IN DELIVERING RADIO SETS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE

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LEBANESE FORCES NOW OPERATING IN WEST BEIRUT AS ONE INDICATION OF THE PRIORITY WHICH WE ATTACH TO THIS OBJECTIVE.

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8. BAR-ON ASKED FOR DRAPER'S VIEWS ON THE "LOGISTICAL APPROACH" THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IN THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. DRAPER REPLIED THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES TOMORROW (SEPTEMBER 6) FOR INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION, FOLLOWING WHICH HE WOULD RETURN

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TO THE AREA AND HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS. HE EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN ISRAEL AROUND THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER. IN ADDITION, HABIB WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INAUGURATION OF GEMEYAL IN BEIRUT, EITHER THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 23 OR BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF SHABBAT ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24. SHAMIR WELCOMED HABIB'S VISIT AND SAID IT CERTAINLY WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO WORK CLOSELY WITH HABIB AND DRAPER IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT EARLY PROGRESS WAS REACHED IN THE NEXT NEGOTIATIONS.

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9. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEXT PHASE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, DRAPER EMPHASIZED THAT AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI HAD DEVELOPED EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO KEY SYRIAN LEADERS. THIS WAS IMPORTANT. THE ISRAELIS REACTED BY SAYING THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT "PERHAPS HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH WHAT ISRAEL HAS ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR IN BEIRUT." SHAMIR CLOSED THIS PART OF THE MEETING WITH THE POSITIVE OBSERVATION: "LET'S BE OPTIMISTIC. I CANNOT SEE ANY OBSTACLES UNLESS THE SYRIANS CHANGE THEIR MINDS."

10. DRAPER RAISED THE ISSUE OF THOSE PALESTINIANS STILL REMAINING IN BEIRUT WHO WISHED TO LEAVE THE CITY, FEARING POSSIBLE REPRISALS FROM PHALANGIST ELEMENTS. DRAPER SAID WE WANTED TO SET UP "A ROUTINE SYSTEM" WITH THE LEBANESE AND SYRIAN AUTHORITIES "TO MAKE IT EASY" TO EVACUATE SUCH PALESTINIANS OVERLAND TO SYRIA. SHAMIR QUICKLY AGREED TO THIS APPROACH, NOTING THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO ASSIST THOSE WHO WANTED TO LEAVE THE CITY.

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11. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, DRAPER RAISED THE ISSUE OF ISRAEL BEING MORE FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING THE NAMES, LOCATIONS, HEALTH AND RELEASE PROSPECTS OF SHIITES HELD BY THE ISRAELIS. CONCERNED RELATIVES WERE PRESSING AMAL LEADER BARRI ON THOSE DETAINEES, AND IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF ISRAEL COULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN ORDER TO HELP BARRI MEET THE CONCERNS OF HIS COMMUNITY. DRAPER REFERRED TO BARRI'S RECENT COOPERATION IN ARRANGING THE RETURN OF SEVERAL ISRAELIS WHO HAD STRAYED INTO WEST BEIRUT AND SAID COOPERATIVE ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS COULD HELP CONSIDERABLY WITH THE 400,000 STRONG SHIITE COMMUNITY, MOSTLY LOCATED IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. SHAMIR RESPONDED POSITIVELY, INDICATING THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO FACILITATE DRAPER'S REQUEST.

12. THIS MESSAGE NOT SEEN BY DAS DRAPER.

13. MINIMIZE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.
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NEA FOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, US, IS, LE, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: DRAPER-SHARON MEETING SEPTEMBER 5

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY: DURING A LONG, FAIRLY RELAXED MEETING SEPTEMBER 5, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON BASICALLY AGREED WITH DAS DRAPER'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE NEUTRALIZATION OF WEST BEIRUT WAS PROCEEDING BETTER THAN EXPECTED. HOWEVER, SHARON INDICATED ISRAEL WOULD NOT MAKE ANY MAJOR REDEPLOYMENTS IN AND AROUND BEIRUT UNTIL THE CITY WAS FULLY OPEN AND UNIFIED, THOUGH HE DID AUTHORIZE GENERAL DRORY TO MEET WITH GENERAL HAMDAN THIS WEEK AND SEE WHAT LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR MINOR ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT BE AC-

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COMMODATED. ON THE OPENING OF THE AIRPORT, HE WAS UN-IMPRESSED BY WAZZAN'S POSITION THAT THE IDF SHOULD STOP USING THE AIRPORT. HE CONSIDERS WAZZAN "HOSTILE" TO ISRAEL AND IS DETERMINED TO DEFER TALKS ON SUCH "POLITICAL" ISSUES UNTIL BASHIR GEMAYEL ASSUMES OFFICE ON SEPTEMBER 23. SHARON RAISED NO OBJECTIONS TO DRAPER'S OUTLINE OF THE SCHEDULE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF FROM BEIRUT. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE ONE AND HALF HOUR MEETING WAS HELD IN THE PRIME MINISTRY IN JERUSALEM ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER ATTENDING ON THE ISRAELI SIDE IN ADDITION TO SHARON WERE CHIEF-OF-STAFF EITAN, GENERAL LEVI, GENERAL SAGI, GENERAL DRORY, GENERAL TAMIR, SHARON'S MEDIA ADVISOR URI DA , AND OTHER AIDES, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES FROM MOSS D AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. ACCOMPANYING DRAPER WERE AMBASSADOR LEWIS, POLITICAL COUNSELOR HARE, DEFENSE ATTACHE RAINES, COLONEL SEHULSTER (WHO ACCOMPANIED DRAPER FROM BEIRUT) AND POLOFF HADLEY (NOTETAKER).

4. DRAPER OPENED THE MEETING WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF THE "SURPRISINGLY FAST PACED" NEUTRALIZATION OF BEIRUT FOLLOWING THE PLO'S DEPARTURE, MUCH BETTER THAN EXPECTED. HE NOTED THAT ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WERE BEGINNING TO TAKE UP POSITIONS IN WEST BEIRUT AND THAT LEBANESE ARMY UNITS HAD EVEN ENTERED THE SABRA AND BURJ-AL-BARAJNEH PALESTINIAN CAMPS, ADDING THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE EVEN WELCOMING THE LAF INTO THEIR AREAS. THE LEBANESE ARMY NOW WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLING FIVE RECENTLY DISCOVERED PLO ARMS DEPOTS (MOSTLY CONTAINING AMMUNITION) IN BEIRUT,

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FOUR UNDERGROUND AND ONE ABOVE GROUND. SINCE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE CITY WAS PROCEEDING SO WELL, DRAPER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR U.S., ITALIAN AND FRENCH TROOPS TO STAY MUCH LONGER. THE U.S. PLANNED TO WITHDRAW ITS MARINE CONTINGENT BY SEPTEMBER 10 (IN A TWELVE-HOUR OPERATION), TO BE FOLLOWED THE NEXT DAY (SEPTEMBER 11) BY THE BEGINNING OF THE ITALIAN TROOP PULLOUT AND WITH THE FRENCH TROOPS BEGINNING TO LEAVE BY SEPTEMBER 14. ALL THREE CONTINGENTS SHOULD BE OUT OF BEIRUT BY ABOUT SEPTEMBER 18. DRAPER SAID THE PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE GOL SEPTEMBER 6 AND IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD WANT THE MNF TO STAY LONGER. HOWEVER, OUR INTENTION WAS TO HAVE THE MARINES LEAVE ON SEPTEMBER 10. SHARON STATED "WE HAVE NO PROBLEMS" WITH THE MNF WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE, AS OUTLINED BY DRAPER.

5. SHARON, SAGI AND DRORY BASICALLY AGREED WITH DRAPER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE BEIRUT SITUATION, SAYING THERE STILL WAS A PROBLEM MANY ARMED MILITIA GROUPS REMAINING IN POSITION

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BUT THE LEBANESE FORCES WERE SOLVING THE PROBLEM.
SHARON STATED FOR THE RECORD THAT ISRAELI STUDIES
(NOTE: PROBABLY BASED ON AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
PHOTOGRAPHY) INDICATED THAT OF THE 26,000
BUILDINGS IN WEST BEIRUT (INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN
CAMPS), A TOTAL OF ONLY ABOUT 350 BUILDINGS

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HAD BEEN DESTROYED IN THE CAMPS AND ONLY
BUILDINGS HAD BEEN DESTROYED IN THE BUILT-UP
AREAS IN WEST BEIRUT NORTH OF THE BOU ARD
MASRAA. SAGI NOTED THE ISRAELIS ESTIMATED
THAT BETWEEN 2,000 AND 2,500 PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS
REMAINED UNDERGROUND IN BEIRUT AND THE PLO
OFFICE, HEADED BY AL-HUT, AND THE HAWATMEH

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NEWSPAPER OFFICE REMAINED OPEN. A MOSSA REPRESENTATIVE ALSO SAID THAT SOME PLO ARMED FORCES CONTINUED TO OPERATE OFFICES FROM THE SHATILA AND SABRA CAMPS. DRAPER RESPONDED THAT THE PRESENT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD ALLOWED TO ALLOW AL-HUT TO MAINTAIN A SMALL OFFICE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SERVICES TO THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY BUT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD EXPIRE ON SEPTEMBER 23. AFTER THAT, THE FUTURE DEPENDED UPON BASHIR. BASHIR WOULD NOT ALLOW

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THE PLO TO HAVE FLAGS OR GUARDS, THOUGH HE WOULD PERHAPS ALLOW MINOR PALESTINIAN FIGURES TO REMAIN TO KEEP THE SCHOOLS AND OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES FUNCTIONING. DRAPER SAID HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION SURROUNDING HAWATMEH'S NEWSPAPER, THOUGH HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT.

6. DRAPER PRESSED FOR SHARON'S AGREEMENT TO AUTHORIZE ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEBANESE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS GENERAL HAMDAN REGARDING POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS AROUND BEIRUT. DRAPER EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES WOULD DEMONSTRATE ISRAEL'S GOOD FAITH, ENCOURAGE CONTINUING NORMALIZATION OF LIFE IN BEIRUT AND HELP STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, ADDING PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED GENERAL HAMDAN TO ENTER INTO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THIS SUBJECT. SHARON REPLIED THAT CONTACT BETWEEN THE LAF AND IDF WAS IMPROVING (AND INDEED THE IDF HAD BEEN HELFUL IN ASSISTING THE LAF IN SUCH AREAS AS MINE CLEARING) AND THAT HE CERTAINLY HAD NO PROBLEM IN AUTHORIZING GENERAL DRORY TO TALK TO GENERAL HAMDAN THIS WEEK. SHARON, HOWEVER, THEN TURNED TO DRORY TO REMIND HIM THAT ISRAEL--AND NOT THE LEBANESE--WOULD DECIDE ON ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS IN BEIRUT. WHILE DRORY AND HAMDAN COULD TALK AND EVEN REACH AGREEMENTS ON RELATIVELY MINOR "TECHNICAL" ISSUES, SHARON MADE IT EMPHATICALLY CLEAR THAT MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY READJUSTMENTS INVOLVED KEY "POLITICAL"

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ISSUES AND WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THE TI BEING. HE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT ISRAELI TROOPS WOULD NOT BE MOVED UNTIL BEIRUT WAS A COMPLETELY "OPEN CITY." SHARON DEFINED N OPEN CITY ONE IN WHICH HE AND ANY OTHER I RESTED ISRAELIS COULD TRAVEL FREELY THROUGHOUT BE RUT, INCLUDING IN FORMERLY PLO-DOMINATED AREAS, SUCH AS THE HIPPODROME, THE CORNICHE AND FAKHANI AMONG OTHERS. AT SEVERAL POINTS SHARON SAID HE WAN ED BEIRUT TO BE SUFFICIENTLY "OPEN" SO THAT HE COULD TAKE HIS FAMILY TO SPEND THE NIGHT AT THE COMMODORE HOTEL. BUT, SHARON EMPHASIZED, BEIRUT "IS NOT YET SUCH A CITY." BESIDES, AS BOTH SHARON AND DRORY POINTED OUT, ISRAEL HAD ALREADY THINNED OUT ITS FORCES BY WITHDRAWING SOME TROOPS FROM LEBANON, AND WERE NOT INTERFERING.

7. DRAPER BROACHED THE POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAEL AGREE NOW TO REOPEN BEIRUT AIRPORT TO INTERNATIONAL LEBANESE CIVILIAN FLIGHTS. SHARON SAID HE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO PROBLEM IN OPENING BEIRUT AIRPORT AND DRORY POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELS "TWO WEEKS AGO" HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE TO GO AHEAD AND REOPEN THE AIRPORT. SHARON MENTIONED THAT ISRAELI TROOPS HAD RECENTLY CLEARED MINES FROM THE ROADS LEADING TO THE AIRPORT, WHICH WAS A HELPFUL STEP. DRAPER SAID THAT WHILE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE WORKING-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES HAD REACHED A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT ON THE REOPENING OF THE AIRPORT (E.G., BY AGREEING THAT ISRAELI TROOPS WOULD OPERATE ONLY AT THE END OF THE ONE RUNWAY), PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD TOLD HIM THE PREVIOUS EVENING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AGREE TO RESUME

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LEBANESE

FLIGHT ACTIVITY AT THE AIRPORT UNTIL THE
IDF CEASED USING THE AIRPORT, POINTING OUT
THE PROBLEMS THIS WOULD CREATE WITH OTHER ARAB
STATES. IN CONVEYING WAZZAN'S MESSAGE, DRAPER
SAID HE WAS SIMPLY ACTING AS A MAIL BOX AND WAS
NOT TAKING A POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ISSUE.

8. SHARON, IN REPLY, DESCRIBED THE WAZZAN GOVERNMENT
AS "HOSTILE" TO ISRAEL AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE
UNITED STATES WAS "VERY WRONG IF IT THINKS THAT
ISRAEL WILL, IN THE LAST EIGHTEEN DAYS BEFORE
A NEW GOVERNMENT ENTERS OFFICE IN BEIRUT, TRY TO
WORK OUT AGREEMENTS ON SENSITIVE POLITICAL
ISSUES WITH A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN
HOSTILE AND UNCOOPERATIVE FOR MANY YEARS."
SHARON THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN EBULLIENT DISCOURSE

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ON "THE GREAT VICTORY" THAT ISRAEL HAD WON IN
GETTING THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT. "LET'S ENJOY
LIFE" FOR THE TIME BEING, HE STRESSED, AND NOT
GET BOGGED DOWN WITH THE "DETAILS" DRAPER WAS
RAISING REGARDING ISRAELI MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS
IN BEIRUT AND AROUND THE AIRPORT. SHARON STATED
CANDIDLY THAT "I'M JUST NOT GOING TO GET INTO
THESE THINGS NOW." WAZZAN, AFTER ALL, MIGHT WELL
NOT BE PRIME MINISTER IN EIGHTEEN DAYS AND WITH
THIS POSSIBILITY IN MIND HE ASKED RHETORICALLY
WHAT INCENTIVE ISRAEL HAD TO COOPERATE NOW WITH
WAZZAN'S GOVERNMENT. GENERAL SAGI ALSO SPOKE
UP, DISMISSING AS "ABSURD" AND AS "NONSENSE"

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WAZZAN'S POSITION THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO REOPEN THE AIRPORT UNLESS THE IDF STOPPED USING THE AIRPORT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. SAGI SAID THAT SYRIAN TROOPS HAD BEEN AT BEIRUT AIRPORT BEFORE ISRAEL LAUNCHED THE PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION AND THAT THE LEBANESE HAD NOT COMPLAINED. THUS, THE LEBANESE ALSO COULD AGREE TO REOPEN THE AIRPORT WITH ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE AREA. WAZZAN'S NEGATIVE POSITION, SAGI CONCLUDED, THUS CLEARLY WAS "A POLITICAL, NOT A TECHNICAL, PROBLEM."

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9. SHARON THEN SPELLED OUT ISRAEL'S BASIC PRINCIPLES REGARDING LEBANON. FIRST, THERE WAS THE NECESSITY OF MAKING BEIRUT AN "OPEN CITY," WHICH HE SAID WAS EVEN MORE IN THE AMERICAN THAN THE ISRAELI INTEREST SINCE OTHERWISE THERE WAS NO CHANCE FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO SURVIVE. SECOND, AS LONG AS BEIRUT WAS NOT ONE CITY, ISRAEL WAS NOT GOING TO WITHDRAW. SHARON ADDED THAT WHEN BEIRUT WAS REALLY OPEN, HE WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE

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WITH HIS GOVERNMENT IN ADVOCATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM BEIRUT. THIRD, ISRAEL WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OF THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY UNTIL ALL FOREIGN FORCES HAD LEFT LEBANON. ISRAEL WOULD ALLOW CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TO PASS ON THE HIGHWAY, BUT WOULD, OF COURSE, PREVENT ANY EFFORT BY THE SYRIANS TO REENTER. AND FOURTH, ISRAEL WILL NEGOTIATE WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT ON PEACE AGREEMENTS, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND OPEN BORDERS.

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10. AMBASSADOR LEWIS AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING AND UNIFYING BEIRUT WAS BY ITS VERY NATURE BOUND TO BE A LENGTHY ONE. SOME ISRAELI MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS AROUND THE CITY--TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT--WOULD CLEARLY HELP "PSYCHOLOGICALLY" TO FURTHER THIS NORMALIZATION PROCESS. LEWIS SAID POINTEDLY THAT HE ASSUMED SHARON "WOULD NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND" SUCH BENEFICIAL ACTIONS, WHICH MOREOVER WOULD IN NO WAY WEAKEN ISRAEL'S MILITARY POSITION IN THE AREA AND ITS POLITICAL LEVERAGE. SHARON REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS POINT THAT MATTERS "SHOULD CONTINUE AS THEY ARE" UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 24, BUT HE DID RESTATE AGAIN HIS APPROVAL FOR GENERAL DRORY TO MEET WITH HAMDAN AND LISTEN TO HIS REQUESTS.

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11. IN CONCLUDING THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION,

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DRAPER ONCE AGAIN DESCRIBED THE VALUE OF REACHING AT LEAST SOME LIMITED AGREEMENTS WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, POINTING OUT THAT LEBANON, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES SHARED SOME COMMON OBJECTIVES,

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EXDIS

SUCH AS KEEPING THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT, HAVING ALL FOREIGN FORCES LEAVE LEBANON, NO REESTABLISHMENT OF A MINI-STATE, AND ALLOWING PEACE TO DEVELOP WITH ISRAEL. HE ASKED SHARON TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND AS THE VARIOUS ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED IN THE NEXT DAYS. SHARON SIMPLY REPLIED THAT "WE ARE NOT IN A HURRY."

12. DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE MEETING, SHARON INDIRECTLY VENTED HIS BITTER FRUSTRATION AND UNHAPPINESS OVER THE PERCEIVED LACK OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF WHAT ISRAEL

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HAD ACCOMPLISHED BY ITS OPERATION IN LEBANON. ISRAEL, HE STRESSED, HAD NOT UNDERTAKEN THE PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION TO WIN SYMPATHY FROM THE ORLD. RATHER, ISRAEL HAD SOUGHT TO SERVE ITS OWN AND INDEED OUR INTERESTS BY DEALING A CRUSHING BLOW O PLO TERRORISM AND WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN CCOMPLISHED, EVEN

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THOUGH THIS HAD TAKEN A HEAVY PRICE IN ISRAELI BLOOD. SHARON SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT NOW TAKE ACTIONS JUST TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF COOPERATING WITH THE GOL AND THEREBY ELICITING PRAISE AND SYMPATHY FROM OTHERS. ON THE CONTRARY, ISRAEL WOULD CONTINU TO BE THE ARBITER OF ITS ACTIONS IN LEBANON.

13. THIS MESSAGE NOT SEEN BY DAS DRAPER.

14. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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RECAPTIONED

FOR AMB. DILLON FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, XF, FR, IT
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW UP: WAZZAN REQUEST FOR DELAY
IN DEPARTURE OF MNF

REF: (A) BEIRUT 6093 (B) BEIRUT 6081

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~2. IN RESPONSE TO WAZZAN'S REQUEST THAT THE MULTINATIONAL
FORCE DEPARTURE BE POSTPONED AND TAKE PLACE ONLY IN STEP
WITH AN IDF READJUSTMENT, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING

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BASIC POINTS:

-- HABIB AND DRAPER ARE CONSULTING IN WASHINGTON ON NEXT
STEPS, AND THE HIGHEST IMMEDIATE PRIORITY AMONG SUCH STEPS
IS THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE LIMITED DISENGAGEMENT OF THE IDF
FROM THE BEIRUT AREA.-- AT HABIB'S INSTRUCTION, DRAPER WENT TO ISRAEL--AS THE
PRIME MINISTER KNOWS-- TO SOUND OUT SHARON ABOUT SUCH A

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DISENGAGEMENT. DRAPER HAD PREVIOUSLY CONSULTED WITH THE LAF (GENERAL HAMDAN AND HIS STAFF) ABOUT AN IDF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE THE NECESSITY FOR THE IDF TO MOVE THEIR SUPPLIES THROUGH BEIRUT OR ITS SUBURBS. AS IS

OFTEN THE CASE WHEN THESE MATTERS ARE BROACHED WITH THE ISRAELIS, SHARON WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEN AND THERE EITHER THE DETAILS OR THE TIMING OF SUCH DISENGAGEMENT. HOWEVER, HE AUTHORIZED GENERAL DRORY TO DISCUSS WITH GENERAL HAMDAN THE DETAILS OF A DISENGAGEMENT AND OF ANY OTHER MATTERS THAT NEED TO BE REVIEWED AS REGARDS IDF ACTIVITIES.

-- IT WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE RECEIVE A FULL REPORT OF ANY SUCH DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GENERALS HAMDAN AND DRORY SO THAT WE CAN--WITHOUT DELAY--RENEW OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS ON THIS SUBJECT.

-- DRAPER WILL BE RETURNING SHORTLY TO BEIRUT, BUT WE WILL NOT WAIT UNTIL THEN TO TALK AGAIN TO SUCH ISRAELIS AS SHARON.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIMING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF SHOULD NOT BE LINKED DIRECTLY TO AN IDF DISENGAGEMENT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THE LAF AND ISF HAVE BEEN DOING OUTSTANDING JOBS IN NEUTRALIZING THE WEST BEIRUT SITUATION, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT A NEW PAGE HAS BEEN TURNED SUCCESSFULLY. THE ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF, BEGINNING WITH THE U.S., AND THEN THE ITALIANS AND FRENCH, CAN BE PRESENTED AS AN EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GOL'S CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. SHULTZ

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FOR COVEY FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: XF, MILI, LE, SY, IS, PINT

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION FOLLOW-UP: MESSAGE FOR GENERAL
HAMDAN

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. YOU WILL SEE FROM SEPTTEL REPORTING THAT SHARON IS UNLIKELY - AT LEAST AT THIS JUNCTURE - TO GIVE UP VERY MUCH TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, WHETHER ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA, OR ON THE AIRPORT. HE HAS, HOWEVER, AUTHORIZED DRORY TO TALK WITH HAMDAN BUT ALL MAJOR POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE TO BE REFERRED TO HIM AND THE GOI. I THINK IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE TWO MEN COULD COME TO A REASONABLE UNDERSTANDING ON LIMITED DISENGAGEMENT AND WE COULD THEN MAKE ANOTHER STAB AT SHARON. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU DELIVER THE MESSAGE BELOW TO HAMDAN AND TALK OVER WITH HIM HOW HE MIGHT PROCEED. JIM SHOULD ACCOMPANY YOU SINCE HE WAS PRESENT AT THESE MEETINGS HERE AND WILL HAVE A GOOD FEEL FOR THE NUANCES. MESSAGE FOR GENERAL HAMDAN:

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02728 051822Z

- AS WE TOGETHER AGREED, I BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF IDF DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA WITH SHARON. HE HAD HIS TOP MILITARY STAFF WITH HIM, INCLUDING DRORY.

- I DID NOT TAKE OUT THE MAP YOU HAD GIVEN ME, BUT SAID THAT YOU AND THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES HAD AN IDEA FOR IDF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WOULD STILL PERMIT IDF POSITIONS ALONG THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT HIGHWAY AND IN THE

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BEIT MERI AREA TO BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY.

- SHARON AUTHORIZED DRORY TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH YOU ABOUT THIS SUBJECT OR ANY OTHER RELATED TO THE IDF PRESENCE. HE MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ALL "POLITICAL DECISIONS" WOULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED BACK TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. MOREOVER, HE WAS UNWILLING TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE IN THE EARLY FUTURE. HE WANTS TO SEE HOW THE UNIFICATION OF THE CITY OF BEIRUT PROCEEDS.

- IN MY OPINION, YOU SHOULD PROCEED TO HAVE TALKS WITH DRORY. HE WILL PROBABLY BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU THROUGH COL. FAWZI ABU FARHAT WITHIN A DAY OR TWO. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YDU PRESENT YOUR CASE IN A STRAIGHT-FORWARD FASHION AND TALK ABOUT YOUR PROPOSALS AS ONE MILITARY MAN TO ANOTHER.

- DON'T BE DISAPPOINTED IF YOU ENCOUNTER RESISTANCE, AS YOU CERTAINLY WILL. THIS IS THE WAY IT IS WHEN DEALING WITH COMPLEX ISSUES WITH THE ISRAELIS. TRY TO MAKE DRORY UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO ALL THE LEBANESE PEOPLE THAT THE CITY OF BEIRUT BE GIVEN SOME "ROOM TO BREATHE".

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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- PLEASE KEEP US INFORMED.

- WITH WARMEST BEST WISHES AND GOOD LUCK.

3. FINAL NOTE: SAM AND I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE AN AMERICAN PRESENT AT THE MEETING BETWEEN DRORY AND HAMDAN. WE WILL GET FURTHER IN THIS WAY, BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT US TO GET OUT OF THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY WHENEVER POSSIBLE. GROVE

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS

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JIDDA/CAIRO FOR HABIB

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: HABIB'S FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS
- WITH SYRIANS ON WITHDRAWAL OF SARG FORCES FROM
- LEBANON

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1. ALTHOUGH PORTIONS OF DAMASCUS 6325 HAVE BEEN OVER-
TAKEN BY MOMENTOUS EVENTS OF PAST 2 WEEKS, WE BELIEVE
IT IS STILL GENERALLY VALID AS BACKGROUND FOR HABIB'S
OCTOBER 2-3 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIANS. WE ARE REPEATING
THIS MESSAGE TO JIDDA/CAIRO FOR HABIB'S REVIEW.

2. IN TWO RESPECTS, THE SITUATION LOOKS SOMEWHAT MORE
FAVORABLE THAN IT DID WHEN DAMASCUS 6325 WAS WRITTEN
ON AUGUST 31. FIRST, THE SYRIANS NOW HAVE, IN THE FEZ

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COMMUNIQUE, THEIR LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR
FORCE FROM LEBANON. SECONDLY, THE DEMISE OF BASHIR
GEMAYEL AND THE INAUGURATION OF AMIN GEMAYEL INCREASES
THE CHANCES THAT SARG WILL BE ABLE TO WORK WITH THE
LEBANESE LEADERSHIP. SYRIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
NASSER QADDOUR TOLD US ON SEPTEMBER 18 (DAMASCUS 6803)
THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE FEZ DECLARATION, THE STEPS FOR
SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOL,
ALTHOUGH THESE TALKS HAD NOT YET BEGUN.

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3. NOW THAT AMIN GEMAYEL IS FUNCTIONING AS PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, SARG OUGHT TO BEGIN TALKING TO HIM ABOUT LITIES OF SYRIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS, BUT TWO OBSTACLES, A PROCEDURAL AND A SUBSTANTIVE ONE, REMAIN. FIRST, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO HIGH-LEVEL CONTRACTS BETWEEN SARG AND GOL SINCE BASHIR WAS ELECTED. SARG IS MORE COMFORTABLE WITH AMIN THAN BASHIR, BUT IS PROBABLY AWAITING FOR AMIN TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP AT COOPERATION. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE AMIN TO DO SO SOONEST.

4. SECONDLY, AS QADDOUR TOLD US ON SEPTEMBER 18, THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, AND IN SARG'S VIEW WE ARE STILL IN PHASE I WHICH MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE WE CAN MOVE TO PHASE TWO INVOLVING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO SEE HOW EFFECTIVE WE ARE IN OUR DECLARED DETERMINATION TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS OUT OF BEIRUT. SARG'S PERCEPTION OF OUR SUCCESS WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON HOW FAR HABIB WILL GET HERE IN ENGAGING THE SYRIANS IN A MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF THEIR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

5. U.S. CREDIBILITY. IN OUR TALKS WITH SARG OFFICIALS (AND AMPLIFIED IN SYRIAN MEDIA) IS A CONSTANT THEME OF

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QUESTIONING OF U.S. CREDIBILITY WHEN IT COMES TO MEDIATING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND OTHERS. THE SYRIAN RESPONSE OF SEPTEMBER 22 TO OUR MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 20 ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM LEBANON (DAMASCUS 6917) - ALTHOUGH BRIEF AND CRYPTIC - REFERRED BACK TO A U.S. "COMMITMENT" TO GET ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW WHICH STILL HAD TO BE MADE GOOD. QADDOUR ON SEPTEMBER 18 ALSO EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE THE U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL IN BEIRUT OR ELSEWHERE. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE SYRIANS ARE WATCHING EVENTS ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON VERY CLOSELY, AND WILL ONLY BE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT THEIR OWN WITHDRAWAL WHEN THEY SEE ISRAEL STARTING TO PULL BACK.

6. INTERIM LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS: THE SYRIANS WILL TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT INTERIISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN SUPPORT OF THE IDF. THE SYRIAN ARMY IS IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND IN NO POSITION TO ATTACK THE IDF NEAR BEIRUT. CAN WE SUPPORT ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR IDF ACCESS TO PORT, AIRPORT, AND ROAD FACILITIES TO AN EXTENT THAT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL ONLY IN EVENT OF A FULL SCALE ISRAEL/SYRIAN CONFLICT IN LEBANON? IF SO, SYRIANS WILL SURELY SUSPECT WE ARE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIAN FORCES. THE ISRAELI DEMAND TO HOLD ONTO THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY UNTIL THE LAST

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SYRIAN SOLDIER LEAVES LEBANON IS ALSO NON-STARTER IN DAMASCUS. AS WE ARE WORKING OUT OVER NEXT FEW DAYS WITH ISRAELIS AND GOL FRAMEWORK OF RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN BEIRUT AREA, WE SHOULD GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO THESE SYRIAN CONCERNS IF WE EXPECT TO OBTAIN FORTHCOMING SARG POSITION ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07045

EXDIS

JIDDA/CAIRO FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: HABIB'S FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS

7. UNIFIL: THE IDF ENTRY INTO BEIRUT AND THE ENSUING

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MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS BOTH SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE SYRIAN CONVICTION THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS NEEDED. ALTHOUGH SYRIA ACCEPTS THE MNF IN ITS CURRENT CAPACITY, WE SUSPECT A PREFERENCE FOR A STRENGTHENED UNIFIL THAT COULD BE PLACED BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI TROOPS DURING A PHASED WITHDRAWAL AND THAT COULD HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EXPAND ITS AUTHORITY, ESPECIALLY OVER MAJOR HADDAD. SEPTEMBER 27 WIRELESS FILE CARRIES ITEM THAT SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN ACHIEVING WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES

[REDACTED]

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FROM LEBANON AND LONDON 20947 INDICATES UK MIGHT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN A UNIFIL TYPE FORCE FOR LEBANON. STATE 271578 ALSO INDICATES UK INTEREST IN EXPANDED UNIFIL ROLE. PAGANELLI

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY

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FOL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE, BEIRUT, JIDDA, RIYADH
DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM AND TEL AVIV AUG 27, RPT FOR
YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 08129

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O.12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, SY, JO, US, LE

SUBJECT: HABIB'S SEPTEMBER 26 MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

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2. SUMMARY: I HAD A TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR WORKING LUNCH
WITH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS TOP AIDES SEPTEMBER 26. OUR
TALKS COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
LEBANON AND THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS (SEPTEL).
ON LEBANON I OUTLINED U.S. OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON
FULLY AND HUSSEIN RESPONDED WITH STRONG SUPPORT FOR OUR
EFFORTS. HE IS SOLIDLY BEHIND AMIN GEMAYEL AND SAID
JORDAN WANTS TO HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. AT THE

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SAME TIME HUSSEIN MADE A MAJOR POINT THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT AND THE MASSACRE AT SABRA AND SHATILA. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON, PARTICULARLY THOSE PRISONERS HELD BY THE ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY.

3. I HAD A TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING AND WORKING LUNCHEON WITH KING HUSSEIN AT NADWAH PALACE ON SEPT. 26. AMBASSADOR VIETS AND DCM DJEREJIAN ACCOMPANIED ME. ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE THE PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, PRIME MINISTER BADRAN, CINC LT. GENERAL BIN SHAKER, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER HASAN IBRAHIM, CHIEF OF THE ROYAL CABINET AHMAD AL-LOZI AND COURT MINISTER AMER KHAMMASH. IN THE TALKS ABOUT LEBANON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED:

SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND WITHDRAWAL ISSUES

4. I BRIEFED THE KING IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE. IN EXPLAINING OUR GOALS IN LEBANON

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I SAID THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO: (1) REMOVAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM BEIRUT SO THAT IT CAN ONCE AGAIN BECOME THE CAPITAL OF A SOVEREIGN LEBANESE STATE, (2) HELPING THE GOL TO REASSERT ITS FULL AUTHORITY FOLLOWING AMIN GEMAYEL'S INAUGURATION AND, (3) HASTENING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. AT THE SAME TIME I SAID THE PRESIDENT IS INSISTENT THAT ALL OF THIS BE DONE IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONTINUING MOMENTUM IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN BEIRUT REPRESENT A ROADBLOCK TO THESE EFFORTS, BUT CERTAINLY NOT A TOTAL IMPASSE. THEY SHOULD NOT HOLD UP THE FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE.

5. I THEN BRIEFED HUSSEIN ON THE DETAILS OF OUR PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON BEIRUT, INCLUDING THE ISSUES OF THE IDF PRESENCE IN BEIRUT AND THE AIRPORT AND THE PROBLEM OF IDF LOGISTICAL ROUTES AROUND THE CITY. I TOLD HUSSEIN WE ARE TELLING THE ISRAELIS THAT A RETURN TO THE SEPTEMBER 15 IDF LINES IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH AND THAT THE IDF MUST REDEPLOY OUT OF THE BEIRUT AREA. I ALSO EXPLAINED THE ROLE OF THE LARGER MNF, AS AN INTERPOSITION FORCE (1) TO PROTECT THE HEART OF THE CITY; (2) TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE IN THE CAMPS THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPRESSION; AND (3) TO PROVIDE A CLEAR AREA IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY WHERE THE GOL

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CAN ESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY. ALL OF THIS, I STRESSED, WE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH IN A SHORT TIME WITH THE MNF FULLY OPERATING NO LATER THAN WEDNESDAY MORNING.

WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES

6. I EMPHASIZED THAT ALL OF THESE MOVES ARE INTENDED AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS LEADING TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON, INCLUDING THE



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SYRIANS, ISRAELIS AND THE REMAINING 5,000-6,000 PLO FIGHTERS IN THE NORTH AND THE BEKAA. WITH REGARD TO THE PLO TROOPS, I SAID, SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE SOON BECAUSE THESE PEOPLE ARE ENGAGING IN DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIONS. TO ACHIEVE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, I SAID,



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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
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EXDIS

WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL
OF IDF AND SYRIAN FORCES, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TO AVOID
TALKING ABOUT MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. WE THINK SYRIA
IS PREPARED TO GET OUT OF LEBANON, ESPECIALLY SINCE ITS
MILITARY POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE IDF IS PRECARIOUS.
(I TOLD HUSSEIN I HOPED TO SEE PRESIDENT ASSAD EVEN
THOUGH HE IS PRESENTLY ON VACATION TO TALK ABOUT
WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.) WE WILL BE EXPLORING A WAY
TO ARRANGE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, LOOKING AT A
FRAMEWORK BASED EITHER ON WITHDRAWAL IN PHASES OR WITHIN
A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME. AMBASSADOR DRAPER, I SAID,
WOULD BE STAYING IN THE AREA TO WORK OUT THESE
ARRANGEMENTS. I NOTED THAT I WILL COME BACK TO THE
AREA FROM TIME TO TIME WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY.
HUSSEIN ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS WERE REALLY SERIOUS
ABOUT MOVING OUT OF LEBANON. I SAID THAT SHARON
EXPLICITLY TOLD ME THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO MOVE

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OUT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUERY OF HOW LONG IT WOULD
TAKE, I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT I AM THINKING OF WEEKS,
AND I HOPE WE CAN GET THINGS MOVING IN THIS TIME-FRAME.

PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

7. IN RESPONSE TO HUSSEIN'S QUESTIONS ABOUT
PROSPECTS FOR THE AMIN GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT, I NOTED


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THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CONSENSUS APPROACH TO POLITICS. AMIN, I SAID, IS A STRONGER LEADER THAN PEOPLE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE. HE DEFINITELY WANTS TO ESTABLISH A RECONCILIATION PROCESS WITH THE MUSLIMS, ESPECIALLY WITH THE SUNNIS, SINCE HE ALREADY HAS GENERAL SUPPORT FROM THE SHI'A. AMIN RETAINS SOME RELATIONS WITH ALL OF THEM, WHEREAS BASHIR DID NOT. WALID JUMBLATT WOULD NOT RPT NOT MEET WITH BASHIR, BUT AMIN HAS MAINTAINED HIS CONTACTS WITH SAEB SALAAM AND TAQIADDIN SULH, FOR EXAMPLE. HUSSEIN RESPONDED SAYING, "WE WANT TO BE HELPFUL TO LEBANON." HE SAID THAT AMIN HAS A GOOD POLITICAL FOUNDATION. HE WISHED HIM WELL. I MENTIONED THAT AMIN WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE KING'S MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON HIS INAUGURATION AND NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE TAKEN A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TO AMIN'S ELECTION THAN THAT OF BASHIR'S. I ALSO MENTIONED THAT I TOLD ISRAELIS AT EVERY LEVEL NOT RPT NOT TO SMOTHER AMIN AND I HOPED THIS MIGHT MOVE THE ISRAELIS AWAY FROM PRESSING THE IDEA OF A PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON.

U.S. CREDIBILITY AND ISRAEL



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8. THE KING RAISED THE MASSACRES AT THE SHATILA/SABRA PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND THE DEEP IMPACT THIS INCIDENT HAS HAD ON ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. HE SAID U.S. CREDIBILITY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY PLACED IN DOUBT AND THE PERCEPTION REMAINS THAT ISRAEL CAN PURSUE ITS INTERESTS AND ITS POLICIES WITHOUT ANY REAL COSTS IN TERMS OF U.S. BACKING. THE KING SAID THAT AS LONG AS U.S. ECONOMIC AID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FLOW TO ISRAEL IN THE QUANTITIES THEY DO, THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE REINED IN. THEY WILL NOT REACT TO "U.S. ANGER" ONLY. I TOLD THE KING OF THE DEPTH OF U.S. REACTION TO THE MASSACRES. I HAD BEEN GIVEN ASSURANCES BY BASHIR THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN THE CAMPS AND BY THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WOULD NOT ENTER WEST BEIRUT. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE ASSURANCES WE HAD GIVEN OUR WORD. WE HAD BEEN DECEIVED. THIS IS A PRINCIPAL REASON WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN IS SO UPSET. AND IS A MAJOR REASON FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND THE MARINES BACK TO BEIRUT.

9. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE SHATILA/SABRA MASSACRES WILL GO DOWN IN HISTORY ALONG WITH OTHER EVENTS


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PERPETRATED BY THE ISRAELIS SUCH AS DEIR YASSIN.
THE ISRAELIS SIMPLY WANT TO SOW PANIC AMONG THE
PALESTINIANS AND SCARE THEM OUT. THIS IS AKIN TO
WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DO IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA. THE ISRAELIS MUST KNOW THAT THEIR ACTIONS
HURT THE U.S. PRESIDENT'S POSITION AND THAT OF THE
U.S. ADMINISTRATION. THEY CERTAINLY KNEW WHAT
ARAB REACTION WOULD BE AND THAT THE REACTION WOULD



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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECTION 03 OF 03 AMMAN 08129

EXDIS

WORK AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT WE ARE URGENTLY TRYING TO PUT THE LEBANESE PIECES TOGETHER AGAIN AS EVIDENCED BY OUR QUICKLY MOVING TO RE-ESTABLISH THE MNF ALONG WITH THE CLEAR STATEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. THE REACTION TO THE MASSACRES IN ISRAEL ITSELF, INCLUDING YESTERDAY'S PROTEST DEMONSTRATION BY SOME 400,000 PEOPLE, IS INDICATIVE OF THE POLITICAL COSTS THE PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS PAYING FOR THIS TRAGIC INCIDENT. I ALSO SAID THAT U.S. REACTION WAS MORE THAN TEMPORARY. THE ISRAELIS HAD LOST A GREAT DEAL IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THIS LOSS PRE-DATED THE SHATILA/SABRA TRAGEDY.

10. I ASKED HUSSEIN WHAT HE THOUGHT SHOULD BE

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DONE ABOUT THE FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND PALESTINIAN MILITIA REMAINING IN LEBANON, IN THE BEKAA AND NORTH IN TRIPOLI. HUSSEIN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THEIR FATE, AND THE FATE OF THOSE PALESTINIAN PRISONERS WHO ARE BEING HELD BY THE ISRAELIS. HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE SOME TYPE OF PLO REPRESENTATION IN LEBANON WITH ALL THE RESTRAINTS THE GOL REQUIRED. HUSSEIN HAD NO READY ANSWER AS TO HOW BEST HANDLE THE QUESTION OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON AND

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82AMMAN 008129

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SAID HE HOPED THIS HUMANITARIAN CONCERN COULD BE
ADDRESSED IN SOME PRACTICAL WAY.

11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. VIETS

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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6624

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER: JIDDA PASS HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, IT, FR, US, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: US MNF DEPLOYMENT AND OTHER ISSUES,
SEPT 27

REF: STATE 271644 (NOTAL)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. THIS MESSAGE NOT ONLY RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS IN
REFTEL BUT SETS FORTH WHERE WE ARE TODAY, MONDAY, SEPT 27,
FOLLOWING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT AMIN
GEMAYEL AND WITH THE LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE,
ON WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LAF, THE ITALIANS, THE

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FRENCH, AND THE US SIT.

3. THE GENERAL PICTURE:

--BY THE END OF THE DAY, THE FRENCH WILL HAVE BROUGHT
APPROXIMATELY 1050 TROOPS TO BEIRUT AND THE
ITALIANS APPROXIMATELY 1100. THIS MORNING, I
WATCHED FRENCH HELICOPTERS TAKING CARGO AND VEHICLES INTO
THE PORT FROM THE CARRIER FOCH IN THE OUTER PORT. ITALIANA
TROOPS WERE ASSEMBLED IN THE PORT AREA, PREPARATORY TO

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CHANNEL: n/a

MOVING TO THEIR POSITIONS ELSEWHERE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THE PRESS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS HAS BEEN FILLED WITH INTERESTING PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE LANDINGS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN TROOPS.

--I HAVE SEEN FRENCH JEEPS WITH THEIR AERIALS CARRYING FRENCH FLAGS CRUISING IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE CITY, INCLUDING EAST BEIRUT AND BAABDA. THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF IN BEIRUT IS ALREADY A WELL-KNOWN AND WELL PUBLICIZED FACT.

--MEANWHILE THE IDF WITHDRAWAL HAS STOPPED BECAUSE OF YOM KIPPUR, ALTHOUGH EVACUATION OF MOST OF THE CITY PROPER HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE.

--A NOTABLE EXCEPTION IS THE PRESENCE IN THE LEGAL PORT OF AN IDF MEDICAL UNIT, ALONG WITH SOME THREE APCs, WHICH ARE LOCATED ONLY A FEW HUNDRED YARDS FROM THE DEBARKATION AREA OF THE ITALIAN TROOPS. THE IDF UNIT IS SUPPOSED TO BE WITHDRAWING TOMORROW, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28.

4. THE ISSUE OF THE IDF USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT:

--PRESIDENT GEMAYEL CONFIRMED TO US TODAY THAT "THE LIMIT OF TOLERATION" OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IS THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT WILL USE THE AIRPORT-IN THE AREA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SET ASIDE FOR THEM--ONLY BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 2100 THROUGH 0400 AT NIGHT (OTHER THAN FOR EMERGENCIES). DURING THIS PERIOD, THERE WILL BE NO COMMERCIAL CIVIL AIR ACTIVITIES; AND THE LEBANESE WILL THEREBY BE ABLE TO ARGUE WITH THE UNDERWRITERS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES THAT THERE WILL BE NO ISRAELI ACTIVITY AT THE AIRPORT DURING THE HOURS OF CIVIL AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS IS THE POSITION THEY WILL PUT FORWARD TO IDF AND OTHER ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES TONIGHT OR TOMORROW, SEPTEMBER 28. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR US SUPPORT FOR THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHICH THEY CONSIDER REASONABLE. IF ISRAELIS REFUSE, LEBANESE TELL US THEY WILL NOT REOPEN AIRPORT. --IN ADDITION, LAF LIAISON INFORMS US THAT ISRAELIS ARE PREPARED TO GO DOWN TO 12 REPEAT 12 PEOPLE AFTER THE SETTLING- IN PROCESS. THERE MAY BE TWO TRAILERS IN THE AREA WHERE THEY OPERATE.

--IDF WILL NOT REPEAT NOT KEEP VULCANS OR CREW-SERVED WEAPONS, ACCORDING TO LAF LIAISON. IDF SOLDIERS, HOWEVER, ARE EXPECTED TO KEEP THEIR PERSONAL SIDE WEAPONS.

--THE LAF TELLS US THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO HAVE AN ASSEMBLY AREA IN THE RADIO ORIENT COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AREA JUST SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT AND ABOVE THE KHALDEH TRIANGEL. FROM THERE, THE SOLDIERS GOING ON LEAVE WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE AIRCRAFT AT THE AIRPORT. THE LEBANESE ARE WORKING TO MAKE ALL THESE ARRANGE-

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MENTS AS INCONSPICUOUS AS POSSIBLE. THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT.
--THE LEBANESE ARE HOPEFUL THAT UNDER THESE ARRANGEMENTS THERE WILL BE NO ISRAELI PERSONNEL IN THE AIRPORT AREA DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND THAT ISRAELIS (INCLUDING THE AIR CONTROLLER) WOULD COME INTO THE AIRPORT AT NIGHT ONLY AFTER SOME ONE HOUR'S ADVANCE NOTICE. THEY WOULD COME THROUGH A GATE AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE AIRPORT IN AN INCONSPICUOUS AREA - AND THE GATE WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE LAF.
--WE HAVE ASKED LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO CONSULT IN ALL CASES WITH THE US CONTINGENT OF THE MNF ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF ISRAELI FLIGHTS. WE WILL BE

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[REDACTED]

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WORKING OUT THESE ARRANGEMENTS IN ADVANCE OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE US CONTINGENT.

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FROM DRAPER: JIDDA PASS HABIB

4. AS REGARDS THE ISRAELIS AT THE "ILLEGAL PORT":
-- IT IS TRUE THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS ACQUIESCED
IN AN ISRAELI PRESENCE THERE. ANY SUCH ISRAELI
PRESENCE IS LIKELY TO BE NOMINAL. IT SHOULD BE BORNE
IN MIND THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT REPEAT NOT USE PORT
FACILITIES EXTENSIVELY IN THE IMMEDIATE BEIRUT AREA
DURING THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS THIS SUMMER. THE
ISRAELIS LANDED TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT FURTHER UP THE
COAST FROM TIME TO TIME. THE LAF DOES NOT EXPECT THE
IDF TO USE THE PORT FOR RE-SUPPLY, BUT A MEDICAL UNIT
COULD BE MOVED THERE, SINCE THE ISRAELIS ON OCCASION
HAVE USED THE PORT AREA FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION BY HELI-
COPTER. THE ILLEGAL PORT ITSELF IS CONTROLLED BY THE
PHALANGE (OR THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES"), AND IT

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HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE FRENCH CONTINGENT OF THE MNF -- WHEREEVER ITS DEPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE IN EAST BEIRUT -- WILL NOT REPEAT NOT MOVE INTO THE LOGICAL EASTWARD EXIT FROM THIS ILLEGAL PORT AREA, SINCE IT COULD BRING THE FRENCH INTO UNNECESSARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES," AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ISRAELI MOVEMENTS FROM THE ILLEGAL PORT.

5. AS REGARDS THE LAND ROUTE FROM KHALDEH NORTHEAST TO THE MAZIMYAH CIRCLE AND THE MAIN BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY:

-- THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT IDF "CONVOYS." THE LAF HAS TAKEN A STRONG POSITION THAT IT WILL NOT ESCORT IDF VEHICLES FOR ANY REASON, IN CONVOYS OR NOT. AS IT IS, MOST IDF VEHICLE MOVEMENTS ALONG THIS ROAD HAVE BEEN IN RELATIVELY SMALL GROUPS. A GROUP OF MORE THAN 7 OR 8 VEHICLES HAS BEEN A RARITY.

-- US POSITIONS CERTAINLY WOULD BE TO THE WEST OF THIS PRINCIPAL LAND ROUTE. WITH OR WITHOUT AN IDF VEHICULAR PRESENCE ON THIS ROAD, WE HAD NEVER CONSIDERED PUTTING THE US CONTINGENT ON THE ROAD ITSELF. CONSEQUENTLY, SETTING UP US POSITIONS TO THE WEST OF THIS ROUTE WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HAD BEEN PLANNED ALL ALONG.

-- THE US POSITIONS WOULD BE TO LEND A "PRESENCE" TO BACK-UP THE LAF AND ISF, WHICH IS FACT WOULD BE CONTROLLING MOVEMENT INTO THE MNF AREA OF OPERATIONS IN A WESTWARD DIRECTION FROM THE LAND ROUTE WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, AND WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE USING.

6. TIMING OF US ARRIVAL:

-- ASSUMING REMAINING ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED, IT IS

[REDACTED]

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IMPORTANT THAT WE BEGIN DEPLOYMENT INTO BEIRUT AS EARLY AS FEASIBLE, ON THE LATE AFTERNOON OF TUESDAY, SEPT. 28 OR ON WEDNESDAY .94NING, SEPT. 29. IT IS INDEED AN UNTIDY SITUATION, BUT SOME MOMENTUM IS UNDERWAY. THE FRENCH, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE ENTERING POSITIONS AROUND SABRA TODAY, AND THE ITALIANS MAY MOVE TO POSITIONS JUST OUTSIDE SHATILA CAMP THIS AFTERNOON OR TOMORROW MORNING. ALL OTHER MAJOR MNF DEPLOYMENTS, HOWEVER, WOULD BEGIN SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OR AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE US CONTINGENT.

-- PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL URGED AGAIN TODAY THAT THE US CONTINGENT ARRIVAL BY WEDNESDAY MORNING, EVEN IF A PRAGMATIC ARRANGEMENT ON AIRPORT USE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED BY THAT TIME AND ENVE IF THE LEBANESE HAVE DECIDED THEY CANNOT OPEN THE AIRPORT FOR COMMERCIAL USE BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI POSITION.

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-- MOREOVER, GEMAYAL WENT ON TO TELL THE COMMITTEE THAT HE WAS PAYING EXTRAORDINARY ATTENTION TO THE MNF, SINCE IT COULD LAUNCH "A NEW NATIONAL DYNAMIC IN LEBANON," AND HELP TO OVERCOME THE FATIGUE AND PESSIMISM THAT HAS AFFECTED EVERYONE. THE MNF WILL GIVE THE LAF/ISF A NEW IMPORTANCE AND STRENGTHEN ITS MORALE.

-- HE SAID HE WANTED TO SET UP A CEREMONY TO MARK THE OPENING TO THE CITY ON WEDNESDAY, SOMETIME FROM 12 NOON ON TO 5 P.M., OR IF NECESSARY, ON THURSDAY MORNING. HE WANTS TO HAVE THE CEREMONY ATTENDED BY THE AMBASSADORS AND COMMANDERS OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES, PLUS APPROXIMATELY A COMPANY EACH OF INFANTRYMEN IN BATTLE DRESS FROM EACH NATIONAL CONTINGENT,

PLUS THE LAF.

-- HE OBVIOUSLY IS ATTACHING GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EVENTS OF THIS WEEK AND, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WILL USE THE WEDNESDAY CEREMONY TO CALL ALL CIVIL SERVANTS AND COURT OFFICIALS BACK TO WORK, SO AS TO PROVE THAT BEIRUT IS RETURNING TO NORMALITY.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

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-- AS NOTED ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THAT WE BRING IN AT LEAST SOME OF OUR INITIAL UNITS THROUGH THE PORT ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER 28, AND BRING IN THE BULK OF OUR FORCES TO THE AIRPORT ON WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 29.

-- TO ASSURE THAT THIS CAN BE DONE SATISFACTORILY, I WILL SEEK MEETINGS WITH GENERAL DRURY AND OTHERS AT IDF HEADQUARTERS TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING, IF TONIGHT IS NOT POSSIBLE, BOTH (1) TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY IN THE AIRPORT BE CONDUCTED ONLY DURING NIGHTTIME HOURS AND (2) FURTHER TO URGE THAT, EVEN IF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS HAVE NOT REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT, THE IDF SHOULD REMOVE ALL ITS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT NOW LOCATED IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL AREA OF THE AIRPORT BETWEEN THE INTERSECTION OF THE TWO MAJOR RUNWAYS SO THAT THE USMC CAN COME IN WITHOUT TROUBLE.

-- FOR THE AVIV: HOPE THAT YOU TOO WILL PUT THIS POSITION FORWARD TO THE ISRAELIS AND URGE THAT THE KIMCHE TEAM, WHICH IS DUE TO TALK TO THE LEBANESE IN BEIRUT TOMORROW, ALSO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME BEFORE RETURNING TO ISRAEL. (I MAY BE AT THE NEWLY REOPENED CHANCERY, PHONE NUMBER 361800.)
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6604

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, FR, IT

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SUBJ: DRAPER MISSION: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN MNF DISCUSSIONS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURED IN US-LEBANESE
AND LEBANESE-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE
ARRIVAL AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE US CONTINGENT OF THE MNG.
I BELIEVE THAT THESE WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE
ARRIVAL OF AT LEAST INITIAL UNITS OF THE US CONTINGENT OF THE

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MNF BY TUESDAY NIGHT OR WEDNESDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 28 OR 29.
3. THESE DEVELOPMENTS EMERGED IN FOUR FORA SEPTEMBER 25:
SEPARATE LAF-IDF AND LEBANESE-ISRAELI "COMMISSION" MEETINGS;
AN MNF COMMITTEE MEETING CHAIRED BY JOHNNY ABDU AND LATER BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BEGINNING
AT 1230 LOCAL TIME; AND A BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN
DRAPER/ROSS AND GEMAYEL BEGINNING AT 1400 LOCAL TIME.

4. THE RESULTS OF THESE THREE MEETINGS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
--GEMAYEL WANTS AT LEAST SOME US UNITS TO ARRIVE AS
EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY TUESDAY NIGHT, TO
MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ORGANIZE A CEREMONIAL
RESUMPTION OF NORMAL LIFE IN BEIRUT, WITH THE MASSIVE
PARTICIPATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THE LAF AND ISF,
AND THE MNF, ON WEDNESDAY MORNING. HE INTENDS THIS
TO BE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LAUNCHING-PAD FOR A RETURN
TO NORMAL ACTIVITIES IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF BEIRUT. AS SUCH, IT
IS THE LYNCHPIN OF HIS LONG-RANGE PLANS TO EXTEND
SECURITY AND THE CONDITIONS OF NORMAL LIFE GRADUALLY
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. HE IS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE
COST OF FAILURE IN THIS, HIS FIRST MAJOR ENDEAVOR AS
PRESIDENT.
-- TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE, HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT

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[REDACTED]

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"PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS" PERMITTING THE ISRAELIS
CONTINUED, BUT LIMITED, USE OF BEIRUT AIRPORT.
HAVING ACCEPTED THIS IN PRINCIPLE, HE HAD DIRECTED
JOHNNY ABDU TO NEGOTIATE THE GREATEST NUMBER OF
LIMITATIONS POSSIBLE WITH THE ISRAELIS -- LOW PROFILE,
VERY FEW FLIGHTS, LIMITED HOURS OF OPERATION, CASE-BY-
CASE AUTHORIZATION, A MINIMUM OF ISRAELI PERSONNEL,
ETC, IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, THE
LEBANESE HAVE ALREADY GOTTEN THEM TO AGREE THAT ANY
CIVILIAN TRAFFIC HAS ABSOLUTE PRIORITY OVER ISRAELI
MILITARY TRAFFIC. THE AIR-CONTROLLER ISSUE
HAS ALSO BEEN WORKED OUT TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE
LEBCEFESE.

--HJ NG ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, GEMAYEL WANTS US TO COME INTO THE AIRPORT EVEN
IF WE HAVE TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO THE LIMITED ISRAELI
PRESENCE THAT ABDU WILL HAVE NEGOTIATED. SUBSEQUENT
TO OUR ENTRY, HE WANTS ABDU, AS WELL AS OURSELVES,
TO CONTINUE PRESSING THE ISRAELIS FOR AN EVEN MORE
LIMITED PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. (ISRAEL TODAY AGREED TO GET ITS
PRESENCE DOWN TO 12 PEOPLE, COMPARED TO 30 INITIALLY, AFTER
SETTLING IN.)

-- GEMAYEL WILL PROBABLY OPEN THE AIRPORT TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC,
WHICH HE WANTS BADLY TO DO FOR POLITICAL AND COM-
MERICAL REASONS, IN SPITE OF A LIMITED ISRAELI

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CHANNEL: n/a

PRESENCE IF HE CAN WORK OUT SATISFACTORY INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND CONVINCE THE ARAB STATES NOT TO DECLARE A BOYCOTT OF THE AIRPORT. IF FOR ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE REASONS, HE CANNOT OPEN THE AIRPORT TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC, HE WILL APPROACH THE SYRIANS FOR ACQUIESCENCE IN USE OF THE "ILLEGAL" PHALANGE-BUILT AIRSTRIP AT HAMAT (NEAR BATRON, 33 KMS SOUTH OF TRIPOLI) FOR LIMITED FLIGHTS OF BOEING 727'S IN ORDER TO GIVE LEBANON IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO CIVIL AVIATION. SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE WOULD BE NECESSARY BECAUSE THE REGION OF HAMAT IS UNDER HEAVY SYRIAN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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INFLUENCE. (COMMENT: GEMAYEL HAS ASKED OUR HELP IN APPROACHING INSURANCE COMPANIES TO DEAL KINDLY WITH CARRIERS WISHING TO FLY INTO BEIRUT AIRPORT IN SPITE OF A LIMITED ISRAELIS PRESENCE, BUT I FRANKLY DO NOT KNOW HOW WE CAN BE USEFUL IN THIS REGARD.)

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

--GEMAYEL WANTS US TO COMPLEMENT OUR ENTRY INTO THE
AIRPORT WITH A DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF
AND ISF AT A MILITARILY SUITABLE DISTANCE WEST REPEAT WEST OF
THE MAIN ROAD FROM KHALDEH (WHICH THE IDF WILL USE) NORTHEAST
TO THE POINT, PROBABLY IN HADATH, AT WHICH THE ITALIANS
WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY. GEMAYEL STATES HE IS PRE-
PARED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE LIGHT TRAFFIC THAT SHARON

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HAS TOLD US WILL BE RUN ON THE ROAD ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL TO KHALDAH IS COMPLETE.

--GEMAYEL SEES NO NEED FOR US TO DEPLOY IN BAABDA, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT OBJECT IF ONE OF OUR UNITS WANTED TO BIVOUAK ADJACENT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN YARZE. I DO NOT FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE.

5. IN SUM, GEMAYEL AND THE LEBANESE ARMY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A LIMITED ISRAELI PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT AND ARE URGING US TO BRING IN OUR MNF CONTINGENT IN SPITE OF IT. THEY SEE THIS AS CRUCIAL TO THEIR SHORT-TERM PLANS FOR EXTENDING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED BY THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR LONG-TERM PLANS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE COUNTRY.

6. IN CONSIDERING OUR POSITION, I DO SEE SEVERAL PROBLEMS THAT REQUIRE FURTHER ATTENTION:

--GENERAL DRORY TOLD GENERAL HAMDAN AT TODAY'S IDF-LAF MEETING THAT THE US SHOULD DEPLOY ONLY IN AREAS WEST OF THE BEIRUT-DIDON RAILROAD LINE. THIS WOULD CUT THE US AREA OF DEPLOYMENT EAST OF THE AIRPORT IN HALF, AND THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE. SHARON NEVER RAISED THIS POSSIBILITY WITH US, AND WE HAVE TOLD THE LEBANESE THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST DROY'S GAMBIT. THE ISRAELIS ARE CLEARLY NERVOUS THAT WE WILL INTERFERE WITH THEIR MOVEMENTS FROM KHALDEH TO THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT HIGHWAY, BUT WE SHOULD ALLAY THEIR FEARS ON THIS SCORE AND INSIST THAT OUR AREA OF DEPLOYMENT EXTEND TO A MILITARILY JUSTIFIABLE LINE WEST OF THIS ROAD.

-- DRORY ALSO TOLD HAMDAN THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO KEEP THEIR "OFFICES" (ESSENTIALLY PRESS AND MFA

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LIAISON) IN BAABDA IN SPITE OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL TO KHALDEH AND THEREFORE HAVE TO PROTECT THEM WITH SOLDIERS. IN OUR TALKS WITH US, SHARON HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO MINIMIZING THE MOVEMENT OF ISRAELI TROOPS IN BAABDA, AND WE SEE NO REASON TO AGREE TO THE ISRAELIS' DESIRE TO PROTECT THE OFFICES. BAABDA IS LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL SEAT, AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT NEED TO REMAIN THERE ONCE THEIR WITHDRAWAL TO KHALDEH IS COMPLETE.

-- THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT KEEP VULCAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS OR OTHER CREW-SERVED WEAPONS AT THE AIRPORT, ACCORDING TO THE LAF. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, KEEP INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, MEANING UZIS, M-16'S, ETC.

-- THE EXISTING ISRAELI NAVAL "BLOCKADE," UNDER WHICH THE ISRAELIS STOP SHIPS LEAVING LEBANON REPORTEDLY FOR HOURS AT A TIME TO CHECK PASSENGERS, HAS NOT BEEN

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ADDRESSED IN ANY DISCUSSIONS TO DATE. IT IS CLEARLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE RESUMPTION OF LEBANESE CONTROL OF BEIRUT PORT AND WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH AT SOME POINT.

7. COMMENT: IN ALL OF MY DISCUSSIONS TODAY, I STRESSED THE CONVICTION OF PHIL HABIB AND MYSELF THAT THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW TO KHALDEH, WHILE IMPERFECT IN SEVERAL RESPECTS, CAN BE PRESENTED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AS THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI PULLBACK IN LEBANON. GEMAYEL HAS SEIZED THIS FUNDAMENTAL POINT AND, AS A RESULT, HAS AGREED TO A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT, IN MY VIEW, WILL PERMIT THE RAPID ARRIVAL OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT UNDER THE BEST CONDITIONS NOW AVAILABLE. BOTH THE LEBANESE AND WE WILL, IN THE NEXT TWO DAYS AND AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT, CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS FOR A FURTHER NARROWING OF THESE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. MEAN

WHILE, IT IS MY STRONG RECOMMENDATION THAT WE WORK INTENSIVELY WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS AT THE AIRPORT IN THE NEXT

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[REDACTED]

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36 HOURS AND BRING IN AT LEAST THE INITIAL UNITS OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT LATE TUESDAY OR EARLY WEDNESDAY IN TIME FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S CEREMONIAL OPENING OF THE CITY WEDNESDAY MORNING. THIS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION AT THIS CRITICAL TIME, HELP KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS, AND PREVENT THE CRITICISM THAT WILL INEVITABLY DEVELOP IN THE PRESS IF WE REMAIN ABSENT AS THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS BEGIN THEIR DEPLOYMENT. DILLON

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TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRESS GUIDANCE

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1. THE FOLLOWING WAS ISSUED BY THE EMBASSY
SPOKESMAN AT 2010 LOCAL IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI
RADIO BROADCAST CLAIMING HABIB HAD CARRIED AN
ULTIMATUM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL:

COMMENCE TEXT: AMBASSADOR HABIB AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER
MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON TODAY TO DISCUSS
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT,
AND THE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA OF THE
ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE USEFUL
AND BUSINESSLIKE. NEWS REPORTS THAT AN ULTIMATUM
WAS DELIVERED BY THE U.S. SIDE ARE FALSE. END TEXT.

2. TEXT OF THE ISRAELI BROADCAST WHICH WAS CARRIED
IN ENGLISH AND HEBREW IS:

COMMENCE TEXT: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND ITALY
HAVE INFORMED ISRAEL THAT THEY WILL NOT DEPLOY
THEIR MULTINATIONAL FORCE SOLDIERS IN BEIRUT UNTIL
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THE IDF SOLDIERS LEAVE THE CITY. A UPI CORRESPONDENT
REPORTS THAT PHILIP HABIB RELAYED THE JOINT ULTIMATUM
TODAY TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THE FRENCH AND
ITALIAN EMBASSY SPOKESMEN IN BEIRUT CONFIRMED THE
REPORT, WHILE THE U.S. EMBASSY DECLINED TO COMMENT.
THE CORRESPONDENT ALSO REPORTS THAT ISRAEL TODAY
INCREASED ITS PRESENCE IN BEIRUT PORT AND THAT 20
SOLDIERS IN 6 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS ARE THERE.
AN ISRAELI FLAG HAS BEEN HOISTED ON ONE OF THE ARMORED

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PERSONNEL CARRIERS, SOME 200 METERS FROM THE SPOT
WHERE FRENCH SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN STATIONED. END TEXT.

3. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

JEURSALEM/TEL AVIV PASS AVBS. HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PINS, MILI, MOPS, SY, LE, US

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SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MNF COMMITTEE MEETING SEPT. 25:
LEBANESE PROPOSAL1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. THE THIRD MEETING OF THE MNF LIAISON AND COORDINATING
COMMITTEE TOOK PLACE FROM 1210 TO 1320 LOCAL TIME, SEPT. 25
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LAF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY
ABDU. ROSS, LT. COL. GAUCHER, COL. SEHULSTER (EUCOM LIAISON),

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AND LT. COL. SMITH (EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 32ND MAU) WERE PRESENT FOR THE US. ABDU HAD ROSS STAY AFTER THE MEETING FOR A BRIEF BILATERAL SESSION WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

3. IN THE INTEREST OF SPEED, WE REPORT THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE TWO MEETINGS WITHOUT ATTEMPTING A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD.

4. LEBANESE REQUEST FOR EARLY ARRIVAL OF US AND ITALIAN UNITS: IN THE LARGE MEETING, ABDU PRESENTED WHAT HE CALLED A LEBANESE "PROPOSAL" THAT THE US AND ITALIANS SEND AT LEAST TOKEN UNITS OF THEIR MNF FORCES "ON SCHEDULE," I.E., TOMORROW. ABDU REPEATED THIS PROPOSAL IN THE SMALLER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, WHO EXPRESSED HIS FULL CONCURRENCE WITH WHAT HE CALLED "THIS LEBANESE WISH." IN BOTH PRESENTATIONS, ABDU STRESSED THAT, IF THE US-ISRAELI TALKS PROVED INCONCLUSIVE AND IF THE US AND ITALY THEREFORE HELD UP OR CANCELLED THE ARRIVAL OF THEIR UNITS, THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT EVIDENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FRENCH ON THE ONE HAND AND THE US AND ITALIANS ON THE OTHER TO STALL FURTHER. ABDU ARGUED THAT, GIVEN THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND (SEE BELOW), IT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US AND ITALY TO BRING INITIAL MNF UNITS IN "ON SCHEDULE." THIS, HE SAID, COULD ACT AS A FORM OF PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, DEMONSTRATING THAT THE US AND ITALY WERE SERIOUS IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE MNF PROCESS, TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND TO THE FUTURE OF LEBANON. TO REINFORCE ABDU'S POINT, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REPEATED THE APPEAL HE HAD MADE YESTERDAY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THROUGH AMBASSADOR DRAPER, EMPHASIZING THAT US CREDIBILITY WAS AT STAKE AND THAT THE US HAD INVESTED A GREAT DEAL IN LEBANON'S FUTURE AND HAD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT INVESTMENT. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENTS ON LEBANON "DEMANDING" AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL (HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER ONE THIS MORNING), SAYING THEY WERE SOLID EVIDENCE OF THE US COMMITMENT TO HIS COUNTRY. THIS COMMITMENT, HE HOPED, WOULD COME TO BEAR ON THE MNF. ROSS RESPONDED TO ABDU AND TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT WE WERE CONTINUING TO INSIST ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND THAT WE WOULD KNOW THE RESULTS OF THE HABIB/DRAPER DISCUSSIONS PROBABLY BY THE EVENING. HE MADE NO COMMITMENT ON THE LEBANESE "PROPOSAL" BEYOND SAYING HE WOULD REPORT IT TO WASHINGTON. HE DID AGREE THAT, IF US-ISRAELI TALKS BROKE DOWN, THIS WOULD REQUIRE A FRESH LOOK AT THE PROBLEM. (COMMENT: THE LEBANESE ARE

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CLEARLY NERVOUS ABOUT OUR CHANCES OF SUCCESS WITH THE ISRAELIS. BOTH GEMAYEL AND ABDU URGED THAT WE "ENERGIZE" THE NEGOTIATIONS. ROSS ASSURED THEM THEY

NOTE: RECATEGORIZED TO EXDIS PER S/S-O, MR. BERRY

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WERE ALREADY QUITE ACTIVE. THROUGH THEIR PROPOSAL, THE LEBANESE SEEM TO BE SEEKING TO COMMIT US TO PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE EVEN IF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS REMAIN INCONCLUSIVE. GIVEN THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, THE ARRIVAL OF INITIAL US AND ITALIAN MNF CONTINGENTS IS TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE.)

5. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND: GENERAL HAMDAN BRIEFED THE COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AS FOLLOWS:
-- THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CONTINUES ON SCHEDULE. OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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THE SIX SECTORS DEFINED IN LAF-IDF TALKS EARLY THIS WEEK, FIVE WILL HAVE BEEN FULLY EVACUATED BY THE END OF TODAY. ALL THAT WILL REMAIN UNDER IDF CONTROL WILL BE THE SOUTHWEST SECTOR DEFINED BY SHARI' SHATILA-RUE MADAME CURIER-SHARI' AR-RASHIDIN - CORNICHE MAZRA'A-AIRPORT ROAD-SULTAN IBRAHIM RESTAURANT.

-- THE FINAL SECTOR, TO HAVE BEEN EVACUATED SEPT. 26, WILL NOT BE FULLY EVACUATED ON THAT DAY BECAUSE THE IDF HAS TOLD THE LAF IT WILL SUSPEND OPERATIONS AT 1600 LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER 26 FOR YOM KIPPUR AND RESUME ABOUT 24 HOURS LATER. THE WITHDRAWAL WILL THUS NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 27. (COMMENT: THE LAF REPS AT THE MEETING ATTRIBUTED THIS DELAY TO "POLITICAL" REASONS, BUT THE IDF MAY WELL WANT ANOTHER DAY TO COLLECT ARMS, MUNITIONS, AND SUSPECTED "TERRORISTS" FROM THE SOUTHWEST SECTOR.)

-- IN ALL THE AREAS EVACUATED TO DATE, THE IDF WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN COMPLETE. THE IDF HAS TOLD THE LAF IT NO LONGER INSISTS ON THE RIGHT OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO ENTER, AND THE LAF REPS AT THE MEETING CONFIRMED TO US THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROBLEMS TO DATE ON THIS POINT. A FEW ISRAELIS IN CIVILIAN VEHICLES HAD TRIED TO GO THROUGH CHECKPOINTS, BUT THE LAF HAD SUCCESSFULLY DENIED THEM ENTRY.

-- THE IDF PRESENCE IN THE "LEGAL" (I.E., GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED) PORT WILL END IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WITHDRAWAL PLAN ON SEPTEMBER 27, AND REMAINING PERSONNEL WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE "ILLEGAL" (E.E., PHALANGE-CONTROLLED) PORT AT THE EASTERN EXTREMITY OF THE HARBOR.

-- THE IDF PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BY THE LAF-IDF COMMITTEE, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE LAF MAY AUTHORIZE EMERGENCY LANDINGS OF
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ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IF THE IDF MAKES APPLICATION TO THAT COMMITTEE.

-- THE ATTACK AGAINST ISRAELI MILITARY PERSONNEL ON RUE HAMRA YESTERDAY, IN WHICH ONE OFFICER WAS KILLED AND TWO SOLDIERS WOUNDED, AS WELL AS A SIMILAR ATTEMPT RESULTING IN ONE INJURY TODAY NEAR THE TELEVISION STATION AT TALLAT AL-KHAYYAT, HAVE HAD NO EFFECT ON THE PACE OF WITHDRAWAL.

(COMMENT: US MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE RECONNOITERING IN WEST BEIRUT TODAY TO VERIFY THE LAF STATUS REPORT FIRST-HAND. WE WILL BE REPORTING THE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF, AS THE LAF INDICATES, THE IDF HAS FULLY EVACUATED FIVE OF SIX SECTORS BY TONIGHT AND WILL EVACUATE THE SIXTH SECTOR, AS WELL AS THE "LEGAL" PORT, BY SEPTEMBER 27, THEN IT WOULD BE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE FOR INITIAL UNITS OF THE US AND ITALIAN MNF FORCES TO DISEMBARK WITHOUT ENCOUNTERING ANY ISRAELIS LATE SEPTEMBER 27. NEW DEPLOYMENT PLANS WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE DRAWN UP. ALSO, NOTHING EXCEPT OUR PRESSURE WOULD PREVENT THE IDF FROM RE-ENTERING THE PORT TO "HELP" US DISEMBARK, AS THEY OFFERED TO DO FOR THE FRENCH.

6. STATUS OF FRENCH MNF FORCES: THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR INFORMED US THAT 300 ADDITIONAL FRENCH TROOPS WOULD DISEMBARK AT THE PORT AT 1530 LOCAL TIME TODAY. NO ADDITIONAL ARRIVALS ARE SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW. THE REMAINDER OF THE FRENCH FORCES, SOME 400, ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE SEPTEMBER 27. ABDO ASKED THAT WE INFORM THE ISRAELIS OF TODAY'S ARRIVALS, AND WE HAVE DONE SO THROUGH IDF HEADQUARTERS IN 'ALAYH. (COMMENT: THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TELLS US HIS GOVERNMENT IN FACT HAS INFORMED THE ISRAELIS OF THIS LATEST ARRIVAL, SO IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THE AMBASSY TEL AVIV TO DO SO.)

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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EXDIS

7. INCREASE IN FRENCH CONTINGENT: THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD US THAT 400 FRENCH TROOPS ATTACHED TO UNIFIL HAD NOW BEEN RELEASED BY THE UN AND THAT, ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS, THE FRENCH HAD APPROACHED THE ISRAELIS FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR THESE TROOPS TO CROSS THE ISRAELI LINES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND COME TO BEIRUT. THESE, IF TRANSFERRED, WOULD INCREASE THE FRENCH CONTINGENT FROM 1100 TO 1500. (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST WE HAVE HEARD OF THIS INCREASE. IN OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF FRENCH UNIFIL FORCES, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD

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PRESENTED THEM AS A PART OF THE FORCE OF 1100, NOT AN ADDITION. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S ANNOUNCEMENT SENT THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR INTO SHOCK, SINCE IT CAUGHT HIM COMPLETELY UNPREPARED AND HE FELT HE HAD TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT RIGHT AWAY. WE WERE SOMEWHAT MORE RELAXED, BUT STILL ANNOYED BY THIS LATEST FRENCH ATTEMPT TO HOG THE LIMELIGHT.)

8. STATUS OF ITALIAN CONTINGENT: THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD THE MEETING THAT THE ITALIAN FORCES WERE COORDINATING THEIR MOVEMENTS WITH US. WHEN WE CAME IN, THEY WOULD DO SO. (COMMENT: AS ROSS LEFT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S OFFICE AFTER HIS BILATERAL

MEETING, GEMAYEL WAS PICKING UP THE TELEPHONE TO CALL THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO PRESS HIM FOR AN EARLY ARRIVAL OF ITALIAN TROOPS.)

9. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE CLEARLY FEAR THAT WE WILL ABANDON OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF IF WE ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELIS. AS WE HAVE SAID ABOVE, THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN EARLY ARRIVAL OF US AND ITALIAN CONTINGENTS SEEMS DESIGNED TO LOCK US IN EVEN IF OUR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS REMAIN INCONCLUSIVE, PARTICULARLY ON THE AIRPORT. IF THE SITUATION REMAINS AS IT IS ON THE GROUND, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING INITIAL UNITS IN LATE MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, WITHOUT MEETING ANY ISRAELI PRESENCE NORTH OF THE ROAD RUNNING WEST-EAST FROM THE SULTAN IBRAHIM RESTAURANT. THE DEPLOYMENT OF MNF FORCES IN THIS SMALLER AREA WOULD SERVE A CENTRAL PURPOSE OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL -- ALBEIT ON A SMALLER SCALE THAN CONTEMPLATED IN OUR POSITION WITH THE ISRAELIS -- BY HELPING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY INSIDE BEIRUT. IN THIS CONNECTION,, IT IS

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SIGNIFICANT THAT THE LAF, WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BEHIND IT, WILL ACCEPT AN IDF PRESENCE AT THE PHALANGE-CONTROLLED "ILLEGAL" PORT AT THE EASTERN EXTREMITY OF THE HARBOR. THE PROBLEM OF EAST BEIRUT IS CLEARLY FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S MIND. FOR NOW, HE IS CONCENTRATING ON WHAT HE CAN REALISTICALLY OBTAIN , ALL THE WHILE PRESSING US TO GET THE MAXIMUM OUT OF THE ISRAELIS.
DILLON

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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY Dacca
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

Date Printed: 10/07/1996

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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 24, 1982

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.

Q. THERE ARE REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT ISRAEL IS ASKING
THE U.S. -- OR PERHAPS IN STRONGER TERMS THAN "ASKING" --
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FOR PERMISSION TO REMAIN WITH SOME TROOPS EITHER ADJACENT
TO WEST BEIRUT OR ADJACENT TO BEIRUT.

IS THE U.S. GOING TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN ANY TROOPS IN
BEIRUT OR ADJACENT TO BEIRUT AS A RESULT OF THESE NEGOTIA-
TIONS OVER WITHDRAWAL AS THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ARRIVES?

A; AMB. HABIB IS IN JERUSALEM TODAY. MR. DRAPER IS BACK
IN BEIRUT. DISCUSSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND CONTINUE TO
TAKE PLACE WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, AND THIS IS THE KIND OF
DETAIL THAT OBVIOUSLY IS BEING DISCUSSED.

IF YOU ARE REFERRING TO THE SUGGESTION THAT ISRAEL HAS SAID
IT WOULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT PATROLS IN WEST BEIRUT EVEN
AFTER THE POSITIONS IT PREVIOUSLY HELD HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER

BY THE LEBANESE ARMY, THIS COULD BE CONTRARY TO U.S.
SUPPORT FOR THE RAPID RESUMPTION OF AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT
BEIRUT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

Q. MAY I ASK WHETHER, UNDER THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH REGARD
TO THE STATIONING OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, U.S. MARINES
OR OTHER PARTS OF THE MNF WILL BE STATIONED SOUTH OF THE
BEIRUT AIRPORT, SUGGESTING THAT ISRAELI TROOPS WOULD HAVE
TO WITHDRAW TO A LINE SOUTH OF THE BEIRUT AIRPORT BEFORE

THE MNF TAKES ITS.....

A. I THINK THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS IS EXACTLY WHAT'S BEING WORKED OUT NOW ON THE GROUND. LIAISON COMMITTEES ARE IN OPERATION, BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY, AND THAT'S THE KIND OF DETAIL WE'RE WORKING ON WITH THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIANS AND THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES.

Q. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY NOW AND THE SAME BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT?
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A. THERE APPARENTLY IS SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE INVESTIGATION, BUT OUR POSITION CONTINUES TO BE THAT THAT IS A MATTER FOR ISRAEL TO DECIDE.

Q. IN TERMS OF WHAT?

A. WE'VE SEEN THE REPORTS OF THE SUGGESTION THAT A JUDGE SHOULD HEAD THAT INVESTIGATION, AND THEN WE'VE SEEN WIRE SERVICE REPORTS, TOO, THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DO THAT. BUT THEY'RE THE WIRE SERVICE REPORTS TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE RE-ENTRY OF PLO FIGHTERS BACK INTO BEIRUT, SOME OF THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN EVACUATED?

A. NO.

Q. YOU PROBABLY READ HENRY CATTO'S COMMENTS YESTERDAY, AND HE THOROUGHLY MUDDIED THE WATER ON WHAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IS GOING TO DO, OR WHAT THE MARINES ARE GOING TO DO, AND IT SEEMED TO CONFLICT WITH WHAT A SENIOR OFFICIAL HAD TOLD US. HAVE YOU ANYTHING THAT MIGHT CLEAR UP WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO DO?

A. AS THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED IN HIS DECISION TO SEND A U.S. CONTINGENT AS PART OF THIS MNF DEPLOYMENT TO BEIRUT, IT IS NOT INTENDED TO ACT AS A POLICE FORCE. WE DO NOT EXPECT THE MNF TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ANY LAW AND ORDER FUNCTIONS. ALTHOUGH ISOLATED ACTS OF VIOLENCE CAN

NEVER BE RULED OUT, ALL APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL DURING THEIR DEPLOYMENT.

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Q. YOU HAVEN'T ANYTHING MORE ON WHAT THEY'RE GOING TO BE INTERPOSED BETWEEN.....

A. NO, WE REALLY DON'T AT THIS STATE. IT'S A LITTLE EARLY, AND IF FIRED UPON THEY WILL FIRE BACK BUT WE DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE INVOLVED IN A COMBAT SITUATION.

Q. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ROLE OF THE MARINES AND THE ROLE OF THE ITALIANS AND FRENCH? IS THEIR ROLE A MUCH MORE PASSIVE ONE?

A. NO, I DON'T THINK SO.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE EXTENT OF THEIR EQUIPMENT, WHETHER IT'S HEAVIER THAN IT WAS ON THE PREVIOUS VISIT THERE?

A. I THINK THEY WILL GO IN WITH THE SAME KIND OF EQUIPMENT THAT THEY DID ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION, CARRYING IT, BUT I THINK ALSO THE PENTAGON HAS SAID THAT A VARIETY OF EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE TO BACK THEM UP IF IT IS NEEDED.

Q. REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF THE KUWAITI OFFICIAL IN MADRID...GENERALLY A STATEMENT IS READ FROM HERE THAT YOU CONDEMN THE ACT AND CALL FOR THE FASTER APPREHENSION OF THE CRIMINALS. IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO SUCH CALL. SHOULD WE READ ANYTHING INTO IT OR....

A. YOU SHOULD NOT READ ANYTHING INTO IT. THE SAME KINDS OF CONCERNS ARE FELT BY THE UNITED STATES, AND I REALLY THINK HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED. VERY SENIOR OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR HORROR AND SHOCK AT THIS EVENT.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INDEPENDENT INFORMATION AS TO WHAT'S UNCLASSIFIED

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GOING ON IN MECCA?

A. NO.

Q. IS THERE ANYTHING NEW ON THE EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL?

A. NO. IT'S JUST WHERE I SAID WE WERE. SHULTZ

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TO AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, PPDC, DJ, US, LE

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER ON LEBANON

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1. FOLLOWING IS RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTER MOUMIN
BAHDON FARAH'S LETTER TO SECRETARY SHULTZ ON LEBANON.
THE SECRETARY'S RESPONSE SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO MINISTER
MOUMIN BAHDON AT THE DJIBOUTI MISSION IN NEW YORK, AND TO
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN DJIBOUTI.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I WAS GLAD TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF JULY 24 EXPRESSING
YOUR CONCERN OVER THE PRESENT CRISIS IN LEBANON. EVENTS,
OFTEN TRAGIC, HAVE FOLLOWED AT A RAPID PACE.

SINCE-THE OUTBREAK OF THE CURRENT CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES
HAS BEEN -ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION
WHICH-WOULD NOT-ONLY END THE BLOODSHED IN LEBANON BUT ALSO

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MAKE POSSIBLE A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT IN THAT COUNTRY AND THE
ENTIRE REGION. I WAS PLEASED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SKIL
AND PATIENCE RESULTED IN A PLAN FOR THE EVACUATION OF THL
PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT, AND WAS HEARTENED BY THE PROSPECTS
WHICH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN PROMISED. THE PRESIDENT HAS

ASKED AMBASSADOR MORRIS DRAPER, AMBASSADOR HABIB'S DEPUTY
IN THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS, TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO
NEGOTIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN,

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ISRAELI AND REMAINING PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE COWARDLY ASSASSINATION OF LEBANESE PRESIDENT-ELECT GEMAYEL AND THE MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS SERVE TO UNDERLINE THE IMMEDIACY OF LEBANON'S NEED FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT AND HAS INCREASED MY DETERMINATION TO PURSUE IT. WE ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE ISRAELI ADVANCE INTO WEST BEIRUT AND ARE WORKING ON AN URGENT BASIS TO RESTORE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTROL TO THE CITY. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WILL BE RE-INTRODUCED INTO BEIRUT SHORTLY AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ARMY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AS WE ENCOURAGE IT TO EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN ITS INSTITUTIONS, EXPAND ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT ITS SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND PROMOTE A GENUINE RECONCILIATION AMONG LEBANON'S MANY COMMUNITIES.

THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO EXERT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO ALLEVIATE THE ENORMOUS HUMAN AND MATERIAL LOSSES WHICH INNOCENT LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS HAVE SUSTAINED, AS WELL AS TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN LEBANON WHICH WILL PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE PRESENT TRAGEDY. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY PROVIDED DOLS 15 MILLION IN EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND AN ADDITIONAL DOLS 50 MILLION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO BEGIN MEETING THE

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URGENT NEEDS OF THOSE IN LEBANON WHO NEED HELP. WE HOPE THE WORLD BANK WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS FOR LEBANON.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS SEPTEMBER 1 SPEECH, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS ONLY PART OF THE OVERALL MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. WITH THE AGREEMENT IN LEBANON, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A MORE FAR-REACHING PEACE EFFORT IN THE REGION, ONE WHICH RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND JUST REQUIREMENTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND ENSURES THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. CAN PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN SEEKING TO EXPAND NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE THE PALESTINIANS AND ARAB STATES PREPARED TO PURSUE THE CAUSE OF PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN NO LONGER REMAIN SILENT ON THE CRITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED, IF WE ARE TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY TO THE PEACE PROCESS. IT IS MY FERVENT HOPE THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN RESURRECTING THE SPIRIT OF PEACE AND HOPE FOR A JUST SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS.

THESE ISSUES ARE AS IMPORTANT AS THEY ARE COMPLEX, AND THEIR RESOLUTION WILL REQUIRE THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF ALL THE CONCERNED NATIONS OF THE WORLD. SINCERELY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT. SHULTZ

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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USLO RIYADH

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION:SECOND MEETING OF MNF COMMITTEE

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

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2. SUMMARY: THE SECOND MEETING OF THE MNF LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE DISCUSSED ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES. AT OUR PROMPTING, CHAIRMAN JOHNNY ABDU STRESSED THE NEED FOR FULL COORDINATION AND LIAISON. AMONG THE POLITICAL ISSUES RAISED WERE ISRAELI USE OF THE AIRPORT AND OF THE KHALDAH-HAZMIYYA ROAD. ABDU SOLICITED OUR VIEWS WITHOUT PRESENTING THE LEBANESE POSITION. AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE

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CHANNEL: n/a

MEETING, HE URGED THAT, IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, WE NOT EXPOSE THE STILL WEAK LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TOO MUCH. EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS TOLD US THE LEBANESE HAD ACCEPTED A CERTAIN POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD OPPOSE IT FOR OUR OWN REASONS (THIS IS TANTAMOUNT TO ADMITTING THE LEBANESE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN A FIRM LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN LAF-IDF DISCUSSIONS). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, FOR HIS PART, IMPLICITLY ADMITTED THAT THE EARLY ARRIVAL OF FRENCH FORCES HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, WHO ATTENDED THE LATTER PART OF THE MEETING, MADE IT PLAIN THE LEBANESE FEEL ISRAEL IS THE PROBLEM IN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND SAID HE WAS ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THE HABIB-DRAPER TALKS.

END SUMMARY.

3. THE LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE MNF HELD ITS SECOND MEETING AT 1230 LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER 24 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LAF INTELLIGENCE SHIEF JOHNNY ABDU. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL JOINED THE MEETING FOR 20 MINUTES AS IT WAS ENDING. ROSS AND GAUCHER ATTENDED FOR THE US.

4. ROSS MET BRIEFLY WITH ABDU JUST BEFORE THE MEETING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TO (A) URGE ABDU, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI CLAIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REPEAT NO COORDINATION WITH THE FRENCH BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF FRENCH MNF FORCES, TO STRESS TO THE MEETING THE NEED FOR FULL COORDINATION AMONG MNF CONTRIBUTORS AND THE LAF AND FULL LIAISON WITH THE ISRAELIS; AND B) TELL ABDU THAT ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES -- PRINCIPALLY THOSE OF A CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN AREAS FROM WHICH THE IDF HAD WITHDRAWN, THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE AIRPORT, AND THE SCOPE OF THE IDF WITHDRAWAL SOUTH OF BEIRUT -- THE ISRAELIS WERE TELLING US THEY HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED POSITIONS FROM THE LEBANESE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WE WERE ATTRIBUTING TO THEM.

5. ABDU AGREED TO ADDRESS THE COORDINATION ISSUE IN THE LARGE MEETING. HE MADE NO COMMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES EXCEPT TO SAY THAT ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS FROM WHICH THE IDF HAD WITHDRAWN MIGHT NO LONGER BE AN ISSUE, SINCE, IN CONTACTS WITH THE LAF, THE IDF WAS NO LONGER INSISTING ON THE RIGHT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN UNIFORM TO ENTER.

6. IN THE LARGE MEETING, ABDU AND HIS STAFF OUTLINED THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE ALONG PREVIOUSLY REPORTED LINES, NAMED THE

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LAF LIAISON OFFICERS (FOR THE US, COL. ELIAS KHALIL AND A MEMBER OF HIS STAFF, PLUS MAJOR CHEHAB OF LAF INTELLIGENCE), AND REVIEWED THE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR SECTORS OF DEPLOYMENT AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED WITH ONE EXCEPTION: IN PREVIOUS PLANS, THE US HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BURJ AL-BARA INAH AREA. NOW, THE LINE BETWEEN THE ITALIAN AND US SECTORS WAS DRAWN FURTHER SOKBH (JUST NORTH OF THE AIRPORT), AND THE ITALIANS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR BURJ AL-BARAJINAH. THE PRECISE DELINATION OF SECTORS OF DEPLOYMENT

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REMAINS SUBJECT TO FURTHER DISCUSSION.

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7. ABDU THEN PUT FORTH THREE "POLITICAL PROBLEMS"
THAT IN HIS VIEW REQUIRED DISCUSSION:
-- COORDINATION AND LIAISON: THE ISRAELIS, HE SAID,
CLAIM THAT THERE WAS NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT LIAISON
WITH THE FRENCH BEFORE THEIR ARRIVAL; IT WAS ABSOLUTELY
ESSENTIAL, ABDU SAID, THAT THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS WORK
THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED LIAISON AND COORDINATION
MECHANISMS TO MAKE SURE NO PROBLEMS AROSE. THE FRENCH

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AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN AND WOULD NOT BE IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS, SINCE THE MNF WAS RESPONSIBLE ONLY TO THE LEBANESE. RATHER DEFENSIVELY, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD CERTAINLY HAD A GENERAL IDEA OF FRENCH PLANS FOLLOWING PUBLIC FRENCH STATEMENTS, BUT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT INFORMED THEM OF THE DETAILS. (COMMENT: HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY HE HAD NOT ASKED THE US TO PLAY ITS CUSTOMARY LIAISON ROLE, BUT THE REASONS ARE OBVIOUS --- FRENCH PRIDE AND OUR OPPOSITIN TO THEIR EARLY ARRIVAL.) ABDU REPEATED THAT, WHILE THE FRENCH POSITON WAS UNDERSTANDABLE, THE EBANESE HAD TO BE INFORMED OF AND COORDINATE ALL MNF ACTIONS, INCLUDING MAKEING SURE THE PROPER LIAISON WITH THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT.

-- ISRAELI USE OF THE KHALDAH-HAZMIYYA ROAD: ABDU REPORTED HE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO USE THE OLD SIDON ROAD THROUGH KHALDAH, SHUWAYFAT, AND HAZIMIYYA TO REACH THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY TO RESUPPLY THEIR FORCES IN THE 'ALAYH-SAWFAR SECTOR OF THAT HIGHWAY AND WERE CLAIMING THE LAF HAD AGREED. WIITHOUT SETTING FORTH THE LEBANESE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, HE ASKED US AND THE ITALIANS, THGOUGH WHOSE SECTORS THE OLD SIDON ROAD PASSED, WHAT OUR POSITION WOULD BE. THE ITALIANS GAVE NO RESPONSE. ROSS STATED THAT OUR POSITION REMAINED THAT THE IDF HAD TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA AND RESUPPLY ITS FORCES ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY VIA THE BACK ROADS FROM DAMOUR.

-- ISRAELI US OF THE AIRPORT: ABDU SAID THAT ISRAELIS WANTED TO RETAIN AN IDF PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS AND WERE CLAIMING THAT THE LAF AGREED. AGAIN WITHOUT STATING THE LEBANESE POSITION, HE ASKED OUR VIEWS. ROSS EMPHASIZED THAT WE

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WERE DETERMINED TO OBTAIN A FULL IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AIRPORT.

8. AT LEAST TWICE IN THE MEETING, INCLUDING IN FRONT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, ABDU URGED US, IN OUR DISCUSSINS WITH THE ISRAELIS, NOT TO PUT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT POSITION OUT IN FRONT AS IF THE US WAS NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT YET STRONG, HE SAID, AND IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT WE TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT WHAT WE WANTED REPRESENTED OUR POSITION FIRST, AND THE LEBANESE POSITION SECOND. EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS TOLD US THE LEBANESE HAD ACCEPTED A GIVEN POSICON, WE SHOULD OPPOSE IT FOR OUR OWN REASONS. (COMMENT: THIS IS TANTAMOUNT TO ADMITTING THAT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT FOUND THEMSELVES ABLE TO MAINTAIN A FIRM LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN LAF-IDF

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DISCUSSIONS.)

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9. ABDU THEN ASKED US AND THE ITALIANS WHEN OUR CONTINGENTS WERE PREPARED TO ARRIVE. HE SHOWED NO SURPRISE OR DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN HE WAS TOLD THAT OUR FORCES AND THE BULK OF THE ITALIAN FORCES WOULD NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE ISRAELI-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THE ITALIANS WERE TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF SENDING A TOKEN INITIAL CONTINGENT IN THIS AFTERNOON. (COMMENT: THEY SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US IT WOULD NOT ARRIVE BEFORE THE OTHERS.) ROSS CONFIRMED THAT SUNDAY REMAINED OUR TARGET DATE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

10. SPURRED BY YET ANOTHER REMARK ABDU MADE ABOUT THE NEED FOR COORDINATION, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR FELT CONSTRAINED TO JUSTIFY THE PREMATURE ARRIVAL OF HIS INITIAL UNITS BY EXPLAINING THAT FRANCE HAS ACTED RAPIDLY IN RESPONSE TO A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUEST (THE FRENCH HAVE NOT YET BOTHERED WITH AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES). LATER, HOWEVER, HE ADMITTED THAT THE

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FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS NOW REPEAT NOW WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING IDF ACTIVITIES IN THE WEST BEIRUT --- SEARCHES, ARRESTS, ETC. -- IN THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH TROOPS IN THE CITY. THE LA

CK OF RESPONSE

ON THE PART OF FRENCH FORCES SEEMED TO CONSTITUTE A BLESSING FOR IDF ACTION. THIS WAS A GRAVE POLITICAL ISSUE. ABDU REJOINED THAT THIS WAS WHY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD INSISTED THE IDF EVACUATE WEST BEIRUT. SINCE FOR POLITICAL REASONS NEITHER THE LAF NOR THE MNF WOULD BE WILLING TO CONFRONT THE ISRAELIS MILITARILY, ANY CONTINUED IDF ACTIVITY IN WEST BEIRUT WOULD DISCREDIT THE MNF AND LAF COMPLETELY. (COMMENT: ROSS, BITING HIS TONGUE, REFRAINED FROM TELLING THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN PUBLIC THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS WE HAD WANTED A COORDINATED ENTRY INTO BEIRUT FOLLOWING REPEAT FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS; LATER, IN PRIVATE, HE DID MAKE THIS POINT.)

11. THE MEETING CLOSED WITH A DISCUSSION OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE MNF. IT WAS AGREED AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THAT HE COULD BE CONSIDERED THE "COORDINATOR-IN-CHIEF," BUT NOT THE "COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF", OF THE MNF'S ACTIVITIES.

12. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE ARE ORGANIZING RAPIDLY FOR THE MNF. HOWEVER, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON OUR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS, VIS-A-VIS WHOM

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THEY FEEL THEMSELVES TO BE IN A VERY WEAK POSITON.
AS PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SAID IN CLOSING THE MEETING,
"THE PROBLEM IS ISRAEL, AND WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING
THE RESULTS OF THE HABIB/DR
ER TALKS."

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BEIRUT 06532 01 OF 02 232048Z
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 227

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PARTFOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6532

EXDTC

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER MISSION(ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, SY, IS, LE, XF, FR, IT

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON MNF

1 ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY. IN HIS FIRST WORKING MEETING AS PRESIDENT, AMIN

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GEMAYEL CHAIRED INAUGURAL SESSION OF MNF LIAISON
AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE SEPTEMBER 23. AT THIS MEETING
HE MADE IT CLEAR, WITH SOME LEADING QUESTIONS FROM US,
THAT:-- HE IS GIVING MNF TOP PRIORITY AS HIS FIRST PROJECT.
IT SYMBOLIZES REESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN
CAPITAL AS FIRST STEP IN EFFORTS TO DO SO THROUGHOUT LEBANON.
-- HE UNEQUIVOCALLY SEEKS FULL IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL**UNCLASSIFIED**

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OF BEIRUT (BOTH EAST AND WEST) AND ITS SUBURBS, INCLUDING NATIONAL AIRPORT AND PRESIDENTIAL SUBURB OF BAABDA.

-- ANY FOREIGNERS - INCLUDING ISRAELIS -- SEEKING TO ENTER AREA FROM WHICH IDF HAS WITHDRAWN WILL BE REQUIRED TO HAVE APPROPRIATE VISA OR PASS FROM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

-- HE DOES NOT WANT MNF TO DO ANY POLICE WORK -- THIS WILL BE DONE BY LEBANESE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES; INSTEAD, MNF IS TO HAVE CALMING PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON POPULATION AND HELP LAF TAKE UP ITS TASKS. TO INCREASE THIS IMPACT, HE HAS ASKED FRENCH TO DELAY THEIR ARRIVAL UNTIL TOMORROW, WHEN THEY CAN BE JOINED BY ITALIANS.

-- HE WISHED LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO OPERATE OUT OF HEADQUARTERS TO BE ESTABLISHED AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE UNDER SUPERVISION OF LAF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDU AS OF TONIGHT. THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL SERVE AS CENTRAL COORDINATING MECHANISM BETWEEN ENTIRE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND MNF CONTINGENTS.

-- HE CONCURS WITH PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT PLANS AND INTENDS DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT BY COMMITTEE, WITH AMBASSADOR DRAPER TO UNDERTAKE LIAISON WITH ISRAELIS. HE CONCURS THAT BEFORE MNF BEGINS TIS TASKS (AS DISTINCT FROM ARRIVING IN BEIRUT) IT WILL BE NECESSARY, TO AVOID ANY PROBLEMS, TO HAVE UNDERTAKEN BASIC COORDINATION WITH ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY

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3. IN HIS FIRST WORKING MEETING AS PRESIDENT, AMIN GEMAYEL CHAIRED THE INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE MNF IN INT CABINET ROOM OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AT 1545 LT SEPTEMBER 23. HABIB, DRAPER, ROSS, AND GAUCHER ATTENDED FOR THE U.S., AS DID THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN SPECIAL ENVOYS, AMBASSADORS, AND MILITARY ATTACHES. ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WERE LAF GENERAL HAMDAN AND COLONEL JOHNNY ABDU AND MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS.

4. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT, GEMAYEL STRESSED THE DESIRE OF ALL LEBANESE TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN ARMIES FROM LEBANON AND REESTABLISH NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEETING AS A CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE "GOOD FRIENDS" OF LEBANON TO HELP ITS ARMY TO RETAKE CONTROL OF ITS CAPITAL AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD DOING THE SAME ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. HE EXPRESSED THANKS TO THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS FOR THEIR PAST EFFORTS ON LEBANON'S BEHALF, AND IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS EMPHASIS AND TONE THAT HE WAS SINGLING THE U.S. OUT FOR SPECIAL RECOGNITION.

5. GEMAYEL DESCRIBED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MNF TO HIS

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PRESIDENCY: IT WAS HIS FIRST MAJOR PROJECT AND WOULD THEREFORE RECEIVE TOP PRIORITY. IT WOULD ESTABLISH THE STRENGTH OF HIS GOVERNMENT RIGHT AWAY BY MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO REGAIN CONTROL OVER BEIRUT AND INSTITUTE STRICT MEASURES OF PUBLIC ORDER. THIS WOULD CREATE THE MOMENTUM NECESSARY FOR SUBSEQUENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AHIMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 115
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 228
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 6532

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6. TO MAKE HIS PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE MNF CLEAR, GEMAYEL ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS CREATING AN MNF HEAD-QUARTERS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF LAF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDU AS OF TONIGHT. THIS HEADQUARTERS WOULD COORDINATE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. ALL SUCH CONTACTS SHOULD BE CHANNELED THROUGH THE COMMITTEE. HABIB PROPOSED, AND GEMAYEL ACCEPTED, DAILY MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

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AT 1200 LT.

7. HABIB BRIEFED GEMAYEL ON THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT PLAN, AND GEMAYEL INDICATED HIS GENERAL APPROVAL. HE LEFT THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE COMMITTEE, WITH DRAPER PROVIDING LIAISON WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY, BEFORE THE MNF CONTINGENTS TOOK UP THEIR TASKS, BASIC COORDINATION WITH THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT "TO AVOID PROBLEMS."

8. HABIB THEN BRIEFED GEMAYEL ON THE MAIN PURPOSE OF HIS IMPENDING TRIP TO ISRAEL: TO CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW ALL THEIR FORCES FROM BEIRUT AND ITS ENVIRONS, EVEN IF THIS MEANT DAYS OF NEGOTIATION. HABIB MADE IT CLEAR IT WAS OUR STRONG DESIRE THAT BY SUNDAY THE IDF BE OUT OF WEST BEIRUT, EAST BEIRUT, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT DOWN TO KHALDEH, AND THE BAABDA AREA. WE DID NOT WISH TO BLESS THE IDF PRESENCE BY MINGLING MNF AND IDF TROOPS, BUT SOUGHT SIMULTANEOUS MNF DEPLOYMENT AND IDF WITHDRAWAL AS A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT. HABIB INDICATED HE NEEDED A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA (AS DEFINED ABOVE), AND GEMAYEL SAID UNEQUIVOCALLY THIS WAS HIS GOAL AS A FIRST STEP.

9 GEMAYEL WENT FURTHER, SAYING THAT ANY FOREIGNERS -- INCLUDING ISRAELIS -- SEEKING TO ENTER THE AREAS FROM WHICH THE IDF WITHDRAW WOULD REQUIRE VALID VISAS, PASSES, OR OTHER TRAVEL DOUCMENTS. THIS WAS CRUCIAL, HE SAID, IF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY WAS TO BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED OVER THE BEIRUT AREA.

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10. GEMAYEL TOLD THE MEETING THAT, TO INCREASE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE MNF'S ARRIVAL, HE HAD ASKED THE FRENCH TO DELAY THEIR ARRIVAL FOR ONE DAY UNTIL FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, TO PERMIT THE ITALIANS TO JOIN THEM. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED THE PLANS OF THE INITIAL FRENCH CONTINGENT TO ARRIVE IN THE EARLY HOURS OF DAYLIGHT ON FRIDAY, AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID HE EXPECTED HIS INITIAL CONTINGENT TO ARRIVE FRIDAY AFTERNOON. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT, PENDING ARRIVAL OF THE US CONTINGENT AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN CONTINGENTS, PRESUMABLY BY MONDAY, THE INITIAL FRENCH CONTINGENT WOULD MOVE FROM THE PORT TO THE PINE FOREST NEAR THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND STAND FAST.


11. FINALLY, GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE MNF WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO DO ANY POLICE WORK SUCH AS SEARCHING FOR ARMS CACHES. THIS, HE SAID, WAS THE WORK OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES WITH MNF BACKING.

12. COMMENT: GEMAYEL SHOWED EXCELLENT LEADERSHIP QUALITIES AND POLITICAL SENSITIVITY DURING THIS, THE FIRST WORKING MEETING OF HIS PRESIDENCY. THROUGHOUT, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE FOCUS REMAIN ON LEBANON AND ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ON THE LEBANESE ARMY AS ONE OF THE MAIN INSTRUMENTS FOR THE REBUILDING OF AN INDEPENDENT, UNITED, STRONG AND PEACEFUL LEBANON. HIS INSISTENCE ON AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GREATER BEIRUT AS A FIRST STEP, AS WELL AS HIS INTENTION TO CONTROL THE ENTRY OF ISRAELIS INTO AREAS FROM WHICH THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN, INDICATE THAT HE WILL NOT HESITATE TO DO WHATEVER HE JUDGES NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON. DILLON



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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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BEIRUT 6497

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGSC MILI: MOPS, SY, IS, LE, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION:MNF ISSUES

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06497 231012Z

2. DRAPER MET WITH IDF NORTHERN COMMANDER DRORY, PLUS LOCAL
COMMANDR GGENERAL AMON, AT 0800 TODAY, SEPTEMBER 23. DRAPER
SAID THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE BRINGING IN THE INITIAL MNF
UNIT TODAY AT APPROXIMATELY 1700 AND WOULD PROBABLY DEPLOY
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HARBOR AREA AND IN THE AREA NEAR
THE MUSEUM AND FRENCH EMBASSY RESIDENCE WHERE THEY HAD
DEPLOYED PREVIOUSLY. DRAPER WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE WANTED
TO BRING IN THE BULK OF THE REMAINING MNF FORCES --
FROM THE US, ITALY, AND PERHAPS EVEN FRANCE -- TO

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BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26.

3. DRORY MADE CLEAR -- AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY -- THAT THE IDF WAS WITHDRAWING FROM WEST BEIRUT NORTH OF THE MAZRA'A CORNICHE ON A STAGED PROGRAM THROUGH SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, WITH THE LAST STAGE TO INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL FURTHER SOUTH TO THE LINES OCCUPIED BY THE IDF AS OF APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 15. HOWEVER, DRORY CLAIMED REPEAT CLAIMED THAT THE IDF HAD REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE LAF (SEE BELOW) THAT AN IDF MEDICAL UNIT COULD REMAIN IN THE PORT AREA FOR SEVEREZE DAYS BEYOND THIS INITIAL WITHDRAWAL, THAT THE IDF WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEND PATROLS AND MEN INTO THE SECTORS EVACUATED BY THE IDF AND THAT THERE WAS NO RESTRICTION ON EAST/WEST OR WEST/EAST MOVEMENT OF IDF TROOPS.

4. DRORY WENT ON TO SAY IN EFFECT THAT, ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN MNF USE OF THE BEIRUT AIRPORT AS EARLY AS SEPTEMBER 26, SUNDAY, THE IDF WOULD WANT TO CONTINUE LIMITED USE OF THE AIRPORT THEN AND BEYOND THAT DATE.

5. DRAPER SAID THAT THE POSITION OF THE USG AS COMMUNICATED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR

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EARLIER THIS WEEK WAS THAT THE IDF SHOULD WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM EAST AND WEST BEIRUT, AND FROM THE AIRPORT. IN SHORT, WE WANTED THE IDF COMPLETELY OUT OF THE BEIRUT AREA.

6. DRORY INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A "POLITICAL" MATTER. HE COULD ONLY PUT THE POSITION FORWARD THAT HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED. HE AND DRAPER AGREED, THEREFORE, THAT HABIB AND DRAPER SHOULD TRY TO MEET WITH SHARON TONIGHT IN ISRAEL. DRORY ALREADY KNEW THAT WE HAD AN APPOINTMENT WITH BEGIN FOR TOMORROW MORNING. THE MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERS IN ISRAEL WOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF COMPLETE IDF WITHDRAWAL.

7. AFTER DRAPER'S RETURN TO THE RESIDENCE, WE MET WITH THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, AND THEIR STAFFS, PLUS G2 CHIEF JOHNNY ABDU (WHO IS TO BE DESIGNATED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TODAY AS OVERALL COORDINATOR FOR THE LEBANESE IN CONNECTION WITH THE MNF OPERATION), WITH LAF OPERATIONS CHIEF GENERAL HAMDAN AND CHIEF LAF LIAISON OFFICER ABU FARHAT.

8. TO SUM UP THE SITUATION AS OF 1000 THIS MORNING, IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY AGREED THAT:
--A. THERE WILL BE A MEETING AT 1500 TODAY OF

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REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AS WELL AS ABDO AND OTHER LAF REPRESENTATIVES. THE MEETING MIGHT BE CHAIRED BY THE NEW PRESIDENT. B. IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES, AS OUTLINED TO US LAST NIGHT, THE COORDINATING GROUP WILL MEET DAILY AT THE PALACE AND THE EXECUTIVE (PRESIDENT'S) IMPRIMATUR WILL BE ON ALL FUTURE DECISIONS. --C. THE LEBANESE AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING AGREE THAT THE IDF SHOULD WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE BEIRUT AREA, INCLUDING THE AIRPORT, WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO RETURN.

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--D. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT AT THIS 1500 MEETING THAT THIS POSITION IN FAVOR OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BE ENDORSED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, SO THAT DRAPER AND HABIB CAN PROCEED TO ISRAEL FOR MEETINGS ON THE BASIS OF A COMMONLY AGREE US-LEBANESE-ITALIAN-FRENCH POSITION.

8. FOR CHARGE FLATEN: HABIB, DRAPER AND BUERLE WILL PROCEED FROM BEIRUT AIRPORT BY LIGHT AIRCRAFT AT 1700 LOCAL, LANDING AT DOV AIRPORT IN TEL AVIV AS EARLY AS 1735. PLEASE COORDINATE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN SETTING AN EARLY MEETING THIS AFTERNOON OR EVENING WITH SHARON AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS. PLEASE ALSO EXPLAIN TO THE GUESTS WE INVITED TO THE DINNER THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO POSTPONE IT TO ANOTHER TIME AND EXTEND OUR REGRETS. DILLON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR *OK* Date: 11/6/97
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EX DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OTRA (HABIB, PHILIP), LE
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: SCHEDULE IN ISRAEL

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

1. ~~----- ENTIRE TEXT. -----~~
2. DINNER IS SCHEDULED FOR 2000 HOURS THURSDAY
AT VENEZIA, JERUSALEM. INVITATIONS HAVE BEEN
EXTENDED. SINCE BEN-TSUR IS OUT OF TOWN WE HAVE
ADDED ELI RUBENSTEIN, LEGAL ADVISER TO THE MFA.
3. 10:00 A.M. MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. OTHER APPOINTMENTS STILL
PENDING. FOREIGN MINISTER MAY INVITE HABIB TO
LUNCH ON FRIDAY.
4. MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON RENEWS HIS INVITATION
TO HABIB AND DRAPER FOR DINNER FRIDAY EVENING AT HIS
FARM.
5. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. FLATEN

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= FOREIGN RELATIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS, DEVELOPMENT PR

TAGS= PEPR, MOPS, US, IS, LE, (DRAPER, MORRIS)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CP/IR ^{en} Date: 11/6/97
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 7185

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, IS, US

SUBJ: DRAPER MISSION: GEMAYEL REQUESTS APPROACH TO ISRAELIS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. AT THE OCTOBER 13 OF THE MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE, THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORMALLY REQUESTED US ASSISTANCE IN
APPROACHING THE ISRAELIS ON TWO ISSUES: THE SECURITY SITUATION

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TION IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE 'ALAYH DISTRICT AND THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE YARZAH-BAABDA AREA.

3. SECURITY SITUATION IN THE 'ALAYH DISTRICT. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REQUESTED ME FORMALLY TO HAVE THE USG APPROACH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON AN URGENT BASIS TO AVERT A SITUATION IN WHICH CONTINUED PHALANGE-JUMBLATTI FIGHTING IN THE 'ABAYH-KFAR MATTA AREA WOULD THREATEN THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY OF THE CITY OF BEIRUT. AS MATTERS STOOD, GEMAYEL SAID, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF DAMAGE TO ELECTRICAL INSTALL-

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[REDACTED]

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TIONS IN THAT AREA TO INSTITUTE ELECTRICITY RATIONING, SO THAT THERE WOULD ONLY BE FOUR HOURS OF ELECTRICITY PER DAY IN THE VARIOUS NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE CITY BEGINNING THIS AFTERNOON (EMBASSY POWER WENT OFF AS THIS MESSAGE WAS BEING TYPED.) ELECTRICITY CUTS WOULD ALSO PRODUCE WATER CUTS. JUST AS HIS GOVERNMENT WAS ATTEMPTING TO SOLIDIFY ITS CONTROL OF THE CITY, THIS WOULD POSE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

4. AFTER GEMAYEL HAD LEFT THE MEETING, THE LAF OFFICERS PRESENT INDICATED THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION WAS FOR THE IDF TO INTERVENE TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND PERMIT LEBANESE TEAMS TO EFFECT THE NECESSARY REPAIRS. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE, THEY INSISTED, FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ENTER THE REGION WHILE THE IDF WAS THERE, AS THE ISRAELIS HAD PROPOSED. THE LEBANESE HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE AT LEAST THREE TIMES IN THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE IN RECENT DAYS TO NO AVAIL. IT WAS ESSENTIAL, FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, THAT THE ISRAELIS ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES IMPOSED ON THEM AS AN OCCUPYING POWER. THERE WAS NO OTHER SOLUTION. AT TODAY'S MILITARY-TO-MILITARY MEETING, THE LEBANESE SIDE HAD FORMULATED AN OFFICIAL REQUEST THAT THE IDF STOP THE FIGHTING AND PERMIT REPAIRS.

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5. ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE BAABDA-YARZAH AREA. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE ENTERING EAST BEIRUT TO BEGIN ITS SEARCH AND ARREST OPERATIONS. AS A FIRST STEP, THE REGION OF BAABDA, HAZMIYYAH, AND HADATH WOULD BE SEALED OFF FOR THIS PURPOSE BY THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 14 AND GEMAYEL HOPED THE US WOULD INSTITUTE MARINE PATROLS IN THESE AREAS -AS HAD PROMISED". THE IDF PRESENCE

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
IN BAABDA (IDF PRESS CENTER AND GUARD FORCE) WOULD HAVE TO DEPART TO MAKE LAF DEPLOYMENT POSSIBLE. AFTER GEMAYEL LEFT THE MEETING, COLONEL ABDU SAID THE IDF SHOULD BE OUT BY NOON, OCTOBER 14, NOT ONLY FROM BAABDA, BUT FROM YARZAH (THERE IS ONE ISRAELI PRATROOP COMPANY THERE). COLONEL ABU FARHAT, WHO HEADS THE LEBANESE TEAM IN THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COMMITTEE, SAID HE WOULD BE MAKING THIS REQUEST URGENTLY TO THE ISRAELIS. ABDU MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WISHED US TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS WITH THE SAME REQUEST.

6. COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN HEARING OF THE FIGHTING IN THE 'ALAYH DISTRICT FROM VARIOUS SOURCES FOR SOME DAYS. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS MADE IT CLEAR THE HE CANNOT SEND THE LAF INTO THE AREA AS LONG AS THE IDF REMAINS THERE. THIS IS BOTH A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. MANY LEBANESE BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE--INCLUDING FOMENTING INTERCOMMUNAL STRIFE--TO ASSOCIATE THE LAF WITH THEM. GEMAYEL IS DETERMINED TO RESIST THIS. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR ENCOURAGING THE DILUTION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES THAT WOULD RESULT FROM A MIXED LAF/IDF PRESENCE. IN MY INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICERS IN BAABDA, I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT

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ISRAEL DOES NOT CONSIDER ITSELF TO BE AN OCCUPYING
POWER IN THE LEGAL SENSE OF THE TERM, BUT MERELY A
"GUEST." THIS IS A SEMANTIC NICETY. I RECOMMEND THAT
WE RESPOND TO THE LEBANESE REQUEST AND RAISE THE
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE
'ALAYH DISTRICT URGENTLY WITH THE ISRAELIS, BOTH
IN WASHINGTON AND IN ISRAEL. I WILL BE DOING SO
SHORTLY WITH ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICERS IN BAABDA.



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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

7. THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN BAABDA HAS BEEN A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AND THE ISRAELIS FOR SOME TIME, AND DISCUSSIONS I HAD YESTERDAY WITH THE ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICERS IN BAABDA INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE IN FACT PREPARING TO REMOVE THE IDF PRESENCE THERE. IT WOULD DO NO HARM TO IMPART A SENSE OF URGENCY TO THEIR MOVE BY INFORMING THEM OF LEBANESE PLANS TO SEAL THE AREA. THE ISSUE OF THE PARATROOP COMPANY ABOVE YARZAH, HOWEVER, IS MORE DIFFICULT. THIS COMPANY IS CLEARLY THERE TO DEAL WITH ANY DIFFICULTY ON THE KHALDEH 'ALAYH LOGISTICAL ROUTE. IT IS UNLIKELY THE ISRAELIS WILL REMOVE IT EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREED OVERALL PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL. TO SATISFY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF REQUESTING ITS WITHDRAWAL IN PARALLEL WITH THE LEBANESE.

8. REGARDING THE ISRAELI MFA CIVILIAN PRESENCE, I ENGAGED COLONEL ABDU AND COLONEL ABU FARHAT IN A DISCUSSION OF ITS FUTURE FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 13 MEETING.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ABDU TOLD ME THAT IT WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION TO FORMALIZE THIS PRESENCE UNTIL AFTER THE NEW LEBANESE CABINET HAD RECEIVED A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE PARLIAMENT. MEANWHILE, HE SAID, THE MFA LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD HAVE TO STAY PUT WHEREVER THEY CHOSE. IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO MOVE AROUND ON THEIR OWN, THEY WOULD RUN THE RISK OF BEING ARRESTED. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO HAVE THE LEBANESE ARMY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" GIVE THEM TRANSPORTATION WHENEVER THEY WISHED TO GET AROUND. ABDU SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE THIS, BUT NO MORE, AT THIS TIME.

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9. BOTH YESTERDAY AND TODAY I HAVE BEEN MAKING THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS ON THESE SECONDARY ISSUES AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE BRACING FOR OUR APPROACH ON AN OVERALL PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE HAVE UNDERSTOOD THIS TACTICAL CONSIDERATION, BUT THEY ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE NEGATIVE IMPACT FOR GEMAYEL THAT A DISRUPTION OF ELECTRICITY SERVICE TO BEIRUT OR AN INABILITY TO DEPLOY IN BAABDA WOULD HAVE.

10. I RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, THAT WE DO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS URGENTLY AND FORCEFULLY ON THE NARROW ISSUES OF RESTORING PEACE IN THE 'ABAYH-KFAR MATTIA REGION AND WITHDRAWING THE IDF FROM BAABDA. THE IDF PRESENCE ABOVE YARZAH CAN BE SORTED OUT AT A LATER DATE.

11. THE ISSUE OF US PATROLS IN THE BAABDA AREA, WHICH GEMAYEL BELIEVES WE "PROMISED" TO INSTITUTE, WAS RAISED BOTH AT THE OCTOBER 13 AND THE OCTOBER 12 MEETINGS. AT THE LATTER, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THIS IDEA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT AN EARLIER STAGE, BUT NO DECISION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE REMAINS UNCONVINCED EVEN THOUGH THE LAF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETINGS HAVE TOLD ME THEY KNOW THE RECORD IS CLEAR ON THIS POINT: SUCH A POSSIBILITY HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BUT NEVER DECIDED.
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☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

JERUSALEM 03042

9302566

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MILI, MOPS, SY, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: IDF PRESENCE SOUTH OF AIRPORT

REF: STATE 28122 *NR*

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. YESTERDAY, OCTOBER 5, WHEN WE TOOK OFF FROM
BEIRUT AIRPORT TO GO TO ISRAEL, LT. COL. GAUCHER
AND I SCANNED THE AREAS SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT WHERE
WE PERSONALLY HAD SEEN THE ISRAELI TANKS AND ONE
APC ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT
THE ISRAELI ARMOR WAS NO LONGER THERE, OR AT LEAST
NOT WHERE IT HAD BEEN ON THE PREVIOUS DAY.

3. THEREFORE, BEFORE WE TAKE THE ISSUE UP WITH THE

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ISRAELIS IN ANY FORUM, I BELIEVE WE NEED A FURTHER
VISUAL CHECK BY THE US MNF CONTINGENT AS WELL AS
A CHECK WITH LAF LIAISON OFFICER COL. ABU FARHAT, WHO
HAS BEEN PRESSING THE ISRAELIS STRONGLY TO REMOVE
THEIR ENTIRE PRESENCE FROM THE AREA OF THE RADIO ORIENT
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT. GROVE

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03046 061121Z
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PA Exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SOPN, PINT, PINS, MOPS, PLO, LE
SUBJECT: ABC REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW ON GUARANTEES FOR
PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS

REF: CROCKER-DRAPER MEMORANDUM DATED 4 OCT. 82 (NOTAL) M

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. THE DEPARTMENT IS PROBABLY AWARE THAT ABC IS PREPARING AN HOUR-LONG DOCUMENTARY ON THE SABRA/SHATILA MASSACRES FOR AIRING SOME TIME IN DECEMBER. TEAMS ARE NOW IN BEIRUT (JOHN COOLEY) AND ISRAEL TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS AND FILMING.

3. COOLEY IS SEEKING AN ON-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW WITH AN AUTHORITATIVE US OFFICIAL CONCERNING THE GUARANTEES AND ASSURANCES GIVEN BY THE US ON THE SAFETY OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON. HIS FIRST REQUEST HAS BEEN FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER OR DILLON.

4. I RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT DETERMINE THE STANCE WE SHOULD ALL TAKE AND INFORM US, SINCE IT

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IS LIKELY ABC WILL REQUEST SUCH INTERVIEWS AT SEVERAL POSTS. AS FOR MYSELF, I WOULD NOT AGREE TO BE INTERVIEWED. THIS MESSAGE FROM DRAPER.
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STATE 281604

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: IS, US, LE
SUBJECT: ACTING SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI
AMBASSADOR AREN'S ON LEBANON

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. IN WHAT WAS TO BE A COURTESY, GET-ACQUAINTED CALL ON
THE ACTING SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR ARENS SPENT THE BETTER

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PART OF THEIR 45-MINUTE MEETING GOING OVER SEVERAL POINTS
ON LEBANON:

-- WHILE ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS BETTER THAN IT DID A MONTH
AGO THE DIFFICULTIES OF PUSHING GEMAYEL TO SIGN A PEACE
TREATY NOW, ARENS STILL BELIEVES THAT A TREATY IS
ESSENTIAL TO ADDRESSING ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS ALONG ITS
NORTHERN BORDER. IF GEMAYEL DOES NOT AGREE TO A TREATY
IN THE INITIAL GESTATION PERIOD OF HIS GOVERNMENT WHEN HE

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HAS GREATEST FLEXIBILITY, THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH A TREATY WILL BE LOST FOR A LONG TIME AND, INSTEAD OF BEING THE SECOND ARAB STATE TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL, LEBANON WILL BE AMONG THE LAST. DAM TOLD ARENS THAT WHILE WE DO NOT OPPOSE A PEACE TREATY PER SE, WE CANNOT SUPPORT ISRAELI PRESSURE ON LEBANON TO SIGN A TREATY UNDER THE THREAT OF ISRAELI GUNS.

-- DESPITE PREVIOUS EFFORTS BY THE SECRETARY TO DISCOURAGE ARENS, HE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S-ISRAELI WORKING-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE GROUP IN WASHINGTON TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS IN LEBANON ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS. ARENS HAS BEEN TOLD IN THE PAST THAT THIS IS A FUNCTION FOR THE HABIB-DRAPER MISSION AND OUR EMBASSIES IN THE REGION TO FILL.

-- ARENS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BECAUSE ISRAEL "HAS NO BUSINESS BEING IN LEBANON", THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM SECURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PRIOR TO THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES WILL RESULT IN THOSE FORCES REMAINING IN LEBANON.

-- ARENS WAS DECIDEDLY NEGATIVE ABOUT UNIFIL (IN ITS



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PRESENT FORM, EXPANDED, OR EVEN WITH A CHANGE OF MANDATE) MAKING ANY FUTURE CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

3. IN REPLY, ACTING SECRETARY DAM INDICATED THAT WHILE HE FOUND THE CONVERSATION USEFUL IN GETTING A BETTER APPRECIATION OF ISRAELI THINKING, HE PREFERRED TO RESERVE JUDGMENT UNTIL HE HAD THE BENEFIT OF TALKING TO PHIL HABIB AND FULLY ASSESSING AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S MEETING WITH BEGIN TODAY.

4. BEFORE THEIR DISCUSSION ON LEBANON, ARENS OFFERED OLD EXPLANATIONS FOR CERTAIN MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE U.S. WHICH HAVE ARISEN ON LEBANON OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS. HE CITED THE IDF STOPPING AT THE 40 KM. LINE ("THERE WAS NO IMAGINARY LINE WHICH STOPPED AT 40 KM. BUT OUR OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING THE PLO WAS CLEAR FROM THE START") AND THE IDF'S ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT ("NOBODY ENVISAGED THE BASHIR ASSASSINATION"). EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD NEVER MEANT TO MISLEAD THE U.S., ARENS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE NEVERTHELESS BORE A SHARE OF THE BLAME FOR SUCH MISUNDERSTANDINGS. DAM

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, PLO, XF, LE, SY, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: PHASE II DISCUSSIONS WITH
BEGIN, OCTOBER 5

1. ~~(SECRET ENTIRE TEMP.)~~

2. SUMMARY: I MET FOR 90 MINUTES WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN AND DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON ON AFTERNOON OF
OCTOBER 5. I REVIEWED THE DISCUSSIONS AMBASSADOR HABIB
AND I HAD HAD WITH THE SYRIANS, NOTING THAT THE SYRIANS
HAD TAKEN A VERY HARD INITIAL BARGAINING POSITION,
INSISTING THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST WITHDRAW COMPLETELY
BEFORE THE SYRIANS WOULD LEAVE LEBANON. I STRESSED THAT

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WE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TO GET THE SYRIANS TO AMEND
THEIR POSITION. THE ISRAELI REACTION INDICATED THAT
THEY HAD ANTICIPATED A TOUGH SYRIAN RESPONSE. PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN PUT HIS EMPHASIS ON GETTING THE PLO OUT
OF LEBANON. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO
POSTPONE FOR A SHORT TIME ANY US DISCUSSIONS OF THE
WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES, AND TO CON-
CENTRATE INSTEAD ON WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO AS THE FIRST
ORDER OF BUSINESS. HE IMPLIED STRONGLY THAT A LONG

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"STALEMATE" MIGHT DEVELOP IF WE DID NOT SATISFACTORILY DEAL WITH THE PLO QUESTION, DESPITE MY EXPLANATIONS THAT EXHORTATIONS TO THE PLO -- IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCURRENT PRESSURES AND INDUCEMENTS -- WOULD NOT NECESSARILY PRODUCE RESULTS. BEGIN AND SHARON REITERATED THAT THE SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WOULD REQUIRE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE, AND THEY MADE CLEAR THEY HOPED FOR US SUPPORT. ADDRESSEES SHOULD ANALYZE THE ISRAELI POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BROADER-RANGING TALK I HAD EARLIER WITH KIMCHE (SEPTEL). THE DIRECTION OF ISRAELI THINKING IS BECOMING CLEARER. THEY HAVE GIVEN UP A PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON FOR NOW, BUT THEY WANT STRONG SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH LEBANON BEFORE THEY WILL WITHDRAW, REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO THAT MAY BE WORKED OUT IN THE MEANTIME. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET FOR 90 MINUTES WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 5. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR, KIMCHE, BAR-ON, TAMIR, DAN MERIDOR, AND OTHERS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DCM FLATEN, ROSS, LT. COL. GAUCHER, AND SCOTT. BEGIN WAS IN A SUBDUED MOOD, OBVIOUSLY VERY CONCERNED ABOUT

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HIS WIFE, WHO IS IN THE HOSPITAL. YESTERDAY SHE WAS IN A COMA. THE PRIME MINISTER LEFT FOR THE HOSPITAL IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING.

4. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN RECALLED THAT, IN HIS LAST DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB, HE HAD DISCUSSED THREE PREFERRED PHASES FOR EVENTS IN LEBANON. THE FIRST WAS THE EVACUATION OF THE PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES FROM BEIRUT, WHICH HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THE SECOND PHASE WOULD BE THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM NORTHERN LEBANON AND THE BEKA'A VALLEY. THE THIRD PHASE WOULD BE THE EVACUATION OF THE SYRIANS (AND ISRAELIS) FROM LEBANON, AND THE CONCLUSION OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE UNDERScoreD THAT IT HAD BEEN ISRAEL'S INTENTION THAT THE PLO WOULD LEAVE LEBANON BEFORE THE SYRIANS WITHDREW, AND HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE US WOULD AGREE. I POLITELY BUT FIRMLY MADE CLEAR THAT I WAS FAR FROM SURE THIS WAS A REALISTIC EXPECTATION.


5. I STRESSED THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB AND I WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ARRANGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM THE REST OF LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. IT WAS ALL PART OF A POLICY TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON. I AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT

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ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERNS AND A SECURITY ZONE IN
SOUTHERN LEBANON WERE VERY MUCH A PART OF THE EQUATION.
HABIB HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP. I
RECALLED THAT BEFORE GOING TO SYRIA, HABIB AND I HAD
MADE IT CLEAR TO PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL THAT MUCH WOULD
BE EXPECTED OF THE LEBANESE IN THE COMING PHASES. I



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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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WENT ON TO DESCRIBE BRIEFLY WHAT I SAID WAS A HARD
BARGAINING POSITION THE SYRIANS HAD TAKEN DURING DIS-
CUSSIONS IN DAMASCUS. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, HOWEVER,
THE SYRIANS HAD STATED CLEARLY THAT THEY WOULD WITH-
DRAW ALL OF THEIR FORCES FROM LEBANON QUICKLY AT LEBANON'S
REQUEST. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF
SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE IDF, OR ANY EQUATING
OF ISRAEL'S PRESENCE IN LEBANON WITH SYRIA'S "LEGAL"
PRESENCE. THE SYRIANS STRESSED THAT THEY COULD NOT BE
SEEN AS BOWING TO ISRAELI PRESSURE. NEVERTHELESS,
THE SYRIANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT, AFTER ALL ISRAELI
FORCES HAD LEFT LEBANON, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO
LEAVE "WITHIN ONE DAY." I STRESSED THAT THE US WAS NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SYRIAN POSITION, AND I ASSURED
THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE WOULD WORK TO GET THE SYRIANS
TO AMEND THEIR POSITION, BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE

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GOOD OFFICES OF OTHER ARAB STATES AND LEBANON.

6. BEGIN LISTENED TO MY REVIEW OF THE SYRIAN POSITION
WITH LITTLE VISIBLE REACTION. HE STATED THAT IT WOULD
BE DESIRABLE TO "POSTPONE FOR A FEW DAYS" DISCUSSIONS
ON WITHDRAWAL OF REGULAR ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON.
INSTEAD; WHAT WAS NECESSARY NOW WOULD BE TO WORK ON THE
WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FORCES IN LEBANON. HE STRESSED THAT
ISRAEL CANNOT PERMIT A THREAT TO ITS FORCES TO CONTINUE


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IN LEBANON. (IN THIS CONNECTION, HE REFERRED TO THE AMBUSH TWO DAYS AGO WHICH LEFT SIX ISRAELIS DEAD, AND 22 WOUNDED.) HE IMPLIED THAT A STRONG IDF MILITARY REACTION COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. HE STATED THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD DEMAND THAT THE PLO LEAVE LEBANON, RHETORICALLY ASKING "IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DEMANDS THAT THEY GO, WHAT CAN THEY DO?" SHARON ADDED THAT THERE WERE SOME 1,000 PLO FORCES IN TRIPOLI, AND ANOTHER 5,000 OR SLIGHTLY MORE IN THE BEKA'A VALLEY, AN INCREASE OF 1,000 SINCE THE EVACUATION, WITH MORE INFILTRATION ALL THE TIME.

7. I REPLIED THAT HABIB HAD BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF PLO RE-INFILTRATION INTO LEBANON WITH THE SYRIANS, STRESSING THAT THIS WAS A VIOLATION OF THE EVACUATION AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE SYRIANS MUST TAKE STEPS TO CONTROL IT. HE HAD BEEN VERY FIRM. THE PRIME MINISTER INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONTROL RE-INFILTRATION, BUT THE PLO FIGHTERS WHO HAD NEVER LEFT LEBANON MUST GO TOO. I STRESSED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON, BUT NOTED THAT THERE WAS A FEELING IN LEBANON THAT A GOOD MANY OF THE PLO FIGHTERS WOULD LEAVE THE BEKA'A AND NORTHERN LEBANON WHEN THE SYRIANS LEFT, SINCE THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO LOSE



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SYRIAN PROTECTION. THIS MIGHT BE A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, I SAID, TRYING TO MAKE CLEAR THAT EXPECTING TO GET THE PLO OUT THROUGH MERE EXHORTATION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE EFFECTIVE. I DID SAY HOWEVER THAT WE WOULD TRY TO GET SOME PLO FIGHTERS TO LEAVE BEFORE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. BEGIN CONCLUDED THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE TERRORISTS IN LEBANON IS "A PRESENT DANGER TO A RENEWED CONFLAGARATION." IN A FEW WEEKS TIME, HE SAID, THERE COULD AGAIN BE 20,000-30,000 WELL-ARMED TERRORISTS IN LEBANON. ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF (NATIONAL) FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE PLO MUST GO FIRST. OTHERWISE, ITS FIGHTERS WOULD SIMPLY MOVE IN TO FILL THE GAP LEFT BY THE WITHDRAWING ISRAELI FORCES AND THE SITUATION WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT THAN IT WAS BEFORE THE WAR. IF THE PALESTINIANS DO NOT GO, THERE MIGHT BE A STALEMATE, AND NO FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON.

8. IN MANY WAYS, THIS REFERENCE TO A STALEMATE WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT COMMENT OF THE EVENING. I NOTED THAT PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL WANTS THE PLO OUT OF LEBANON AS MUCH AS ANYONE. NONETHELESS, THE GOL HAS A PROBLEM. IT BELIEVES IT MUST HAVE SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN PLACE TO GUARD AGAINST RE-INFILTRATION FROM SYRIA UNTIL THE LEBANESE ARMY IS BUILT

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UP TO HANDLE THE JOB. THE LAF CANNOT HANDLE THE
PRESENT TASKS. WE NEED TO GIVE HARD THOUGHT TO WHAT
WE CAN DO TO HELP THE GOL GAIN CONTROL. THE USG NOW
HAS A MILITARY TEAM IN LEBANON CONSULTING ON WAYS
TO HELP BUILD UP THE LEBANESE ARMY, BUT IT MAY BE A
YEAR OR MORE BEFORE THE LAF WILL BE READY TO HANDLE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3369
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

THE EMERGENCY SECURITY PROBLEMS WE COULD FORESEE. WE
NEED TO THINK IN AN OPEN-MINDED AND IMAGINATIVE WAY
ABOUT MEANS OF HANDLING THE SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE
BEKA'A AND NORTHERN LEBANON.

9. SHARON THEN RECAPPED THE ISSUES IN SOME DETAIL.
FIRST, THE PLO FIGHTERS MUST LEAVE THE BEKA'A AND
TRIPOLI. THIS IS AN ISSUE FOR THE LEBANESE. SECOND,
ON WITHDRAWAL, ISRAEL DOES NOT ACCEPT THE PRESENT
SYRIAN POSITION. IDF AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL MUST BE
SIMULTANEOUS. THIRD, PRISONERS MUST BE EXCHANGED AND
ALL KILLED AND MIAS MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR. WITHOUT
A RESOLUTION OF THE PRISONER ISSUE, THERE CAN BE NO
WITHDRAWAL. FINALLY, HE STRESSED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
MUST BE NEGOTIATED. IT MUST BE DISCUSSED IN DIRECT
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. ONLY THE GOL

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CAN BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY ZONE, AND ONLY IT
CAN NEGOTIATE IT. THE ZONE, HE CONTINUED, NEEDS TO
BE 40 TO 50 KILOMETERS WIDE, DEPENDING ON THE TOPOGRAPHY.
(HE BRIEFLY SHOWED US A MAP OF ISRAEL'S PREFERRED
ZONE, BUT HE AND OTHER ISRAELIS WOULD NOT GIVE US A
COPY, ALTHOUGH I CRUDELY ASKED FOR ONE.) IN LOW
AREAS, THE DISTANCE CAN BE LESS, HE SAID; IN HIGH
POINTS, THE DISTANCE MUST BE GREATER. IN SOME PLACES,
SHARON SAID, ISRAEL IS ALREADY LESS THAN 45 KMS. FROM

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THE BORDER. IN OTHERS, IT IS ONLY 10-15 KM. BEYOND THE 45 KM. LINE. "ALL TOGETHER, WE ARE CLOSE TO THE LINE." MOREOVER, THE SECURITY ZONE ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE DISCUSSED BEFORE ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM LEBANON. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO START SOON. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE NEED FOR A SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE ISSUES FOR US WERE THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTROLLING THE ZONE AND HOW TO BRING IT INTO BEING. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR SUCH A ZONE. FOR THE US, THE QUESTION IS HOW WE CAN HELP TO BRING IT ABOUT IN A WAY SATISFACTORY TO BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON. AT THIS POINT, SHARON SHOWED SOME SLIGHT FLEXIBILITY, SAYING THE ISRAELIS HAD NOTHING AGAINST US PARTICIPATION BUT HE SEEKS A SIGNED ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, AND THERE MAY BE A POSSIBILITY OF US GUARANTEES. AS FOR DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONTACTS ON THE SUBJECT, I NOTED THAT THE EXISTING MILITARY TO MILITARY CHANNEL, TO WHICH THE LEBANESE WISH TO ADD A FOREIGN MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE ON THEIR SIDE, COULD SERVE AS A USEFUL FORUM. HABIB AND I HAD STRONGLY ENCOURAGED GEMAYEL TO MAKE USE OF THIS EXISTING ARRANGEMENT. I ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT GEMAYEL WAS NOT FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT AND IT IN TURN WOULD HAVE TO ORGANIZE ITSELF FOR MANY



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TASKS. APPOINTMENTS IN THE ARMY AND ELSEWHERE COULD DICTATE THE FORMATION OF NEW MEMBERS ON THE LEBANESE SIDE. I ASKED WHAT THE ISRAELI PREFERRED ARRANGEMENTS WERE FOR THE SOUTHERN ZONE.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT IT WAS TOO SOON TO GO INTO DETAIL. "UNIFIL IS NO SOLUTION. THEY LET THE TERRORISTS GO THROUGH. ONE CONTINGENT EVEN CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH THEM." HIS OPPOSITION TO UNIFIL, WHILE QUIETLY STATED, WAS WHOLLY UNCOM-PROMISING.

11. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ASKED WHETHER AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD TAKEN UP THE ISRAELI PRISONERS ISSUE WHEN HE WAS IN DAMASCUS. I REPLIED THAT HE HAD, AND REVIEWED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER THE INFORMATION THE SYRIANS HAD GIVEN US SO FAR, AS OF OCTOBER 4, DRAWING ON AMB. PAGANELLI'S REPORT. WHEN PRESSED, I ADDED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW UP ON THE QUESTION. BEGIN ASKED ME WHETHER I COULD RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN THE NEXT TIME I WAS IN DAMASCUS. I SAID I WOULD DO SO. (COMMENT: I WAS PREPARED TO STRESS THAT I THOUGHT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE ICRC; HOWEVER, BEGIN WAS EMOTIONAL ABOUT THE ISSUE AND WENT INTO GREAT LENGTHS ABOUT THE REASONS FOR ISRAELI CONCERNS, DRAWING ON THE PROBLEMS IN 1973-74. I DID NOT FEEL I COULD ON THIS OCCASION SAY THAT IT

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WAS BEST TO STICK ONLY TO THE ICRC. END COMMENT.)
SHARON STRESSED THAT THE RETURN OF ISRAEL'S PRISONERS
AND THE REMAINS HELD BY THE SYRIANS OF THOSE WHO HAD
DIED WOULD BE PREREQUISITE FOR ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
FROM LEBANON.

12. AT ONE POINT, I ASKED BEGIN WHETHER THE FATE OF 8000



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
INRE-00 /026 W

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O 052253Z OCT 82
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3370
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

PALESTINIAN PRISONERS HELD BY THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE USED
IN SOME WAY TO BRING ABOUT PLO EVACUATION FROM LEBANON.
THIS WAS A MISTAKE ON MY PART, EVEN IF STIMULATED BY
KIMCHE. BEGIN MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS HOPING TO
USE THESE PRISONERS AS A BARGAINING TOOL, AMONG OTHERS,
TO BRING ABOUT NOT ONLY THE RELEASE OF ISRAELI POWS
BUT SYRIAN JEWS AS WELL. GROVE

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06828 041415Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 INRE-00)/025 W

O 041326Z OCT 82

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9041

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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BEIRUT 6828

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

ROME PASS AMB. HABIB FROM DRAPER

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PINS, MILI, MOPS, SY, LE, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: BRIEFING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON TALKS IN
DAMASCUS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. JOINED BY AMB. DILLON AND ROSS, I BRIEFED PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL TODAY, OCTOBER 4, ON THE TALKS HABIB AND I HAD
IN DAMASCUS WITH SYRIAN MFA OFFICIALS AND WITH ASSAD.
GEMAYEL WAS IN AHURRY, AND MY BRIEFING WAS THEREFORE
SKETCHY (GEMAYEL WAS TO MEET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER-
DESIGNATE SHAWFIQ WAZZAN A FEW MINUTES LATER IN PREPARATION
FOR TODAY'S SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

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3. GEMAYEL WAS PHILOSOPHICAL ABOUT THE HARD SYRIAN
POSITION, HAVING HALF EXPECTED IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS WOULD
BE DIFFICULT, BUT HE HOPED THEY WOULD NOT BE PROTRACTED.
HE SAID THAT, WITH THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT,
HE WOULD BE SETTING UP A TEAM OF "EXPERTS" TO WORK WITH
US CLOSELY ON "STAGE II" RELATING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF
ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE ASKED

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WHETHER THE LEBANESE COULD BE HELPFUL RIGHT AWAY, AND I RESPONDED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD DEFINITELY HAVE A KEY ROLE TO PLAY--PARTICULARLY IN WORKING ON THE SYRIAN POSITION--BUT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO HOLD UP ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS UNTIL MY RETURN FROM CONSULTATIONS IN ISRAEL, WHICH I INTENDED TO BEGIN ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5. I ALSO SAID THAT I EXPECTED TO HEAR FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON.

4. FOR HABIB: I DID DESCRIBE TO GEMAYEL ASSAD'S OWN ACCOUNT OF THE EPISODE AT THE FEZ SUMMIT FOLLOWING THE RECEIPT BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION OF ACABLE FROM BEIRUT SUGGESTING THAT THE LEBANESE HANDS WERE TIED AND ASSAD'S REACTION TO THIS. PERHAPS BECUASE HIS TIME WAS LIMITED, GEMAYEL DID NOT RESPOND. HE DID UNDERSTAND ASSAD'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL "IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL". HE UNDERSTOOD IT BUT DID NOT LIKE IT,

5. AS OUR MEETING BGROKE UP, GEMAYEL DISCLOSED THAT THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE OF THE NEW CABINET WILL INCLUDE A CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND A STATEMENT THAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE



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PLO PRESENCE IS NULL AND VOID.
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2

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CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8563

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

USLO RIYADH

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LM/PS/CR/IR

Date: 11/6/97

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FOIA Exemptions

☐CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.

PA Exemptions

☐DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

DAMASCUS 07177

9302566

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON ONLY AFTER

- ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ACCORDING TO MONTE CARLO

- RADIO REPORT

REF: FBIS ITEM JN31357

1. MONTE CARLO RADIO CORRESPONDENT LOUIS FARES, OFTEN
USED BY THE SARG AS AN UNOFFICIAL CONDUIT, REPORTED AT
1400 GMT OCTOBER 4 THAT SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW ITS FORCES
FROM LEBANON ONLY AFTER THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER
LEAVES. FARES SAID HE OBTAINED THIS "OFFICIAL SYRIAN
REACTION" TO THE DISCUSSION OCTOBER 3 BETWEEN PRESIDENT
ASSAD AND AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM A SENIOR SYRIAN OFFICIAL.

2. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY SARG HAS USED FARES REPORT
TO CORRECT SPATE OF CURRENT MEDIA REPORTS FROM RADIOS

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ISRAEL AND MONTE CARLO (FARES) AND OTHERS THAT
INDICATE SYRIANS READY TO PULL OUT OF LEBANON ACCORDING
TO SCENARIO THAT POINTS TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH
ISRAELIS.

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Date Printed: 02/24/1997

DOC NUMBER: 82DAMASC07177


CHANNEL: n/a

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3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

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*** Current Classification *** 

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PAGE 01 DAMASC 07155 01 OF 03 031922Z
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O 031914Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
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SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8549
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY ☒ DECLASSIFY
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DECAPTIONED

ROME FOR HABIB

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SYRIAN
- PRESIDENT ASSAD

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS
DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF HUME MET WITH
PRESIDENT ASSAD WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHAR'A AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
QADDOUR FOR 1-1/2 HOURS BEGINNING 1245 OCTOBER 3. HABIB

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REVIEWED FOR ASSAD U.S. HOPE FOR QUICK, SIMULTANEOUS
WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE PUT FOR-
WARD THE IDEA OF A QUICK, TIME-PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
FOREIGN FORCES AS THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY TO REACH THIS
OBJECTIVE AND ARGUED THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION CALLING FOR
PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT PRACTICAL AND WOULD
POSTPONE ANY REAL PROGRESS. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM NOW IN ORDER
TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST

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PEACE. ASSAD REVIEWED THE BASES OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS MADE BY HABIB ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ASSAD IN JUNE SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED NOW. ASSAD STUCK FIRMLY TO SYRIAN POSITION THAT FEZ PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" REQUIRES TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEFORE SYRIANS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS WITH LEBANESE. ASSAD SAID THE ISRAELI PRESENCE PREVENTED THE LEBANESE FROM EXERCISING THEIR FREE WILL, BUT ONCE THE ISRAELIS WERE GONE, SYRIAN DEPARTURE COULD BE ARRANGED QUICKLY IF THE LEBANESE WANTED IT. HABIB SAID THAT HE WAS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE. DRAPER WOULD RETURN TO LEBANON AND SHORTLY PROCEED TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT ALL OF THE RECENT BAD EVENTS DID NOT CHANGE THE BASIC FACTS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS STILL THE SAME--AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN LEBANON WITH AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT ITS OWN TERRITORY. ASSAD AND HABIB HAVE AGREED ON THIS FOR MORE THAN A YEAR. WHATEVER HAS HAPPENED IN RECENT WEEKS, IT IS NECESSARY TO RETURN TO THIS BASIC OBJECTIVE



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AND SEEK ITS ACHIEVEMENT. WHEN HABIB LEFT WASHINGTON AFTER SEEING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. PRIORITIES WERE:

-- TO MOVE ISRAELI FORCES OUT OF BEIRUT AND THE BEIRUT AREA.

--TO SEEK TO INCREASE THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON.

-- TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES SO THAT WE CAN CONCENTRATE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROCESS; PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS PUT FORWARD A U.S. MIDEAST PEACE INITIATIVE, THE FEZ SUMMIT HAS TAKEN DECISIONS, AND THE PRESIDENT NOW WANTS TO ACCELERATE THE PEACE PROCESS.


4. HABIB REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER TALKS WITH MINISTER SHAR'A, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS EFFICIENT AND BUSINESS-LIKE ALTHOUGH IN THE END AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO DAMASCUS TO CONCENTRATE ON A PRACTICAL PLAN TO WITHDRAW ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE STATED THAT PRESENCE OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON CANNOT BE EQUATED, FOR THEIR PRESENCE IS BASED ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS, BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER ALL EXTERNAL FORCES SHOULD DEPART AT THE SAME

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TIME. THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD PRESENTED (TO SHAR'A)
THE IDEA OF A VERY QUICK TIME-PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
EXTERNAL FORCES, AND HE HAD HEARD THAT SYRIA INSISTED
ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FIRST AND THEN WITHOUT
DELAY SYRIA AND ELBANON COULD NEGOTIATE FOR THE DEPARTURE
OF SYRIAN FORCES. ASSAD INDICATED THAT THIS WAS AN
ACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE SYRIAN POSITION.



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 INRE-00 /026 W
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O 031917Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8550
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

ROME FOR HABIB

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

5. HABIB SAID HE BELIEVED THIS SYRIAN POSITION MAKES THE PROBLEM OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT NEEDS TO BE. IT IMPOSES A BURDEN ON THE LEBANESE BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ISRAELI FORCES. HE UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN POSITION, BUT HE WAS HOPING TO FIND A WAY TO OVERCOME IT AND REACH A SOLUTION IN "A TECHNICAL MANNER." HE WAS HOPING NOT TO BE LEFT WITH A PROCESS WHICH WOULD BE LONGER, HARDER, AND PERHAPS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. HABIB SAID HE REMEMBERED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY THAT SYRIA DID NOT REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF ITS FORCES IN LEBANON TO

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PRESERVE ITS INFLUENCE AND THAT SYRIA WAS READY TO LEAVE LEBANON AT LEBANESE REQUEST. IN ADDITION, HE TOOK THE WORDS OF THE FEZ DECISION "IN LIGHT OF" TO BE A DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY ALLOWING FOR SIMULTANEOUS BUT UNLINKED ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE DAMASCUS WITHOUT EXCHANGING A FEW WORDS WITH THE PRESIDENT SO THAT WHEN HE RETURNED TO REPORT IN WASHINGTON, AND WHEN AMBASSADOR DRAPER CONSULTED IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, THEY WOULD BE SURE OF

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HAVING A CLEAR VIEW OF SYRIAN POLICY FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

6. IN CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, HABIB SAID THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS UNLESS THE EXTERNAL FORCES DEPART. HE SAID THE LEBANESE PROBLEM INTERFERES WITH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THEREFORE, ONE MUST WORK TO ACCELERATE THE SOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD DEMONSTRATED HIS INTENT TO ACCELERATE THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; WHETHER ONE AGREED WITH HIS PEACE PROPOSAL OR NOT, MOST PEOPLE REALIZE IT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES. HABIB CONCLUDED THAT WE NOW FACED AN IMPASSE AS TO HOW TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES, AND ASKED ASSAD WHETHER THERE WASN'T A FASTER, BETTER, TOTAL WAY OF DOING THIS THAN THAT SUGGESTED BY ASSAD'S COLLEAGUES IN THE PREVIOUS DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. HE ASKED ASSAD TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE IN HIS RESPONSE, RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO FIND AN EARLY SOLUTION WITH SYRIAN COOPERATION.

7. ASSAD BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY REAFFIRMING SYRIA'S DESIRE FOR THE UNITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON. THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE ARE ONE PEOPLE WITH THE



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SAME PAST AND THE SAME FUTURE, EVEN IF THEY HAVE BECOME TWO INDEPENDENT STATES. SYRIA AND LEBANON ARE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND JOINED BY COMMON DEFENSE TREATY AGAINST ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST EITHER. ON THIS BASIS, SYRIA ACTED TO HELP PUT AN END TO THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS REINFORCED BY THE PLEA OF MANY LEBANESE CITIZENS ASKING FOR SYRIAN HELP. THEREFORE, THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES TO THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES AND THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. SYRIA, AS A MATTER OF FRATERNITY WITH THE LEBANESE, HAD MADE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY SACRIFICES THAT NO ONE ELSE HAD BEEN WILLING TO MAKE. (ASSAD NOTED, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT FORMER LEBANESE PRESIDENT SULEIMAN FRANJIEH HAD TOLD ASSAD THAT U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO LEBANON DEAN BROWN HAD SAID TO FRANJIEH THAT ALL UNITED STATES COULD OFFER WAS TO SEND SHIPS TO CARRY THE LEBANESE TO CANADA. HABIB INTERJECTED THAT HE REMEMBERED HEARING THIS STORY FROM ASSAD BEFORE, BUT IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT NOW U.S. SHIPS WERE CARRYING AMERICAN MARINES IN THIS DIRECTION TO BEIRUT.)


8. CONTINUING, ASSAD SAID THAT THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND UNITY OF LEBANON REQUIRES CONDITIONS OF STABILITY FOR LEBANESE CITIZENS. LONG EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF LEBANESE STABILITY IS

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TO CONTINUATION OF GOOD, FRIENDLY, COOPERATIVE, AND
FRATERNAL TIES BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON. IF THE UNITED
STATES REALLY WANTS TO HELP LEBANON, IT SHOULD NOT WEAKEN
THESE TIES. SYRIA HAS NO UNILATERAL AMBITIONS IN
LEBANON. AMBASSADOR HABIB INTERJECTED THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAS NO DESIRE TO WEAKEN SYRIAN-LEBANESE TIES AND
BELIEVES THAT HEALTHY RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LEBANON'S STABILITY. HE SAID WE WERE
ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS OF IMPROVED LEBANESE-SYRIAN RELATIONS
AFTER AMIN GEMAYEL'S ELECTION. ASSAD ACKNOWLEDGED



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SYRIA HAD SUPPORTED AMIN GEMAYEL.

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ACTION SS-25

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8551
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 03 OF 03 DAMASCUS 07155

EXDIS

ROME FOR HABIB

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

9. ASSAD THEN WENT BACK TO THE JUNE 10 CEASE-FIRE DISCUSSIONS, SAYING THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD AT THAT TIME READ ASSAD A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHICH CONTAINED A THREE-POINT AGREEMENT: A CEASE-FIRE; AN EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON; AND AN IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO A CERTAIN LINE. NOTHING WAS ASKED OF SYRIA OR SYRIAN FORCES. IT IS IMPORTANT, SAID ASSAD, THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF ONE STATE AGREES WITH THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF ANOTHER STATE, WHICH IS A GREAT POWER AND A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE AGREEMENT.

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10. HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE DOES NOT JUSTIFY WHAT HAPPENED, AND WOULD OFFER NO EXCUSES, BUT STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT THE U.S. DESIRE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT ACTED IN BAD FAITH. HABIB WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS A PRACTICAL MAN WHO HAD TRIED TO PURSUE BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TO BE PATIENT. DESPITE WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST, WE ARE NOW FACED WITH AN IMMEDIATE SITUATION. THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO THINK OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL

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EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD GOTTEN THE SARG VIEW THE DAY BEFORE, BUT IT WAS NOT PRACTICAL OR COGNIZANT OF THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY. IN HIS OPINION, IT WAS NECESSARY TO MOVE QUICKLY AND DEAL WITH WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED A PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION ANT TO AVOID POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS. HABIB THEN POSED A QUESTION TO ASSAD: WHEN MINISTER SHAR'A SPEAKS OF NEGOTIATING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IMMEDIATELY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHAT DOES "IMMEDIATE" MEAN? WOULD THERE BE A PRIOR ARRANGEMENT SO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL COULD BE CONCURRENT WITH, AT SOME STAGE OF, OR AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL?

11. ASSAD EXPLAINED THE LEBANESE ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE THEIR FREE POLITICAL WILL BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE. THE LEBANESE CANNOT EXERCISE THEIR FREE WILL WITH ISRAELI BAYONETS POINTED AT THEIR HEADS. ONCE THE ISRAELIS DÉPART, THE SYRIANS WILL BE WILLING IMMEDIATELY TO SIT WITH THE LEBANESE AND WILL CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY OVER REACHING AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL, IF THE LEBANESE WANT IT. BUT THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT THAT GOL ACTIONS ARE THE FREE WILL OF THE LEBANESE.

12. TURNING TO THE FEZ CONFERENCE, ASSAD SAID IT WAS



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NOT NECESSARY TO REVIEW ALL OF THE DISCUSSIONS THERE BUT HE WANTED TO CITE ONE EXAMPLE WHICH SHOWED THAT WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS DOING IS NOT OF ITS OWN FREE WILL. DURING THE FEZ CONFERENCE, ASSAD SAID, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION RECEIVED A CABLE FROM BEIRUT SAYING THAT OUR BROTHERS IN SYRIA KNOW THAT WE ARE NOT TAKING DECISIONS NOW ON OUR OWN. ASSAD SAID HE TOLD THE HEAD OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION THAT SYRIA WOULD LISTEN TO THE OPINION OF THE GOL WHEN IT WAS TRULY FREE. AFTER SEEING THIS CABLE FROM BEIRUT, ASSAD SAID, HE PROPOSED A (NEW) FORMULA FOR THE FEZ DECLARATION WHICH MEANT THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT FOR THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE TO DISCUSS SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON ONLY AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE. AS FOR THE PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF," ASSAD SAID HE THOUGHT HE KNEW ARABIC BETTER THAN HABIB, AND HE COULD EXPLAIN THAT IT MEANT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW BEFORE SYRIA COULD WITHDRAW. ASSAD SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO FACE THE SAME PROBLEM OF AMBIGUITY THAT HAD ARISEN WITH RESOLUTION 242, AND HE WANTED TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WHAT THIS LANGUAGE IN THE FEZ DECLARATION MEANT.

13. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN POSITION FULLY, BUT THAT WHETHER HE AGREED WITH IT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. HE SAID HE WOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS AND THAT AMBASSADOR DRAPER

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WOULD PROCEED TO LEBANON AND ISRAEL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL. IN HIS OPINION, IT WILL BE NECESSARY NOW TO PAUSE AND TO DO SOME THINKING. HABIB WOULD BE SURE THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD WOULD BE KEPT INFORMED BY EITHER AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, AMBASSADOR DRAPER OR HIMSELF.

14. THIS MESSAGE NOT REPEAT NOT SEEN BY HABIB AND DRAPER.

15. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI



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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ROUND TWO WITH THE
- SYRIANS, OCTOBER 2

REF: (A) DAMASCUS 7135; (B) DAMASCUS 7136

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY
AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF
HUME, MET FOR 90 MINUTES AT 1900 HOURS, OCTOBER 2--
SECOND TIME IN ONE DAY--WITH SYRIAN ACTING FOREIGN
MINISTER FAROUK SHAR'A, SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR
AND MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR QABBANI. SUBSTANTIVE

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SUMMARY REFTEL A. END SUMMARY.

3. SHAR'A BEGAN THE MEETING BY READING VERBATIM A
PREPARED TEXT, WHICH HE SAID WAS THE SYRIAN RESPONSE
TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE
LEBANESE PROBLEM, AS PUT FORWARD IN THE MORNING
MEETING (REF B). THE SIX SPECIFIC POINTS WERE:

--THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS LEAGAL FROM THE ARAB

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AND LEBANESE POINTS OF VIEW; SYRIA AND LEBANON ARE BOTH MEMBERS IN THE ARAB LEAGUE AND HAVE SIGNED THE LEAGUE'S DEFENSE TREATY;

--THE JUNE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AT THE 40 KM LINE WAS YET TO BE FULFILLED AS AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD ACKNOWLEDGED;

--THE HABIB PROPOSALS FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL EQUATE THE ISRAELI/SYRIAN PRESENCE. HABIB IS NOT ONLY NOT A MEDIATOR BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, BUT IS GIVING AN ADVANTAGE TO ISRAEL THROUGH HIS PROPOSED IDF INTERIM WITHDRAWAL TO THE 40 KM LINE, WHICH IS PROPOSED FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL "WHILE WE (SYRIA) REMAIN MERE SPECTATORS."

--AMBASSADOR HABIB DOES NOT SEEM THROUGH HIS PROPOSALS TO BE TAKING THE ROLE OF AN IMPARTIAL MEDIATOR.

--THE PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" USED AT FEZ CLEARLY MEANS THE ISRAELIS MUST WITHDRAW FIRST; OTHERWISE THE ARAB DELEGATES WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE WORKING PAPER STIPULATING SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES, THE IDF AND ADF, WHICH THEY IN FACT REJECTED.

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--SYRIA IS PREPARED NOT TO STAY IN LEBANON MORE THAN ONE DAY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT SYRIA TO STAY.

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB RESPONDED BY FIRST POINTING OUT THAT THE JUNE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WAS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THAT NOW WE MUST DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS WE FIND IT. HE THEN ARGUED THAT THE PHRASE "IN LIGHT OF" COULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWALS, AND EMPHASIZED THAT SYRIAN INSISTENCE ON PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEFORE AGREEING TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WITH LEBANON MEANS NO CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN THE IMMEDIATE OR

FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AMBASSADOR HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIANS CONSIDRE A SCENARIO IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW BY A DATE CERTAIN AND THEN THE SYRIANS WOULD AGREE WITH THE LEBANESE ON WITHDRAWAL, WITH THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS THEN TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE SAME ROUGH TIME FRAME. ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBILITY WAS EXPLORED IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT WAYS THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION, SHAR'A NEVER ACCEPTED IT AND INSISTED THAT SYRIAN-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS ON WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE ONLY AFTER COMPLETE IDF WITHDRAWAL.

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5. AMBASSADOR HABIB POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH SYRIA'S MAIN OBJECTIVE--THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID HE WOULD TRY ANY FORMULA AS LONG AS THE SAME FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI TROOPS TOOK PLACE AT THE SAME TIME. WHEN HABIB TRIED OUT THE IDEA THAT SYRIA WOULD AGREE IN ADVIACE TO WITHDRAW ON A DATE ONE DAY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SHAR'A ON THIS OCCASION ONLY SHOWED A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY; HE SAID THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED, BUT HE COULD NOT RESPOND TO IT OFFICIALLY WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS (HE LATER

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HARDENED EVEN ON THIS POSITION).

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

6. SHAR'A REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT SYRIAN WATHDRAWAL MUST NOT APPEAR TO OCCUR UNDER ISRAELI PRESSURE. THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCES IN LEBANON CANNOT BE EQUATED; PROPOSALS FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SEEN BY OBSERVERS TO EQUATE THE TWO. HE SAID THAT SYTIA WOULD BE UNWILLING EVEN TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL TO DEPART, THEREFORE, UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI FORCES ACTUALLY HAD DEPARTED LEBANON, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL COULD BE REACHED IN ONE DAY.

7. AMBASSADOR HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF A GOL REQUEST ELIMINATED THE APPEARANCE OF AN EQUATION WITH THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SHAR'A DEMURRED. HABIB REPEATEDLY

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ARGUED THAT THE SYRIAN FORMULA WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS CAN CITE LEGALITY; HOWEVER, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO STAND ON FORM BUT TO GET RESULTS. THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL FORMULA IS WORKABLE; THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES BEARS THE DANGER OF MILITARY INCIDENTS, ESCALATION, AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON. IN ADDITION, DELAYED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEBANESE INTERNAL POLITICS. SHAR'A SUGGESTED HABIB TURN HIS PROPOSAL AROUND AND TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT IF THEY WANT SYRIA OUT OF LEBANON, ISRAEL SHOULD GET OUT FIRST.

8. WHEN SHAR'A RAISED THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS IN LEBANON, AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVED BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE PALESTINIANS IN THE SAME TIME FRAME AS THE DEPARTURE OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES.

9. HABIB BROUGHT UP THE DANGEROUS SITUATION CAUSED BY REINFILTRATION INTO LEBANON OF PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS FROM SYRIA, SOME OF WHOM TRANSITED DAMASCUS AIRPORT. REINFILTRATION IS A VIOLATION OF THE EVACUATION AGREEMENT, AND THE UNITED STATES IS AN INTERESTED PARTY BECAUSE OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN THAT AGREEMENT AND ITS DESIRE NOT TO HAVE EVENTS IN LEBANON GET OUT OF HAND. SHAR'A DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF REINFILTRATION, BUT HABIB PRESSED SHAR'A TO GET THE SYRIANS, IN THEIR OWN INTEREST, TO CONTROL THESE MOVEMENTS. QADDOUR SAID THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION FOR THE UNITED STATES TO RAISE WITH LEBANON, NOT WITH SYRIA, HABIB SAID FIRMLY THAT THE SYRIAN HAD THE CAPACITY TO CONTROL THESE PEOPLE AND SHOULD DO SO.

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10. HABIB BROUGHT THE DISCUSSION BACK TO THE SEARCH FOR A FORMULA FOR SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS SHOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR A POLITICAL SPECTACLE GLORIFYING THEIR ROLE AND AGREE TO A MECHANICAL PLAN FOR SIMULTANEOUS DEPARTURE. IT SHOULD BE A TRANSPORT PROBLEM. SPEAKING TO THE FEAR REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED BY SHAR'A THAT ISRAEL WOULD RENEGE ON ANY PROMISE TO WITHDRAW, HABIB SAID THE PARTIES HAD TO PRESUME COMPLIANCE BUT COULD MAKE SELF-ENFORCING ARRANGEMENTS AS A SAFEGUARD. IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEPART UNDER THE PLAN, SYRIA WOULD NOT BE COMMITTED TO DEPART. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SYRIAN RATIONALE AND POSITION, INCLUDING THE HISTORIC LEBANESE-SYRIAN ASSOCIATION, BUT HE DID NOT ACCEPT IT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A PRACTICAL SOLUTION

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THAT COULD GET THE NECESSARY RESULTS. THE LEBANESE CRISIS HAS GONE ON TOO LONG, AND A QUICK, EARLY SOLUTION IS NEEDED.

11. SHAR'A STUCK TO HIS POSITION. HE ASKED HABIB TO CONSIDER THE SARG APPROACH AND PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FIRST. SHAR'A EXPLAINED THAT SARG INSISTED ON ITS POSITION BECAUSE IF ISRAEL DID NOT WITHDRAW FIRST, THE IDF COULD GO RIGHT BACK INTO LEBANON IN 24 HOURS, WHILE SYRIA, BEING WEAKER, COULD NOT DO THAT. SHAR'A SAID ISRAEL HAD THE UPPER HAND IN LEBANON, BUT SYRIA COULD ONLY LEAVE WITH HONOR. HABIB REJOINED THAT AN HONORABLE SOLUTION IS ONE THAT GIVES NO PARTY AN ADVANTAGE. HE PROMISED TO REPORT THE SARG POSITION FAITHFULLY TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THE SARG APPROACH WAS WORKABLE.

12. HABIB SAID HE PLANNED TO LEAVE DAMASCUS AT 7 A.M. OCTOBER 3 UNLESS HE WERE GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. (NOTE: EARLY A.M. OCTOBER 3 THE

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MFA INFORMED US THAT ASSAD WOULD SEE HABIB ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 3.)

13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, LE, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: GEMAYEL ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI
RELATIONS

REF: BEIRUT 6769 ✓

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REVIEWED LEBANESE-ISRAELI
RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HPS PARTY OCTOBER 1.
ALTHOUGH HE HAD MET WITH SHARON AND SHAMIR BEFORE HIS
ELECTION, HE COULD NOT DO SO AGAIN. AT URGING OF HABIB

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DRAPER, HE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, TO CONTINUED EXISTANCE
OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY COMMISSION AND INDICATED
HE PLANNED TO ADD A FOREIGN MINISTRY ADVISOR. REGARDING
ISRAELI OFFICE IN BAABDA, HE SAID HE FOUND IT EMBARRASSING
AND "UNFAIR" BUT CONFESSED HE WAS POWERLESS TO DO
ANYTHING ABOUT IT. DRAPER SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED TO
DAVID KIMCHE SEPTEMBER 30 THAT ISRAELIS REMOVE IDF
COMPONENT ENTIRELY AND MOVE CIVILIAN (MFA) PART ELSE-
WHERE. ON FUTURE OF SA'D HADDAD, BEMAYEL SAID HE COULD**UNCLASSIFIED**

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DEAL WITH HIM IF HE ACCEPTED TERMS OF A GENERAL AMNESTY, WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY. IF ISRAELIS TRIED TO BLACKMAIL OR BARGAIN ON HADDAD'S BEHALF, THEY COULD KEEP HIM. HE DID NOT, HE EMPHASIZED, WANT TO BE EITHER ISRAEL'S ENEMY OR ITS PUPPET. COMMENT: GIVEN VARIETY OF ISRAELI, LEBANESE, AND ARAB PRESSURES GEMAYEL IS FEELING ON RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, IT IS NATURAL THAT HE IS SEEKING TO MOVE SLOWLY. IF DRAPER'S SUGGESTIONS TO KIMCHE DO NOT BRING MOVEMENT ON THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE MAY HAVE TO TAKE ISSUE OF BAABDA OFFICE UP FORMALLY WITH ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY.

3. IN THE COURSE OF EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH AMBASSADORS HABIB, DILLON AND DRAPER AND ROSS ON PHASE II OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS OCTOBER 1, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL INITIATED A DISCUSSION OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

4. GEMAYEL SAID HE WANTED TO BE FRANK AND CLEAR ABOUT RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE HAD MET WITH SHARON AND SHAMIR BEFORE HIS ELECTION. NOW, FOLLOWING HIS ELECTION, IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT HE HAVE ANY KIND OF CONTACT HIMSELF. HIS MEETING WITH SHARON AND SHAMIR HAD BEEN HIS FIRST AND LAST. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES".

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5. GEMAYEL SAID HE WELCOMED CONTACTS WITH ANYONE AS LONG AS THEY WERE NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. THIS WAS WHY HE HAD REFUSED AN ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO SEND LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL TO ISRAEL FOR TRAINING. IN HIS EXPERIENCE, 10 PERCENT OF THOSE LEBANESE WHO HAD HAD TRAINING IN ISRAEL HAD RETURNED "BRAINWASHED". GEMAYEL CONFIDED THAT, FURTHERMORE, HE FELT MOSSAD TO BE VERY ACTIVE IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. IT HAD, HE FELT MANIPULATED THE MASSACRES. THE "LEBANESE FORCES" HAD BECOME DEPENDENT ON SHARON AND MOSSAD, AND THEY HAD WANTED TO GET THEM INTO THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. SINCE HE HAD NOT BEEN A "LEBANESE FRONT" OFFICIAL, HE HAD TAKEN NO FORMAL STAND, BUT HE HAD INTIMATED IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE "LEBANESE FORCES" TO STAY OUT.

6. GEMAYEL SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE CONTINUING TO INSIST ON CONTACT WITH HIM, AND, TO MAKE HIS POINT, HE SHOWED HABIB AND HIS PARTY A LETTER THAT DAVID KIMCHE HAD SENT HIM DURING A VISIT TO LEBANON SEPTEMBER 30. THE ISRAELIS WERE PRESSING FOR A QUICK PEACE PROCESS. UNTIL THIS POINT WAS CLARIFIED, GEMAYEL SAID, THE LEBANESE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

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7. HABIB ASKED WHETHER THE EXISTING LEBANESE-ISRAELI
MILITARY COMMISSION WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. HGEMAYEL
SAID THAT THIS COMMISSION, SET UP UNDER HIS PREDECESSOR,
WAS STILL IN EXISTENCE. HE WOULD MAINTAIN IT TO DEAL
WITH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND AND THUS FACILITATE

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THE LEBANESE AND US GOAL OF RESTORING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. IN BACKING ITS WORK, HE SAID, HE WOULD WAIT TO SEE WHAT PROPOSALS EMERGED AND THEN DECIDE WHAT HE COULD ACCEPT IN THE LIGHT OF LEBANESE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. TO ASSIST THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON TECHNICAL, LEGAL, AND FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, AN OFFICER OF THE LEBANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD SERVE WITH THEM IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY.

8. GEMAYEL INITIALLY TOLD HABIB THAT THIS COMMISSION

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WOULD CEASE TO EXIST WHEN PHASE II DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL BEGAN, BECAUSE WE WOULD HAVE CREATED OTHER STRUCTURES TO MANAGE THE PROBLEMS OF PHASE II. HABIB AND DRAPER URGED GEMAYEL TO MAINTAIN THE COMMITTEE AS A SAFETY VALVE EVEN AFTER THE BEGINNING OF PHASE II. GEMAYEL FINALLY AGREED THAT THE COMMISSION COULD CONTINUE TO EXIST, PERHAPS BECOMING PART OF THE ILMAC MECHANISM OVER TIME. HE REMAINED CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE DEGREE OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS THE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT. HABIB SAID THE ISRAELIS WOULD SURELY WANT MORE THAN GEMAYEL WAS PROPOSING, BUT HE STRESSED IT WAS UP TO GEMAYEL TO DECIDE WHAT WAS REASONABLE.

9. NOTING THAT IN A SEPTEMBER 30 MEETING WITH DAVID KIMCHE, HE HAD FELT THE STRENGTH OF ISRAELI DESIRE FOR CLOSE RELATIONS, DRAPER THEN RAISED THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF THE ISRAELI OFFICE IN BAABDA. GEMAYEL IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THIS OFFICE WAS AN EMBARRASSMENT, DESCRIBING ITS PRESENCE AS "UNFAIR". HOWEVER, HE SAID, HE WAS POWERLESS TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HABIB QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR SUCH AN OFFICE, SUGGESTED IT BE RAISED IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI COMMISSION. DRAPER ADDED THAT HE HAD TOLD KIMCHE HE SHOULD THINK OF REMOVING THE IDF PRESENCE. (IDF PRESS OFFICE AND GUARD UNIT, INCLUDING AN APC) ENTIRELY AND MOVING THE CIVILIAN PRESENCE (TWO ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LIAISON OFFICERS) ELSEWHERE.

10. HABIB THEN RAISED THE ISSUE OF SA'D HADDAD AND HIS FUTURE. GEMAYEL SAID HE WAS A PUPPET OF THE ISRAELIS, BUT COULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL AMNESTY. IF HADDAD ACCEPTED THE TERMS OF THE AMNESTY,

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GEMAYEL WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE DEALING WITH HIM. UNTIL SUCH TIME, HOWEVER, HE WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH HIM. IF THE ISRAELIS FELT RESPONSIBLE FOR HADDAD AND TRIED TO BARGAIN ON HIS BEHALF, THEY COULD KEEP HIM IN ISRAEL. GEMAYEL WOULD COUNTENANCE NO BLACKMAIL OR BARGAINING ON THIS SCORE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ISRAELIS LIFTED THEIR HAND FROM HADDAD, THEN HE COULD DEAL WITH HIM. HE DID NOT, HE EMPHASIZED, WANT TO BE EITHER ISRAELI'S ENEMY OR ITS PUPPET.

11. COMMENT: GEMAYEL IS CLEARLY CAUGHT AMIDST A VARIETY OF PRESSURES-ISRAELI, LEBANESE, AND ARAB-- ON RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IT IS NATURAL IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE SEEK TO WORK SLOWLY. TO HIM, DIRECT CONTACTS ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION, AT THIS TIME, AND THE BAABDA OFFICE IS AN EMBARRASSMENT. HE COULD PROBABLY BE CONVINCED TO ACCEPT A DISCREET ISRAELI MFA PRESENCE, SINCE THE ISRAELIS WILL PROBABLY WANT TO ADD MFA REPRESENTATIVES TO THEIR SIDE OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY COMMISSION, AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR HOUSING AND OFFICE SPACE WOULD FLOW NATURALLY FROM THAT FACT. A CONTINUED IDF PRESENCE, HOWEVER, NEITHER HE NOR WE SHOULD ACCEPT. IF DRAPER'S SUGGESTIONS TO KIMCHE DO NOT RESULT IN CONCRETE ACTION IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IT MAY WELL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO TAKE THE ISSUE UP WITH THE ISRAELIS FORMALLY. AS GEMAYEL SAID, HE HAS NO MEANS OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE ON IT. DILLON

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/RAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, SY, US

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ROUND ONE WITH THE SYRIANS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF HUME, MET WITH SYRIAN ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER FAROUK SHAR'A, SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR, AND AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR QABBANI AT 9 A.M. OCTOBER 2 FOR TWO HOURS. SECOND MEETING, EVENING OF OCTOBER 2, WITH SAME PARTICIPANTS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTTEL. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

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3. AMBASSADOR HABIB BEGAN BY NOTING THAT SINCE HE LAST VISITED DAMASCUS, THERE WERE BAD EVENTS THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED, BUT THERE ARE NOW GOOD PROSPECTS. IN HIS LAST TALK WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AND FONMIN KHADDAM, BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THE SAME GENERAL OBJECTIVE: SUPPORT FOR A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON. WE HAVE COME THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD, AND TIME HAS COME TO RE-

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AND PRACTICAL WAY TO DEVELOP VERY PRECISE AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS AS TO WHAT IS TO BE DONE. THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT WAS SUCCESSFUL, AND SYRIA CAN TAKE SOME OF THE CREDIT FOR THIS. WE HAVE HOPE THAT BEIRUT WILL BE THE FREE AND OPEN CAPITAL OF LEBANON AND THAT ONE CAN THEN STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT CAN EXPAND ITS AUTHORITY TO ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZE BORDERS.

4. HABIB ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS: THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL, THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF BEIRUT AND THE CAMP MASSACRES. SEVERAL PIECES HAD TO BE PUT TOGETHER IN ORDER TO RESUME OUR COURSE. NOW WE HAVE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, THE OPENING OF THE BEIRUT AIRPORT AND THE ELECTION OF A NEW LEBANESE PRESIDENT BY CONSENSUS--ALL SIGNS OF PROGRESS. AMIN GEMAYEL HAS TAKEN MEASURES THAT ARE CALMING AND SENSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE DULY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. GEMAYEL WILL SOON HAVE A CABINET. THE LAF AND ISF HAVE EFFECTIVELY MOVED INTO BEIRUT, AND EAST AND WEST BEIRUT ARE OPEN FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS. FINALLY, THE SITUATION MUST BE DEVELOPED IN WHICH TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES CAN BE ACHIEVED IN A BRIEF TIME.

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5. ALL OF THE PROBLEMS IN LEBANON, HABIB POINTED OUT, INTERFERED WITH EFFORTS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. NOW WE ALSO HAVE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT.

6. AMBASSADOR HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT EITHER THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO MOVE QUICKLY NOW, OR ALL MUST FACE THE UNHAPPY PROSPECT OF A CONSTANT SERIES OF INCIDENTS WITHOUT REAL PURPOSE. BECAUSE OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF OPPOSING ARMED FORCES (ISRAELI AND SYRIAN) IN LEBANON AND THE EFFORT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO SPREAD ITS AUTHORITY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE QUICKLY. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES--ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO. AS PRESIDENT ASSAD MADE CLEAR AT FEZ, AND EARLIER IN CONVERSATION WITH HABIB, SYRIA DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT ITS FORCES REMAIN IN LEBANON. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE LEBANESE POLICY OF REQUESTING WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES, AND NOW THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY WANTS TO BE MASTER OF ITS OWN TERRITORY. AMBASSADOR HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT PRACTICAL MATTERS, ABOUT A SCENARIO TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. AFTER DESCRIBING THE U.S. ROLE AS A UNIQUE ONE OF MEDIATION VALUABLE TO SYRIA, LEBANON AND OTHER PARTIES, HE SAID THAT IN ORDER TO

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MEDIATE AND FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF JOINT OBJECTIVES, WE MUST KNOW PRACTICALLY WHAT THE SYRIANS ARE PREPARED TO DO IN A SPECIFIC TIME FRAME. HABIB SAID HE CAME TO DAMASCUS IN THE HOPE OF FINDING SPECIFIC ANSWERS. HIS PURPOSE IS NOT JUST TO TALK BUT TO HELP IN REACHING DECISIONS. THE PARTIES SHOULD NOT LET THE PARTIAL SUCCESS ALREADY ACHIEVED BE LOST. EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROCESS CAN MOVE FORWARD.

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

7. IN RESPONSE TO MINISTER SHAR'A'S QUESTION ON THE POSITION OF ISRAEL, AMBASSADOR HABIB SIAD THAT FROM THE BEGINNING ISRAEL HAS STATE IT DOES NOT WISH TO STAY IN LEBANON, AND HE HAS PUT THIS ASSURANCE IN HIS POCKET. ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE IS THE STARTING POINT OF

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HIS PRESENT DISCUSSION, BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO FIND A WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO EQUATE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES, AS THEIR PRESENCES ARE ON ENTIRELY DIFFERENT BASES, BUT CONCURRENT ACTIVITIES ARE STILL POSSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTS THE SYRIAN POSITION THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD COME ABOUT AS THE RESULT OF A LEBANESE REQUEST, AND THE LEBANESE POLICY IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN REASONABLE. AT THE TIME OF THE BEIRUT EVACUATION, THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED THAT THE SYRIAN

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FORCES, UNLIKE THE PLO UNITS, COULD GO ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. THE GOAL OF SAVING BEIRUT WAS ACCOMPLISHED. NOW THE ISSUE IS HOW TO ARRANGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO UNITS WITHOUT SYRIA'S IGNORING ITS HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON. THE SIMPLE ANSWER IS THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AS TO WHO GOES FIRST. HABIB UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE USED THE WORD "SIMULTANEITY." THE ISRAELI POSITION HAS WAVERED ON THIS POINT, SOMETIMES ASKING FOR PRIOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT IT CAN PROBABLY BE DEALT WITH AS A TECHNICAL PROBLEM.

8. IN RESPONSE TO SHAR'A'S QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS COULD BE DONE, HABIB SAID IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSTRUCT A SELF-ENFORCING PLAN BY WHICH SPECIFIC ACTIONS MUST HAPPEN AT SPECIFIC TIMES. THAT WAY ONE CAN KNOW IF EVERYONE IS ON BOARD. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS CONSTRUCTION OF A PRACTICAL PLAN, ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE SYRIANS WILL NOT CONCLUDE A DIRECT AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS.

9. SHAR'A RAISED THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI VIOLATION OF THE BEIRUT EVACUATION PLAN, ASKING "HOW WE COULD RELY ON ISRAELI PROMISES?" HABIB ADMITTED THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH ISRAEL'S ACTION, BUT AFTER STRONG STAND OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, AS OF TODAY NO ISRAELI FORCES WERE IN EAST OR WEST BEIRUT OR NORTH OF THE KHALDE TRIANGLE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ITS AUTHORITY ACCEPTED IN THE CAPITAL. AMIN GEMAYEL SEES THIS AS A VITAL FIRST STEP IN PROVING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CAN BE THE GOVERNMENT OF ALL LEBANON. THE UNITED STATES AGREED TO SEND THE MNF BACK TO BEIRUT AS A KEY ELEMENT IN CREATING APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS IN THE CITY. THE MNF

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WILL LEAVE WHEN ASKED, AND IT OPERATES ONLY WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES ALONGSIDE.

10. EXPANDING ON THIS THEME, HABIB SAID THAT PREVENTING AN ISRAELI REENTRY INTO LEBANON MAY DEPEND ON THE USE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, WHETHER UNIFIL OR SOMETHING ELSE, AND A BUFFER ZONE IS PROBABLY NEEDED. ANY FUTURE MANDATE FOR UNIFIL WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT EQUAL TO ITS TASK, AND IT MUST OPERATE ALL THE WAY TO LEBANON'S SOUTH BORDER, PERHAPS IN A ZONE 40 KILOMETERS DEEP. WHEN SHAR'A SUGGESTED THIS WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A STRONG CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HABIB DISAGREED AND SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONTRADICTION AS LONG AS THE FORCE SERVED AT LEBANON'S REQUEST AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE ZONE. THIS NEW MANDATE COULD CORRECT THE WEAKNESS OF THE EARLIER UNIFIL OPERATION. HABIB SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF PALESTINIAN CROSS-BORDER ACTION REMAINED, ALTHOUGH HE HOPED THAT THE PLO HAD DECIDED ITS FUTURE LIES IN POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY ACTION. THE UNITED STATES HAS SUPPORTED THE EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S TERM IN ORDER TO PRESERVE A TOOL THAT COULD BE MADE MORE USEFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF A BUFFER ZONE POLICED BY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

11. WHEN ASKED IF SYRIA HAS A PROBLEM WITH AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE BUFFER ZONE, SHAR'A SAID THIS WAS A LEBANESE PROBLEM. QADDOUR THEN RAISED THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE MUST BE A BUFFER ZONE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER, NOT JUST THE LEBANESE SIDE. HABIB REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT BY STATING THAT THE CONCEPT OF A BUFFER ZONE IN LEBANON ALREADY EXISTS, THAT THIS

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

CONCEPT CAN BE CHANGED TO ASSURE ASSERTION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY UP TO THE BORDER. SPECIFICALLY, THE HADDAD ENCLAVE WOULD HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED. HABIB FIRMLY DENIED QADDOUR'S SUGGESTION THAT THIS IDEA MIGHT BE A COVER FOR SOME CONTINUING ROLE FOR HADDAD. ALL LEBANESE, INCLUDING HADDAD, THE MILITIA AND THE PHALANGE, MUST BE BROUGHT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

12. AFTER AN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION AS TO STATUS OF THE PROPOSALS FOR 400 KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE THAT WERE INCLUDED IN CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD ON JUNE 10, HABIB STRESSED THAT IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS AND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES STATED THAT ITS GENERAL POLICY AIMED AT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON.

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13. SHAR'A THEN STATED THAT SYRIA AGREES ON A CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE DIFFERENCE IS ON THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS. AFTER REVIEWING SYRIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS FROM WORLD WAR I TO 1976, SHAR'A SAID THAT THE SYRIAN FORCES ENTERED LEBANON IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DECISION AND THAT SINCE THEN HAVE STOPPED THE CIVIL WAR AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF LEBANON. ISRAEL THEN INVADDED LEBANON, HOWEVER, WENT PAST THE 40 KILOMETER LINE, AND CLASHED WITH SYRIAN FORCES IN THE BIQA'. NOW THE UNITED STATES REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. SHAR'A REPEATEDLY OBJECTED TO WHAT HE THOUGHT

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WAS HABIB'S ATTEMPT TO "LINK" SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS, GIVING THE FAMILIAR SYRIAN LINE THAT ISRAEL AND SYRIA WERE IN LEBANON ON ENTIRELY DIFFERENT BASES.

14. HABIB DENIED THAT HE USED THE WORDS LINK OR EQUATE, SAYING HE SIMPLY WANTED THINGS TO HAPPEN IN THE SAME TIME FRAME, SIMULTANEOUSLY. LATER, HABIB RETURNED TO THE SAME POINT, EXPLAINING THAT WHEN WE CANNOT PRODUCE FORMAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WE NEED TO CREATE A SERIES OF PARALLEL ACTIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT SYRIA HAS ALWAYS SAID IT WOULD COMPLY WITH A GOL REQUEST TO WITHDRAW. SHAR'A AGREED, BUT THEN SUGGESTED THAT U.S. POLICY WAS CREATING A HOSTILE FEELING AGAINST SYRIA IN LEBANON, TO WHICH HABIB REPLIED THAT IT IS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WHICH WANTS EXTERNAL FORCES TO LEAVE AND THE SYRIANS HAVE ALWAYS SAID THEY WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A REQUEST.

15. SHAR'A THEN RAISED, AND REPEATEDLY CAME BACK TO, THE

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CONDITION THAT ISRAELI FORCES MUST WITHDRAW FIRST. HE SAID THAT THE PHRASE "IN THE LIGHT OF" USED IN THE FEZ DECLARATION ON LEBANON MEANS THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FIRST. EACH TIME HABIB FIRMLY REJECTED THAT IDEA, CITING THE SOPHISTICATED AMBIGUITY OF THE PHRASE--WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN INTENTIONAL--AND THE NEED TO AVOID A LEGALISTIC APPROACH. HE STRESSED THAT DEMAND BY EITHER SYRIA OR ISRAEL THAT THE OTHER WITHDRAW FIRST WOULD IN REALITY PRECLUDE A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. PRESSING THIS ARGUMENT, HABIB SAID HE HAD TOLD BEGIN AND SHARON THAT DEMANDS FOR PRIOR WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT WORK. THE IMPORTANT POINT NOW IS TO CONSTRUCT A PLAN THAT WILL BRING THE LEBANESE CRISIS TO AN END. THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS SHOULD WORK TOGETHER ON A PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL, AND THE UNITED STATES COULD HELP GET ISRAELI ARRANGMENTS MADE IN THE SAME TIME FRAME. IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO DELAY.

16. SHAR'A AGAIN RAISED THE JUNE 10 CEASE-FIRE DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, SAYING THAT IT CONTAINED NO MENTION OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS VIOLATED. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL HAS CERTAINLY BEEN RAISED AT OTHER TIMES, AND IN ANY CASE THE JUNE 10 PROPOSAL WAS NEVER RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF AN AGREEMENT. NOW, SAID HABIB, PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE THAT INCLUDE SAFEGUARDS AND PROVIDE FOR THE TIMED WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS FROM LEBANON. OTHERS COULD DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF SAAD HADDAD AND THE PLO COMBATANTS. THE U.S. ROLE IS THAT OF AN INTERMEDIARY, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE

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LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS.

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

17. WHEN SHAR'A AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT U.S. POLICY WAS UNDERMINING THE STATUS OF SYRIA IN THE REGION, HABIB ARGUED THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, THE VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM TO WASHINGTON IN JULY, HIS TWO-HOUR TALK WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND U.S. READINESS TO WELCOMETHE FEZ COMMITTEE ALL INDICATE U.S. CONCERN FOR SYRIAN RELATIONS. HE SAID HE EXPECTS TO SEE A REAL IMPORVEMENT IN U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS IN THE COMING MONTHS. HE REPEATED THAT HE WANTED

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TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE OF WHO MUST LEAVE LEBANON FIRST AND STRUCTURE A PLAN FOR PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES. UNLESS SYRIA AGREES TO THIS CONCEPT, HIS MISSION WILL FAIL.

18. IN RESPONSE TO A REMARK BY SHAR'A THAT THE PROBLEM

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WAS THE ISRAELI FAILURE TO HONOR PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS, HABIB SAID HE WOULD REDEDICATE HIMSELF TO WORK FOR TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. TO GIVE HIM A CHANCE OF SUCCESS, HOWEVER, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SYRIA DROP ANY PRECONDITIONS. WHAT THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE NEGOTIATE CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CONCURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. HABIB INDICATED HE HOPED THE WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE COMPLETED BY NOVEMBER 1.

19. SHAR'A CHARGED THAT U.S.-SYRIAN COOPERATION SEEMS TO BE A LONE-WAY STREET BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SYRIAN INTERESTS. HABIB ARGUED THAT SYRIA'S MAIN INTEREST IN LEBANON IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND THAT THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IF SYRIA INSISTED ON PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. PROBABLY THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY TO ARRANGE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE IN TWO STAGES: FIRST TO SOME NEGOTIATED POINT: SHAR'A SUGGESTED THAT POINT COULD BE THE 40 KILOMETER LINE AND HABIB INDICATED THAT WAS A POSSIBILITY. THERE COULD BE ALTERNATIVES, BUT SUCH A PLAN COULD CALL FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL BY OCTOBER 15 AND THE FINAL STAGE BY NOVEMBER 1. IF THE PARTIES AGREE ON THIS CONCEPT, THE REST OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE MERELY A TECHNICAL PROBLEM.

20. IN CONCLUSION, SHAR'A INDICATED THE MAIN ISSUE IS TO GUARANTEE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS PROPOSED ANOTHER MEETING AT 7 P.M., AT WHICH TIME THEY COULD RESPOND TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S IDEAS.

21. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

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DECAPTIONED

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, JO, US, EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST PEACE: SHARON COMMENTS ON THE
- REAGAN INITIATIVE

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

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2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING SEPTEMBER 25 DESIGNED FOR DIS-
CUSSIONS OF MNF DEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON, DEFENSE MINISTER
SHARON OFFERED AMBASSADOR HABIB (UNSOLICITED) A SUMMARY OF
ISRAEL'S POSITIONS FOR ANY FUTURE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH
HE STRESSED, "WOULD NOT BE HELD ON THE BASIS OF THE REAGAN
PLAN": ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES WILL REMAIN IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA FOR FIVE YEARS AND BEYOND; ISRAEL WILL REMAIN
IN CHARGE OF INTERNAL SECURITY AS IT RELATES TO ANTI-
TERRORIST ACTTVITTES; ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO

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GROW AND MULTIPLY; THERE CAN BE NO CHANGE WHATSOEVER IN THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM; THERE MUST BE NO "SECOND" PALESTINIAN STATE, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL HAS NO OBJECTION TO KING HUSSEIN AS RULER OF JORDAN, "WHICH IS IN FACT ALREADY A PALESTINIAN STATE." THIS OBVIOUSLY PREPLANNED STATEMENT TO HABIB UNDOUBTEDLY WAS MADE AT BEGIN'S SUGGESTION. IN A BRIEF RESTRICTED MEETING WITH HABIB, DRAPER, AND LEWIS ON PREVIOUS DAY, BEGIN HAD MADE A POINT OF SAYING DEFIANTLY THAT "ISRAEL WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE WITH ANYONE ON THE BASIS OF THOSE "NAHARIYA PROPOSALS" (I.E., THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN DELIVERED TO BEGIN BY LEWIS AT NAHARIYA ON AUGUST 31). ASSUMING THAT HABIB WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AT FUTURE STOPS IN ARAB CAPITALS, BEGIN AND SHARON WANTED TO BE SURE THAT HABIB HAD A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LONG SESSION SEPTEMBER 25 AT SHARON'S FARM ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE DEPLOYMENT IN BEIRUT WITH AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER (SEPTTEL), DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON ASKED HABIB IF HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WITH KING HUSSEIN WHEN HE VISITED JORDAN AFTER LEAVING ISRAEL. HABIB REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS INTENTION. HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE IS INTENDED TO HELP COMPLETE THE CAMP

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DAVID ACCORDS WHICH FROM THE BEGINNING ENVISAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF JORDAN. HABIB SAID THAT HE MAY BE BACK IN THE AREA TO DISCUSS SOME ASPECTS OF THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS AT A LATER POINT. SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL AGREED THAT IT WAS ALWAYS THE INTENTION OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS TO GET JORDAN IN AND TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE SAID IT CAN'T BE DONE NOW, HOWEVER, BECAUSE "WE CAN'T AND WON'T ACCEPT" SOME OF THE KEY POINTS IN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. HE ASKED HABIB IF HE WAS GOING TO BE INVOLVED PERSONALLY AND ADDED THAT HE WOULD ALWAYS WELCOME AMERICANS AS A PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD ESPECIALLY WELCOME PHIL HABIB IN THAT ROLE. HABIB SAID HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE, BUT NOT ON THIS TRIP. HABIB SAID THAT THE SEQUENCE AS WE SEE IT IS TO GET THE LEBANON QUESTION SOLVED QUICKLY AND THEN MOVE ON TO AN ACCELERATED PROCESS OF PEACE MAKING. IF WE CAN MOVE QUICKLY THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO GET EGYPT TO REJOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. SHARON THEN BEGAN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A PREPARED PRESENTATION ON THE REAGAN PROPOSALS, UNDOUBTEDLY AT BEGIN'S SUGGESTION:

A. MILITARILY, HE SAID, IDF TROOPS WILL STAY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR FIVE YEARS AND BEYOND. HE SAID THAT THE CDA CALLS FOR ONLY "A" WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO

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SPECIFIC LOCATIONS WHERE THEY WILL REMAIN FOR FIVE YEARS AND BEYOND THE FIVE YEAR POINT. AMBASSADOR LEWIS CHALLENGED THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE CDA, NOTING THAT THE AGREEMENT SAYS RATHER THAT NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE WORKED OUT "FOR THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND

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INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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BEYOND." THERE IS NO LANGUAGE IN THE CDA WHICH SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZES ISRAELI FORCES TO REMAIN IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BEYOND THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD, THOUGH NEITHER IS THAT PRECLUDED. AFTER SOME BRIEF DEBATE, SHARON CONTINUED:

"THE AUTONOMY TALKS ARE NOT WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. YOU HAVE DR. BURG," HE SAID. BUT, HE SAID THE FACTS ARE: "ISRAEL WILL MAINTAIN A MILITARY PRESENCE IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA FOREVER." HE SAID THE

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IDF COULD BE ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIED LOCATIONS BUT WOULD HAVE FREE MOVEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES. THERE WILL BE A WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. HABIB NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT OF FREE MOVEMENT WAS NOT IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. HABIB SAID LET US START FROM THE CONCEPT OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY, NOT START WITH THE ASSERTION OF A MILITARY PRESENCE. HE SAID THE PRESENCE ITSELF DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO SECURITY. SHARON SAID THE CONCEPT OF THE PRESENCE IS NOT NEGOTIABLE.

B. SHARON THEN TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF INTERNAL SECURITY. HE SAID ISRAEL WILL COORDINATE WITH THE LOCAL INHABITANTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER, BUT NOT FOR CONTROLLING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. HE SAID ISRAEL RECEIVED A LESSON IN LEBANON WHERE THERE MAY BE AS FEW AS 275,000 PALESTINIANS COMPARED WITH WELL OVER A MILLION IN THE WEST BANK/GAZA. BUT EVEN SUCH A SMALL GROUP, WHEN BACKED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE RICH ARABS ARE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE A WAR. HE SAID IT WAS NOT JUST THE SIZE, BUT ALL THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF A HOSTILE STATE WHICH CREATE THE PROBLEMS. "AFTER LEBANON, ISRAEL CAN SEE THAT THE DANGER OF TERRORISM REMAINS GRAVE." IN CONCLUSION, HE SAID THAT WHEN IT COMES TO SECURITY THERE IS NO QUESTION OF A JORDANIAN ARMY OR PALESTINIAN ARMY: ONLY THE ISRAELI ARMY WILL PROVIDE FOR ISRAELI SECURITY.

C. SETTLEMENTS. SHARON SAID THE NEXT ISSUE IS SETTLEMENTS. SETTLEMENTS ARE PART OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY. SECURITY DOES NOT REST ONLY ON F-15'S AND TANKS, IT IS BASED ON MOTIVATION. "WE DEVELOP MOTIVATION TO DEFEND THE TERRITORIES" BY NEEDING TO DEFEND OUR POPULATION (RESIDENT IN THEM). (NOTE: AN OLD SHARON THEME.)

D. JERUSALEM. ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT NO CHANGE WHATSOEVER IN THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, ACCORDING TO SHARON.

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E. PALESTINIAN STATE. SHARON SAID THERE WILL BE NO SECOND PALESTINIAN STATE. PALESTINIANS CAN BE JORDANIAN CITIZENS, BUT THERE WILL BE NO PALESTINIAN STATE. SHARON THEN ASKED HABIB TO TELL KING HUSSEIN THAT SHARON NEVER INTENDED TO THREATEN HIM. HE SAID IF THE PALESTINIANS WANT HIM AS THEIR KING, THAT IS FINE WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION TO OVERTHROW OR UNDERCUT KING HUSSEIN. IF THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS WANT HIM THAT'S FINE WITH ISRAEL.

5. COMMENT: SHARON'S PRESENTATION HAD ALL THE MARKINGS OF A PREPARED TEXT. HE HIT THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ISSUES THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO HIM, AND REFERRED OCCASIONALLY TO KIMCHE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED HABIB TO BE A PART OF THE NEXT ROUND IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND HE TOOK CARE TO ASSURE HABIB THAT HE WOULD BE WELCOMED. HE WAS, HOWEVER, NOT INVITING HIM BACK TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE REAGAN PROPOSALS. SHARON WAS ALSO INDICATING THE CONVICTION THAT HE WILL BE AN ACTOR IN THE NEXT ROUND. LEWIS

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE JAWIPS/CR/IR Date: 11/1/97
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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, SY, XF, IS

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: SYRIANS MAKE CLEAR THEIR
POSITION ON STAGE TWO1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. JOINED BY DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, DCM RUGH AND POLOFF HUME, I HAD SOME THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF MEETINGS TODAY, OCTOBER 2, WITH SYRIAN ACTING FONMIN FAROUK SHAR'A, IN TWO SESSIONS. SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR AND MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR QABBANI WERE WITH SHAR'A. I ALSO HAD A CANDID EXCHANGE AT LUNCH WITH QADDOUR. THIS WILL BE A SUMMARY REPORT OF THESE

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DISCUSSIONS AND THE SYRIAN POSITION: DETAILS BY SEPTELS.

3. IN ESSENCE, I REVIEWED WITH THE SYRIANS WHAT HAD OCCURRED IN THE LEBANESE SITUATION OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, ACNOWLEDGED OUR DEEP CONCERN AND UNHAPPINESS OVER SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS THE MASSACRES IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND THE ISRAELI INVASION OF WEST BEIRUT, BUT WENT ON TO STRESS THAT WE NOW HAD AN

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OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY TO PUT LEBANON AND ITS NEW GOVERNMENT ON A NEW FOOTING. THIS COULD WORK TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE SYRIANS. OUR UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN A WAY THAT WOULD ENHANCE NATIONAL UNITY AND ALLOW IT TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY UP TO ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. THE RECENT IDF DIS-ENGAGEMENT FROM THE BEIRUT AREA, THE OPENING OF THE BEIRUT AIRPORT, AND THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT TO SUCCEED THE ASSASSINATED BASHIR GEMAYEL ALL CONSTITUTED EVIDENCE THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. THE CITY OF BEIRUT IS OPEN FOR MOVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS.

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4. I PROCEEDED TO SUGGEST THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD, GIVEN A READINESS BY ALL PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE CARRYING OUT OF A SCENARIO--A "PLAN"--WHICH WOULD HAVE BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS. SUCH WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS--WHICH IN MY VIEW MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN TWO STAGES--WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FEZ SUMMIT DECISIONS AND WITH THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF SYRIA, FOR EXAMPLE. I REMINDED MY

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LISTENERS THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HIMSELF HAD SAID THAT SYRIA DID NOT HAVE TO KEEP ITS TROOPS IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO ASSERT INFLUENCE THERE. THE UNITED STATES, I STRESSED, HAD A UNIQUE CAPABILITY, BECAUSE OF ITS INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL AND THE NEW LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, TO PLAY A USEFUL FACILITATIVE AND MEDIATORY ROLE. AS FOR ISRAEL, I SAID THAT WE COULD PLAY ON THE PERSISTENT THEME THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD PROJECTED: THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO STAY IN LEBANON ANY LONGER THAN WAS NECESSARY.

5. WE GOT INTO A LIVELY GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH SHAR'A AND QADDOUR. SHAR'A REGISTERED THE FOLLOWING MAIN THEMES, AMONG OTHERS, TO DESCRIBE THE PRESENT SYRIAN POSITION (I WILL COMMENT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON HOW WE MIGHT DEAL FURTHER WITH THEM AS THE PROCESS GOES FORWARD):

A. THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON MUST NOT BE EQUATED WITH THAT OF ISRAEL. THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IS LEGAL, HAVING BEEN ENDORSED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE AND BY LEBANON. THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT OF AN INVADER.

B. SYRIA--WHEN IT WITHDRAWS FROM LEBANON --MUST NOT BE SEEN AS HAVING DONE SO IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI PRESSURE.

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C. BY THE SAME TOKEN, ISRAEL MUST NOT BE SEEN AS
HAVING "GAINED" THROUGH ITS INVASION OF LEBANON. ANY
FORMULA BRINGING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
EXTERNAL FORCES MUST NOT ALLOW ISRAELIS TO SAY THAT
THEY WENT INTO LEBANON TO ELIMINATE THE PLO AND SYRIAN
PRESENCES THERE AND SUCCEEDED.

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FROM HABIB

D. THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, ARE IN PRINCIPLE READY TO
WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOL AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE FEZ SUMMIT DECISION TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF) MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN

"IN THE LIGHT OF" (OR IN THE CONTEXT OF) THE ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL.

E. TRANSLATED, THIS MEANS THAT ALL EFFORTS TO
BRING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY
FORCES FROM LEBANON MUST GIVE PRIORITY TO THE WITH-
DRAWAL OF THE IDF. THIS WAS THE SENSE OF THE FEZ
SUMMIT DECISION; OTHERWISE, THE SUMMIT WOULD HAVE
APPROVED THE LEBANESE WORKING PAPER WHICH EQUATED IDF
WITHDRAWAL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FORCES.

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F. MOVING TO DETAILS, THE SYRIANS WOULD BE PREPARED
IN PRINCIPLE TO LEAVE LEBANON ONE DAY AFTER FINAL
AND COMPLETE IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HOWEVER,
EVEN HERE, THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT BE READY TO DISCUSS
IN ADVANCE WITH THE LEBANESE THE CONDITIONS AND TIMING
OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL; THEY WOULD ONLY DO SO AFTER IDF
WITHDRAWAL, ALTHOUGH SHAR'A ASSURED ME THAT THIS WOULD
BE NO PROBLEM AND COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, ASSUMING
THAT THE GOL DOES NOT WANT SYRIA TO STAY.

G. THE SYRIANS ARE NOT ATTRACTED TO THE CONCEPT OF A
TWO-STAGE WITHDRAWAL ON DISENGAGEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE,
THEY SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWING THE IDF
INITIALLY TO THE 40 KILOMETER ZONE--WITH UNIFIL OR AN
INTERNATIONAL FORCE CONTROLLING THAT ZONE--WOULD BE A
CONCESSION AND GIFT TO ISRAEL.

6. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I PUT FORWARD NUMEROUS COUNTER-
ARGUMENTS AND STRESSED PARTICULARLY MY CONCLUSION THAT
AN ELEMENT OF "SIMULTANEITY" WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF
THERE WAS TO BE ANY SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL
MILITARY FORCES, INCLUDING THE IDF. I SAID I THOUGHT
IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE IDF WOULD WITHDRAW
FROM LEBANON WITHOUT SOME UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SYRIANS
ALSO WOULD WITHDRAW MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY. I
SAID THAT IF WE DID NOT SOMEHOW OVERCOME THIS IMPASSE,
THE REAL LOSERS WOULD BE THE LEBANESE AND PERHAPS ALSO
THE SYRIANS; SINCE A CONTINUED NEAR CONFRONTATION IN
LEBANON COULD PRODUCE ESCALATION, MILITARY INCIDENTS,
A HIGH RISK OF WIDER WAR, AND A LONG-TERM OCCUPATION OF
LEBANON.

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7. WHEN THE SYRIANS REITERATED THAT THEIR POSITION WAS BASED ON "LEGALITY" AND THEIR OWN FORM OF "LOGIC," I REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT WE HAD TO BE PRACTICAL AND PRAGMATIC AND DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS IT WAS. WE HAD TO DEVISE A PRACTICAL PLAN WHOSE MEASURES WOULD BE SELF-ENFORCING AND REINFORCING. WHEN THE SYRIANS ARGUED THAT, GIVEN THE EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI REFUSALS TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENTS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BUILD IN STRONGER SAFEGUARDS, I AGREED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SEEK STRONGER ARRANGEMENTS. THE SYRIANS PER- SISTENTLY ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT UNDER- STAND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE OPERATING, AND THE FACTS OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE ASSOCIATION. I JUST AS CONSISTENTLY SAID I UNDERSTOOD THEIR POSITION AND THEIR STRESS ON LEGALITIES, BUT THAT DID NOT MEAN THAT I BELIEVED THEY COULD BE A BASIS FOR A SENSIBLE OUTCOME. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT THE SYRIAN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW WITH THEIR HONOR INTACT.

8. FOR THE RECORD, I EXPLORED IN DETAIL A SCENARIO UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK AND OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM THE ISRAELIS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL ON A DATE CERTAIN; I PROPOSED IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE GOL AND THE SYRIANS ALSO NEGOTIATE BEFOREHAND THE TERMS AND TIMING OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, SO THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCES OF SYRIA AND ISRAEL COULD OCCUR "WITHIN THE SAME TIME FRAME." SHAR'A IN THE END REJECTED EVEN THIS PRACTICAL PROPOSAL, AT LEAST FOR NOW.

9. I ENDED OUR NIGHT SESSION BY SAYING THAT WE (MEANING AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND MYSELF) WOULD, OF COURSE, COMMUNICATE THE SYRIAN POSITION TO THE LEBANESE AND TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT THAT IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE A GOOD BASIS FOR MAKING PROGRESS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I WAS DISAPPOINTED. IT WAS LEFT CLEAR--ALTHOUGH IMPLICITLY--

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THAT AFTER THIS INITIAL STAKING OUT OF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, WE WILL HAVE TO RETURN WITH SOME ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS.

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (M/IPS/CR/IR) Date: 11/6/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: OUTCOME OF OCTOBER 30 CONSULTATIONS WITH
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, I MET FOR 90 MINUTES TODAY, OCTOBER 30, WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN. THEY WERE JOINED BY FORMER UN PERMREP GHASSAN TUENI AND A NOTETAKER. REPORTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THE MNF AND ON GEMAYEL'S TRIP TO MOROCCO ARE IN SEPTTELS.

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3. I PRESSED HARD THE NOTION THAT LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD COMMENCE ON ABOUT MONDAY, NOV. 8. THEY HAD MUCH TO PREPARE BEFORE THEN, I SAID, AND OFFERED MY FULLEST HELP. SURPRISINGLY, THERE WERE NO VISIBLE OJECTIONS. IN CONNECTION WITH OUR DISCUSSION OF A US CRASH PROGRAM TO IMPROVING THE LAF'S CAPABILITIES QUICKLY, I CONDITIONED GEMAYEL ON THE NEED TO SEEK FUNDING FROM THE SAUDIS. GEMAYEL WAS PREOCCUPIED AND TIRED. HE IS

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GREATLY CONCERNED THAT SHI MUSLIM LEADERS HAVE DEVELOPED A BASIC MISCONCEPTION (WHICH HE SUSPECTS HAS BEEN PRODUCED BY MOSSAD MACHINATIONS). THIS MISCONCEPTION IS THAT THE LIMITED, SIMULTANEOUS PULLBACK OF IDF AND SYRIAN FORCES WHICH GEMAYEL WANTS AS A FIRST STEP WOULD BE IN FACT TURN OUT TO BE THE "FINAL STEP," AND THAT THE SHIA AREAS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND IN THE BEKA'A WOULD REMAIN IN THE HANDS OF FOREIGN OCCUPATION FORCES, WHILE ONLY THE MOUNTAINS OF LEBANON WOULD BE FREE. I PROMISED I WOULD DO WHAT I COULD WITH SHI POLITICIANS TO COMBAT THIS CANARD.

4. THE BASIC OUTLINE OF OUR EXCHANGES WAS AS FOLLOWS:
 -- A. LEBANESE- AMERICAN COORDINATION AND TUENI'S ROLE
 ----- I URGED THAT THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM MEET WITH ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO GO OVER THE PROBLEMS I KNEW IT WOULD FACE IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. I PRESSED HARD TO START THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WITH US PARTICIPATION AS EARLY AS MONDAY, NOV. 8. GIVEN THE TOUGHNESS OF THE ISRAELI POSITION, RAPID LEBANESE-AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS ON STRATEGY AND ON THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUES WERE ESSENTIAL. GEMAYEL CONFIDED THAT THIS WAS WHY HE HAD INSISTED THAT I PARTICIPATE PERSONNALLY IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETINGS. THE

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LEBANESE TEAM, HE SAID, WAS READY. ITS COMPOSITION WOULD BE DECIDED AT THE CABINET MEETING TO BE HELD SUNDAY, OCTOBER 31. GHASSAN TUENI WOULD BE APPOINTED THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS DIRECTLY, HE WOULD SUPERVISE THE LEBANESE POSITIONS. (I AM MEETING TUENI TONIGHT.)

--B. ASSISTANCE TO LAF
 ----- IN DISCUSSING THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE LAF IN THE SOUTH, I STRESSED THAT THE US WAS GOING TO ASSIST LEBANON IN REEQUIPPING FOUR BRIGADES WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME. THIS WOULD GIVE THE LAF A REAL CAPABILITY EVEN BEFORE IT WAS LATER EXPANDED TO 40,000 PLUS MEN. I PROPOSED THAT WE AND THE LEBANESE APPROACH THE SAUDIS TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL FUNDING THE LEBANESE MIGHT NEED IN THIS REGARD. GEMAYEL, I EMPHASIZED, COULD COUNT ON WASHINGTON'S ENTIRE SUPPORT IN THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF SECURITY EFFORTS IN LEBANON. I RECOGNIZED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS FACING MANY DIFFICULTIES, BUT IT SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE GREAT SYMPATHY THAT LEBANON AND ITS PRESIDENT NOW ENJOYED IN A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. I REPEATED THIS THEME AT THE END OF THE MEETING, SAYING THAT OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS I HAD NEVER SEEN THE USG GEARING UP FOR SUCH RAPID

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ASSISTANCE ON SUCH A SCALE FOR ANY COUNTRY. GEMAYEL
EXPRESSED HIS DEEP APPRECIATION.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1448

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EXDIS

--C. GEMAYEL'S PROBLEMS WITH SHI'ITES OVER ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL

----- GEMAYEL STATED THAT A FULL TIMETABLE FOR THE VARIOUS
WITHDRAWALS WAS NEEDED. THIS, HE SAID, WAS NECESSARY TO
COUNTER A STRONG CAMPAIGN BEING ORGANIZED BY THE
SHI'ITES IN THE SOUTH, PERHAPS THROUGH MOSSAD MANIPULA-
TION. POLITICAL LEADERS LIKE KAMIL AL-AS'AD AND RELI-
GIOUS FIGURES LIKE SHAYKH SHAMS AD-DIN WERE AFRAID THAT
GEMAYEL WOULD ARRANGE ONLY A FIRST-STATE PULLBACK AND
THAT EVENTS WOULD CONSPIRE TO KEEP THE ISRAELIS IN SOUTH
LEBANON AND THE SYRIANS IN THE BEKAA. GUARANTEES O
FULL WITHDRAWAL WERE NEEDED FOR SUCH LEADERS. OTHER-
WISE, THEY COULD DESTROY THE NEGOTIATIONG PROCESS. I
REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE KIND OF PROBLEM THAT HIGH-

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LIGHTED THE NEED FOR RAPID COORDINATED NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE ISRAELIS, THE SYRIANS, AND THE PLO. I ALSO ASSURED
GEMAYEL THAT I WAS PLANNING TO SEE KAMIL AL-AS'AD AND
OTHER SHI'ITE LEADERS AND COULD BE HELPFUL IN COUNTERING
THIS CAMPAIGN.

-- D. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH

----- I REAFFIRMED THAT ISRAEL NOW ACCEPTED THAT UNIFIL
COULD PLAY A ROLE AS A CORDON AT THE

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NORTHERN EDGE OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. TUENI INTERJECTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD SOME IDEAS TO MAKE IT MORE MOBILE AND MORE FULLY INTEGRATED INTO LAF OPERATIONS. I MADE THE POINT THAT, WITH A ROLE FOR UNIFIL, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE LAF TO MOVE INTO THE WHOLE SOUTHERN AREA RIGHT UP TO THE BORDER USING ONLY ONE BRIGADE. GEMAYEL'S FACE SHOWED THAT HIS ENTHUSIASM FOR SUCH A SOLUTION WAS NOT TOTAL. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE MEETING, HE TRIED TO BOX ME INTO COMMITTING THE MNF TO DEPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH.

--E. NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA

----- (TUENI'S PAPER HAD TODAY CARRIED AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN WHICH, WHIPW DENYING SYRIA SOUGHT A SECURITY TREATY WITH LEBANON, ASSAD DID REPEAT THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW UNTIL AFTER ISRAEL HAD DONE SO.) GEMAYEL ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE TH US WAS PUTTING ON SYRIA. I REPLIED LEBANON HAD TO NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA, AND URGED THAT LEBANON REQUEST SYRIA TO CARRY OUT A LIMITEDPULLBACK IN PARALLEL WITH ISRAEL, AND MAKE THIS REQUEST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OR PRIORIT TO STARTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL (ON NOV. 8) KHADDAM HAD SIGNALLED A CHANGE IN SYRIA'S POSITION ON TALKS WITH LEBANON DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. I URGED GEMAYEL



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TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY THIS OFFERED.

--F. NEGOTIATIONS WITH PLO

----- I ASKED ABOUT WAZZAN'S TALKS WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVE SHAFIQ AL-HUT. WAZZAN CONFIRMED THAT AL-HUT HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM UPON HIS RETURN TO BEITUR AND HAD SAID THE PLO WAS WILLING TO ARRANGE THE DEPARTURE OF ITS FIGHTERS FROM THE BEKAA AND TRIPOLI AREAS. ALTHOUGH THIS INITIAL DISCUSSION HAD BEEN PRELIMINARY AND GENERAL IN NATURE, IT HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PLO'S READINESS TO ARRANGE THE DEPARTURE OF ITS FIGHTERS WAS GREATER THAN HAD BEEN THOUGHT. AS HE HAD IN DISCUSSING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, GEMAYEL STRESSED THAT THE US HAD AN ACTIVE ROLE TO PLAY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO, SINCE IT HAD MEANS OF PRESSURE NOT AVAILABLE TO LEBANON. I VOLUNTEERED THAT WE COULD HELP FIND DESTINATIONS FOR THE FIGHTERS, AS WE HAD IN THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS, AND SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS, ESPECIALLY THE COSTS OF RESETTLEMENT. WHAT WE COULD NOT DO WAS TO PROVIDE THE GUARANTEES THE PLO WAS LIKELY TO WANT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. GEMAYEL SAID LEBANON COULD DO THAT.

--G. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

----- IN DISCUSSING THE PLO'S POSITION, WAZZAN ARGUED THAT A TANGIBLE STEP BY THE ISRAELIS WOULD STRENGTHEN LEBANON'S HAND WITH BOTH SYRIA AND THE PLO. I RESPONDED

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THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, AN INITIAL PLO MOVE OUT OF THE
TRIPOLI OR BAALBECK AREAS WOULD BE EVEN MORE USEFUL
WITH THE ISRAELIS. LATER IN THE MEETING, WAZZAN ASKED
ME WHETHER I HAD BEEN ABLE TO RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

PARTIAL ISRAELI AND SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENTS AWAY FROM
THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD DURING THE TALKS IN ISRAEL. I
TOLD WAZZZAN THAT, FRANKLY, THE IDF WOULD NOT EVEN CON-
SIDER MOVING UNTIL LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS HAD BEGUN.
TUENI, LOOKING FOR SOMETHING MORE FEASIBLE, WONDERED
IF SOME KIND OF ANNOUNCEMENT COULD NOT BE MADE THAT
A PARTIAL DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE
AGENDA OF THESE TALKS. I TOLD HIM THIS WAS SOMETHING
THE LEBANESE COULD RAISE AT THE FIRST SESSION, BUT
THEY HAD TO KNOW THAT SHARON WAS VERY NEGATIVE ON THIS
IDEA. HE WOULD WANT OTHER CONDITIONS SATISFIED,
PARTICULARLY ON THE PLO EVACUATION, BEFORE HE WOULD
BE WILLING EVEN TO CONSIDER SUCH A PULL BACK. HOWEVER,
I SAID, LEBANON SHOULD TRY, BOTH WITH ISRAEL AND
WITH SYRIA. IN FACT, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO BROACH THIS

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IDEA WITH THE SYRIANS BEFORE BRINGING IT UP WITH THE
ISRAELIS. THE SYRIANS MIGHT BE MORE NEGATIVE
THAN THE ISRAELIS, SINCE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL INTO THE
BEKAA WOULD LEAVE THEM RELATIVELY MORE VULNERABLE THAN
PREVIOUSLY.

--H. ISRAELI PRESS ON ALLEGED "JOINT COMMITTEE"
---- WAZZZAN RAISED THE MISINTERPRETATION OF MY POSITION
IN THE ISRAELI PRESS REGARDING AN ALLEGED "JOINT
COMMITTEE." HE SAID A CLARIFICATION WAS NEEDED. I

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I SHOWED ALL A PROPOSED US CLARIFICATION, TO BE USED IF
ASKED (TEXT VIA SEPTTEL). GEMAYEL,
WAZZAN, AND TUENI EXPRESSED THEIR SATIFICTION. UPON
DEPARTING THE PALACE, I USED ITS THRUST IN ANSWER TO
QUESTIONS FROM THE WAITING LEBANESE JOURNALISTS (AND
ISSUED THE FULL TEXT FROM THE EMBASSSY).
DILLON

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JIDDA FOR HABIB

BEIRUT FOR DRAPER AND DILLON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MNF DEPLOYMENT -- ISRAELIS AGREE

- TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM AIRPORT

REF: A) TEL AVIV 14457 B) STATE 273141 (TOSEC 130012)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~2. KIMCHE TELEPHONED ME SHORTLY AFTER 5 P.M. SEPTEMBER 28
TO CONVEY THE GOI RESPONSE TO THE PRESENTATION I MADE TO
HIM AND SHARON EARLIER TODAY (REFTELS).3. KIMCHE SAID THAT BEGIN AND SHARON HAD AGREED TO RESPOND
FAVORABLY TO THE U.S. REQUESTS. THE IDF WILL WITHDRAW
COMPLETELY FROM THE BEIRUT AIRPORT BY TONIGHT AND ISRAEL
ACCEPTS THE POSITION THAT THERE WILL BE NO IDF USE OF THE

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AIRPORT EXCEPT IN EMERGENCIES.

4. KIMCHE SAID HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT
THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES MUST BE CERTAIN THAT THE IDF CAN
INDEED PERFORM EMERGENCY FLIGHTS WHEN REQUIRED AND THAT
A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING CASE-BY-CASE APPROVALS
QUICKLY IS ESTABLISHED. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SURE THESE
PROCEDURES COULD AND WOULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG THE MILITARY
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AND THAT I WOULD**UNCLASSIFIED**

RECOMMEND THAT THIS BE DONE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT DRAPER GET TOGETHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS EVENING WITH GENERAL DRORY TO COORDINATE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ACTUAL TIMING OF FINAL WITHDRAWAL TONIGHT AND THE TIMING FOR THE ENTRY OF THE U.S. MNF UNIT.

5. THE DEFINITION OF "EMERGENCIES" REMAINS TO BE AGREED AND I URGE THAT THIS DEFINITION BE CAREFULLY DEFINED AND AGREED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN DRAPER, THE LEBANESE, AND DRORY. SHARON HAS MENTIONED ILLUSTRATIVELY BOTH MEDEVAC EMERGENCIES AND EMERGENCY SUPPLY MATTERS, THOUGH HE CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THESE WERE NOT THE ONLY CATEGORIES. HAVING NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, I HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY THE DEFINITION HERE AND WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE THAT TO BE DONE IN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BY DRAPER.

6. COMMENT: IT'S A RARE OCCASION WHEN MY PESSIMISM ABOUT ISRAELI BEHAVIOR PROVES UNWARRANTED (E.G., REF A). I AM DELIGHTED IN THIS CASE TO BE PROVEN WRONG. RECALLING A COMMENT SHARON MADE TO HABIB LAST WEEK THAT: "OF COURSE IF PRESIDENT AMIN DOES NOT AGREE, THAT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER," I BELIEVE THAT THE CRITICAL STEP IN GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO YIELD WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY DRAPER'S MESSAGE TO AMIN THROUGH JOHNNY ABDU EARLY THIS MORNING (BEIRUT 6631),

[REDACTED]

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WHICH RESULTED LATER IN THE MORNING IN THE LEBANESE CLEARLY COMMUNICATING THEIR CHANGE OF POSITION TO THE IDF. FACED WITH THE NEWS THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT AGREE TO IDF USE OF THE AIRPORT, SHARON'S POSITION WAS GREATLY WEAKENED. THE UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE U.S. POSITION WAS CERTAINLY ALSO TELLING, MORE SO THAN USUAL BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL VULNERABILITY BEGIN CURRENTLY FEELS VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS.

7. POSTSCRIPT: AS I WAS COMPLETING THIS CABLE, HANAN BAR-ON CALLED TO SAY THAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF HAD JUST INFORMED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THEY CANNOT RPT CANNOT COMPLETE THE REMOVAL OF ALL THE EQUIPMENT AT THE AIRPORT UNTIL ROUGHLY MID-DAY TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29. BAR-ON STRESSED THIS IS PURELY A TECHNICAL DELAY, OCCASIONED BY THE INSTALLATION OF CERTAIN AIRPORT EQUIPMENT WHICH TAKES SOME TIME TO REMOVE. HE APOLOGIZED BUT SAID THAT THIS WAS THE VERY BEST THE CHIEF OF STAFF COULD DO UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. (OBVIOUSLY, THE IDF HAD NO INTENTION OF PULLING OUT OF THE AIRPORT COMPLETELY UNTIL BEGIN AND SHARON'S DECISION LATE THIS AFTERNOON; THEREFORE, THIS SLIGHT DELAY ADDITIONAL DELAY IS CREDIBLE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS.) DRAPER SHOULD COORDINATE PRECISE TIMETABLE WITH DRORY.

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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PAGE 01 STATE 273649 TOSEC 130021
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STATE 273649 TOSEC 130021

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE JERUSALEM TEL AVIV
INFO AMMAN ANKARA CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA LONDON PARIS RIYADH
ROME WHITE HOUSE SECDEF WASHDC USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK COMSIXTHFLT DIA WASHDC USNMR SHAPE BE
JCS WASHDC SEPTEMBER 28

QUOTE

BEIRUT 6653

EXDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES
FROM DRAPER --JIDDA FOR AMB HABIB

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS/ PINT, PINS, MILI MOPSS SY, LE, US IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MNF DEVELOPEMENTS SEPT 28

REF: STATE 273141 TOSEC 130012

1. (SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS AGREED TO ACT IN
HARMONY WITH OUR POSITION ON THE NEED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
FROM THE AIRPORT. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, I BRIEFED
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SEPTEMBER 28 (JUST PRIOR TO OUR REG-

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ULAR 1200 MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING) ON OUR
POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE ISRAELI PRESENCE AT AND USE
OF THE AIRPORT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REFTTEL IN-
STRUCTIONS, I STRESSED THAT WE BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT THE
IDF MUST WITHDRAW FULLY FROM BEIRU (EAST AND WEST),
INCLUDING THE AIRPORT, THAT WE HAD DECIDED AT THE HIGHEST
LEVEL NOT TO SEND THE MNF INTO BEIRUT UNTIL THE AIRPORT
WITHDRAWAL HAD OCCURRED, THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW
THE IDF EMERGENCY REPEAT EMERGENCY USE OF THE AIRPORT ONLY

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IF THE LEBANESE AND THE US CONTINGENT AT THE AIRPORT CONCURRED, AND THAT AMBASSADOR LEWIS WOULD BE SEEING THE ISRAELIS TODAY TO MAKE THESE POINTS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. I EMPHASIZED THAT, WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD LEBANESE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE "PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS," WE WERE MAKING THE AIRPORT AN ISRAELI-AMERICAN ISSUE.

4. IF THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO YIELD, I SAID, WE WOULD EXPLAIN PUBLICLY THAT WE WERE NOT BRINGING OUR MNF CONTINGENT IN BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO WITHDRAW. I SAID WE MIGHT ALSO NOTE THAT HERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE ISRAELIS TO BE AT THE AIRPORT, THAT I BELONGED TO THE LEBANESE, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE FRUSTRATING LEBANESE ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE THEIR ECONOMY BY OPENING IT TO COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC. THIS, I SAID, WOULD BE A STRONG POSITION. I ASKED GEMAYEL TO ENSURE THAT THE LEBANESE TOOK POSITIONS IN HARMONY WITH OUR OWN. THE LEBANESE POSITION, I SAID, SHOULD BE THE SAME AS OURS, SINCE IT IS IN LEBANON'S LONG-TERM INTEREST.

5. GEMAYEL, TO WHOM LAF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDU HAD OUTLINED OUR POSITION EARLIER IN THE DAY AT MY REQUEST, ACCEPTED HE NEEDED FOR IDENTICAL US AND LEBANESE POSITIONS MATTER-OF-FACTLY. OUR POSITION WAS HIS OWN PREFERRED POSITION. HE SAID HE WAS READY TO COOPERATE FULLY AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY

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ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH US. AT HIS INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID. JOHNNY ABDU HAD TRIED OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS TO REACH "A CERTAIN COMPROMISE" PARTLY "AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION" (E.E., 2100 TO 0400 OPERATING HOURS). SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAD REJECTED IT, AND SINCE THE LEBANESE HAD NOT IN ANY CASE GIVEN IT FINAL APPROVAL, HE WOULD REJECT IT JUST AS THEY HAD. IT WAS CLEAR FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT THE LEBANESE WILL NOT PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF "PRACTICAL" ARRANGEMENTS ALONG PREVIOUSLY REPORTED LINES ANY FURTHER.

6. WHEN I NOTED THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE AIRPORT MIGHT TAKE SOME DAYS AND A LOT OF PRESSURE AND THAT MEANWHILE OUR MARINE UNITS WOULD NOT COME IN, GEMAYEL ASKED WHY IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR AT LEAST INITIAL UNITS TO COME INTO THE PORT AND STAND FAST AT AGREED LOCATIONS, AS THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAD DONE. I REPLIED THAT I HAD CONSULTED WASHINGTON ON THIS PROSPECT. WE DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS BECAUSE WE FELT IT WOULD WEAKEN OUR LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL. WE WANTED TO TAKE A CLEAR POSITION. THIS, WE FELT, WOULD SERVE LEBANESE INTERESTS. NONTHELESS, I SAID, I WOULD REPORT HIS PREFERENCE TO WASHINGTON. GEMAYEL SAID HE APPRECIATED OUR REASONING, BUT FELT AN EARLY ARRIVAL AND STANDFAST WOULD NOT, IN FACT, UNDERMINE OUR POSITION

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VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL.

7. GEMAYEL SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR CONTINUED USE OF THE AIRPORT WERE FOR PRIMARILY POLITICAL REASONS; THEY WANTED JOINT USE OVER THE LONG TERM AND WOULD HAVE SOUGHT TO EXPAND ANY "PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS" THE LEBANESE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT WITH THEM. LEST THERE BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING IN ANY LEBANESE QUARTERS ABOUT OUR POSITION, HE CONFIDED, HE HAD INFORMED THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES." IN PASSING, HE MENTIONED HE HAD MET WITH THEM YESTERDAY TO REVIEW THEIR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, AND IT HAD

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BEEN DECIDED TO "REORGANIZE" THEM. HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THIS POINT.

8. AT THE MNF LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING THAT FOLLOWED, THE LEBANESE MADE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS:

- THE LAF LIAISON OFFICER HAD ALREADY TOLD THE IDF -- ON ABDU'S INSTRUCTIONS CONVEYED FROM GEMAYEL -- THAT THE GOL WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI POSITION.
- THE CEREMONIAL OPENING OF THE CITY OF BEIRUT WILL BE HELD UP A FEW DAYS PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT ISRAELI-AMERICAN CONTACTS ON THE AIRPORT.
- US AND ITALIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONSULTED, AND THE ITALIANS WILL, WITH LEBANESE CONCURRENCE, OCCUPY SOME POSITIONS IN THE US SECTOR OF DEPLOYMENT TEMPORARILY.
- THE ISRAELI FORCES IN THE "LEGAL" PORT WILL LEAVE BY TOMORROW MORNING. (COMMENT: IN FACT, THEY LEFT THIS AFTERNOON. ROSS AND I PASSED THEIR EMPTY POSITIONS IN THE PORT AND SAW THEM IN FURN ASH-SHUBBAK MOVING ALONG THE OLD DAMASCUS ROAD TOWARD THE HAZMIYAH CIRCLE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD MOVE UP TO 'ALAYH OR DOWN TO KHALDEH FROM THERE.)

9. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR URGED US PRIVATELY TO STRESS, IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE MAKE DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS, THAT US LIAISON OFFICERS ALREADY IN BEIRUT REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEIR FRENCH AND ITALIAN COUNTERPARTS, THAT OUR FLEET REMAINS OFFSHORE, AND THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ASSIST THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN FORCES IN ANY WAY FEASIBLE PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE AIRPORT PROBLEM.

DILLON

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PAGE 01 STATE 273275 TOSEC 130016
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STATE 273275 TOSEC 130016

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PA Exemptions

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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JERUSALEM JIDDA 9/28/82

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QUOTE S TEL AVIV 14457

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JIDDA FOR HABIB

BEIRUT FOR DRAPER AND DILLON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION; MNF DEPLOYMENT -- USE OF AIRPORT

REF: A) STATE 273141 (TOSEC 130012), B) BEIRUT 6631,
- C) BEIRUT 6624, D) TEL AVIV 14420

1. ENTIRE TEXT)

PAGE 02 STATE 273275 TOSEC 130016

2. SUMMARY: I MADE PRESENTATION CONCERNING AIRPORT USE
(REF A) TO SHARON AND KIMCHE FOLLOWING CABINET MEETING
(AT APPROXIMATELY 12:45 P.M.) ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28.
SHARON WILL DISCUSS ISSUE WITH BEGIN IN LATE AFTERNOON
AFTER BEGIN RETURNS FROM MEMORIAL SERVICE. ANTICIPATE
RECEIVING REACTION SOMETIME THIS EVENING. SINCE BOTH
SHARON AND KIMCHE BELIEVE THEY HAVE ALL BUT REACHED AGREE-
MENT WITH LEBANESE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR MINIMAL AIRPORT USE

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(REFS B AND C), STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION CAME AS BLOW. REACTION INITIALLY WAS CAREFUL AND SOBER, BUT SHARON SIGNALLED STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT HE AND BEGIN WILL STAND FAST IN INSISTING ON SOME LIMITED IDF USE OF AIRPORT BEYOND "PURE EMERGENCIES," WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BE "VERY DIFFICULT TO DEFINE." ISRAELIS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT IF THEY DO NOT ACCEPT U.S. POSITION, U.S. MNF CONTINGENT WILL NOT DEPLOY AND THAT WE WILL EXPLAIN PUBLICLY THAT DELAY IS ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY. PROJECTED PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT LATE TONIGHT IS WELL KNOWN TO THEM. END SUMMARY.

3. AS SOON AS I RECEIVED INSTRUCTION IN REF A EARLY TUESDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 28, I BEGAN TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR MEETING WITH SHARON WHO HAS BEEN DELEGATED ACTION ON ALL SUCH ISSUES BY BEGIN. UNFORTUNATELY, CRUCIAL CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING AND HEAVY AFTERNOON SCHEDULE INVOLVING MEMORIAL SPEECHES AT VARIOUS ISRAELI CEMETERIES MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET TO EITHER SHARON OR BEGIN BEFORE LATE TONIGHT. ACCORDINGLY, I MET WITH DAVID KIMCHE AT NOON TO GO OVER THE PRESENTATION IN REF A FOR RAPID TRANSMISSION TO BOTH SHARON AND BEGIN.

4. AS SOON AS I HAD FINISHED MY PRESENTATION AND KIMCHE UNDERSTOOD IMMEDIATELY ITS SIGNIFICANCE, HE ARRANGED FOR THE TWO OF US TO MEET QUICKLY WITH BEGIN BETWEEN THE CABI-

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NET MEETING AND HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE MEMORIAL SERVICE. WHEN WE REACHED THE PRIME MINISTRY, HOWEVER, BEGIN WAS ALREADY ON HIS WAY OUT AND ASKED THAT I DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH SHARON INSTEAD WHO WAS ALSO JUST LEAVING THE CABINET. SINCE THIS HAD BEEN MY ORIGINAL INTENTION IN ANY CASE, I READILY AGREED.

5. BEFORE I COULD BEGIN MY REMARKS, SHARON SUMMED UP HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE AIRPORT ISSUE STOOD AFTER THE KIMCHE TEAMS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ON SUNDAY MORNING. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD ALL BUT REACHED AGREEMENT AT THAT TIME ON A VERY LIMITED, LOW-PROFILE USE OF THE AIRPORT DURING NIGHT HOURS ONLY. HOWEVER, SHARON HAD JUST HEARD FROM CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN, WHO IS IN BEIRUT TODAY, THAT THE LEBANESE HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION THIS MORNING AND NOW WERE REFUSING TO AGREE TO ANY IDF USE. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS CHANGE OF POSITION TO U.S. PRESSURE ON THE LEBANESE, AND SAID THAT THIS CONTRADICTED PHIL HABIB'S STATEMENTS TO HIM AT THE FARM ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON. SHARON REMINDED ME THAT PHIL HAD SAID MORE THAN ONCE DURING THAT LENGTHY SESSION THAT WHATEVER THE ISRAELIS COULD AGREE ON FREELY WITH THE LEBANESE CONCERNING A LOW-PROFILE, MINIMAL-USE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO THE U.S. (COMMENT: A RECHECK OF OUR NOTES OF THAT MEETING CONFIRMS THAT SUCH STATEMENTS WERE INDEED MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE LENGTHY DISCUSSION.)

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6. I THEN TOLD SHARON THAT THERE HAD BEEN SUBSEQUENT, HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATION OF THE AIRPORT ISSUE IN WASHINGTON AND THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED OVERNIGHT TO CONVEY THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THE ISSUE IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OR TO HIM. I THEN WENT THROUGH SLOWLY WITH HIM, AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY ALREADY DONE WITH KIMCHE, THE PRECISE POINTS IN PARA THREE OF REF A, STRESSING THAT THIS WAS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM, NOT JUST A LEBANESE ONE AND THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO BRING IN OUR MARINE CONTINGENT TO THE AIRPORT UNTIL THE ISRAELI WITH-

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STATE 273275 TOSEC 130016

DRAWAL IS TOTALLY COMPLETED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR TO HIM AS I HAD ALREADY DONE TO KIMCHE THAT ANY DELAY IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF OUR CONTINGENT RESULTING FROM ISRAELI REFUSAL TO ACCEPT OUR POSITION ON AIRPORT USE WOULD BE PUBLICLY ATTRIBUTED BY U.S. SPOKESMEN TO ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY.

7. TO MAKE SURE THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD ME CORRECTLY, SHARON REPEATED: "I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL NOT LET US USE THE AIRPORT, EVEN THOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE." I CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE U.S. POSITION, WHILE STRESSING THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO USE IN REAL EMERGENCIES AND THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE, AFTER LEBANESE AND U.S. APPROVAL HAD BEEN OBTAINED, ONE IDF COULD PUT ITS AIR CONTROLLER PERSONNEL INTO THE AIRPORT TO HANDLE THE EMERGENCY FLIGHTS. SHARON MUSED FOR A FEW MOMENTS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING "EMERGENCIES," WHICH HE SAID COULD INCLUDE MEDICAL EVACUATIONS, EMERGENCY NEED FOR CERTAIN SUPPLIES, OR OTHER SITUATIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS QUICKLY IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO WAKE UP THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT TO GET AUTHORIZATION. I DEMURRED, SAYING THAT I FELT SURE THAT LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LAF, THE U.S., AND THE IDF WITH DEFINED YET RAPID PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCY CASES. SHARON SEEMED HIGHLY SKEPTICAL. IT WAS AGREED THAT KIMCHE WOULD BRIEF BEGIN LATER THIS AFTERNOON WHEN BEGIN RETURNED, AND THAT SHARON WOULD CONFER WITH BEGIN SOMETIME THEREAFTER. IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT, DESPITE HIS SOBER AND RESTRAINED REACTION, SHARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY URGE BEGIN TO STAND FIRM ON THE "ABSOLUTE NECESSITY," AS HE PUT IT, OF HAVING REGULAR IF MINIMAL USE OF THE AIRPORT FOR THE IDF. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE EMBATTLED SITUATION SHARON FINDS HIMSELF IN THESE DAYS, HE WAS CAREFUL TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

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STATE 273275 TOSEC 130016

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BEFORE GIVING US ANY RESPONSE.

8. COMMENT: IN SIDE CONVERSATIONS WITH KIMCHE AND WITH HANAN BAR-ON OVER LUNCH AFTER THIS MEETING, BOTH ALLUDED WITH SOME AMAZEMENT TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD SEEMINGLY REVERSED THE POSITION PHIL HABIB HAD TAKEN ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON IN THE MEETINGS WITH SHARON AT THE RANCH. THEY REMINDED ME THAT THE EMPHASIS THERE HAD BEEN ENTIRELY ON GETTING THE IDF SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT AS A MILITARY FORCE, AND THAT HABIB HAD INDICATED THAT SOME LOW-PROFILE, MINIMAL-USE OF THE AIRPORT WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT U.S. MNF PURPOSES IF IT COULD BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN THE POSITION I HAD JUST CONVEYED, AND STRESSED THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE THE RESULT OF A CAREFUL, HIGH-LEVEL REVIEW IN WASHINGTON OF THE WHOLE ISSUE IN THE LIGHT OF HABIB AND DRAPER'S MEETINGS BOTH HERE AND IN BEIRUT. BAR-ON AND KIMCHE BOTH PREDICTED THAT BEGIN AND SHARON WOULD STAND FAST. THEY BOTH POINTED TO WHAT THEY THOUGHT WOULD BE THE MOST OMINOUS IMPLICATION FOR THE ISRAELI LEADERS IN MY PRESENTATION: THE FACT THAT WE WERE ASSERTING A U.S. "DIKTAT" REGARDLESS OF WHAT MIGHT BE AGREEABLE BILATERALLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. BAR-ON SAID THAT THIS COULD HAVE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF ISRAEL'S EFFORT TO BEGIN SOME DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM; FOR EXAMPLE, THE ISRAELI DESIRE TO MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF CIVILIAN MFA LIAISON OFFICE IN BEIRUT, WHICH BEGIN WOULD NOW ANTICIPATE WE MIGHT INSIST ON VETOING FOR ALLEGED U.S. INTERESTS, REGARDLESS OF LEBANESE READINESS TO ACCEPT IT. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE WAS JUMPING FAR PAST THE CORRECT CONCLUSIONS; BUT THIS IS A STRICTLY MILITARY ISSUE RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERESTS IN HAVING A "CLEAN AREA" FOR THE MNF TO DEPLOY AND ALSO TO THE ACKNOWLEDGED POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF ASSISTING THE LEBANESE TO REASSERT FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN EVERY RESPECT. CIVILIAN LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS, I SAID, WOULD SURELY NOT HAVE TO FALL IN THE SAME CATEGORY.

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9. BOTH SHARON AND BAR-ON REFERRED TO THEIR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL'S LEVERAGE ON AMIN'S GOVERNMENT WAS RAPIDLY VANISHING AND THAT THE U.S. IS NOW PREEMINENT IN INFLUENCE. THIS OBVIOUSLY GRATES, BUT ALSO CARRIES WITH IT IMPLICATIONS WHICH THE ISRAELIS CANNOT IGNORE.

10. KNOWING THE WAY BEGIN REACTS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I ANTICIPATE WE WILL GET A RESPONSE WHICH AMOUNTS TO POLITE DEFIANCE, PERHAPS COMBINED WITH SOME QUIET SUGGESTION THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATION ABOUT "CIVILIANIZING" THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996 DOC NUMBER: 82STATE273275

CHANNEL: n/a

USE OF THE FIELD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. I DO NOT,
UNFORTUNATELY, BELIEVE THAT OUR INTENTION TO PUBLICIZE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURTHER DELAY IN MNF DEPLOYMENT WILL
CHANGE BEGIN'S RESPONSE.

11. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 6653
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES
FROM DRAPER --JIDDA FOR AMB HABIB

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR

TAGS/ PINT, PINS, MILI MOPSS SY, LE,US IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MNF DEVELOPEMENTS SEPT 28

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REF: STATE 273141 TOSEC 130012

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

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2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS AGREED TO ACT IN
HARMONY WITH OUR POSITION ON THE NEED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
FROM THE AIRPORT. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, I BRIEFED

PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SEPTEMBER 28 (JUST PRIOR TO OUR REGULAR 1200 MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING) ON OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE ISRAELI PRESENCE AT AND USE OF THE AIRPORT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS, I STRESSED THAT WE BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT THE IDF MUST WITHDRAW FULLY FROM BEIRU (EAST AND WEST), INCLUDING THE AIRPORT, THAT WE HAD DECIDED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL NOT TO SEND THE MNF INTO BEIRUT UNTIL THE AIRPORT WITHDRAWAL HAD OCCURRED, THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE IDF EMERGENCY REPEAT EMERGENCY USE OF THE AIRPORT ONLY IF THE LEBANESE AND THE US CONTINGENT AT THE AIRPORT CONCURRED, AND THAT AMBASSADOR LEWIS WOULD BE SEEING THE ISRAELIS TODAY TO MAKE THESE POINTS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. I EMPHASIZED THAT, WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD LEBANESE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE "PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS," WE WERE MAKING THE AIRPORT AN ISRAELI-AMERICAN ISSUE.

4. IF THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO YIELD, I SAID, WE WOULD EXPLAIN PUBLICLY THAT WE WERE NOT BRINGING OUR MNF CONTINGENT IN BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO WITHDRAW. I SAID WE MIGHT ALSO NOTE THAT HERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE ISRAELIS TO BE AT THE AIRPORT, THAT I BELONGED TO THE LEBANESE, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE FRUSTRATING LEBANESE ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE THEIR ECONOMY BY OPENING

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IT TO COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC. THIS, I SAID, WOULD BE A STRONG POSITION. I ASKED GEMAYEL TO ENSURE THAT THE LEBANESE TOOK POSITIONS IN HARMONY WITH OUR OWN. THE LEBANESE POSITION, I SAID, SHOULD BE THE SAME AS OURS, SINCE IT IS IN LEBANON'S LONG-TERM INTEREST.

5. GEMAYEL, TO WHOM LAF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JOHNNY ABDU HAD OUTLINED OUR POSITION EARLIER IN THE DAY AT MY REQUEST, ACCEPTED HE NEEDED FOR IDENTICAL US AND LEBANESE POSITIONS MATTER-OF-FACTLY. OUR POSITION WAS HIS OWN PREFERRED POSITION. HE SAID HE WAS READY TO COOPERATE FULLY AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH US. AT HIS INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID. JOHNNY ABDU HAD TRIED OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS TO REACH "A CERTAIN COMPROMISE" PARTLY "AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION" (E.E., 2100 TO 0400 OPERATING HOURS). SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAD REJECTED IT, AND SINCE THE LEBANESE HAD NOT IN ANY CASE GIVEN IT FINAL APPROVAL, HE WOULD REJECT IT JUST AS THEY HAD. IT WAS CLEAR FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT THE LEBANESE WILL NOT PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF "PRACTICAL" ARRANGEMENTS ALONG PREVIOUSLY REPORTED LINES ANY FURTHER.

6. WHEN I NOTED THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS

ON THE AIRPORT MIGHT AKE SOME DAYS AND A LOT OF
PRESSURE AND THAT MEANWHILE OUR MARINE UNITS WOULD NOT

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AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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COME IN, GEMAYEL ASKED WHY IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR AT LEAST INITIAL UNITS TO COME INTO THE PORT AND STAND FAST AT AGREED LOCATIONS, AS THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAD DONE. I REPLIED THAT I HAD CONSULTED WASHINGTON ON THIS PROSPECT. WE DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS BECAUSE WE FELT IT WOULD WEAKEN OUR LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL. WE WANTED TO TAKE A CLEAR POSITION. THIS, WE FELT, WOULD SERVE LEBANESE INTERESTS. NONTHELESS, I SAID, I WOULD

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REPORT HIS PREFERENCE TO WASHINGTON. GEMAYEL SAID HE APPRECIATED OUR REASONING, BUT FELT AN EARLY ARRIVAL AND STANDFAST WOULD NOT, IN FACT, UNDERMINE OUR POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL.

7. GEMAYEL SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR CONTINUED USE OF THE AIRPORT WERE FOR PRIMARILY POLITICAL REASONS; THEY WANTED JOINT USE OVER THE LONG TERM AND WOULD HAVE SOUGHT TO EXPAND ANY "PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS" THE LEBANESE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT WITH THEM. LEST THERE BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING IN ANY LEBANESE QUARTERS ABOUT OUR POSITION, HE CONFIDED, HE HAD INFORMED THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES." IN PASSING, HE MENTIONED HE HAD MET WITH THEM YESTERDAY TO REVIEW THEIR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, AND IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO "REORGANIZE" THEM. HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THIS POINT.

8. AT THE MNF LIAISON AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING THAT FOLLOWED, THE LEBANESE MADE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS:

-- THE LAF LIAISON OFFICER HAD ALREADY TOLD THE IDF -- ON ABDU'S INSTRUCTIONS CONVEYED FROM GEMAYEL -- THAT THE GOL WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI POSITION.

-- THE CEREMONIAL OPENING OF THE CITY OF BEIRUT WILL BE HELD UP A FEW DAYS PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT ISRAELI-AMERICAN CONTACTS ON THE AIRPORT.

-- US AND ITALIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONSULTED, AND THE ITALIANS WILL, WITH LEBANESE CONCURRENCE, OCCUPY SOME POSITIONS IN THE US SECTOR OF DEPLOYMENT TEMPORARILY.

-- THE ISRAELI FORCES IN THE "LEGAL" PORT WILL LEAVE BY TOMORROW MORNING. (COMMENT: IN FACT, THEY LEFT

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THIS AFTERNOON. ROSS AND I PASSED THEIR EMPTY POSITIONS IN THE PORT AND SAW THEM IN FURN ASH-SHUBBAK MOVING ALONG THE OLD DAMASCUS ROAD TOWARD THE HAZMIYAH CIRCLE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD MOVE UP TO 'ALAYH OR DOWN TO KHALDEH FROM THERE.)

9. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR URGED US PRIVATELY TO STRESS, IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE MAKE DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS, THAT US LIAISON OFFICERS ALREADY IN BEIRUT REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEIR FRENCH AND ITALIAN COUNTERPARTS, THAT OUR FLEET REMAINS OFFSHORE, AND THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ASSIST THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN FORCES IN ANY WAY FEASIBLE PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE AIRPORT PROBLEM.
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SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 14457

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JIDDA FOR HABIB

BEIRUT FOR DRAPER AND DILLON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MNF DEPLOYMENT -- USE OF AIRPORT

REF: A) STATE 273141 (TOSEC 130012), B) BEIRUT 6631,
- C) BEIRUT 6624, D) TEL AVIV 14420,

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: I MADE PRESENTATION CONCERNING AIRPORT USE
(REF A) TO SHARON AND KIMCHE FOLLOWING CABINET MEETING
(AT APPROXIMATELY 12:45 P.M.) ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28.
SHARON WILL DISCUSS ISSUE WITH BEGIN IN LATE AFTERNOON
AFTER BEGIN RETURNS FROM MEMORIAL SERVICE. ANTICIPATE
RECEIVING REACTION SOMETIME THIS EVENING. SINCE BOTH

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SHARON AND KIMCHE BELIEVE THEY HAVE ALL BUT REACHED AGREE-
MENT WITH LEBANESE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR MINIMAL AIRPORT USE
(REFS B AND C), STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION CAME AS BLOW.
REACTION INITIALLY WAS CAREFUL AND SOBER, BUT SHARON SIG-
NALLED STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT HE AND BEGIN WILL STAND FAST

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IN INSISTING ON SOME LIMITED IDF USE OF AIRPORT BEYOND "PURE EMERGENCIES," WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BE "VERY DIFFICULT TO DEFINE." ISRAELIS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT IF THEY DO NOT ACCEPT U.S. POSITION, U.S. MNF CONTINGENT WILL NOT DEPLOY AND THAT WE WILL EXPLAIN PUBLICLY THAT DELAY IS ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY. PROJECTED PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT LATE TONIGHT IS WELL KNOWN TO THEM. END SUMMARY.

3. AS SOON AS I RECEIVED INSTRUCTION IN REF A EARLY TUESDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 28, I BEGAN TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR MEETING WITH SHARON WHO HAS BEEN DELEGATED ACTION ON ALL SUCH ISSUES BY BEGIN. UNFORTUNATELY, CRUCIAL CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING AND HEAVY AFTERNOON SCHEDULE INVOLVING MEMORIAL SPEECHES AT VARIOUS ISRAELI CEMETERIES MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET TO EITHER SHARON OR BEGIN BEFORE LATE TONIGHT. ACCORDINGLY, I MET WITH DAVID KIMCHE AT NOON TO GO OVER THE PRESENTATION IN REF A FOR RAPID TRANSMISSION TO BOTH SHARON AND BEGIN.

4. AS SOON AS I HAD FINISHED MY PRESENTATION AND KIMCHE UNDERSTOOD IMMEDIATELY ITS SIGNIFICANCE, HE ARRANGED FOR THE TWO OF US TO MEET QUICKLY WITH BEGIN BETWEEN THE CABINET MEETING AND HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE MEMORIAL SERVICE. WHEN WE REACHED THE PRIME MINISTRY, HOWEVER, BEGIN WAS ALREADY ON HIS WAY OUT AND ASKED THAT I DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH SHARON INSTEAD WHO WAS ALSO JUST LEAVING THE CABINET. SINCE THIS HAD BEEN MY ORIGINAL INTENTION IN ANY CASE, I READILY AGREED.

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5. BEFORE I COULD BEGIN MY REMARKS, SHARON SUMMED UP HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE AIRPORT ISSUE STOOD AFTER THE KIMCHE TEAMS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ON SUNDAY MORNING. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD ALL BUT REACHED AGREEMENT AT THAT TIME ON A VERY LIMITED, LOW-PROFILE USE OF THE AIRPORT DURING NIGHT HOURS ONLY. HOWEVER, SHARON HAD JUST HEARD FROM CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN, WHO IS IN BEIRUT TODAY, THAT THE LEBANESE HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION THIS MORNING AND NOW WERE REFUSING TO AGREE TO ANY IDF USE. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS CHANGE OF POSITION TO U.S. PRESSURE ON THE LEBANESE, AND SAID THAT THIS CONTRADICTED PHIL HABIB'S STATEMENTS TO HIM AT THE FARM ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON. SHARON REMINDED ME THAT PHIL HAD SAID MORE THAN ONCE DURING THAT LENGTHY SESSION THAT WHATEVER THE ISRAELIS COULD AGREE ON FREELY WITH THE LEBANESE CONCERNING A LOW-PROFILE, MINIMAL-USE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO THE U.S. (COMMENT: A RECHECK OF OUR NOTES OF THAT MEETING CONFIRMS THAT SUCH STATEMENTS

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WERE INDEED MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE LENGTHY DISCUSSION.)

6. I THEN TOLD SHARON THAT THERE HAD BEEN SUBSEQUENT, HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATION OF THE AIRPORT ISSUE IN WASHINGTON AND THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED OVERNIGHT TO CONVEY THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THE ISSUE IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN OR TO HIM. I THEN WENT THROUGH SLOWLY WITH HIM, AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY ALREADY DONE WITH KIMCHE, THE PRECISE POINTS IN PARA THREE OF REF A, STRESSING THAT THIS WAS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM, NOT JUST A LEBANESE ONE AND THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO BRING IN OUR MARINE CONTINGENT TO THE AIRPORT UNTIL THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS TOTALLY COMPLETED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR TO HIM AS I HAD ALREADY DONE TO KIMCHE THAT ANY DELAY IN THE DEPLOY-

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

MENT OF OUR CONTINGENT RESULTING FROM ISRAELI REFUSAL TO

ACCEPT OUR POSITION ON AIRPORT USE WOULD BE PUBLICLY ATTRIBUTED BY U.S. SPOKESMEN TO ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY.

7. TO MAKE SURE THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD ME CORRECTLY, SHARON REPEATED: "I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL NOT LET US USE THE AIRPORT, EVEN THOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE." I CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE U.S. POSITION, WHILE STRESSING THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO USE IN REAL EMERGENCIES AND THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE, AFTER LEBANESE AND U.S. APPROVAL HAD BEEN OBTAINED, THE IDF COULD PUT ITS AIR CONTROLLER PERSONNEL INTO THE AIRPORT TO HANDLE THE EMERGENCY FLIGHTS. SHARON MUSED FOR A FEW MOMENTS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING "EMERGENCIES," WHICH HE SAID COULD INCLUDE MEDICAL EVACUATIONS, EMERGENCY NEED FOR CERTAIN SUPPLIES, OR OTHER SITUATIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS QUICKLY IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO WAKE UP THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT TO GET AUTHORIZATION. I DEMURRED, SAYING THAT I FELT SURE THAT LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LAF, THE U.S., AND THE IDF WITH DEFINED YET RAPID PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCY CASES. SHARON SEEMED HIGHLY SKEPTICAL. IT WAS

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AGREED THAT KIMCHE WOULD BRIEF BEGIN LATER THIS AFTERNOON WHEN BEGIN RETURNED, AND THAT SHARON WOULD CONFER WITH BEGIN SOMETIME THEREAFTER. IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT, DESPITE HIS SOBER AND RESTRAINED REACTION, SHARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY URGE BEGIN TO STAND FIRM ON THE "ABSOLUTE NECESSITY," AS HE PUT IT, OF HAVING REGULAR IF MINIMAL USE OF THE AIRPORT FOR THE IDF. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE EMBATTLED SITUATION SHARON FINDS HIMSELF IN THESE DAYS, HE WAS CAREFUL TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE GIVING US ANY RESPONSE.

8. COMMENT: IN SIDE CONVERSATIONS WITH KIMCHE AND WITH HANAN BAR-ON OVER LUNCH AFTER THIS MEETING, BOTH ALLUDED WITH SOME AMAZEMENT TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD SEEMINGLY REVERSED THE POSITION PHIL HABIB HAD TAKEN ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON IN THE MEETINGS WITH SHARON AT THE RANCH. THEY REMINDED ME THAT THE EMPHASIS THERE HAD BEEN ENTIRELY ON GETTING THE IDF SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT AS A MILITARY FORCE, AND THAT HABIB HAD INDICATED THAT SOME LOW-PROFILE, MINIMAL-USE OF THE AIRPORT WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT U.S. MNF PURPOSES IF IT COULD BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN THE POSITION I HAD JUST CONVEYED, AND STRESSED THAT MY

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INSTRUCTIONS WERE THE RESULT OF A CAREFUL, HIGH-LEVEL REVIEW IN WASHINGTON OF THE WHOLE ISSUE IN THE LIGHT OF HABIB AND DRAPER'S MEETINGS BOTH HERE AND IN BEIRUT. BAR-ON AND KIMCHE BOTH PREDICTED THAT BEGIN AND SHARON WOULD STAND FAST. THEY BOTH POINTED TO WHAT THEY THOUGHT WOULD BE THE MOST OMINOUS IMPLICATION FOR THE ISRAELI LEADERS IN MY PRESENTATION: THE FACT THAT WE WERE ASSERTING A U.S. "DIKTAT" REGARDLESS OF WHAT MIGHT BE AGREEABLE BILATERALLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. BAR-ON SAID THAT THIS COULD HAVE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF ISRAEL'S

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EFFORT TO BEGIN SOME DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM; FOR EXAMPLE, THE ISRAELI DESIRE TO MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF CIVILIAN MFA LIAISON OFFICE IN BEIRUT, WHICH BEGIN WOULD NOW ANTICIPATE WE MIGHT INSIST ON VETOING FOR ALLEGED U.S. INTERESTS, REGARDLESS OF LEBANESE READINESS TO ACCEPT IT. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE WAS JUMPING FAR PAST THE CORRECT CONCLUSIONS; BUT THIS IS A STRICTLY MILITARY ISSUE RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERESTS IN HAVING A "CLEAN AREA" FOR THE MNF TO DEPLOY AND ALSO TO THE ACKNOWLEDGED POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF ASSISTING THE LEBANESE TO REASSERT FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN EVERY RESPECT. CIVILIAN LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS, I SAID, WOULD SURELY NOT HAVE TO FALL IN THE SAME CATEGORY.

9. BO

TH SHARON AND BAR-ON REFERRED TO THEIR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL'S LEVERAGE ON AMIN'S GOVERNMENT WAS RAPIDLY VANISHING AND THAT THE U.S. IS NOW PREEMINENT IN INFLUENCE. THIS OBVIOUSLY GRATES, BUT ALSO CARRIES WITH IT IMPLICATIONS WHICH THE ISRAELIS CANNOT IGNORE.

10. KNOWING THE WAY BEGIN REACTS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I ANTICIPATE WE WILL GET A RESPONSE WHICH AMOUNTS TO POLITE DEFIANCE, PERHAPS COMBINED WITH SOME QUIET SUGGESTION THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATION ABOUT "CIVILIANIZING" THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT USE OF THE FIELD SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. I DO NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, BELIEVE THAT OUR INTENTION TO PUBLICIZE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURTHER DELAY IN MNF DEPLOYMENT WILL CHANGE BEGIN'S RESPONSE.

11. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV PASS AMB DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE REACTION TO LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

REF: A) TEL AVIV 17250; B) STATE 321615 NOTAL; C) JERUSALEM
03499 NOTAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08360 171511Z

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SINCE YESTERDAY (NOVEMBER 16), THE LEBANESE HAD BEEN CALLING FREQUENTLY TO SEE IF THE ISRAELIS HAD REPLIED TO THEIR COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION. TODAY, AFTER RECEIVING AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S REPORTS FROM ISRAEL AND AMBASSADOR HABIB'S REPORT FROM WASHINGTON, ROSS CALLED ON TUENI TO BRIEF HIM ON THE STATE OF PLAY. LAF BRIG GEN HAMDAN AND

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COL RUHAYYIM WERE ALSO PRESENT.

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3. ROSS DESCRIBED DRAPER'S TWO MEETINGS IN ISRAEL AND HABIB'S CALL TO ARENS, AS WELL AS THE IMPASSE THAT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN REACHED. TUENI IMMEDIATELY CALLED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO CONVEY THE HIGHLIGHTS. ACCORDING TO TUENI, GEMAYEL WAS NOT SURPRISED, DISMISSING THE NEWS BY EXCLAIMING "BASITA" ("NO BIG DEAL"). THE CABINET IS TO MEET THIS EVENING, AND THE PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE ON THE AGENDA. TUILL SUBMIT A WRITTEN SUMMARY OF THE STATE OF PLAY TO GEMAYLE BEFORE THAT MEETING AND SEE HIM PERSONALLY AFTER THE MEETING TO MULL OVER NEXT MOVES.

4. TUENI ASKED WHAT THE NEXT STEPS MIGHT BE FROM THE US SIDE. ROSS REPLIED THAT DRAPER WAS HAVING LUNCH WITH KIMCHE AND WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN IN ISRAEL ANOTHER NIGHT TO CONTINUE EXPLORING WAYS TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAD BEEN COMPLICATED BY BEGIN'S MOURNING PERIOD, WHICH HAD STALLED THE ISRAELI DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. FURTHERMORE, WITH THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE REAGAN-BEGIN MEETING, THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY FELT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08360 171511Z

THAT THE HEAT WAS OFF FOR THE MOMENT.

5. TUENI SAID IT WAS LIKELY THE LEBANESE WOULD PLAY IT COOL. GEMAYEL DID NOT LIKE BEING DICTATED TO, AND PRESSURE TACTICS LIKE RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS AFFIRMING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEPARATE SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES WERE ONLY TURNING A FRIEND OF ISRAEL'S INTO AN ENEMY. THE ISRAELIS SEEMED DETERMINED TO PUT GEMAYEL TO THE TEST, BUT HE WOULD ONLY BECOME MORE STUBBORN.

6. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE WERE CLEARLY EAGER FOR TALKS TO BEGIN TODAY. THEY HAD EVEN ASSEMBLED MOST OF THE DELEGATION AT TUENI'S OFFICE IN ANTICIPATION OF A GREEN LIGHT FROM ISRAEL. BARRING A SURPRISE, THEY WILL MAINTAIN THEIR MOST RECENT PROPOSAL IN THE FACE OF THE ISRAELI REJECTION AND AWAIT THE RESULTS OF OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS. DILLON

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ZFF TEL AVIV ONLY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING NOVEMBER 12, 1982

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.

Q. HAVE YOU ANY REACTION TO YESTERDAY'S EVENTS IN TYRE,
IN SOUTH LEBANON?
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A. YES, I DO. WE GREATLY REGRET THE LOSS OF LIFE CAUSED
BY THE EXPLOSION OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN
TYRE. WE EXTEND OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF
THE VICTIMS AND WE NOTE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS
APPOINTED A BOARD OF INQUIRY TO LOOK INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE EXPLOSION.

WE ALSO NOTE THAT THERE ARE CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT THE
ORIGIN OF THE BLAST.

Q. IT'S BEEN REPORTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE AVOWED THEY
WILL TAKE SOME KIND OF REVENGE FOR THIS ACTION. DO YOU
HAVE A REACTION TO THAT?

A. I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THAT, BUT THE POINT I JUST MADE
I THINK IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT THEY'RE GOING TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION.

Q. ANYTHING ON THE SCHEDULE OF MR. HABIB...WHEN AND WHERE
HE IS GOING?

A. HE'S IN WASHINGTON. THERE ARE PLANS SET FOR HIM TO
RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT I WOULD EXPECT THAT HE WOULD
BE HERE FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND THROUGH THE VISIT OF PRIME

MINISTER BEGIN.

Q. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SENDING MR. HABIB BACK TO THE MIDDLE EAST IF MR. DRAPER IS THERE?

A. YOU RECALL THAT MR. HABIB'S PREVIOUS MISSION WAS LEBANON EXCLUSIVELY. AFTER HIS LONG, GOOD WORK THERE, MR. HABIB RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES AND MR. DRAPER UNDERTOOK THAT MISSION AND CONTINUES WITH THAT MISSION.

WHAT MR. HABIB IS GOING TO DO IS HAVE AN OVERALL ROLE IN UNCLASSIFIED

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THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH CERTAINLY WILL ENCOMPASS LEBANON BUT WILL BE FAR FROM CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO LEBANON. HE WILL BE VERY MUCH INVOLVED WITH THE OVERALL PEACE INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND WILL BE ASSISTED ON THAT FRONT BY AMB. DRAPER.

Q. THIS MEANS THIS WILL PUT TO REST ALL THE RUMORS ABOUT APPOINTING A SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE EAST THAT WERE MENTIONED - A FEW NAMES

A. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WILL PUT TO REST THE RUMORS OF APPOINTING A SPECIAL ENVOY, BUT THE FACT IS MR. HABIB HAS JUST BEEN APPOINTED THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US A READOUT ON THE MEETING BETWEEN MR. SHULTZ AND MR. ALI?

A. I DOUBT IT. AS YOU KNOW, THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS SEEING THE PRESIDENT TODAY, HAVING LUNCH HERE IN THE BUILDING, SEEING THE SECRETARY. BUT I DOUBT THERE WILL BE ANY READOUT ON THOSE DISCUSSIONS UNLESS THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID SOMETHING HIMSELF AFTER IT.

Q. REGARDING THE RESPONSE TO THE TYRE EXPLOSION: I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY YOU'RE ACTUALLY ASKING ISRAEL NOT TO DO SO UNTIL A DECISION IS FOUND AND THEN ISRAEL CAN RETALIATE?

A. NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT. I WAS ASKED WHETHER WE EXPECTED

THERE WOULD BE RETALIATION AND I JUST REMARKED THERE'S AN OBSERVATION THAT PERHAPS IF YOU'RE CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION YOU HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY. SHULTZ UNCLASSIFIED

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EG IS

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS: TABA AND RETURN
OF GOE AMBASSADOR

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER ALI MET WITH HABIB, VELIOTES, FAIRBANKS AND OTHERS NOVEMBER 13 TO FOLLOW UP ON ISSUES RAISED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. DURING THE COURSE OF THESE WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS, SEPTTEL, ALI ASKED THAT THE U.S. PROPOSE TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN DURING HIS U.S. VISIT A FORMULA FOR THE RESUMPTION OF TABA TALKS AND TALKS ON NORMALIZATION ISSUES. IN VIEW OF THE CANCELLATION OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S VISIT, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE PRESENTATION PERSONALLY TO HIM IN WASHINGTON.

3. ON TABA IT WAS AGREED THAT EGYPT PROPOSES THAT

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A DATE BE FIXED TO MEET ON TABA NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 10. ONCE THE DATE IS FIXED ALI IMMEDIATELY WILL SEND A LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR PROPOSING DATES FOR NORMALIZATION MEETINGS WITHIN A TIMEFRAME OF TWO WEEKS AFTER

DECEMBER 1U. ADDITIONALLY, ALI AGREED THAT AMBASSADOR MORTADA WILL RETURN TO ISRAEL WHEN AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON CAN BE DECLARED BY THE U.S.


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4. FOR CAIRO: AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO INFORM HASSAN ALI ON HIS RETURN THAT GIVEN CANCELLATION OF BEGIN VISIT, WE WERE UNABLE TO DISCUSS ISSUE WITH HIM. GIVEN URGENCY, U.S. RECOMMENDS THAT FORMULAS SHOULD BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL BY GOE IN FIRST INSTANCE. DEPARTMENT AND TEL AVIV WILL THEN MAKE FOLLOW-UP APPROACHES IN WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM.

5. FOR TEL AVIV: AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF GOI, AND AFTER IT IS CLEAR THAT EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED GOI, REQUEST YOU MAKE IT CLEAR AT APPROPRIATE HIGH LEVEL WITHIN GOI THAT U.S. URGES ISRAEL TO ACCEPT PROPOSED DATES FOR MEETING ON TABA NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 10. WE CONSIDER THIS FORMULA TO BE FAIR, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT ONCE TABA MEETING DATE IS FIXED, EGYPT WILL PROPOSE DATES FOR NORMALIZATION TALKS WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF DECEMBER 10. ALSO, PLEASE INFORM GOI THAT USG UNDERSTANDS AMBASSADOR MORTADA WILL RETURN TO ISRAEL WHEN AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON CAN BE DECLARED BY THE U.S.

6. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP ON THESE ISSUES WITH SUPPORTING PRESENTATIONS TO ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON. SHULTZ



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SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 8215

EX DECAPTIONED
FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MARR, PLO, LE, IS, SY, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL NOVEMBER 11

REF: A) JERUSALEM 3466 (NOTAL), B) BEIRUT 8185 (NOTAL)

C) BEIRUT 8192

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: IN TWO-HOUR MEETING NOVEMBER 11, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AGREED TO LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI CIVILIAN REPS TO PREPARE FOR "IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS" AT DELEGATION LEVEL, EVEN THOUGH ISRAELIS HAVE NOT AGREED TO DATE CERTAIN FOR DELEGATION MEETINGS.

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I URGED GEMAYEL TO GIVE LEBANESE REP INSTRUCTIONS ON SUCH ASPECTS OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AS VENUE, DATE, COMPOSITION AND CHAIRMANSHIP OF LEBANESE DELEGATION, AND AGENDAS FOR FORMAL MEETINGS. HE DID NOT REJECT MY URGINGS FOR TALKS IN BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL. GEMAYEL'S PREFERRED TARGET DATE FOR FIRST FORMAL MEETING IS NOVEMBER 17. AGENDA APPEARS TO BE NO PROBLEM. CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE MAY BE FINESSED BY APPOINTING NO CHAIRMAN, OR POLITICAL AND MILITARY CO-CHAIRMEN, BUT I WANT LEB-

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ANESE AND ISRAELIS TO WORK THIS OUT FACE-TO-FACE, AND DID NO MORE THAN SUGGEST THESE OPTIONS. GEMAYEL REVEALED CABINET DECISION TO AVOID UNHELPFUL OFFICIAL COMMENT ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI ISSUES AND AGAIN SHOWED VERY POSITIVE AND FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD LONG-TERM LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY FALSE STEP WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE HIS "HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES" TO BUILD THE STRUCTURE OF A NEW LEBANON, WHICH WOULD LAST FIFTY YEARS. IN DISCUSSION OF NORMALIZATION PROCESS, GEMAYEL REPEATED LEBANESE POSITION THAT NEW AGREEMENT PREFERABLY SHOULD BE AN ADDITION OR ANNEX TO EXISTING ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, THUS MAKING IT EASIER TO SELL DOMESTICALLY AND IN ARAB WORLD. HE WAS, HOWEVER, PREPARED FOR A NEW "SIGNED" DOCUMENT. ON SPECIFIC ISSUE OF MOVEMENT ACROSS BORDERS, GEMAYEL IS READY FOR SOME PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN MEETING, GEMAYEL EXPRESSED FEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DRAG ON AND THAT FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE DELAYED, EVEN IF INITIAL PULLBACKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED. I REITERATED US COMMITMENT TO MOST RAPID POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY

3. COMMENT: I HAVE HAD THREE LONG SESSIONS WITH GEMAYEL OVER THE PAST FOUR DAYS. WHILE IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TO REPORT ANYTHING BEYOND HIGH POINTS, HIS WORDS SHOW HOW FAR HE HAS MOVED SINCE RETURNING FROM WASHINGTON AND HOW MUCH HE HAS CONDITIONED HIS PEOPLE FOR "POLITICAL" TALKS. WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT DOING WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO REGAIN LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH A SIGNED AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, DESPITE HIS EXPECTATION OF OPPOSITION FROM THE ARAB WORLD AND HIS ERSTWHILE SUPPORTERS HERE, I DETECT REAL QUALITY IN THE MAN. HIS PRESENT DETERMINATION TO PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE PLAN WITH ALL INGREDIENTS AGREED TO, INCLUDING NORMALIZATION, ETC., BEFORE EVEN AN INITIAL IDF/SYRIAN PULLBACK, MAY REQUIRE MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR OWN APPROACH AND THAT OF ISRAEL. END COMMENT.

4. ACCOMPANIED BY ROSS AND DCM PUGH, I MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR TWO HOURS LATE NOVEMBER 11. NO OTHER LEBANESE WERE PRESENT.

5. AGREEMENT ON INFORMAL LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETING:
--GEMAYEL FINALLY ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI COUNTER PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AFTTAL AND AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE TO PREPARE FOR "IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS" ALONG THE LINES OF THE FORMULATION DISCUSSED WITH SHARON AND SHAMIR ON NOVEMBER 10 (JERUSALEM 3466). IN PERSUADING GEMAYEL, I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY MY DISCUSSIONS

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IN ISRAEL, NOTING THE TOUGH POSITION SHARON HAD TAKEN REJECTING A CLEAR PRIOR COMMITMENT TO FORMAL TALKS, AS WELL AS SHAMIR'S HELPFUL DEFINITION OF "IMMEDIATE" AS MEANING WITH "A FEW DAYS." GEMAYEL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISRAELI EMPHASIS ON PROCEDURES AND FEARS PROLONGED DISCUSSIONS. HE WILL CALL ON US FOR HELP IF THE ISRAELIS ENGAGE IN STALLING TACTICS.

-- GEMAYEL TOLD US THAT FATTAL WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MEET AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE BEGINNING SATURDAY AFTERNOON (NOVEMBER 13). WE AGREED ON A TENTATIVE TIME OF 1900, WHICH I UNDERTOOK TO PROPOSE TO THE ISRAELIS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE EXISTING LAF-IDF LIAISON CENTER IN B'ABDA (NOT REPEAT NOT THE ISRAELI MFA LIAISON CENTER) "COULD" BE THE BEST VENUE FOR THIS INFORMAL MEETING, SINCE THE FACT THAT IT IS USED DAILY BY ISRAELI AND LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS AND IS FULLY

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SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 8215

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FROM DRAPER

GUARDED BY LAF TROOPS WILL ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF
KEEPING THE MEETING SECRET. GEMAYEL AGAIN SAID HE
DID NOT EXPECT THE MEETING TO BE KEPT SECRET. HE WILL
NOT BEFOREHAND VOLUNTEER ANYTHING PUBLICLY, BUT IS
PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANY CRITICISM THAT EMERGES.
-- GEMAYEL PRESSED HARD FOR THE MOST RAPID POSSIBLE
CONVENING OF THE FIRST FORMAL MEETING. I EXPLAINED
THAT THE RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL SO-CALLED "SECRET"
MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED BY THE ISRAELIS
BEFORE THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A DATE, BUT WE
AGREED INFORMALLY THAT A GOOD TARGET DATE WOULD BE
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17. GEMAYEL WILL BE AWAY IN SAUDI

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ARABIA NOVEMBER 14 AND 15, AND HE WANTS TO BE HERE WHEN THE FORMAL TALKS OPEN, IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF TROUBLE IF IT DEVELOPS IN THE COUNTRY.

6. ISSUES FOR INFORMAL LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETING:

-- I URGED GEMAYEL TO GIVE FATTAL NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS ON ALL THE OBVIOUS ISSUES. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING FATTAL NOVEMBER 12 TO DO SO, AND HE REVIEWED WITH PRIDE THE COMPOSITION OF HIS FULL TEAM, WHICH HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE COL. RUHAYYIM, AN OFFICER WHO IS VERY HIGHLY REGARDED. -- VENUE. I TOLD GEMAYEL IT IS INEVITABLE THAT ISRAEL WOULD PROPOSE HOLDING FORMAL MEETINGS IN BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL. GEMAYEL SWALLOWED HARD AT THIS POINT, BUT DID NOT OBJECT OPENLY WHEN IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO AN ISRAELI TOWN (SUCH AS TIBERIAS, FOR EXAMPLE), IN EXCHANGE FOR MEETINGS IN KHALDAH, WHICH I ASSUMED THE LEBANESE WOULD WANT TO PROPOSE. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. FURTHERMORE, HE NOTED, THE PERMANENT LEBANESE SECRETARIAT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE INSTALLED AT KHALDAH.

-- CHAIRMANSHIP. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT SHAMIR HAD LIKED THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE AS MANY CIVILIANS AS MILITARY MEN ON THE LEBANESE DELEGATION (GEMAYEL INTERJECTED THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE MORE CIVILIANS THAN MILITARY). SHAMIR HAD ALSO APPRECIATED THE LEBANESE READINESS TO FORM SUBCOMMITTEES, INCLUDING A POLITICAL SUB-COMMITTEE. WHILE THE US CERTAINLY SUPPORTED LEBANON'S RIGHT TO NAME ITS OWN DELEGATION, IT MIGHT, I CAUTIONED, BE BETTER NOT TO NAME A FORMAL CHAIRMAN. NO CHAIRMAN OR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CO-CHAIRMEN MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. GEMAYEL AGREED THAT THIS COULD BE FINESSED.

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LEBANON, HE SAID, DID NOT WANT TO DRAMATIZE THIS ISSUE, AND FORMALITIES SHOULD NOT GET IN THE WAY.

-- DATE OF FORMAL MEETINGS, I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT, WHILE THERE WOULD BE A CERTAIN DELAY WHILE THE ISRAELIS REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL MEETING, IT WOULD BE IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO BEGIN THE FORMAL MEETINGS BEFORE BEGIN'S NOVEMBER 19 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, OTHERWISE, THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BECOME A HOT ISSUE FOR THAT MEETING. GEMAYEL SAID LEBANON WOULD PRESS FOR AN EARLY MEETING.

-- AGENDA. I TOLD GEMAYEL I FORESAW NO REAL PROBLEM ON AGENDA. THE OBVIOUS MILITARY AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED. AS I EXPECTED, GEMAYEL DID NOT DEMUR.

7. LEBANESE STATEMENTS ON ISRAEL:

-- GEMAYEL CONFIDED THAT TO HELP BUILD THE PROPER

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ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THE CABINET HAD TAKEN A DECISION NOVEMBER 10 THAT MINISTERS SHOULD, UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS H

AD BEEN COMPLETED, REMAIN SILENT ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT SHAMIR HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY GEMAYEL'S EARLIER EFFORTS TO QUIET HIS MINISTERS, AND THAT THE FORMAL CABINET DECISION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE VERY WELL RECEIVED.

8. ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE PROCESS:

-- GEMAYEL WAS AGAIN EXPLICIT IN HIS CONVICTION THAT, ONCE THE PEACE PROCESS HAD BEGUN, MORE SENIOR CONTACTS ON A BROADER RANGE OF ISSUES COULD BEGIN "WITHIN A MONTH.." HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD NO COMPLEX IN THIS REGARD, SAYING HE WAS READY FOR AN "AGGRESSIVE APPROACH." HE REVEALED THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN THE "OFFICIAL SOURCE" FOR THE POSITIVE PRESS BACKGROUNDING PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 11 (BEIRUT 8185).

-- HIS ONLY FEAR, HE SAID, WAS THAT HE REMAINED UNSURE OF ISRAEL'S REAL INTENTIONS (SEE BELOW). HE WAS WORRIED THAT WITHOUT REAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FROM THE US, THERE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WOULD BE NO POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS, I RESPONDED THAT THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GET INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WE WOULD THEN PLAY OUR ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. WE WERE DETERMINED TO AVOID A STALEMATE AND WOULD WORK HARD TO CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS THAT A STRONG LEBANON WAS BETTER FOR THEIR INTERESTS THAN A PROLONGED OCCUPATION.

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EXDIS
FROM DRAPER

--GEMAYEL REITERATED HIS APPREHENSION, GIVEN HIS
"HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES" IN BUILDING A NEW STRUCTURE
FOR A NEW LEBANON WHICH HE WANTED TO LAST FOR THE NEXT
50 YEARS, AND SAID HE ALSO WANTED TO ENSURE THAT NO FALSE STEPS
COMPLICATED HIS TASK.

9. NORMALIZATION:

-- I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT ACCEPT THE

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1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

ESTICALLY AND IN THE ARAB WORLD TO SPEAK OF REBUILDING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD IN FACT BE GIVEN A NEW SUBSTANCE AND APPEARANCE TO TAKE THE NEW SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT. THE 1948 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WOULD SERVE AS A BASE, AND NEW DOCUMENTS OR ARTICLES COULD BE ADDED.

--LATER, MOST IMPORTANT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF LIKELY LEBANESE MUSLIM AND ARAB OPPOSITION TO WAHT HE MIGHT HAVE TO DO, GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO HAVE WHATEVER DOCUMENT THAT EMERGED FROM THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SIGNED BY THE APPROPRIATE LEBANESE. HE IS PREPARED FOR RULY STRONG OPPOSITION, HE SAID.

--ONE ELEMENT GEMEYAL TOLD US HE WAS KEEN ON PRE-SERVING WAS INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH UNIFIL AND UN OBSERVERS. "IF WE ARE TO HAVE OPEN BORDERS," HE SAID, "IT IS BETTER TO HAVE THEM UNDER INTERNATIONAL, NOT LEBANESE-, RESPONSIBILITY." (COMMENT: AS MENTIONED EARLIER, THIS IS OBVIOUSLY GOING TO REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION AFTER IT IS SURFACED WITH ISRAEL. WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT HERE IS GEMAYEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA FO OPEN BORDERS OF SOME KIND.)

--GEMAYEL CAME BACK REPEATEDLY TO HIS FEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD THEREFORE KEEP THEIR FORCES IN LEBANON INDEFINITELY. HE POINTED TO ISRAELI PREPARATIONS FOR THE WINTER, AS WELL AS THE INSTALLATION OF SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT ON THE PEAK OF JABAL BARUK, AS DISTURBING EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

I SAID, AND WANTED ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. I HAD CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS STILL OUR POLICY OBJECTIVE IN A RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB. A TWO-STEP WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED, I SUGGESTED.

--AS HE AND OTHERS HAVE SAID BEFORE, GEMAYEL PROFESSED

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HIMSELF TO BE VERY WARY OF SUCH AN APPROACH, BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT A FIRST-PHASE PULLBACK WOULD LEAVE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN "COMFORTABLE POSITIONS" FROM WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO WITHDRAWAL. HE STRESSED THAT LEBANON NEEDS A GUARANTEED TIMETABLE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL IN A "PACKAGE DEAL," A BEFORE MOVING ON INITIAL "PULLBACKS."

-- I REPEATED THAT THE US WOULD FIND IT INTOLERABLE TO HAVE FOREIGN FORCES STAYING FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS HAD BEGUN. FOR ONE THING, THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE WOULD BE GREATLY COMPLICATED. WHILE IN SOME WAYS A PACKAGE DEAL COULD BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE, THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. THEN, THE US COULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION AT CRITICAL POINTS.

--GEMAYEL FINALLY ASKED THAT WE OBTAIN THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES BY THE END OF THE YEAR EVEN IF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED. I COUNTERED THAT NO ONE COULD PROVIDE AN IRONCLAD GUARANTEE, AND SOME ISSUES SUCH AS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND A DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED.

11. FURTHER COMMENT: GEMAYEL WAS VERY RELAXED AND INFORMAL, SHARING JOKES AND EVEN SHARPENING HIS OWN PENCILS AND TAKING HIS OWN NOTES* HE WENT FURTHER THAN EVER BEFORE IN DEMONSTRATING AN OPEN-MINDED ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL AND A GREAT DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISSUES OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE FACING HIM AS WE APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS. I AM THEREFORE OPTIMISTIC THAT, IF WE CAN GET THE ISRAELIS FINALLY ON BOARD, WE ARE ABOUT TO START THE LONG-AWAITED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND

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ISRAEL.
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CONCEPTS= FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, PRESS SUMMARIES, NATIONAL UNIFICATION

TAGS= SOPN, PEPR, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, US, PLO

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-----BEIRUT 8185

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, MOPS, PLO, LE, IS, SY, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: PREPARING LEBANESE PUBLIC FOR NEGOTIATIONS

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1. (C) AS PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR CHASSAN TUENI AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN TELLING US, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN QUIETLY PREPARING LEBANESE PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS EXHORTING ARAB PUBLIC OPINION TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING AS THE PROCESS GETS UNDER WAY. IN ADDITION TO MEETINGS WITH THE LEADERS OF VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPINGS, TUENI HAS BEEN HAVING HIS NEWSPAPER, THE LEADING INDEPENDENT "AN-NAHAR," PUT KEY IDEAS BEFORE THE PUBLIC.

2. (U) ON NOVEMBER 10, A FRONT-PAGE STORY IN "AN-NAHAR"

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DESCRIBED THE LEBANESE POSITION IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS (ALL QUOTES):

— DIPLOMATIC SOURCES CLOSE TO THE LEBANESE SIDE SAY THAT LEBANON HAS REFRAINED SO FAR FROM COMMENTING ON WHAT HAS BEEN COMING OUT OF ISRAEL ON NEGOTIATIONS, CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-CONDITIONS, SO AS TO AVOID THE EMERGENCE OF A MEDIA DEBATE PRIOR TO THE DEBATE EXPECTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE LEBANESE SIDE HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO LET THE AMERICAN TEAM PLAY THE ROLE OF MOVING POINTS OF VIEW CLOSER TOGETHER----

-- THESE SOURCES ADDED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL RAISED THE LEBANESE POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BRIEFLY WITH PRESIDENT REAGEN.... DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE IN DEPTH (WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND OTHER OFFICIALS) ON THE FUTURE OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS, WITH ISRAELI AND NON-ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS BEING THE POINT OF DEPARTURE....

— ON THIS BASIS, THE LEBANESE SIDE SEES NO BENEFIT IN CAUSING TENSION IN THE ATMOSPHERE BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BY ... PREJUDGING THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CREATING A DEBATE OVER THEIR EXPECTED RESULTS.

— THE LEBANESE SIDE CONSIDERS... THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS, LIKE ALL NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE GIVE AND TAKE, DIFFERING

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POINTS OF VIEW WILL NATURALLY EMERGE DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, WHY WOULD THERE BE A NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS?

-- LEBANESE SOURCES ARE TENDING, IT APPEARS, NOT TO GIVE THE EXISTING DEBATE ANY MORE IMPORTANCE THAN IT DESERVES, SINCE THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN ROLE WILL NOW BE ABLE, AS IT WAS IN THE PAST, TO FIND FORMULAS ON FORM THAT WILL ENABLE THE TWO PARTIES TO MOVE TOWARD THE GOALS ON WHICH AGREEMENT MUST

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INEVITABLY BE REACHED.

3. (U) ON NOVEMBER 11, ANOTHER FRONT-PAGE STORY SOUGHT TO BUILD LEBANESE AND ARAB RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,

USING THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS (ALL QUOTES):

--AN OFICIAL SOURCE HAS SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST MOVE BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS TO END ALL OCCUPATION AND RECOVER LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY FULLY. HE INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE HAD REINFORCED ITS WORKING GROUP WITH WELL-KNOWN PERSONS, INCLUDING SOME WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE CAMP DAVID TALKS AND THE KILOMETER-101 NEGOTIATIONS. HE CALLED FOR FACING UP TO THIS SITUATION SERIOUSLY AND EFFECTIVELY, WITHOUT LETTING FORMALITIES GET IN THE WAY, "BECAUSE THE OBJECT IS THE LIBERATION OF TERRITORY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."



-- THE SOURCE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS MOVING ON THE BASIS OF TWO PRINCIPLES IT WILL NOT ABANDON-- LEBANESE UNITY AND ARAB SOLIDARITY. HE HOPES THAT THE ARAB STATES WILL UNDERSTAND LEBANON'S SITUATION, FOR WHICH IT PAID A LOT, AND WHICH IT CANNOT ABANDON. NEITHER ARAB COLLUSION AGAINST IT ON THIS SUBJECT NOR ANY RELUCTANCE IN WORKING TO HELP IT BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS IS PERMISSIBLE ANY LONGER.

-- IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS READY, IN ORDER TO LIBERATE THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON, TO DO WHATEVER IT SEES AS SUITABLE ON THE FUTURE OF

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THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND ON THE NATURE OF THE
NEGOTIATION TEAM. THE ARAB STATES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT
THE PURPOSE OF ANY LEBANESE MOVE AT WHATEVER LEVEL IS
TO ACHIEVE FULL WITHDRAWALS FROM ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY.
-- THE SOURCE MENTIONED THAT THE ONE-UPSMANSHIP
THAT HAD BEEN USED IN THE PAST AS A STYLE OF ACTING
AGAINST OFFICIAL MOVES HAD REMOVED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
FROM THE SOUTH AND LOST IT AND ITS INHABITANTS. ITS
LOSS WAS ALSO AN ARAB RESPONSIBILITY, AND ITS
RECOVERY TODAY IS AN ARAB RESPONSIBILITY AS WELL.



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EX DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, IS, LE, SY, PLO, US, XF
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS

REF: (A) BEIRUT 8094 (NOTAL), (B) JERUSALEM 3401

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. I HELD TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS NOVEMBER 10
WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO URGE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
FORMULA I HAD ELICITED FROM PRESIDENT GENAYEL TO GET
ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. THE FIRST

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MEETING WITH KIMCHE, BAR-ON, AND TAMIR WENT WELL,

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WITH WHAT SEEMED TO BE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF PRELIMINARY, INFORMAL SECRET TALKS BETWEEN FATTAL AND AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE, FOLLOWED BY TALKS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS. HOWEVER, DURING THE SECOND MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON, AND ELEVEN OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS, SHAMIR AND SHARON REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE INITIAL PRELIMINARY TALKS AND THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF DELEGATIONS. SHARON WAS AT HIS WORST, ARGUING THAT, SINCE THE ISRAELIS ALREADY KNOW LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES OF CHAIRMANSHIP, LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, AND VENUE, ISRAEL CANNOT AGREE NOW TO A MEETING OF DELEGATIONS UNTIL THE PRELIMINARY PCAL TALKS HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON THESE ISSUES. SHAMIR WAS HELPFUL THROUGHOUT THE MEETING BUT FOUND HIS SCOPE FOR COMPROMISE SEVERELY LIMITED BY SHARON'S ADAMANT POSITION. AFTER TWO HOURS OF ARGUING, THE ISRAELIS AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING FORMULA: "REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL HAVE A SECRET, INFORMAL MEETING IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS CONCERNING THE IMMEDIATE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS." FOLLOWING A SECURE PHONE CALL WITH HABIB AND VELIOTES, I CALLED SHAMIR TO CONVEY WASHINGTON'S DISAPPOINTMENT THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE COUNTER-PROPOSAL AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF WHAT ISRAEL MEANT BY "IMMEDIATE." SHAMIR AUTHORIZED ME TO TELL GEMAYEL THAT ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS THIS TO MEAN "IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS." I WILL MEET GEMAYEL NOVEMBER 11 TO URGE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULA SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN BEFORE THE WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, KRECZKO, AND KURTZER, I MET NOVEMBER 10 WITH KINCHE, BAR-ON, TAHIR,

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RUBINSTEIN, AND BEN-TSUR BEFORE MEETING SHAMIR AND SHARON, TO URGE ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE LEBANESE COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. I REVIEWED IN DETAIL MY DISCUSSIONS WITH GEMAYEL, EMPHASIZING IN PARTICULAR THE DEGREE TO WHICH GEMAYEL HAS MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF TALKING ABOUT PEACE, NORMALIZATION, AND CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS FIRST THAT, AS THEY HAD REQUESTED, I HAD TALKED TO GEMAYEL ABOUT THE NEED TO TEMPER LEBANESE RHETORIC AND COMMENTARY ABOUT ISRAEL. I STRESSED GEMAYEL'S

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UNDERSTANDING OF THE DAMAGE THIS WAS CREATING AND HIS COMMITMENT TO TALK WITH OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS TO TRY AND TONE DOWN THE RHETORIC.

4. I THEN TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT ANIN HAD APPOINTED ANTOINE FATTAL AS HIS PERSONAL CONDUIT AND REPRESENTATIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I DESCRIBED FATTAL AS A MAN OF SIGANT POLITICAL EXPERIENCE WHO ENJOYS CLOSE AND LONG-STANDING PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH GEMAYEL. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT GEMAYEL HAD AGREED THAT FATTAL COULD MEET WITH AN APPROPRIATE ISRAELI OFFICIAL, BEFORE INITIATION OF MEETINGS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS, FOR PRELIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY TALKS. I THEN DESCRIBED GEMAYEL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT FATTAL WOULD ENGAGE IN POLITICAL TALKS WHICH WOULD CONTINUE EVEN AFTER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DELEGATIONS HAD STARTED. KINCHE IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT THIS NEWS WAS PROMISING.

5. I THEN DESCRIBED TO THE ISRAELIS THE DEGREE TO WHICH GEMAYEL HAS COME AROUND TO A POSITION IN WHICH HE STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS

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NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL. GEMAYEL AND SALEM, I NOTED, HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR APPRECIATION OF WHAT ISRAEL HAD DONE FOR THE LEBANESE. GEMAYEL TOLD ME HE WANTS FRIENDLY RELATIONS, PEACE, AND CONTINUED CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH ISRAEL EVEN AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND AGREEMENT ON OTHER ARRANGEMENTS. GEMAYEL HAD ACKNOWLEDGED PREVIOUS POOR PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT HAD LOBBIED WITH SENIOR LEBANESE POLITICIANS IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL TALKS WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT GEMAYEL HAD SAID THAT HE INTENDS TO DO EVERYTHING POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, AND HAD NOT BALKED WHEN I HAD STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WANTS WRITTEN AND SIGNED AGREEMENTS. GEMAYEL HAD TOLD ME THAT HE IS SERIOUSLY LOOKING TO THE FUTURE AND THAT

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HE SEES RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AS DEVELOPING ALONG A CONTINUUM. GEMAYEL HAD EVEN GONE SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT, IF THINGS GO WELL AND THE LEBANESE AND ARABS CAN ADJUST TO LEBANON'S RELATIONS TO ISRAEL, HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN SALEM AND SHAMIR OR EVEN BETWEEN BEGIN AND HIMSELF.

6. I ASKED KIMCHE WHETHER, AS GEMAYEL HAD ASSURED ME, THE ISRAELIS WERE RECEIVING THIS SAME MESSAGE THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THE MESSAGE IN OTHER CHANNELS HAD NOT COME THROUGH AS CLEARLY AND LOUDLY, BUT THAT THE GIST OF WHAT I HAD CONVEYED HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE ISRAELIS. IN GENERAL, KIMCHE SAID, THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTAND THAT GEMAYEL WANTS CONTINUED DIALOGUE, NEEDS ISRAELI SUPPORT, AND WANTS RELATIONS TO CONTINUE. KIMCHE THEN CONGRATULATED ME FOR HAVING PUSHED WELL AND HAVING ACHIEVED "DEFINITE PROGRESS IN EVERY SENSE OF THE WORD." HE ASKED WHETHER GEMAYEL HAD DISCUSSED WHEN AND WHERE THE PRELIMINARY TALKS SHOULD BE HELD. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT WE HAD NOT TALKED ABOUT DATES OR PLACES, BUT THAT THESE WERE MINOR PROBLEMS THAT COULD BE WORKED OUT QUICKLY. KIMCHE ALSO ASKED WHETHER GEMAYEL STILL INTENDED TO NAME HAMDAN TO LEAD THE

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LEBANESE DELEGATION. I REPLIED THAT, AT THIS TIME, HAMDAN WOULD LEAD THE DELEGATION THAT WOULD INCLUDE TWO OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS AND THREE CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING FATTAL, BAROOD, AND A FOREIGN MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH FATTAL FACE TO FACE TO SEE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GIVE IN THE LEBANESE POSITION. IN SUM, AS THIS MEETING ENDED, IT APPEARED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE COUNTER FORMULA TO GET THE TALKS STARTED.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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7. I THEN MET FOR OVER TWO HOURS WITH SHAMIR, SHARON, AND ELEVEN AIDES, INCLUDING THOSE WHO HAD ATTENDED THE FIRST MEETING. I DESCRIBED MY TALKS WITH GEMAYEL IN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME TERMS AS I HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY, AGAIN EMPHASIZING GEMAYEL'S STRONG INTEREST IN PEACE AND FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD SHAMIR AND SHARON THAT GEMAYEL HAD SAID THAT LEBANON WANTS TO BE A "FRIEND AND ALLY OF ISRAEL," AND WANTS RELATIONS TO MOVE TOWARDS NORMALIZATION. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT I HAD FAITHFULLY AND FULLY DESCRIBED THEIR VIEWS TO GEMAYEL, AND THAT HE HAD RESPONDED WITH THE PROPOSAL TO DELEGATE FATTAL TO HOLD SECRET, INFORMAL TALKS WITH AN APPROPRIATE ISRAELI OFFICIAL, TO BE FOLLOWED BY MEETINGS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS. I DESCRIBED FATTAL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GEMAYEL AND HIS OFFICIAL STATUS. I ALSO EMPHASIZED GEMAYEL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AGENDA FOR TALKS BETWEEN FATTAL AND THE ISRAELIS WAS OPEN AND THAT POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE AFTER DELEGATION MEETINGS HAD BEGUN. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT GEMAYEL FORESAW THE EXPANSION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THESE POLITICAL TALKS, AND HAD AGREED TO THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF NEGOTIATIONS. I ADDED THAT GEMAYEL HAD BEGUN TO SENSITIZE THE LEBANESE PUBLIC THROUGH THE PRESS AND HAD MET WITH SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICIALS TO ELICIT THEIR SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I ALSO STRESSED THAT, IN TALKING ABOUT THE NEED FOR PEACE AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS, GEMAYEL AND SALEM HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR GRATITUDE TO ISRAEL FOR WHAT IT HAD DONE FOR LEBANON.

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8. SHAMIR INITIALLY ASKED ABOUT THE STATE OF LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. I REPLIED THAT

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
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EXDIS

LEBANON HAS HAD INITIAL EXCHANGES WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO,
BUT THAT GEMAYEL BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT FACE-TO-
FACE, SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH ISRAEL CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE
LEVER FOR LEBANON TO USE IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH
SYRIA AND THE PLO. I CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE QUESTION
OF PRISONERS AND THE RETURN OF THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO
HAD FALLEN, SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR LEBANON
TO HEAR ISRAEL'S CONCERNS DIRECTLY IN ORDER TO PUSH
FOR PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO.

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9. SHAMIR AND MORE

PARTICULARLY SHARON THEN BEGAN TO PROBE ON WHAT STEPS WOULD FOLLOW AFTER THE INITIAL TALKS WITH FATTAL. I REVIEWED GEMAYEL'S AGREEMENT

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THAT THE FATTAL TALKS WOULD BE OPEN TO A DISCUSSION ON ALL ISSUES OF CONCERN, INCLUDING CHAIRMANSHIP, LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, AND VENUE. I ALSO REVIEWED THE PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF LEBANON'S DELEGATION TO THE SUBSEQUENT SET OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE WELL UNDER WAY IN ORGANIZING THEMSELVES FOR TALKS ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES. SHAMIR THEN SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD READILY ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL FOR TALKS BETWEEN FATTAL AND AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE, AND THAT NEXT STEPS WOULD BE DECIDED DURING THIS PRELIMINARY MEETING. EMPHASIZING THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RIPE FOR SERIOUS, FACE-TO-FACE TALKS ON THE RANGE OF ISSUES, AND REITERATING GEMAYEL'S EXPECTATION OF CONTINUING RELATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, I TRIED TO BRING SHAMIR TO UNDERSTAND GEMAYEL'S NEED FOR THE PRELIMINARY TALKS TO BE FOLLOWED WITHIN A DAY OR TWO BY A MEETING OF DELEGATIONS. AMBASSADOR LEWIS REMINDED SHAMIR THAT ISRAEL HAD ASKED ME TO GET GEMAYEL TO AGREE ON THE PRELIMINARY ROUND OF TALKS AS THE FIRST STEP IN CONVENING A MEETING OF DELEGATIONS IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. LEWIS EMPHASIZED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT THE FORM OF DELEGATION MEETINGS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT, BUT THAT THE FACT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE HAD BEEN AGREED. SHAMIR DEMURRED, REPEATING THAT AGREEMENT ON THE FORMAT AND AGENDA OF DELEGATION MEETINGS WOULD BE REACHED DURING THE PRELIMINARY TALKS BETWEEN FATTAL AND THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE.

10. AT THIS POINT SHARON INTERVENED WITH THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF HIGHLY NEGATIVE AND UNHELPFUL COMMENTS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. "LET'S NOT PLAY GAMES, WE ARE NOT CHILDREN." HE SAID THE ISRAELI CABINET

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DECISION OF OCTOBER 11 WAS STILL BINDING AND THAT

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ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT VENUE AND THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. "NEGOTIATIONS ARE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, FINALIZED BY WRITTEN, FORMAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND NOT SIGNED BY A MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OR BY AN AMBASSADOR." SHARON SAID THAT THE DELEGATIONS CAN INCLUDE MILITARY COMPONENTS TO NEGOTIATE MILITARY ANNEXES AND ECONOMIC COMPONENTS TO NEGOTIATE NORMALIZATION, BUT THAT HEAD OF DELEGATION MUST BE A SENIOR POLITICAL OFFICIAL. ISRAEL, HE SAID, HAS HELD SECRET MEETINGS WITH LEBANESE IN THE PAST AND WILL DO SO IN THE FUTURE. THE DIFFERENCE, ACCORDING TO SHARON, BETWEEN THOSE MEETINGS AND THE PROPOSED MEETING WITH FATTAL IS THAT THIS WOULD BE A FORMAL POLITICAL MEETING WITH THE CLEAR TASK OF DECIDING WHERE AND WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEGOTIATING DELEGATIONS. BEFORE STARTING NEGOTIATIONS, SHARON SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT TO PREPARE THE GROUND FORMALLY. AFTER THE INITIAL MEETING WITH FATTAL ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL CONSULT INTERNALLY AND DECIDE ON HOW TO PROCEED.

11. SAM LEWIS AND I ARGUED THAT A FORMULA WAS NEEDED TO INCORPORATE ISRAEL'S CONCERN, WHILE PRESERVING LEBANON'S NEED TO LINK THE PRELIMINARY MEETING WITH A SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF DELEGATIONS. SHARON REACTED ANGRILY, SAYING THAT OUR PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED LANGUAGE WAS "DANGEROUS AND UNSUITABLE" AND WAS A "TRICK" TO LURE ISRAEL INTO A PRELIMINARY MEETING AND THEN BLAME ISRAEL FOR REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE PRELIMINARY MEETING ON THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF AGENDA, CHAIRMANSHIP, VENUE, AND LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION. HAVING BEEN OUTFLANKED BY SHARON,

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CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

SHAMIR ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER SIMPLY TO
CONVENE A MEETING BETWEEN AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE
AND FATTAL, AND LET THEM HAMMER OUT AN AGREEMENT ON
THE MODALITIES FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARGUED
AROUND THIS ISSUE FOR SEVERAL MORE MINUTES, DURING
WHICH I TRIED OUT AN ADDITIONAL FORMULA. SHARON, HOWEVER,
ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO BUDGE. HE SAID THE LEBANESE ARE
HEADING FOR SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE
TO ISRAEL. ISRAEL, HE SAID, IS NOT THE OBSTACLE TO
STARTING NEGOTIATIONS; IN FACT, THE EVACUATION OF
TERRORISTS FROM ALL OF LEBANON SHOULD BE COMPLETED
IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT ANY FURTHER REFERENCE TO ISRAEL.

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12. FOLLOWING A 10-MINUTE BREAK I TOLD SHAMIR AND
SHARON THAT LEBANESE CONCERNS ARE MIRROR IMAGES OF
ISRAEL'S. I TOLD THEM THAT I NEEDED TO CONVEY TO
GEMAYEL THE CERTAINTY THAT SOMETHING BEYOND SECRET
POLITICAL TALKS WILL OCCUR SOON. I THEN TRIED OUT A

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DIFFERENT PROPOSED FORMULA, BUT THIS DID NOT WASH WITH SHARON. AFTER ONCE AGAIN REVIEWING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT HAD BROUGHT ME BACK TO ISRAEL WITH WHAT I HAD ASSUMED TO BE THE POSITION WHICH ISRAEL HAD ASKED ME TO DISCUSS WITH GEMAYEL, I TRIED OUT ONE LAST FORMULA WHICH READ, "REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL HAVE A SECRET, INFORMAL MEETING IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS CONCERNING THE IMMEDIATE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS." SHARON AND SHAMIR ACCEPTED THIS FORMULA, AND I TOLD THEM THAT I WOULD TRAVEL TO LEBANON NOVEMBER 11 TO SEEK GEMAYEL'S CONCURRENCE.

13. AFTER CONSULTING WITH PHIL HABIB AND NICK VELIOTES BY SECURE PHONE, I GOT BACK IN TOUCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR TO SAY THAT WASHINGTON WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT SIMPLY ACCEPTED THE GEMAYEL COUNTER-PROPOSAL. I SAID THAT, WHILE I WOULD BE GOING TO SEE GEMAYEL TOMORROW WITH THE AGREED ISRAELI FORMULATION, I NEEDED FURTHER CLARIFICATION AS TO THE DEFINITION OF "IMMEDIATE." SHAMIR SAID THAT I COULD BE AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT "ISRAEL MEANS TO START NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS." HE REPEATED THAT "WITHIN A VERY FEW DAYS" WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE ISRAELI INTENTION AND THAT BEGIN HIMSELF ALSO WANTED SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN.

14. SHAMIR SAID HE THOUGHT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE

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ATTITUDES OF GEMAYEL AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM HAD IMPROVED THE CLIMATE SIGNIFICANTLY AND THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC. COVEY

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL NEWS CONFERENCE JULY 28: NEA PORTIONS

REF: RABAT 8115N

1. FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 211180 DATED JULY 29, 1982 TO
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS:

BEGIN TEXT: THE FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE NEA PORTIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 28 NEWS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO STAY WITH FOREIGN POLICY
BUT TURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I WONDERED WHAT EFFECT
YOU BELIEVE THE CONSTANT, DAY-AFTER-DAY BOMBING BY THE
ISRAELIS AND SHELLING BY THE ISRAELIS IN BEIRUT IS HAVING
ON YOUR EFFORTS, AND YOUR SPECIAL ENVOY MR. HABIB'S
EFFORTS, TO TRY TO BRING SOME KIND OF A SETTLEMENT, AND
SECONDLY, MR. HABIB HAS BEEN THERE NEARLY SEVEN WEEKS AND
CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF WHAT PROGRESS, IF ANY, HE
IS MAKING?

A. THERE'S NOTHING WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE THAN TO SEE
AN END TO THE BLOODSHED AND THE SHELLING, BUT I MUST
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REMINDE YOU IT'S ALSO BEEN TWO-WAY. THE PLO HAS BEEN, AND

IN SOME INSTANCES HAS BEEN THE FIRST, TO BREAK THE CEASE-
FIRE. THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ENDED, OF COURSE, AND
WE STILL STAY WITH OUR ORIGINAL PURPOSE--THAT WE WANT THE
EXODUS OF THE ARMED PLO OUT OF BEIRUT AND OUT OF LEBANON.
MR. HABIB HAS BEEN MAKING A TOUR OF COUNTRIES TO SEE IF
WE CAN GET SOME HELP IN TEMPORARY STAGING AREAS FOR
THOSE PEOPLE. WE WANT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

TO ONCE AGAIN, AFTER SEVERAL YEARS OF ALMOST DISSOLUTION, TO ONCE AGAIN BE THE AUTHORITY WITH A MILITARY FORCE, NOT SEVERAL MILITIAS BELONGING TO VARIOUS FACTIONS IN LEBANON, AND THEN WE WANT THE FOREIGN FORCES--ISRAELI AND SYRIAN BOTH--OUT OF LEBANON.

AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS BEEN DOING A MAGNIFICENT JOB. I DON'T COMMENT ON SPECIFICS BECAUSE I KNOW HOW SENSITIVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE AND SOMETIMES YOU LOSE SOME GROUND THAT YOU THINK YOU'D GAINED AND SOMETIMES YOU GAIN AGAIN. I STILL REMAIN OPTIMISTIC THAT THE SOLUTION IS GOING TO BE FOUND. AS I SAY, HE HAS RETURNED FROM THAT TRIP TO OTHER COUNTRIES, SOME OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND TO TEL AVIV--CONTRARY TO SOME REPORTS OR RUMORS TODAY THERE ARE NO DEADLINES THAT HAVE BEEN SET OF ANY KIND. THERE IS AN UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORT NOW THAT ANOTHER CEASE-FIRE HAS GONE INTO EFFECT. LET'S HOPE IT WILL HOLD. BUT HE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE IT IS WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND I THINK HE'S ENTITLED TO OUR SUPPORT.

Q. SIR, YOU SAID THAT YOU WANTED THE BOMBING STOPPED, IF I UNDERSTOOD YOU CORRECTLY. HAVE YOU CONVEYED YOUR FEELINGS TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN?

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A. WELL, WHEN I SAY THAT I SAY--WHAT I SHOULD SAY IS WE WANT THE BLOODSHED AND THE CONFLICT TO STOP. AND I'M HESITANT TO SAY ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT WHERE WE ARE IN THOSE OR WHO MIGHT BE PROVIDING THE STUMBLING BLOCK NOW TO THE STEPS I JUST OUTLINED THAT ARE NECESSARY TO BRING PEACE THERE. SO I CAN'T GO BEYOND THAT EXCEPT TO SAY THAT UNLESS AND UNTIL AMBASSADOR HABIB WOULD TELL ME THAT THERE'S NOTHING MORE TO BE NEGOTIATED AND THEY CAN'T SOLVE IT, I'M GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE OPTIMISTIC.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, A QUESTION CONCERNING A MEMBER OF YOUR CABINET: SECRETARY WATT RECENTLY HAD TO DISAVOW SOME COMMENTS BY HIM WHEN HE SUGGESTED THAT U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL MIGHT BE CURTAILED IF AMERICAN JEWS DO NOT SUPPORT YOUR ENERGY POLICIES. NOW MR. WATT, IN A LETTER TO CONGRESS, SUGGESTS THAT AMERICAN TROOPS MIGHT HAVE TO FIGHT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IF THERE'S ANY INTERFERENCE

WITH THE VAST NEW OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING. IS SECRETARY WATT REFLECTING YOUR VIEWS? IS HE REFLECTING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION? OR, AS SENATOR MOYNIHAN SUGGESTS, HAS HE EMBARRASSED YOUR ADMINISTRATION AND SOMEONE WHO SHOULD BE FIRED?

A. NO, HE SHOULDN'T BE FIRED. AND, AS I SAY, THE WHOLE CONTEXT OF HIS LETTER AND THE OPENING STATEMENT THAT YOU MADE FROM THAT LETTER, OR PARAPHRASING IT, WAS THE RESULT OF A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ARENS, A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AT A SOCIAL GATHERING THE NIGHT BEFORE. AND, AS MANY OF US DO, YOU GO HOME AND YOU THINK OF A COUPLE OF POINTS YOU HADN'T MADE AND HE MADE THEM.

WHAT HE WAS SUGGESTING, WITH REGARD TO THE DANGER TO ISRAEL, WAS OUR VULNERABILITY AS LONG AS WE ARE DEPENDENT

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ON OIL, ENERGY, FROM INSECURE SOURCES. AND THAT IF THERE SHOULD BE, AS WE ONCE HAD, AN EMBARGO, AND IF WE SHOULD FIND OURSELVES WITHOUT THE ENERGY NEEDED TO TURN THE WHEELS IN THIS COUNTRY AND THE WHEELS IN INDUSTRY, WE WOULDN'T BE MUCH OF AN ALLY TO OUR FRIENDS, AND THAT WOULD CERTAINLY INCLUDE ISRAEL.

AND HE WAS MAKING IT VERY PLAIN THAT WE ARE MORALLY OBLIGATED TO THE SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. NOW, HE HAS MADE A SPEECH TO A GROUP IN NEW YORK--I BELIEVE IT WAS THE B'NAI B'RITH--TODAY, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT IN OUTLINING HIS WHOLE POSITION AND WHERE HE STANDS THAT HIS AUDIENCE WAS MOST ENTHUSIASTIC AND SUPPORTIVE OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY.

HIS LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMEN...I THINK HE WAS ONLY TRYING TO MAKE THE EXAMPLE THAT SOME OF THOSE WHO'VE BEEN THE MOST OUTSPOKEN UP THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN THE--HAD THE MOST OBJECTIONS TO US TRYING TO IMPROVE OUR ENERGY SITUATION. AND WHAT HE WAS POINTING OUT IS WHERE WOULD THE WESTERN WORLD BE IS SOME DAY OUR SOURCE OF SUPPLY WAS PURELY THERE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IT WAS DENIED TO US.

SO THIS WAS HIS DRAMATIC STATEMENT ABOUT THE OTHER. BUT I THINK HE'S ALSO EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT HE'S HAD SECOND THOUGHTS.

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU MENTIONED EARLIER THE SENSITIVITY OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. DID YOU CONSIDER IT HARMFUL TO THOSE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS LAST WEEK WHEN SEVERAL U.S. CONGRESSMEN MET WITH THE PLO LEADER ARAFAT,

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AND DO YOU FEEL CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY AND THE OTHERS WERE EITHER MANIPULATED OR USED BY ARAFAT TO MAKE IT LOOK LIKE THERE WAS PROGRESS?

A. WELL, NOW, YOU...I WILL BE CONSCIOUS OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND SAY OF COURSE IT IS THE RIGHT OF CONGRESSMEN TO GO THERE IF THEY SO CHOOSE. I DON'T HAPPEN TO BELIEVE THAT RIGHT NOW IS A GOOD TIME TO DO THAT OR A GOOD IDEA, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE CONGRESSMEN THEMSELVES AND REPRESENTATIVE MCCLOSKEY HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT HE NOW BELIEVES THE PAPER THAT WAS SIGNED DID NOT AMOUNT TO ANYTHING AND SO HE'...

Q. AS YOU SAID BEFORE, AND AS YOUR SPOKESMAN HAS BEEN SAYING, PLO CHIEF ARAFAT HAS NOT YET MET THE CONDITIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SET TO DIRECT TALKS WITH YOU. HOWEVER, DO YOU THINK THAT MR. ARAFAT IS MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION, AND WOULD YOU WELCOME SUCH A DEVELOPMENT?

A. WELL, I THINK IT WOULD BE A STEP FORWARD IN PROGRESS IF THE PLO WOULD CHANGE THE POSITION IT HAS HAD AND THAT IS THAT ISRAEL MUST BE DESTROYED--THAT IT HAS NO RIGHT TO EXIST AS A NATION. AND WHAT THAT WOULD REQUIRE IS AGREEING TO ABIDE BY UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AGREEING THAT ISRAEL IS A NATION AND DOES HAVE A RIGHT TO EXIST. THEN I WOULD FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO. I'M NOT SPEAKING FOR ISRAEL--THAT'S UP TO THEM AND WE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THEM. BUT WE'RE THERE ARE AN INTERMEDIARY OFFERING OUR SERVICES TO TRY AND HELP BRING ABOUT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. WOULD YOU ALSO THEN SUPPORT AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, WHICH IS THAT THE PLO WANTS?

A. THAT AGAIN IS UP TO THE NEGOTIATORS. WE WOULDN'T
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IMPOSE ANYTHING ON THEM, BUT EGYPT AND ISRAEL--UNDER THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT ARE SUPPOSED TO ENTER INTO NOW AN AREA OF TALKING OF AUTONOMY FOR THE PALESTINIANS. AND THAT AGAIN IS SOMETHING THAT HAS BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE OF THIS TRAGEDY IN LEBANON. BUT I THINK THAT IS UP TO THEM, AND TO HOW THAT AUTONOMY DEVELOPS AND WHAT THEY SEE AS A PROPER SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. END TEXT. SHULTZ

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, IS, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: BEGIN ASKS US TO RAISE
POW ISSUE WITH SYRIANS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY: AT THE OUTSET OF OUR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR,
DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON (SEPTTEL), BEGIN RAISED THE
ISSUE OF ISRAELI PRISONERS IN SYRIAN HANDS. HE ASKED
THAT U.S. RAISE THE ISSUE IN DAMASCUS AGAIN, STATING
THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE TWO SENIOR
SYRIAN OFFICERS OR TWO SYRIAN PILOTS FOR FULL
INFORMATION ON THE FIVE MISSING ISRAELIS
TO THEM IF ALIVE OR IF DEAD, THE RETURN OF THEIR
REMAINS TO ISRAEL). BEGIN PREFERRED THAT THE USG,
RATHER THAN THE RED CROSS SHOULD MAKE THE APPROACH
SINCE THIS WAS AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE AND NOT
A "PROPER EXCHANGE OF POW'S." SAM LEWIS AND I TOLD

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BEGIN WE WOULD DO SO, BUT SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR
PAGANELLI MAKE THE APPROACH SINCE IT MIGHT BE SOME
DAYS BEFORE I WAS IN DAMASCUS. BEGIN AGREED,
AND ASKED THAT I FOLLOW UP WHEN I GOT TO DAMASCUS.
END SUMMARY.

3. AS HE HAS DURING OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS, PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY RAISING
THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI POW'S IN SYRIAN HANDS. I

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REVIEWED DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM'S OCTOBER 23 MEETING WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, AND KHADDAM'S RESPONSE THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH QADDOUR. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT WE HAVE HAD NO FURTHER WORD FROM THE SYRIANS, ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI HAD CONTINUED TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE RED CROSS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SYRIANS CLAIM THEY DO NOT HAVE AND KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THE FIVE MISSING IDF TANK CREWMEN.

4. DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON SAID THE SYRIAN RESPONSE WAS NOT CREDIBLE. HE WENT ON THAT ISRAEL HAS INFORMATION THAT THE FIVE TANK CREWMEN ARE ALIVE. MOREOVER, KHADDAM'S REPLY TO DAM THAT HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE ISSUE WAS NOT BELIEVABLE, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED WITH THE SYRIANS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT ISRAEL IS HOLDING TWO SYRIAN COLONELS AND TWO SYRIAN PILOTS. WHILE HE NOTED IT APPEARS THE SYRIANS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THE COLONELS, THEY SEEM TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN HAVING THE PILOTS BACK FOR SOME REASON. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THIS WAS THE CASE. ISRAEL

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IS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE THE PILOTS IN RETURN FOR FULL INFORMATION ON THE FIVE MISSING TANK CREWMEN. HE ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN HAVING VISITS TO AND DIRECT NEWS FROM THE EIGHT IDF PERSONNEL HELD BY THE PLO. (COMMENT: AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED WE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THE ICRC WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO THE EIGHT POWS HELD BY THE PLO SOON. BEGIN DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION, THOUGH SHARON FELT THESE ASSURANCES WERE NOT VERY SOLID.) DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON ADDED THAT IF ANY OR ALL OF THE FIVE TANK CREWMEN ARE ALIVE, SOMEONE MUST SEE THEM BEFORE THE DEAL CAN BE CONCLUDED. IF THEY ARE DEAD, THEIR REMAINS MUST BE RETURNED FOR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION TO ISRAEL AS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENT.

6. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER IF HE SPECIFICALLY WANTED THE USG AND NOT THE RED CROSS, TO MAKE THE APPROACH TO THE SYRIANS, NOTING THAT IN THE PAST THE SYRIANS HAD CONSIDERED OUR DISCUSSION OF THE POW ISSUE WITH THEM TO BE ADDING A POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE ISSUE. THE ICRC ROUTE COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE. BEGIN REPLIED THAT HE PREFERRED THE USG TO MAKE THE APPROACH, SINCE THIS PROPOSAL WAS BEING MADE IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND WAS "NOT A PROPER PRISONER

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EXCHANGE."

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7. AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I REPLIED WE WOULD OF
COURSE DO WHAT WE COULD. I ADDED THAT I PROBABLY

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AV015980

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EXDIS
WOULD NOT BE IN DAMASCUS FOR SEVERAL DAYS, AND
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE MIGHT MAKE THE APPROACH
THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS. BEGIN ASKED
THAT AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI MAKE AN APPROACH AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I
WOULD FOLLOW UP IF WE HAD NO WORD BY THE TIME I
ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS. I READILY AGREED TO DO SO.

8. EMBASSY TEL AVIV WILL SEEK TO ASCERTAIN FROM
THE MOD THE NAMES OF THE TWO SYRIAN OFFICERS AND
TWO PILOTS TO ASSIST AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI IN HIS
EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS.
LEWIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPP, PINT, LS, IS XF, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: BRIEFING THE ISRAELIS ON
POTENTIAL MNF CONTRIBUTIONS

PAGE 02 STATE 305679

REF: STATE

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. BEFORE GEMAYEL MAKES REQUEST OF POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL
MNF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, REQUEST DCM INFORM BAR-ON OF
FOLLOWING LIST OF COUNTRIES NOW BEING CONSIDERED AS
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS: UK, BELGIUM, SPAIN, SWEDEN,
GREECE, NETHERLANDS, INDIA, MOROCCO, SOUTH KOREA, AUSTRIA

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AND TURKEY.

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3. IN GIVING LIST TO BAR-ON YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT AS MNF WILL HAVE TO BE EXPANDED, IT IS IMPORTANT NOW TO FOCUS ON ADDITIONAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. YOU SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE GOI OBJECTIONS TO THIS LIST, OR GIVE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE REQUESTING ISRAELI APPROVAL, BUT IF BAR-ON SHOWS RESISTANCE TO ANY OF THOSE ON LIST, YOU MAY INFORM HIM THAT NO COUNTRY TO WHICH ISRAEL OBJECTS WOULD HAVE ITS TROOPS STATIONED NEAR THE ISRAELI BORDER.

4. REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF MESSAGE PASSED AND GOI RESPONSE (IF ANY) ASAP SO WE CAN MOVE QUICKLY TO LINE UP TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS. SHULTZ


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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US
SUBJ: DRAPER MISSION: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT AND PRIME
MINISTER ON MNF, OCTOBER 30

REF: (A) STATE 305658, (B) STATE 304454

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, I MET TODAY, OCT 30,
WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN AND SOON TO BE
NAMED PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR GHASSAN TUENI, FOR SOME 90
MINUTES. I REVIEWED THE PRESENT SITUATION AS REGARDS US

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ATTITUDE TOWARDS AN EXPANDED MNF, STRESSING THAT OUR PEOPLE
IN WASHINGTON WERE STILL ANALYZING DESIRABLE GEOGRAPHIC
SCOPE, SIZE, MISSION, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF SUCH AN MNF.
DILLON AND I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ALSO ON THE INTER-
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN EXPANDED MNF AND CRASH EFFORTS NOW
UNDERWAY IN WASHINGTON TO DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO
ASSIST THE LAF TO A HIGHER CAPABILITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
THE FORTHCOMING BING WEST VISIT WAS OUTLINED (SEPTTEL).

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3. AFTER I WENT OVER SOME ASPECTS OF MY TALKS IN ISRAEL AND FOLLOWING SOME GIVE AND TAKE ON THE NEXT STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS (SEPTEL), THE THREE MEN AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS REGARDS THE LIST OF ELEVEN POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING STATES:

--MOROCCO WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA. AS AN ARAB STATE, ITS PARTICIPATION IN AN MNF COULD EXCITE SYRIAN OPPOSITION AND COMPLICATE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, SINCE SYRIA IS A FELLOW ARAB STATE AND FELLOW ARAB LEAGUE MEMBER. IN SHORT, WHY SHOULD THE SYRIANS LEAVE IF ANOTHER ARAB STATE IS COMING IN? ALSO, IF MOROCCO CAME IN, OTHER ARAB STATES MIGHT SEEK TO PLAY A ROLE. LIBYA WAS JOKINGLY CITED.

--GEMAYEL NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT KING HASSAN HAD SOME TIME AGO OFFERED SOME MOROCCAN TROOPS (2000 MEN). IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THAT HE COULD USE THESE MOROCCAN TROOPS IN A SPECIAL CAPACITY. HE WOULD GIVE THE MATTER FURTHER THOUGHT.

--TURKISH PARTICIPATION MIGHT BE RISKY. WHILE GEMAYEL SAID HE GREATLY ADMIRERD THE QUALITIES OF TURKISH TROOPS, HE FEARED THAT THEIR PRESENCE COULD



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ATTRACT PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMENIANS IN LEBANON, AND PARTICULARLY FROM SOME OF THE ORGANIZED ARMENIAN TERRORIST GANGS. (THESE RESERVATIONS WERE VERY MUTED. TUENI SAID, "JUST PUT THEM IN AREAS WITHOUT ARMENIANS.")

--WAZZAN SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED AND GEMAYEL HEARTILY ENDORSED THE IDEA THAT LATIN AMERICAN CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD BE SOUGHT, IN APRTICULAR BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA. BRAZIL HAS A LARGE LEBANESE POPULATION. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO MEET FARILY SOON WITH A HIGH BRAZILIAN DIGNITARY AND HE WOULD BE GLAD TO BRING IT UP.

4. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT APPROACHING SPAIN AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT, JUST AFTER THE ELECTION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT.


5. I PROPOSED THAT -- WHEN WE HAVE A COMMON SCRIPT TO WORK FROM ON DETAILS OF AN MFN -- LEBANESE ENVOYS SHOULD APPROACH THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENTS, AND THE US WOULD FOLLOW UP IMMEDIATELY. WE HOPE THAT THE ITALIANS AND FRENCH WOULD JOIN WITH US IN URGING MORE STATES INTO THE FORCE. IT WAS ONLY SOME DIFFICULTY THAT I PERSUADED GEMAYEL TO WAIT UNTIL WE HAD TOGETHER DEVELOPED COMMON TALKING POINTS OR THEIR EQUIVALENT FOR USE BY LEBANON, THE US, FRANCE, AND ITALY.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82BEIRUT007747

6. COMMENT: I SUSPECT WE MAY HAVE SOME TROUBLE WITH SYRIA IF SOUTH KOREA IS INCLUDED. I RECALL THAT SYRIA HAS BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF COUNTRIES AT THE UN IN PROMOTING THE NORTH KOREAN LINE. WE SHOULD EXERCISE CARE TO AVOID MAKING THE MNF A MINOR EAST-WEST ISSUE. I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR WHAT AMBASSADOR PAGNELLI THINKS.
DILLON



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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, PLO, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: TALKS IN ISRAEL OCTOBER 29

1. ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING MY MEETINGS TODAY (OCTOBER 29)
WITH THE ISRAELIS, I DESCRIBED HOW THE LEBANESE
WERE SERIOUSLY ORGANIZING THEMSELVES FOR THE
ISRAELI-LEBANESE MEETINGS TO DISCUSS THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE IDF FROM LEBANON AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE SOUTH. THE ISRAELIS EXPRESSED GREAT
INTEREST IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE LEBANESE

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TEAM, ITS MANDATE, AND OTHER DETAILS, WHILE ALSO
EXPRESSING THEIR STRONG ABHORRENCE TO RELIANCE ON
ANY 1949 ARMISTICE-TYPE MODEL. SHARON AND BEGIN
REITERATED THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION THAT PLO ARMED
ELEMENTS SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON PRIOR TO ISRAELI/
SYRIAN STAGED WITHDRAWALS. SHARON LAID PARTICULAR
EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS TO
HAVE SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO BE CAPABLE OF ADDRESSING
POLITICAL ISSUES, REFERRING BACK TO THE EXAMPLE

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OF THE 1975 EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARRANGEMENTS. HE ALSO STRESSED THE NEED FOR SIGNED AGREEMENTS. SHARON SPELLED OUT HIS VIEW ON THE NEED FOR CLOSE AND PRIOR U.S.-ISRAELI CONSULTATIONS ON THE DESIRED OUTCOME. SHARON IS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF AMIN GEMAYEL. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT AFTER QUIETLY LISTENING TO SHARON'S CAREFULLY-CRAFTED COMMENTS, BEGIN CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE WAITING FOR THE LEBANESE DECISION ON ESTABLISHING THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAM NEXT WEEK. HE DID NOT ASSOCIATE HIMSELF DIRECTLY WITH THE DETAILS OF SHARON'S COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, ROSS, HARE, GAUCHER, AND SCOTT, I REVIEWED THE FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE SHORT-TERM LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 29. FOLLOWING SHORT MEETINGS FIRST WITH KIMCHE AND HIS STAFF AND THEN WITH SHAMIR, I HAD A TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH BEGIN, SHARON, SHAMIR, KIMCHE, BAR-ON, TAMIR, AND OTHERS. BEGIN WAS ATTENTIVE AND SERIOUS BUT IN GOOD SPIRITS. SHARON WAS SUBDUED BUT FORCEFUL. SHAMIR WAS CLEARLY EAGER TO BE

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HELPFUL, USING NODS OF THE HEAD AND BODY LANGUAGE TO CONVEY AGREEMENT WITH SEVERAL POINTS IN MY PRESENTATION. SHAMIR'S POSITION SHOWED THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH THE WAY HIS WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

4. POLITICAL CONTEXT: I STRESSED THE DELICATE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING TAKEN IN LEBANON:

-- THE NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT IN LEBANON. AS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT GEARS UP FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE PLO ON THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES, IT IS ALSO PREPARING FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE AND VOTE OF CONFIDENCE ON THE NEW CABINET NEXT TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2.

-- PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO TAKE THE DECISIONS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A TEAM OR COMMITTEE FOR ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THESE WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE.


-- THE LEBANESE POSITION IS IN A STATE OF FLUX AND EVOLUTION. WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID BRINGING ABOUT HARDER-THAN-NECESSARY NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.

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-- DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS, I WILL BE SEEKING TO TALK TO AND INFLUENCE LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURES, PARTICULARLY SHI'ITE LEADERS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON SUCH AS KAMIL AS-AS'AD, TO HELP CRYSTALLIZE THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE DIRECTION GEMAYEL INTENDS TO TAKE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING SOUTHERN LEBANON.

-- I WILL ALSO BE ENCOURAGING THE LEBANESE TO DEVELOP DETAILED POSITIONS ON ALL THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF



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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
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EXDIS

THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS -- VENUE, TIMING, PRESS
ASPECTS, ETC.

-- WHILE THE LEBANESE ARE FACING MANY PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS (LOSS OF FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES, INCOMPLETE
STAFFING OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, ETC.) THAT MAKE
IT DIFFICULT TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS RAPIDLY, THEY
ARE TAKING THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS VERY SERIOUSLY.

5. LEBANESE STEPS ON NEGOTIATIONS: I THEN OUTLINED
GEMAYEL'S THINKING AND DECISIONS ON THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS. I HIGHLIGHTED SEVERAL ELEMENTS:

-- WE ARE HOPEFUL, ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, THAT THE NEW CABINET

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WILL FORMALLY ESTABLISH THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING
TEAM BEFORE THE END OF THE COMING WEEK (BEFORE
NOVEMBER 6). GEMAYEL HAD TOLD ME IN PRIME MINISTER
WAZZAN'S PRESENCE THAT THIS TEAM WOULD BE FORMED BY
THEN.

-- THIS TEAM WILL BE EMPOWERED TO DISCUSS SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ISRAELI FORCES DIRECTLY WITH THE COUNTERPART

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ISRAELI TEAM.

-- THE LEBANESE WANT THE US TO PARTICIPATE, AND WE WILL DO SO.

-- THE LEBANESE TEAM, TO BE HEADED BY A MILITARY OFFICER, WILL HAVE A BROADER MANDATE THAN THE LEBANESE TEAM IN THE PRESENT LAF-IDF EXCHANGES. THE LEBANESE WILL ADD SEVERAL SENIOR CIVILIAN ADVISORS, SOME FROM GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS SOME FROM PRIVATE LIFE. THE FINAL CHOICES HAVE NOT BEEN MADE. TWO ARE LIKELY TO BE NAMED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. A RESPECTED SENIOR JUDGE MAY ALSO BE NAMED.

-- SINCE THREE NEGOTIATING TRACKS ARE FORESEEN (ISRAEL, SYRIA, PLO), AN OVERALL COORDINATOR MAY BE NAMED, BUT EFFECTIVE CONTROL WILL REMAIN IN GEMAYEL'S HANDS.

6. TIMING AND NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS: I WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE THAT LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN VERY SOON AND THAT WE WOULD BE PUSHING FOR THIS. CLEARLY, I SAID, EACH SIDE WILL HAVE ITS OWN PROPOSALS TO PRESENT. THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE DIFFICULT, WITH EACH SIDE PRESENTING INITIAL POSITIONS DISTASTEFUL



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OR UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER. HOWEVER, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A PROCESS OF BARGAINING. FORTUNATELY, I SAID, I SEE NO REAL OPPOSITION AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN LEBANON TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY ZONE OF THE KIND THE ISRAELIS WANT. (AT MY EARLIER MEETING WITH KIMCHE, I URGED THAT THE ISRAELIS MOVE CAUTIOUSLY IN THE FIRST MEETINGS AND AVOID THE TEMPTATION TO PRESENT ALL THEIR DEMANDS AT ONCE. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LAY THINGS OUT LITTLE BY LITTLE AND LET THE SITUATION EVOLVE. ISRAEL SHOULD NOT LET ITSELF BE DISCOURAGED BY THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF LEBANESE LEADERS. THEIR ATTITUDES ARE EVOLVING. WAZZAN, FOR INSTANCE, HAD BEEN MORE UNDERSTANDING DURING MY OCTOBER 28 MEETING WITH HIM AND GEMAYEL THAN I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT. GEMAYEL HIMSELF, I SAID IN MY MEETING WITH SHAMIR, HAD TOLD US REPEATEDLY IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE THAT HE WANTS A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AND SEES HIMSELF AS POTENTIALLY PLAYING A ROLE SERVING ISRAEL'S INTERESTS IN THE FUTURE, IF THE ISRAELIS DO NOT EMBARRASS HIM IN THE MEANTIME.)

7. NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA: FINALLY, I SAID IT IS LIKELY THE LEBANESE WILL WANT TO OPEN MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. I DESCRIBED THE CHANGE IN THE SYRIAN POSITION ON THE TIMING OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS AS SIGNALLED BY KHADDAM

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DURING HIS RECENT WASHINGTON VISIT. I WENT ON TO NOTE THAT I HAD URGED GEMAYEL DURING OUR OCTOBER 28 MEETING TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY THIS SHIFT PRESENTED AND OPEN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. GEMAYEL, I SAID, HAD AGREED.

8. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO: BEGIN ENDED MY INTRO-

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DUCTORY REMARKS BY ASKING WHETHER GEMAYEL IS ALSO SEEKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO. I RESPONDED THAT GEMAYEL PERSONALLY FEELS AS STRONGLY ON THIS ISSUE AS HIS BROTHER HAD: HE WANTS THE PLO FIGHTERS OUT OF LEBANON AND AN END TO THE STATE-WITHIN-A-STATE MENTALITY OF THOSE PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON. ON THIS, HE HAS THE GENERAL SUPPORT OF HIS PEOPLE, INCLUDING MUSLIMS AS WELL AS CHRISTIANS.

9. BEGIN THEN ASKED WHERE THE PLO FIGHTERS WOULD GO AND WHETHER ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH POSSIBLE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES HAD BEGUN. I SAID IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE REMAINING PLO FIGHTERS WILL HAVE TO GO TO SYRIA. ALTHOUGH THE SYRIANS ARE VERY RELUCTANT, THEY MAY BE PERSUADED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION, AS WAS THE CASE LAST

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SUMMER. WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF OTHER COUNTRIES WITH A CAPACITY TO EXERCISE GREATER CONTROL OVER THE PALESTINIANS COULD TAKE MORE. JORDAN, HOWEVER, IS INSISTING IT WILL TAKE ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER WITH PREVIOUS TIES TO THAT COUNTRY. EGYPT IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN ITS REFUSAL TO TAKE ANY.


10. (IN MY EARLIER MEETING WITH SHAMIR, I HAD DESCRIBED GEMAYEL'S RECENT CONTACTS WITH YASIR ARAFAT AND ABU

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IYAD AND SAID IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP HAS SAID IT IS READY TO BE HELPFUL. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM FACING THE LEBANESE, I SAID, IS THE NEED FOR FACE-TO-FACE TALKS. SHAFIQ AL-HUT IS BACK IN BEIRUT AND WILL PROBABLY SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATOR, BUT HE WILL HAVE NO REAL OFFICE. MFA LEGAL ADVISOR ELY RUBENSTEIN DEMURRED AT THIS POINT, SAYING WHATEVER PRESENCE AL-HUT ESTABLISHED COULD BECOME THE NUCLEUS OF A LARGER PLO PRESENCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS SUMMER'S AGREEMENTS. I ASSURED HIM THAT I HAD EXPLAINED THE "PLAN" (NOT AN AGREEMENT IN THE USUAL SENSE) TO GEMAYEL AND THAT HE INTENDS TO MAKE SURE THAT AL-HUT'S PRESENCE IS LOW-KEY. THERE IS NO INTENTION TO ALLOW THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A PLO OFFICE. IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT PALESTINIAN MONIES WILL CONTINUE TO FLOW TO PALESTINIAN SOCIO-EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, PROBABLY THROUGH PLO COORDINATION WITH THE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.)

11. NEED FOR PLO TO LEAVE FIRST -- PART I: SHARON THEN BROKE IN WITH THE FIRST OF A NUMBER OF FORCEFUL VIEWS ON THE ISSUES TO BE NEGOTIATED. HE REITERATED PREVIOUS ISRAELI STATEMENTS THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF ANY SCENARIO



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WOULD HAVE TO BE THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO "TERRORISTS" FROM LEBANON. HE COMPLAINED THAT MY DESCRIPTION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND ITS RESULTS IMPLIED SIMULTANEITY OF DEPARTURES. ONE THING, HE SAID, SHOULD BE CLEAR: IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH THE US AND ISRAEL THAT THE "TERRORISTS" LEAVE IN A FIRST PHASE. OTHERWISE, THEY MIGHT FIND SOME WAY TO REMAIN AND AGAIN MOVE SOUTH. THEY MIGHT ATTEMPT NEW TERRORIST RAIDS, AND ISRAEL WOULD BE FORCED TO REACT. SHARON EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THE TIMING OF PLO DEPARTURE WAS NOT A PROPOSAL, BUT A CABINET DECISION REPEAT DECISION. HE SAID HE SEES NO REASON WHY THE CABINET WOULD CHANGE THIS DECISION.

12. REJECTION OF ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS


(AT MEETINGS EARLIER IN THE DAY, I TOLD KIMCHE THAT I HAD WARNED THE LEBANESE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY REJECT ANY RETURN TO THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD HEAR OUT THE LEBANESE, SINCE THEY HAD SOME NEW IDEAS.) IN THE LARGE MEETING, SHARON LAUNCHED AN EVEN STRONGER ATTACK AGAINST ANY LEBANESE EFFORT TO REVIVE ILMAC OR EARLIER ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS. HE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM NO ACCIDENT THAT LAF GENERAL

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HAMDAN WAS BEING TOUTED AS THE HEAD OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, SINCE AS A COLONEL HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN ILMAC.

13. RUBENSTEIN DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO ANYTHING SMELLING OF A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. ISRAEL WANTS TO GET AWAY FROM ANY ARRANGEMENT THAT SMACKED OF A CONTINUED STATE OF WAR. KIMCHE FOR HIS PART SAID THAT GEMAYEL WAS AT A CROSSROADS AND HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE



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EXDIS

NOW TO CREATE A NEW SITUATION; LATER, IT WOULD BE
MUCH HARDER TO CHANGE THAT SITUATION.

14. THE NECESSITY FOR A "POLITICAL" AGREEMENT

SHARON WAS EXTREMELY FIRM IN HIS VIEW THAT WE SHOULD
ALL LEARN THE LESSONS DEVELOPED IN ARAB-U.S.-ISRAELI
NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE 1973 WAR. "POLITICAL"
AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE REACHED, THUS COMMITTING THE GOVERN-
MENTS FIRMLY; ANY MILITARY OR SECURITY AGREEMENTS
SHOULD BE ATTACHED AS ANNEXES TO THE "POLITICAL"
AGREEMENTS. POLITICAL AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE SIGNED
BY DULY-AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES,
PREFERABLY AT A SENIOR LEVEL, ALTHOUGH MILITARY
ANNEXES COULD BE SIGNED BY MILITARY MEN.

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15. CRITICISM OF TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POLITICS

SHARON THEN CLAIMED THAT WHAT HE IS SEEING IN
LEBANON REPRESENTS A DISTURBING RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL
STYLE OF LEBANESE POLITICS, WHICH WAS DIRECTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR GETTING THE SYRIANS INVITED INTO
LEBANON AND ALLOWING THE PLO TO BECOME A STATE WITHIN
A STATE. SHARON INSISTED THAT GEMAYEL CANNOT BE

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ALLOWED TO PLAY GAMES IN EVERY DIRECTION. FOR INSTANCE, HE SAID, WHILE THE LAF IS "KILLING" PEOPLE (I.E. PALESTINIANS), GEMAYEL HAS BEEN TRYING TO MEET WITH PLO LEADERS. THESE MEETINGS HAVE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ARRANGING THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO, HE SAID.

16. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION, I ATTEMPTED TO SATISFY SHARON'S CONCERNS, EVEN ON SUCH TRIVIAL MATTERS AS WHETHER THE LEBANESE MIGHT APPOINT PEOPLE TO THE NEGOTIATING TEAM FROM THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL AREA. I SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE TO DRAW PARALLELS BETWEEN EGYPT IN 1975 AND LEBANON IN 1982. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT GEMAYEL AND LEBANON GENERALLY SHARED MOST OF THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE U.S. AND ISRAEL SOUGHT. GEMAYEL IS INSISTING THAT LEBANON NO LONGER BE A PLACE FOR TERRORISM, WHETHER PALESTINIAN, ERITREAN OR ARMENIAN. I GAVE EXAMPLES OF GEMAYEL'S DETERMINATION IN THIS RESPECT, INCLUDING THE PRESENT BEIRUT CRACKDOWNS.

17. TURNING TO SHARON'S VIEW THAT THE LEBANESE TEAM REALLY OUGHT TO BE HEADED BY CIVILIAN OFFICIALS,



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I SAID THAT LEBANON DESERVED A CERTAIN LEEWAY. IT HAD TO PRESERVE ITS NATIONAL CONSENSUS. THERE WERE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION STARTED, AND THEN THE SUBSTANCE COULD BE DEALT WITH MORE DEEPLY. IN ANY CASE, I SAID, GEMAYEL IS FULLY AWARE OF THE ISRAELI DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD COME IN THE FORM OF A SIGNED DOCUMENT. GEMAYEL ALSO IS AWARE THAT THERE CANNOT BE A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD LISTEN TO WHAT THE LEBANESE HAVE IN MIND, PRESENT THEIR OWN POSITIONS, AND THEN COMMENCE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ALONG TRADITIONAL LINES.

18. AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I BOTH MADE THE POINT THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT GET UPSET ABOUT GEMAYEL'S EFFORTS TO CONTACT THE PLO. HOW ELSE COULD PLO WITHDRAWAL BE BROUGHT ABOUT? I SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD MADE CLEAR TO ME PERSONALLY THAT THE CAIRO AND MELKART ACCORDS GIVING LEGITIMACY TO THE PLO WERE DEAD. I EXPECTED THAT THE CABINET WOULD AFFIRM THIS POSITION FORMALLY AT AN EARLY MOMENT.

19. SHARON CONTINUED TO PRESS IN VARIOUS WAYS FOR A

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SIGNED FORMAL DOCUMENT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.
HE VOICED DARK SUSPICIONS ABOUT AMIN GEMAYEL'S
FUTURE ORIENTATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL, HE SAID, THAT
GEMAYEL'S DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S. AND ISRAEL BE
EXPLOITED. SHARON AT THE END OF THE MEETING SAID
THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE "NAIVE" ABOUT GEMAYEL


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EXDIS

DESPITE MY EXPRESSIONS OF CONFIDENCE. I SAID THAT
I CERTAINLY DIDN'T SEE MANY NAIVE PEOPLE ON HIS
SIDE OF THE TABLE, AND SHARON LATER SAID TO
AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND ME THAT NONE OF US COULD
TOUCH GEMAYEL FOR CUNNING AND SUBLETY.

--
20. PROPOSAL FOR US-ISRAELI DIALOGUE: SHARON WENT DN
TO CRITICIZE THE POSSIBLE ROLE HE FORESEES THE US
PLAYING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE WRONG
FOR ISRAEL AND LEBANON TO NEGOTIATE AND THEN HAVE THE
US TRY TO CONVINCE ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER ON ANY GIVEN
POINT. THE US INTEREST IN LEBANON, HE SAID, IS TO KEEP
IT PART OF THE FREE WORLD BY KEEPING OUT THE SYRIANS
AND THE SOVIETS. THE ISRAELI INTEREST, HE SAID, IS TO
KEEP LEBANON FREE OF ANY TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. GIVEN

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WHAT HE IMPLIED ARE COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS, SHARDN
URGED THAT THE US AND ISRAEL TRY TO ARRIVE, BETWEEN
THEMSELVES, AT A COMMND UNDERSTANDING OF THE BEST
SOLUTION FOR LEBANON IN THE FUTURE AND THEN APPLY IT.
IN SHORT, SHARON SAID, HE WAS PROPOSING A US-ISRAELI
DIALOGUE ON A PREFERRED COMMON SOLUTION IN LEBANON
(WHICH HE IMPLIED MIGHT THEN BE IMPOSED ON LEBANON).
I DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY.

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21. NEXT MOVES: BEGIN, SIGNALLING AN END TO THE MEETING, SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ME TO SAY THAT SOMETIME IN THE WEEK BEGINNING OCTOBER 31 THE LEBANESE WILL BE READY TO JOIN IN A "JOINT COMMITTEE" ARRANGEMENT. THEREAFTER, THERE COULD BE AN EARLY MEETING OF LEBANESE AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES TO NEGOTIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THE U.S. WILL BE PRESENT. THIS BEING THE CASE, HE SAID, HE WILL WAIT TO HEAR FROM ME ON THE TIME AND VENUE OF THIS MEETING. AT THAT MEETING, ISRAEL WILL BRING UP ITS CONCERNS ON THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. I SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD PROBABLY APPOINT ITS TEAM AND COMMITTEE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL SOMETIME NEXT WEEK -- SPELLING THIS OUT IN A WAY THAT MADE CLEAR IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE LEGAL FORM OF A "JOINT COMMITTEE."

--

22. NEED FOR PLO TO LEAVE FIRST -- PART II

REGARDING THE ISRAELI DESIRE TO HAVE THE PLO OUT COMPLETELY BEFORE ANY ISRAELI OR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OR DISENGAGEMENT TOOK PLACE, I SAID I DOUBTED THIS COULD BE DONE. I ASKED BEGIN HOW THIS COULD BE DONE MAINLY THROUGH EXHORTATION.



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23. BEGIN'S RESPONSE IN ESSENCE WAS THAT THE PLO COULD BE MADE TO SEE THAT ITS REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW WOULD PREVENT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS CERTAINLY IN PLO INTERESTS. I SAID ONLY THAT WE RESPECTED HIS VIEWS ON THIS MATTER.

--

24. IN CLOSING, I STRESSED THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL GENERALLY WERE IN AGREEMENT ON ULTIMATE GOALS. AMONG OTHER AIMS, BOTH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. WANT A STRONG LEBANON THAT WILL NOT AGAIN BECOME A BASE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. THIS IS FORMAL U.S. POLICY. WHILE WE COULD DIFFER ON THE MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS, AND WHILE SOME PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS MAY HAVE TO BE MADE, THE ULTIMATE AIM IS THE SAME. FORTUNATELY, THERE IS ALSO A LEBANESE NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THIS ISSUE, AND THE SLOGAN IS "NEVER AGAIN."

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BRIEFINGS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORC

TAGS= MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, XF, US, (DRAPER, MORRIS)

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EXCISE FOR DRAPER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, XF, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: BRIEFING THE GOL ON POTENTIAL
MNF CONTRIBUTORS1. ~~SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT~~2. WE ARE CONSIDERING APPROACHES VERY SOON TO OTHER
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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GOVERNMENTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF). REALIZING THAT THE POSSIBLE SIZE AND EXACT POSITIONING OF AN MNF IS TO FLOW FROM YOUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THE SIZE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IS YET TO BE DECIDED, WE NEED TO BEGIN NOW TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR BRINGING IN ADDITIONAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF LESSENING THE BURDEN ON THE ORIGINAL THREE IN FORMING AN MNF OF AN APPROPRIATE SIZE.

3. OF COURSE, OUR FIRST APPROACHES ARE TO THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS, WHO, AFTER PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S SWING THROUGH THEIR NATIONS, DOUBTLESS ARE ANTICIPATING WORD FROM US. OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST IS A SECOND TIER OF POTENTIAL MNF CONTRIBUTORS. WE HAVE IN MIND THE U.K., SWEDEN, NORWAY, THE NETHERLANDS, AUSTRIA, SOUTH KOREA, AND INDIA. THESE COUNTRIES HAVE SHOWN INTEREST IN THE PAST IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. MOST ARE WESTERN

ORIENTED; ALL LIKE TO MAINTAIN VISIBLE INTERNATIONAL ROLES. THE MILITARY FORCES OF EACH ARE RELATIVELY WELL EQUIPPED AND COMPETENT AT THE LIGHT INFANTRY LEVEL. OTHER KEY CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THIS LIST ARE:

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-- MINIMIZING THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INVOLVED
SIMPLIFIES COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AN MNF; AND,

-- MOST OF THESE NATIONS WOULD PROBABLY PAY THEIR OWN
COSTS IF THEY PARTICIPATED IN AN MNF.

4. EACH OF THESE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS HAS DRAWBACKS OR
MERITS IN TERMS OF THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO ISRAEL AND
SYRIA, AND WE HAVE CONSIDERED THIS IN OUR SELECTION. WE
WOULD LIKE, AS A FURTHER STEP, TO DESCRIBE OUR PROPOSED
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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APPROACH TO THE GOL DRAWING ON THE BACKGROUND ABOVE AND
LISTING FOR THE LEBANESE THE COUNTRIES THAT WE INTEND TO
QUERY AFTER THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAVE BEEN
APPROACHED. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT BEFORE WE MOVE AHEAD TO
HAVE THE GOL'S REACTION TO THE SUGGESTED LIST.

5. WE INTEND TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO WITH
THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS, SO A PROMPT READOUT FROM THE
LEBANESE WOULD BE APPRECIATED. SHULTZ

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DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE, XF, PINT
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI PESSIMISM ABOUT
AMIN GEMAYEL'S INTENTIONS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: DURING LUNCH WITH DRAPER PARTY, KIMCHE
AND BAR-ON RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PRESIDENT
AMIN GEMAYEL MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ORCHESTRATE A SITUATION
IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON
ON WITHDRAWAL WERE DEADLOCKED. THEIR THEORY WAS
THAT, AMONG OTHER REASONS, A DEADLOCK WOULD BUY
AMIN A YEAR OR SO TO REBUILD THE LAF, AND ENABLE HIM
TO SATISFY A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONARY NEEDS BY
BLAMING THE CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON

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ON ISRAEL. BEIRUT MEANWHILE COULD BECOME A BOOM
TOWN. I TOLD KIMCHE I DOUBTED VERY MUCH THAT
GEMAYEL WOULD TRY TO ENGINEER A DEADLOCK, ALTHOUGH
AN "ACCIDENTAL" IMPASSE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY.
NEITHER KIMCHE NOR BAR-ON ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE
OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. THE ISRAELIS ARE DARKLY
SUSPICIOUS ABOUT AMIN, BELIEVING BASICALLY THEY
HAVE BEEN BETRAYED. END SUMMARY.

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3. FOLLOWING LARGE MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, ET AL (SEPTTEL), I HAD LUNCH WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON TO REVIEW A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN MORE DETAIL. I WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, ROSS, GAUCHER, HARE AND SCOTT.

4. KIMCHE ASKED IF WE THOUGHT AMIN MIGHT TRY TO ORCHESTRATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE TALKS WOULD COME TO AN IMPASSE. KIMCHE'S SCENARIO WAS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AMIN NEEDS A YEAR OR SO TO REBUILD THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THAT HE HAS NO REAL INTEREST IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. UNTIL THE LAF REBUILDING PROCESS IS COMPLETED, IT IS IN HIS INTEREST TO HAVE THE IDF REMAIN IN LEBANON TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND HELP MAINTAIN ORDER. MOREOVER, IN THIS WAY HE WOULD AVOID "NORMALIZATION" WITH ISRAEL AND THUS HAVE HIS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO. MEANWHILE, BEIRUT COULD VERY WELL BECOME A "BOOM TOWN," SUSTAINING AMIN'S NATURAL POLITICAL POSITION. BECAUSE OF AMIN'S NEED TO SATISFY OTHER NEEDS (E.G., MONEY FROM THE ARAB STATES, MUSLIM INTERNAL SUPPORT, ETC.), HE CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE OPENLY SEEKING A CONTINUED ISRAELI



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PRESENCE. THUS, THE SCENARIO CONCLUDES, IF THE TALKS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY DEADLOCKED BY AMIN, HE WILL GET A CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON (WHICH HE SECRETLY WANTS) AND CAN BLAME IT ON ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A VERY REAL POSSIBILITY OF AN "ACCIDENTAL" IMPASSE WHICH WOULD PRODUCE THAT RESULT. WE COULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AMIN WOULD DECIDE THE ISRAELIS WERE PUSHING FOR TOO MUCH TOO SOON, AND WOULD THEREFORE CONCLUDE HE COULD NOT CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS UNLESS ISRAEL MODERATED ITS DEMANDS. COMMENT: IN THIS REGARD, I URGED KIMCHE REPEATEDLY TO TAKE THINGS SLOWLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SUGGESTING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT LAY ALL OF ITS DEMANDS AND DESIRES ON THE TABLE AT ONCE. KIMCHE SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT, BUT GIVEN SHARON'S HARD LINE APPROACH IN THE BEGIN MEETING (SEPTTEL) THE ISSUE REMAINS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM. THE ISRAELIS SEE THE SITUATION AS ONE WHERE THEY HAVE ONLY A LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS, AND ARE DETERMINED NOT TO LET THE OPPORTUNITY PASS. END COMMENT.


6. I CONTINUED THAT I DID NOT THINK AMIN WOULD TRY TO ENGINEER AN IMPASSE, HOWEVER. I STRESSED TO KIMCHE THAT AMIN CANNOT SELL TO THE LEBANESE A CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE, EVEN IF THE TALKS ARE DEADLOCKED, WHILE THE

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THEORY OF AN "ENGINEERED DEADLOCK" HAS CERTAIN POINTS WHICH SEEM TO MAKE IT BELIEVABLE, THE DYNAMIC IN LEBANESE AND GENERAL ARAB POLITICS WOULD WORK AGAINST AMIN IF HE TRIED TO PURSUE IT. MOREOVER, A YEAR IS NOT NECESSARY FOR AMIN TO BRING THE LAF TO A POINT WHERE IT CAN FULFILL THE ROLE HE HAS IN MIND FOR IT. HE HOPES



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EXDIS

TO HAVE UNIFIL AND AN EXPANDED MNF AVAILABLE TO SUPPLEMENT THE LAF FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. I POINTED OUT AMIN NEEDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LEBANON. SO LONG AS THE IDF REMAINS IN LEBANON IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET FOREIGN CAPITAL INTO THE LEBANESE ECONOMY. I TOLD KIMCHE FLATLY THAT IF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS WERE IN LEBANON A YEAR FROM NOW, AMIN WOULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. HE HAS PUT THE GREATEST POSSIBLE EMPHASIS ON GETTING ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF LEBANON, AND HE CANNOT MAKE A PLAUSIBLE CASE FOR FAILING TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL.

7. KIMCHE WAS UNCONVINCED, ADDING THAT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELIS ARE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT AMIN, AND BELIEVE HE WANTS THE ISRAELIS TO REMAIN IN LEBANON TO SERVE HIS OWN ENDS WITHOUT ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS. IN THEIR DARK SUSPICION OF

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HIS MOTIVES, THEY COMPARE AMIN UNFAVORABLY WITH BASHIR. THEIR FEELING RUNS MUCH DEEPER THAN A SENSE OF INGRATITUDE. RATHER, THEY FEEL A SENSE OF BETRAYAL (MEANING THAT AMIN -- LIKE BASHIR -- HAD WANTED FOR YEARS TO SEE THE ISRAELIS CLEAN OUT THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS; YET AMIN -- UNLIKE BASHIR -- IS UNWILLING TO CONSIDER A REAL PEACE TREATY EVEN A YEAR OR SO DOWN THE ROAD). COMMENT: THE NEGATIVE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARDS AMIN COULD BE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO WHAT WE ARE

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EXACT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MIL ADDRESSEES

DEPARTMENT/USUN PASS AMB. DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: APPROACH TO ISRAELIS OCTOBER 20

REF: A) BEIRUT 7364, B) BEIRUT 7405^N1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

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2. SUMMARY: FORMAL APPROACH TO ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICER
LEOR OCTOBER 20 YIELDED AGREEMENT THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SOUTHERN 'ALAYH DISTRICT, WHERE LAF WAS GRADUALLY REPLACING
IDF, WERE SATISFACTORY. HOWEVER, APPROACH ALSO YIELDED
RENEWED ASSERTIONS ON RIGHT OF ISRAELIS TO MOVE IN
EVACUATED AREAS OF EAST AND WEST BEIRUT AND BAABDA.
LEOR CLAIMED LAF AND IDF HAD AGREED ON SUCH RIGHTS.
HOWEVER, IDF DID NOT INTEND TO ENTER MNF ZONE OF OPER-
ATIONS, WHICH IT UNDERSTOOD TO BE BOUNDED BY RAILWAY

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LINE. I TOLD LEOR MNF ZONE OF OPERATIONS IN FACT EXTENDED TO JUST SHORT OF OLD SIDON ROAD AND SAID I WOULD CHECK OUT HIS CLAIMS ON EXISTENCE OF IDF-LAF AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENTS BEFORE GETTING BACK TO HIM. SUBSEQUENT CALL TO LAF COLONEL ABDU PRODUCED CATEGORIC LEBANESE DENIAL OF EXISTENCE OF SUCH AGREEMENT, WHILE CHECK OF RECORD PRODUCED NOTHING DEFINITIVE. WHATEVER CASE MAY BE, IDF HAS NOT EXERCISED "RIGHTS" OF MOVEMENT IN EAST OR WEST BEIRUT, AND THEIR EXERCISE AT THIS TIME WOULD REPRESENT HARDENING OF POSITION. FURTHERMORE, IDF CANNOT ASSERT RIGHT OF MOVEMENT IN MNF ZONE OF DEPLOYMENT. I RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZE TEL AVIV AND ME TO MAKE THESE AND SEVERAL RELATED POINTS ON BAABDA TO THE ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY.

3. I CALLED ON ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICER YITZHAK LEOR AT HIS BAABDA OFFICE LATE OCTOBER 20 FOR A FORMAL APPROACH ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN 'ALAYH DISTRICT AND ON IDF RIGHTS OF MOVEMENT. I FOUND THE OFFICE GUARDED BY IDF SOLDIERS IN SANDBAGGED POSITIONS; THE APCs FORMERLY PRESENT HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. LEOR HIMSELF WAS SURROUNDED BY A NUMBER OF YOUNG LEBANESE SEEKING TO INVITE HIM TO THEIR HOMES OR USE THE IDF PRESS TELEPHONE TO CALL FRIENDS AND RELATIVES

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NOW IN ISRAEL FOR BUSINESS OR PLEASURE. THE STAGING WAS PERFECT. IT WOULD TAKE A CYNIC, HOWEVER, TO SAY IT WAS DONE FOR MY BENEFIT.

4. RAISING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN 'ALAYH DISTRICT, I RELAYED COLONEL ABDU'S MESSAGE (REFTEL B), ADDING THAT ABDU FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE DELICATE SITUATION THE ISRAELIS WERE FACING. LEOR SAID THE IDF WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE LAF HAD INCREASED ITS FORCES AND TAKEN OVER ADDITIONAL POSITIONS OCTOBER 19 AND 20. HE PREDICTED THINGS WOULD GO VERY WELL IF ABDU KEPT TO HIS PLAN. I EMPHASIZED ITS SUCCESS DEPENDED ON THE CONTINUED WILLINGNESS OF THE IDF TO WITHDRAW AS THE LAF AME IN. LEOR SAID THE PATTERN OF THE PAST FEW DAYS WOULD CONTINUE. WE AGREED THIS ISSUE SEEMED WELL ON THE WAY TO RESOLUTION.

5. FOR TEL AVIV: IN ANY APPROACH YOU MAY THEREFORE WANT TO SAY SIMPLY THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF THE IDF BY THE LAF SEEMS TO BE PROCEEDING WELL AND EXPRESS OUR HOPE THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE SMOOTHLY.

6. RAISING THE ISSUE OF IDF MOVEMENTS, I ASKED LEOR IF HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CLARIFY WHAT EXACTLY THE IDF MIGHT HAVE DONE TO SET THE LAF OFF ON THIS QUESTION. LEOR

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7. I REPLIED THAT THE MNF ZONE OF DEPLOYMENT IN FACT EXTENDED TO JUST SHORT OF THE OLD SIDON ROAD, WELL BEYOND THE RAILWAY LINE, THAT MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS THAT NO RIGHTS OF MOVEMENT WERE RETAINED, AND THAT I WOULD CHECK WITH THE LEBANESE. WE AGREED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS.

8. AFTER LEAVING LEOR -- AND MEETING TWO ISRAELI COMMAND CARS TAKING A SHORT CUT FROM THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY TO THE OLD SIDON ROAD THROUGH BAABDA -- I CHECKED WITH ABDU. HE CATEGORICALLY DENIED ANY LAF-IDF AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI RIGHTS OF MOVEMENT. I ALSO CHECKED THE RECORD, BUT FOUND MYSELF IN A NOW ALL-TOO-FAMILIAR MORASS OF CONFLICTING LAF AND IDF POSITIONS, WITH THE

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IDF CLAIMING ON SEPTEMBER 23 THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT EXISTED AND THE LAF CLAIMING ON SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25 THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NO LONGER INSISTING ON SUCH AN AGREEMENT. OUR LAST DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS TOOK PLACE IN THE HABIB/DRAPER/SHARON MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 25. ACCORDING TO THE REPORTING CABLE (TEL AVIV 14420), IT WAS VIRTUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE ISRAELIS THAT IDF VISIBILITY IN BEIRUT SHOULD BE AND WOULD BE REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN MOVEMENTS IN BEIRUT WAS TO BE PUT TO THE LAF-IDF COMMISSION. WE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING FURTHER.

9. WHATEVER THE RECORD MAY SHOW, THE IDF HAS NOT EXERCISED THE RIGHTS IT CLAIMS EXCEPT IN BAABDA -- PRECISELY WHERE SHARON UNDERTOOK AT THE SAME SEPT. 25 MEETING TO PREVENT IDF MOVEMENTS* ANY NEW PATTERN OF IDF ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS IN THIS REGARD WOULD -- AS THE LEBANESE FEEL -- REPRESENT A HARDENING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION.

10. WHILE THE IDF MAY SIMPLY BE CLAIMING THESE RIGHTS IN ORDER TO WATCH THE LAF SQUIRM, AND WHILE SUCH MINOR ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO BE SWEEPED ASIDE AS WE MOVE INTO PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE AND POLICY ARE INVOLVED, INCLUDING FOR THE MNF. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZE EMBASSY TEL AVIV AND ME TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- PRESENT LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE EXISTENCE OF AN LAF-IDF AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI MOVEMENTS IN EVACUATED AREAS DIFFER. WHATEVER THE CASE MAY BE, THE IDF HAS NOT MOVED THROUGH THE EVACUATED AREAS OF EAST AND WEST BEIRUT SINCE ITS DEPARTURE.
-- ANY ATTEMPT TO DO SO NOW WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFI-

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CANT SHIFT IN PRACTICE AT A TIME WHEN THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS CONSOLIDATING ITS CONTROL OF BEIRUT.

-- THE US WOULD BE DIRECTLY CONCERNED BY ANY ISRAELI CLAIM THAT IT HAD THE RIGHT OF MOVEMENT IN THE AREA BETWEEN A) THE "LOGISTICAL ROUTE" ON THE OLD SIDON ROAD FROM KHALDAH TO HAZIMIYYAH AND B) THE COASTAL RAILWAY FROM KHALDAH TO BEIRUT PORT. THIS AREA IS PART OF THE ZONE OF OPERATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE US CONTINGENT OF THE MNF. AS SUCH, NO FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OR THE MNF MAY ENTER.

-- WITH REGARD TO IDF MOVEMENTS IN BAABDA, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON UNDERTOOK IN MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS PARTY SEPTEMBER 25 TO PREVENT IDF VEHICLES FROM MOVING THROUGH THAT LOCALITY. WE TAKE THIS TO APPLY TO ALL CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES, INCLUDING COMMAND CARS AND JEEPS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A VERY LIMITED AMOUNT

OF RESUPPLY TRAFFIC MUST GO TO AND FROM THE "SHAHIN CENTER" BUILDING AS LONG AS THE IDF AND MFA RETAIN OFFICES THERE. HOWEVER, NO IDF VEHICLES SHOULD BE USING BAABDA AS A SHORT CUT FROM THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY TO THE OLD SIDON ROAD.

-- THE IDF POSITION IN THE VILLA OF THE AMIR TALAL
ABOVE YARZAH SHOULD, TO PREVE
NT TRAFFIC TRHOUGH BAABDA,
BE RESUPPLIED EXCLUSIVELY FROM JAMHUR TO THE EAST.

-- IN PASSING, WE NOTE THAT WE SEE NO MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS POSITION, WHICH LOOKS OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, NOT THE LOGISTICAL ROUTE. THE LEBANESE TELL US THEY HAVE REQUESTED ITS REMOVAL REPEATEDLY, AND ITS CONTINUED PRESENCE STRIKES US AS A GRATUITIOUS PROVOCATION.

-- WE TAKE NO POSITION ON THE MOVEMENT OF ISRAELI CIVILIANS
IN EVACUATED AREAS. THIS IS A LEBANESE-ISRAELI MATTER.
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EXDIP **DECAPTIONED**

NEA PASS AMB DRAPER AND AMB DILLON

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EPER, PINT, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: ON OCTOBER 17, I VISITED TRIPOLI AND MET SEPARATELY WITH FORMER PM KARAMI AND SAMPLE OF MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS. KARAMI, UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE, WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF US ROLE IN MIDEAST AND LEBANON AND NEGATIVE ON GEMAYEL'S FIRST WEEKS IN OFFICE--PARTICULARLY HIS AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CURB PHALANGE. KARAMI ALSO MINIMIZED DANGER OF PLO IN NORTH LEBANON. HE IS, HOWEVER, PLAYING POSITIVE ROLE AS MEDIATOR OF TRIPOLITANIAN FEUDING. HIS REMARKS ON GEMAYEL WERE PROBABLY INTENDED TO

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INFLUENCE OUR ADVICE TO HIM.

3. SAMPLE OF MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS WAS, ON CONTRARY, EAGER FOR CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM COOPERATION IN LEBANON FREE OF FOREIGN FORCES (INCLUDING PLO), ANXIOUS FOR CONTINUED US COMMITMENT TO LEBANON, AND CONCERNED THAT TRIPOLI NOT BECOME SYRIAN-PALESTINIAN BATTLEFIELD. THIS REPRESENTS SHIFT IN SUNNI THINKING. END SUMMARY.


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4. ON OCTOBER 17, I SPENT MOST OF THE DAYLIGHT HOURS IN TRIPOLI (LEBANON). THROUGH A TRIPOLITANIAN FRIEND, I WAS ABLE TO MEET INFORMALLY WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAMI AND WITH A SAMPLE OF TRIPOLI'S MIDDLE -CLASS SUNNIS. WHILE KARAMI WAS PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF EVENTS PAST AND PRESENT, THE LATTER WERE REMARKABLY UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS.

5. MY MEETING WITH KARAMI, HELD WITHOUT PUBLICITY AT HIS HOME, GAVE HIM HIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY IN MONTHS TO VOICE HIS POSITION TO AN AMERICAN VISITOR. HE WAS THEREFORE UNUSUALLY ELOQUENT. OUR MEETING, HELD IN A ROCCO ROOM FULL OF PHOTOS OF KARAMI WITH WORLD LEADERS, INCLUDING EISENHOWER AND BULGANIN, LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF. AFTER OUTLINING THE BROAD LINES OF THE DRAPER MISSION, I ASKED KARAMI FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE. HE IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE TABLES AND LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY RETROSPECTIVE OF THE LAST 35 YEARS.

6. KARAMI'S PRESENTATION, OBVIOUSLY MADE WITH HIS SYRIAN "PROTECTORS" IN MIND (THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SEVERAL ATTEMPTS ON HIS LIFE), FOLLOWED LINES PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF ISRAEL AND THE US. IN BRIEF, HE SAID THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REGION IS ALL THE FAULT



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OF THE US. IT HAS GIVEN ITS "CHILD", ISRAEL, EVERYTHING IT HAS ASKED FOR WITHOUT EXERCISING ANY CONTROL OVER ITS BEHAVIOR; THIS RESULTED MOST RECENTLY IN THE INVASION OF LEBANON. THE US HAS ALSO PROMOTED ARAB DISUNITY AND ISOLATED EGYPT FROM ITS ARAB BROTHERS. IT HAS REFUSED AGAINST ALL LOGIC TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO. IT HAS ENCOURAGED THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOW SEEM INACTIVE, IT IS KEEPING UP ITS CONTACTS IN THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WILL SOON HAVE NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT.

7. MOVING TO THE PRESENT TO COMMENT ON US SUPPORT FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, KARAMI EXPRESSED AN EQUALLY CRITICAL SERIES OF JUDGMENTS:

-IT WAS A MISTAKE TO ELECT A PRESIDENT FROM THE PHALANGE. A NON-PARTY PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DISPOSED TOWARD TRUE RECONCILIATION AMONG LEBANESE. THE FIRST ELECTION--THAT OF BASHIR GEMAYEL--WAS A FRAUD. DEPUTIES WERE FORCED TO VOTE FOR HIM. --AMIN GEMAYEL, NOW THAT HE HAS BEEN ELECTED, SHOULD DESIST FROM HIS EFFORTS TO IMPOSE ONE-MAN RULE. LEBANON HAS NO TRADITION OF STRONG PRESIDENTIAL RULE IN THE AMERICAN STYLE, AND NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO TRY TO IMPOSE IT. PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN'S ECLIPSE IN RECENT DAYS IS A CLEAR SIGN OF GEMAYEL'S AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES.

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FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

--GEMAYEL SHOULD NEVER HAVE IGNORED THE UNANIMOUS
ADVICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS AND OPTED FOR A NON-
POLITICAL CABINET OF INEXPERIENCED UNKNOWNNS WITHOUT
ROOTS AMONG THE PEOPLE. THIS IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF
GEMAYEL'S INTENTION TO ATTEMPT ONE-MAN RULE.

--THE POLITICIANS ARE THE ONLY PEOPLE CAPABLE OF
CONTROLLING THE POPULATION, AND GEMAYEL WILL INEVITABLY
FIND HE HAS MADE A MISTAKE AND RETURN TO THE POLITICIANS
SOONER OR LATER.

--IT IS IDLE TO ARGUE THWT GEMAYEL TRIED TO FORM A
CABINET OF POLITICIANS BUT COULD NOT DO SO. THE FORMA-
TION OF CABINETS ALWAYS TAKES A LONG TIME INLEBANON,
AND GEMAYEL REFUSED TO BE PATIENT. "HASVI IS THE
DEVIL'S WORK". SAID KARAMI.

--IT IS CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL INTENDS TO SURROUND HIMSELF
[REDACTED]

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WITH PHALANGE PARTY STALWARTS. IN EFFECT, THE PHALANGE
WILL BECOME THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

--GEMAYEL'S PRIORITIES IN HIS FIRST WEEKS INDICATE
CLEARLY THE INFLUENCE OF THE PHALANGE. INSTEAD OF
MOVING TO DISMANTLE THE PHALANGE "STATE WITHIN A
STATE", WHICH HAS SHAMELESSLY ESTABLISHED ITS OWN ADMIN-
ISTRATION IN LARGE AREAS OF LEBANON AND INTERRUPTED THE
FREE PASSAGE OF TRAFFIC ON LEBANON'S INTERNATIONAL
HIGHWAYS, GEMAYEL HAS PREFERRED TO DISPLACE SHI'ITE

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SQUATTERS BY DESTROYING THEIR SHELTERS. THESE SQUATTERS HAD NO BAD INTENTIONS; THEY SIMPLY WANTED TO BUILD TEMPORARY SHELTER UNTIL THEY COULD RETURN TO THEIR RORIGINAL HOMES IN BEIRUT AND OTHER AFFECTED AREAS.

--GEMAYEL SEEMS BENT ON MAINTAINING THE RABIDLY CONFESIONAL CHARACTER OF THE ARMY LEADERSHIP. THUS, HIS EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE BY USE OF THE ARMY ARE BOUND TO FAIL.

8. HAVING TRIED, MOSTLY VAINLY, TO GET KARAMI TO THINK IN MORE POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT I SUCCEEDED IN SWITCHING THE SUBJECT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. AGAIN, KARAMI HAD ONLY NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS:

--ISRAEL HAS EVIL INTENTIONS IN LEBANON. ITS SEARCH FOR "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS" IN THE SOUTH IS A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED CONTROL. ITS SUBTLE PROMOTION OF THE IDEA OF A DRUZE "PRINCIPALITY" REVEALS ITS DESIRE FOR PARTITION.

--THE SYRIANS ARE IN LEBANON LEGITIMATELY, AND NO ONE SHOULD EQUATE THEIR PRESENCE WITH THAT OF THE ISRAELIS.

-THE PLO PRESENCE IN NORTHERN LEBANON POSES NO PROBLEM TO ANYONE. WHY, AFTER THE MASSACRES OF SABRA AND

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SHATILA, SHOULD ANYONE BE SURPRISED THAT THE PALESTINIANS WISH TO RETAIN AN ARMED PRESENCE?

IN CLOSING, KARAMI EMPHASIZED THAT THE ESSENTIAL AND URGENT STEP REQUIRED WAS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIAN AND PLO PRESENCE WOULD THEN SORT ITSELF OUT RAPIDLY. AT THATPOINT, TOO, IF GEMAYEL HAD NOT CHANGED HIS APPROACH, HE WOULD BECOME FARI GAME FOR THE POLITICIANS. AT PRESENT, KARAMI AND OTHERS WERE PUTTING OFF REAL POLITICAL ACTION AGAINST GEMAYEL, BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT TO IMPEDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ONCE THE ISRAELIS WERE GONE, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE OPEN SEASON.

10. AT A LONG LUNCHEON MEETING WITH A SAMPLE OF 12 OF TRIPOLI'S MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS, INCLUDING A FORMER MUFTI, A MERCHANT, AN ARCHITECT, AN ENGINEER, AND OTHERS, I HEAR A VERY DIFFERENT STORY. THE FORMER MUFTI, WHO SERVED AS SPOKESMAN (WITH THE OTHERS AGREEING AUDIBLY), MADE MOST OF THE POINTS:

--LEFT TO THEMSELVES, MADE MOST OF THE POINTS:

--LEFT TO THEMSELVES, LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS COULD GET ALONG JUST FINE. PIERRE GEMAYEL HAD SAID SO, AND THZ MUFTI AGREES WHOLEHEARTEDLY.


--THE FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS, SHOULD BE EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY. ANYONE WHO

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CLAIMS DIFFERENTLY, AND SPECIFICALLY RASHID KARAMI, IS OBVIOUSLY AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE.

--WHEN THE LEBANESE ARE LEFT AMONG THEMSELVES, THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SO-CALLED LEBANESE LEFT WILL BE REVEALED FOR WHAT IT IS: THE OPPORTUNISTIC POWER TRIP OF A FEW MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS, EACH OF WHOM INSISTED ON FORMING HIS OWN "PARTY" AND NONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN ABLE TO ATTRACT A SIGNIFICANT FOLLOWING.



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EXDIS

NEA PASS AMB DRAPER AND AMB DILLON

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

--TRUE LEBANESE, BOTH CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM, ARE LEBANESE FIRST AND KEENLY DEVOTED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THEIR RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS. IN THE CASE OF ISLAM PARTICULARLY, THESE ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH LEFTIST IDEAS.

--IT IS TRUE THAT, THANKS TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND THE POWER OF THE HIRED PRESS, THE LEBANESE LEFT HAS BEEN ABLE TO FRIGHTEN THE MARONITES INTO BELIEVING THEIR EXISTENCE IS AT RISK. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE SUNNI COMMUNITY HAS NEVER SOUGHT TO COALESCE AROUND STRONG ANTI-MARONITE LEADERS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE MARONITES THAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE SUNNIS ARE HONORABLE.

--THE NEW CABINET SHOULD HAVE BEEN FORMED WITH EXPERIENCED POLITICIANS CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING THEIR
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FOLLOWERS. (THIS WAS THE ONLY POINT ON WHICH THE SAMPLE OF SUNNIS AGREED WITH KARAMI).

--THE US MUST MAINTAIN ITS LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO LEBANON. THE FUTURE OF LEBANON IS WITH THE WEST, BUT IT HAS ALL TOO OFTEN BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THE PAST BY SHARP SWINGS IN US ATTENTION.

--IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO TRIPOLI THAT THE FOREIGN FORCES BE REMOVED FROM LEBANON. UP TO NOW, TRIPOLI HAS BEEN SPARED SERIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN

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
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FIGHTING. HOWEVER, IF THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO HAVE A SERIOUS FALLING-OUT, TRIPOLI MAY BECOME THEIR BATTLEGROUND, I.E., A NEW WEST BEIRUT.

11. COMMENT: IT WAS ENCOURAGING TO VISIT TRIPOLI. PHYSICALLY AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, ITS LIFE APPROXIMATES THAT OF LEBANON BEFORE 1975. AS SUCH, IT CAN SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. UNLIKE WEST BEIRUT AND THE SOUTH, WHICH HAVE BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED AND IN WHICH LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED, WOUNDED, OR DISPLACED, AND UNLIKE EAST BEIRUT AND MOST OF THE CHRISTAIN MOUNTAIN, IN WHICH THE POPULATION IS TRYING, SOMETIMES DESPERATELY, TO LIVE A BRITTLE BUT VERY SUPERFICIAL FORM OF LA DOLCE VITA, TRIPOLI CONTINUES TO LIVE AT ITS OWN PACE, WITH ITS TRADITIONS AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT LARGELY INTACT. THE STREETS ARE ANIMATED, THE SHOPS FULL, AND THE PEOPLE GENERALLY HAPPY. THE FIGHTING THAT OCCASIONALLY OCCURS HAS BEEN LARGELY CONFINED, AT LEAST SO FAR, TO THE NORTHERN SUBURBS OF THE CITY, AND HAS GENERALLY BEEN LIMITED TO INTERNECINE FIGHTING AMONG VARIOUS TRIPES OF LEFTISTS. THE SYRIANS, FOR THEIR PART, STAY OUT OF THE CENTER OF THE CITY.



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12. RASHID KARAMI, FOR ALL OF HIS SYRIAN-SINSPiRED PESSIMISM, IS PLAYING A VERY USEFUL ROLE AS MEDIATOR OF THE CITY. HE TOLD ME THAT HE SAW HIMSELF AS A PEACEMAKER. BEYOND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO EXPOSE HIMSELF TO THE VARIOUS CHECKPOINTS ON THE ROAD TO BEIRUT, HE FELT HIS ROLE IN THE CITY WAS SUCH THAT HE COULD NOT ABSENT HIMSELF DURING RECENT MONTHS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL MANEUVERS IN BEIRUT.

13. SETTING ASIDE KARAMI'S CRITICISM OF THE LAST 35 YEARS AND HIS PREDICTABLE VIEWS ON THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO, HIS DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WAS IN ONE SENSE POSITIVE. HE KNEW HE WAS ADDRESSING THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A GOVERNMENT WITH SOME INFLUENCE ON GEMAYEL, AND HIS CRITICISM OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WAS COUCNED IN VERY RELAXED TERMS, AS IF TO WARN US GENTLY OF MATTERS WE SHOULD TAKE UP WITH GEMAYEL BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

14. THE MIDDLE-CLASS SUNNIS WITH WHOM I SPOKE WERE LIKEWISE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR INTERLOCUTOR, BUT THEIR STATEMENTS WERE REMARKABLY POSITIVE, ESPECIALLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MARONITE-SUNNI COOPERATION. THEY CLEARLY FELT THEMSELVES THREATENED BY THE RISE OF LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN TRIPOLI, AND THEY PROBABLY SAW THEIR SALVATION IN A STRONG--ALBEIT CHRISTIAN-

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DOMINATED--CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, ALLIED WITH THE WEST.
THIS REPRESENTS A REAL SHIFT IN SUNNI THINKING.

15. IN SUM, MY VISIT TO TRIPOLI WAS QUITE
ILLUMINATING AND WELL WORTH THE DRIVE. FOR THE RECORD,
THE CHECKPOINTS THAT NOW EXIST ON THE ROAD BETWEEN
AMSHIT AND TRIPOLI ARE: PHALANGE (INCLUDING CUSTOMS
CONTROL), LEBANESE ARMY, FRANJIYYA'S "MARADA FORCES".
AND THE SYRIAN "DETERRENT FORCES". NONE BUT THE
PHALANGE MAKES ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO CHECK EVERY
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SUBJECT= DRAPER MISSION: OCTOBER 16-19 MNF MEETINGS; LEBANESE REQUEST FUI
US APPROACHES TO ISRAELIS

REFERENCE= 82 BEIRUT 7338, 82 BEIRUT 7278

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SECURITY, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, MEETING REPORTS, MILITARY PLANS,
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, OCCUPA

TAGS= PINT, PINS, MILI, MOPS, SY, LE, US, IS, (DRAPER, MORRIS)

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07364 01 OF 02 200517Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10 CIAE-00
H-01 IO-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-08 L-03
PM-09 PA-01 INRE-00 SAL-01 ANAE-00 ACDA-12 SSN-02
USIE-00 SP-02 SPRS-01 /099 W
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O 191615Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9390
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 54
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR 40 Date: 11/6/97
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☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE
CTF 60 IMMEDIATE
CTF 61 IMMEDIATE
CTF 62 IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM IMMEDIATE

 SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 7364

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MILI, MOPS, SY, LE, US
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION; OCTOBER 16-19 MNF MEETINGS: LEBANESE
REQUEST FURTHER US APPROACHES TO ISRAELIS

REF: A) BEIRUT 7338 (NOTAL), B) BEIRUT 7278



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1.  ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: IN THE COURSE OF MNF MEETINGS IN OCTOBER 16-19 PERIOD, LEBANESE RAISED SECURITY SITUATION IN KFAR MATTA-'ABAYH REGION AND NEW IDF ASSERTIONS OF RIGHTS OF FREE MOVEMENT EVERYWHERE EAST OF KHALDEH-BEIRUT PORT RAILROAD LINE. ON OCTOBER 19, LEBANESE REQUESTED US TO RAISE THESE SUBJECTS WITH ISRAELIS, LAF DEMARCHES TO IDF HAVING PRODUCED NO RESULTS. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING THE MNF COMMITTEE MEETINGS HELD OCTOBER 16, 18 AND 19, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED.

4. SECURITY SITUATION IN KFAR MATTA-'ABAYH AREA.

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REFTEL A REPORTS THE SITUATION AS IT STOOD AS OF THE EARLY MORNING OF OCTOBER 19. AT THE MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE AT NOON, COLONEL ABDU COMPLAINED THAT NOTWITHSTANDING EARLIER REPORTS, THE IDF HAD TOLD THE LAF THAT IT PLANNED TO STAY IN THE AREA TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER THE LAF ENTERED THE AREA IN SPITE OF AN IDF-LAF AGREEMENT THAT IDF FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW AS LAF FORCES ENTERED. FUTHERMORE, THE IDF WISHED -- BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT INSIST ON -- SOME KIND OF TURN-OVER CEREMONY. ABDU SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE CLEARLY TRYING TO SCORE POLITICAL POINTS BY DEMONSTRATING TO THE MEDIAL PRESENT ON THE SCENE THAT THERE WAS IDF-LAF COOPERATION. LAF LIAISON OFFICER COLONEL ABU FARHAT HAD TAKEN THIS UP YESTERDAY WITH IDF LIAISON OFFICER COLONEL REUBEN TO NO RESULT. ABDU REQUESTED THAT WE RAISE THE ISSUE AS WELL WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND I WILL DO SO LATER TODAY WITH THE ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICERS. MEANWHILE, ABDU HAS SENT AN ADDITIONAL 25 TOOPS (FOR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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A TOTAL OF 40, OR ONE-THIRD THE TOTAL PLANNED FORCE) TO KFAR MATTA TO OCCUPY ADDITIONAL POSITIONS, BUT HAS REFUSED DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE IDF TROOPS ON THE SCENE.

5. IDF MOVEMENTS EAST OF RAILROAD LINE. AT THE OCTOBER 19 MEETING, ABDU SAID THAT, IN CONTACTS WITH THE LAF, THE IDF WAS NOT INSISTING ON THE RIGHT OF UNIMPEDED MOVEMENT IN ALL AREAS EAST OF THE RAILROAD LINE FROM KHALDAH TO THE PORT OF BEIRUT, INCLUDING THROUGH BAABDA AND YARZAH. APC'S AND OTHER MILITARY VEHICLES WERE MOVING FROM THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY THROUGH BAABDA, AND THERE HAD BEEN AN INCIDENT JUST BEFORE THE MNF MEETING AT AN LAF ROADBLOCK NOT FAR FROM THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN YARZAH. AN ISRAELI COMMAND CAR HAD ATTEMPTED TO FORCE ITS WAY THROUGH THE ROADBLOCK, AND AN LAF SOLDIER HAD SHOT OUT ITS TIRES. IN GENERAL, ABDU SAID, THE IDF HAD RAISED ITS VISIBILITY IN THE BAABDA-YARZAH AREA. THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND THE IDF'S INSISTENCE ON EVEN WIDER

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RIGHTS OF MOVEMENT IN THE ENTIRE REGION EAST OF THE
RAILROAD LINE, APPEARED TO REPRESENT A
DANGEROUS AND INEXPLICABLE HARDENING OF THE ISRAELI
POSITION. AS SUCH, IT THREATENED THE CONTINUING DE-
PLOYMENT OF LAF TROOPS IN EAST BEIRUT AND ITS SUBURBS.
ABDU ASKED US TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE
ASSURED ME THAT COLONEL ABU FARHAT HAD ALREADY DONE SO.
I WILL ACT ON ABDU'S REQUEST, BUT I AM HANDICAPPED BY
THE FACT THAT, AT THE TIME OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM



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ACTION NEA-11


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
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O 191615Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9391
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE
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CTF 62 IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM IMMEDIATE

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FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

WEST BEIRUT, THERE WAS NO FORMAL AGREEMENT ON BABDA AND YARZAH. AT BEST, I WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE "LOGISTICAL ROUTE" WHOSE USE THE ISRAELIS RETAINED (KHALDAH-HAZMIYYAH-'ALAYH, WITH AN EXTENSION FROM HAZMIYYAH TOWARD BEIT MERI OVER THE JISR AL-BASHA ROAD) DID ESTABLISH THE WESTERN AND NORTHERN BOUNDARIES OF THE IDF ZONE OF

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07364 02 OF 02 200500Z

OCCUPATION. AS REGARDS BAABDA AND YARZAH, I WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE TWO IDF "ENCLAVES" THERE IMPLIED A MINIMAL AMOUNT OF MOVEMENT IN AND OUT. (COMMENT: IF THE ISRAELIS IN FACT ATTEMPT TO

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MOVE ABOUT IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE "LOGISTICAL ROUTE" AND THE RAILROAD LINE, THIS WILL BRING THEM INTO DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE US AND OTHER MNF CONTINGENTS.)

6. IDF PRESENCE IN BAABAD. ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE AT THE OCTOBER 19 MNF MEETING, THE IDF HAS FINALLY REMOVED ITS FORMAL PRESENCE FROM THE BAABDA ENCLAVE AND LEFT THE ISRAELI MFA PRESENCE THERE IN THE HANDS OF "CIVILIAN" GUARDS. I WILL VERIFY THIS WHEN I VISIT THE MFA OFFICE LATER TODAY.

7. STATUS OF LAF OPERATIONS. AT THE OCTOBER 19 MNF MEETING, THE LEBANESE TOLD US THAT, PENDING FURTHER ORDERS, THE LAF CORDON AROUND BAABDA, HADATH, AND HAZMIYYAH WAS BEING MAINTAINED, BUT NO HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES WERE BEING CARRIED OUT. SPOT CHECKS WERE CONTINUING THROUGH OUT THE CITY OF BEIRUT AS WELL, BUT NO ARRESTS HAD OCCURED SINCE OCTOBER 17.

8. LAF ARREST STATISTICS. ACCORDING TO STATISTICS DISTRIBUTED BY THE LAF, THERE WERE NO ARRESTS OCTOBER 15, 16, OR 18. ON OCTOBER 17, 5 PALESTINIANS, 2 JORDANIANS, 1 KURD, AND 1 SYRIAN, ALL WITHOUT VALID RESIDENCE PAPERS, AS WELL AS 2 LEBANESE SOUGHT BY THE POLICE, WERE ARRESTED.

9. VISIT OF MNF REPS TO DETAINEES. MNF REPS VISITED 700-800 DETAINEES OCTOBER 19. DETAILS FOLLOW BY SEPTEL TO SELECTED ADDRESSEES.

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 15317 181129Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8945

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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EXDI

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NEA PASS AMBASSADOR DRAPER FROM LEWIS

9302566

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SECURITY SITUATION IN THE

- ABAYH-KAFAR MATTIA AREA -- ISRAELI DETERMINATION
- TO PRESERVE ORDER

REF: A) BEIRUT 7244 B) BEIRUT 7277

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. I TALKED TO DAVE KIMCHE AT MY RESIDENCE SUNDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 17, ABOUT THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES CONCERNING LEBANON CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE. WITH RESPECT TO THE PHALANGE-DRUZE CLASHES, KIMCHE SAID THAT THE SITUATION IS NOW COMPLETELY QUIET IN THE WAKE OF ORDERS GIVEN TO THE IDF TO STATION UNITS IN THE KEY VILLAGES IN ORDER TO PREVENT FURTHER DISTURBANCES FROM EITHER SIDE.

3. KIMCHE SAID THAT THERE WAS A HEATED MEETING ON FRIDAY IN WHICH SHARON WAS ANGRY AT THE IDF FOR ALLOWING THINGS

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TO GET SO FAR OUT OF CONTROL. HE SAID THERE WERE ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES: EITHER TO STATION TROOPS IN ALL THE VILLAGES WHERE TROUBLE MIGHT OCCUR AND PREVENT IT, OR TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA COMPLETELY. THERE WAS NO MIDDLE GROUND AND, SHARON REPORTEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED, ISRAEL CANNOT EVADE THE RESPONSIBILITY SO LONG AS ITS TROOPS ARE IN THE AREA. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE RESULT OF THE MEETING WAS THESE ADDITIONAL IDF ACTIONS WHICH, HE SAID, HE HOPED WOULD KEEP THINGS QUIET IN THE FUTURE.


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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82TEL AV015317

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, KIMCHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PHALANGISTS HAD INITIALLY BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FLARE UPUSHING INTO MIXED CHRISTIAN-DRUZE VILLAGES IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL. ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY, HOWEVER, CERTAIN DRUZE ELEMENTS WERE TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN STARTING THE EXCHANGES. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED THE EXTREME DANGER OF THESE CLASHES, NOT ONLY FOR LEBANON BUT ALSO FOR ISRAEL IN CONNECTION WITH THE OUTRAGED FEELINGS OF ISRAELI DRUZE. THEREFORE, DESPITE A RELUCTANCE TO BECOME FURTHER EMBROILED IN INTERNAL LEBANESE FEUDS, THE IDF IS NOW DRAWING THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCLUSION THAT IT MUST CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING ORDER SO LONG AS IT IS STATIONED IN THESE AREAS.

5. KIMCHE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PUBLIC AND ANGRY APPEALS FROM ISRAELI DRUZE LEADERS HAD UNDOUBTEDLY SENSITIZED THE GOVERNMENT MORE TO THE SITUATION THAN IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN. WHEN I MENTIONED TO HIM THE FACT THAT STORIES WERE CIRCULATING WIDELY IN BEIRUT ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ISRAELIS FOR STIRRING UP BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN EXCUSE FOR THEIR CONTINUED OCCUPATION, HE WAS GENUINELY INCREDULOUS. AND IN THIS INSTANCE I BELIEVE WE CAN ACCEPT



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TEL AV 15317 181129Z

AS CREDIBLE THAT INCREDULITY. THE DANGER OF TROUBLE WITH THE ISRAELI DRUZE IS SUCH A HOT POTATO FOR THE GOI THAT IT WOULD NOT RUN THE RISK OF STIRRING IT UP, EVEN IF THERE WERE ANY NEED FOR SUCH AN EXCUSE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENCE UNTIL THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO ALSO ARE READY TO DEPART.

6. IN ANY CASE, THE IDF NOW HAS ITS MARCHING ORDERS AND THE SITUATION SHOULD REMAIN CALM, OR AT LEAST A GOOD DEAL CALMER. KIMCHE ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN IMPASSIONED PROMISES ON THURSDAY BY PHALANGIST LEADERS THAT THEY WERE NOT INITIATING ANY FIRE, PROMISES TO WHICH HE ATTACHED VERY LITTLE CREDIBILITY. LEWIS

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PAGE 01 STATE 291942
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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STATE 291942

EX-115 **DECAPTIONED**

9302566

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PORG, MOPS, LE
SUBJECT: UNIFIL AND UNTSO OPERATIONS IN LEBANON

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~.
2. AM;ASSADOR DRAPER CALLED ON BRIAN URQUHART OCTOBER 17 TO DISCUSS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN LEBANON. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK AND DEPTOFF MACK ACCOMPANIED.
3. DRAPER SAID WE SEE A FUTURE USE FOR UNIFIL IN LEBANON AND BELIEVE ISRAEL WILL ALSO ACCEPT IT AS LONG AS IT IS REMOVED FROM THE BORDER AREA AND HAS A CHANGED MANDATE. GEMAYEL WANTS UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR WHILE HE BUILDS UP THE ARMY. URQUHART SAID THAT SECRETARIAT

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WAS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. COULD MOVE UNIFIL NORTH OF PRESENT AREA OF OPERATION PROVIDED IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT U.N. WAS HANDING OVER RESPONSIBILITY EITHER TO ISRAEL OR TO HADDAD. FOR TIME BEING, SAID AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, USG WANTS AS SIMPLE AND CLEAN AN INTERIM EXTENSION OF UNIFIL MANDATE AS IS POSSIBLE.

4. ASKED ABOUT UNTSO'S USE OF U.S. OFFICERS IN BEIRUT, URQUHART SAID HE HAD CHANGED AN INCORRECT FIELD DECISION

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82STATE 291942

TO LIMIT THIS ROLE. SHULTZ

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ACTION SS-25

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O 150935Z OCT 82

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9312

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 7244

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DEPARTMENT PASS AMB DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINS; PINT, MOPS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SECURITY SITUATION IN THE 'ABAYH-KFAR
MATTA AREA

REF: A) BEIRUT 7180, B) STATE 288930, C) TEL AVIV 15172, M
D) STATE 288514

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICER
LEOR INFORMALLY OCTOBER 14 IN RESPONSE TO LEBANESE REQUEST
FOR APPROACH ON 'ABAYH-KFAR MATTA SITUATION AND THREAT
TO BEIRUT ELECTRICITY SUPPLY. LEOR INFORMED ME
IDF HAD MOVED INTO AREA EVENING OF OCTOBER 13. HE FEARED,
HOWEVER, THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO STOP FIGHTING.
I BELIEVE ISRAELIS WILL NOT TAKE RISKS TO REESTABLISH
ORDER UNLESS WE PRESS THEM REPEATEDLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE

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ONE OF CONTENDING PARTIES IS "ALLY". AT MINIMUM, WE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO MENTION OUR CONCERN IN COURSE
OF NORMAL CONTACTS OVER NEXT FEW DAYS. WE HERE ARE
MOBILIZING ALL CHANNELS OF PRESSURE ON ISRAELI AND
LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS AND CONTENDING PARTIES. AMBASSADOR
DILLON AND I TOLD GEMAYEL OCTOBER 14 THAT CONTINUED LEBANESE
EFFORTS TO CONTROL BOTH CONTENDING PARTIES WERE ESSENTIAL
COMPLEMENT TO ISRAELI EFFORTS TO RESTORE ORDER. END
SUMMARY.

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
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3. IN RESPONSE TO THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR AN APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE 'ABAYH-KFAR MATTIA AREA AND THE THREAT TO THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY OF BEIRUT, I SAW ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICER YITZHAK LEOR EARLY OCTOBER 14. (ON MY RETURN TO THE CHANCERY I READ REFTELS B AND C AUTHORIZING AND REPORTING TEL AVIV'S PROMPT ACTION. WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED REFTEL D REPORTING AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S PARALLEL APPROACH TO ARENS.)

4. I TOLD LEOR THE LEBANESE WANTED THE IDF TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN OCCUPYING POWER AND DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH ORDER AND PERMIT URGENT REPAIRS TO THE ELECTRICAL GRID. ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE, THIS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE LAF-IDF COMMITTEE TO NO AVAIL. THE LEBANESE HAD NOW ASKED US TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS AS WELL.

5. LEOR RESPONDED THAT FOR SOME TIME THE IDF HAD BEEN ASKING THE LAF AND ISF TO ENTER THIS AREA, BUT THE LEBANESE HAD REFUSED FOR REASONS OF PRINCIPLE. I INTERJECTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE BOTH A POLITICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEM FOR THE LEBANESE. THE POLITICAL



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JUDGMENT WAS ONE FOR THEM TO MAKE; I WOULD NOT ADDRESS IT. THE LEGAL JUDGMENT--THAT THE IDF WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE AREAS IT OCCUPIED--WAS ONE I PERSONALLY FOUND COMPELLING. LEOR SAID THAT, WHATEVER THE LEGAL SITUATION, THE IDF HAD DECIDED OCTOBER 13 TO RESPOND TO THE LAF'S REQUEST AND HAD SENT TWO REINFORCED PLATOONS TO 'ABAYH AND KFAR MATTIA THAT VERY NIGHT. LEOR EXPRESSED THE FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO STOP THE FIGHTING, CITING THE CONTINUING BATTLES DURING THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 13 AS EVIDENCE. THE IDF, HE CLAIMED, HAD NO INTELLIGENCE ASSETS IN THE REGION AND WAS THEREFORE OPERATING "IN THE DARK".

6. I RESPONDED THAT THE IDF INITIATIVE WAS A POSITIVE STEP AND UNDERTOOK TO SEE WHAT PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE SHORT OF SENDING FORCES THE LEBANESE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE TO THE IDF IN CARRYING OUT ITS MISSION.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07244 02 OF 02 151021Z
ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9313
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS AMB DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

7. FOLLOWING MY VISIT TO LEOR, I LEARNED AS THE OCTOBER 14 MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE WAS CONVENING THAT THE IDF HAD TOLD THE LAF IT WOULD BE CONDUCTING MORE INTENSIVE OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH ORDER IN THE AFFECTED REGION BEGINNING AT 1100 LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 14. COLONEL ABDU TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT HPS SPECIAL BRIGADE WOULD BE CONDUCTING INFORMAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY TO DETERMINE THE RESULTS OF THE IDF ACTION. ABDU SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO BEIRUT RADIO REPORTS THAT PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD ORDERED THE ISF INTO THE REGION, NO LEBANESE UNITS OF ANY KIND HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO MOVE IN. AT 1400 LOCAL TIME, AS I WAS LEAVING THE MNF COMMITTEE MEETING, I SAW HEAVY SMOKE RISING FROM THE DIRECTION OF 'ABAYH. THIS IS A BAD SIGN.

8. AT THIS SAME MNF COMMITTEE MEETING, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ASKED ME WHAT THE RESULTS OF OUR EFFORTS WITH THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN. I SAID THAT WE WERE APPROACHING
[REDACTED]

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THE ISRAELIS FORMALLY I WASHINGTON AND ISRAEL AND THAT I MYSELF HAD APPROACHED THE MFA LIAISON OFFICE HERE INFORMALLY. I DESCRIBED MY EXCHANGE WITH LEOR BRIEFLY. GEMAYEL HAD NO PARTICULAR REACTION, HAVING JUST LEARNED THAT THE IDF HAD TAKEN THE ACTION THE LEBANESE HAD REQUESTED.

9. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION: IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT TAKE MANY RISKS TO REESTABLISH ORDER

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UNLESS WE PRESS THEM REPEATEDLY, AND EVEN THEN THEY MAY STOP SHORT OF REALLY FIRM ACTION, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE IDF WASNTS NO CASUALTIES AND ONE OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES IS AN "ALLY". AT A MINIMUM, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MENTION OUR CONCERN IN THE COURSE OF OUR NORMAL CONTACTS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

10. MEANWHILE, WE ARE MOBILIZING ALL OTHER CHANNELS OF PRESSURE ON BOTH THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONTENDING PARTIES.

--AT THE OCTOBER 14 MNF COMMITTEE MEETING, I TOLD PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT CONTINUED LEBANESE EFFORTS TO CONTROL BOTH THE CONTENDING PARTIES WERE AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE ORDER. AMBASSADOR DILLON REINFORCED THIS THEME WITH GEMAYEL LATER IN THE DAY AS WELL.

--ON OCTOBER 14, AMBASSADOR DILLON URGED AMIR FAYSAL ARSLAN TO WORK ON CALMING THE SITUATION. WE WILL BE CONSIDERING FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE PHALANGE AND THE JUMBLATTIS AS WELL.

--ON OCTOBER 13, WHEN THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TOLD AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ME THAT HIS SUMMER RESIDENCE IN 'ABAYH WAS COMING UNDER INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS FIRE,



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I ENCOURAGED HIM TO HAVE HIS GOVERNMENT APPROACH THE ISRAELIS AS WELL. HHE ALSO PLANS TO WORK ON LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND FACTIONAL LEADERS. WE LEARNED LATE OCTOBER 14 THAT HE PLANS TO VISIT 'ABAYH OCTOBER 15 TO TALK TO THE LEADERS OF BOTH SIDES. DILLON

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9338

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (M/TS/CR/IR) Date: 11/6/97
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DEPARTMENT PASS AMBASSADOR DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SITUATION FOLLOWING US DEMARCHES
TO ISRAEL

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. FOLLOWING IS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND FOLLOWING OUR
DEMARCHES TO THE ISRAELIS ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE
'ABAYH-KFAR MATT A AREA DNT EH IDF PRESENCE IN BAABDA.

3. THE THE 'ABAYH-KFAR MATT A AREA, THE ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN SOME
ACTION, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO SUIT THE LEBANESE. THEIR PATTERN OF
OPERATIONS, ACCORDING TO THE LAF (WHICH HAS DONE SOME RECONNAI-
SANCE), HAS BEEN TO SEND TWO REINFORCED PLATOONS EACH MORNING TO
KFAR MATT A (A PHALANGE-CONTROLLED VILLAGE) ONLY, AND NOT TO ENTER
'ABAYH IN ANY REAL WAY AT ALL. THESE PLATOONS ARE WITHDRAWN AFTER
ABOUT AN HOUR, AND THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI PRESENCE

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THEREAFTER. THE SITUATION REMAINS TENSE, ALTHOUGH
THIS MORNING FIGHTING APPEARED TO HAVE HALTED.

4. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHER GOVERNMENT
FIGURES HAVE, COL ABDU TOLD THE MNF COMMITTEE OCT 15,
BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH POLITICAL LEADERS ON
BOTH SIDES, PHALANGE/LEBANESE FORCES AND JUMBLATTI
DRUZE, TO QUIET THE SITUATION. THERE ARE PERSISTENT
REPORTS THAT WALID JUMBLATT IS RETURNING TO BEIRUT

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ANY DAY, BUT WE KNOW FROM EMBASSY PARIS THAT HE IS WAITING FOR FRENCH AND AMERICAN SECURITY ADVISE BEFORE PROCEEDING.

5. AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS, AS WELL AS THE LEBANESE, ON THIS ISSUE.

6. IN THE BAABDA AREA, NOTHING HAS CHANGED SINCE OUR DEMARCHES, AND ISRAELI MFA LISISON PERSONNEL HAVE NOT BEEN AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE A STATUS REPORT OF ANY KIND ON THE POSSIBLE DEPARTURE/TRANSFER OF THE IDF AND MFA OFFICES. COL ABU FARHAT TOLD ME OCTOBER 15 THAT IN AN IDF-LAF MEETING HELD THE NIGHT BEFORE THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THEY WOULD NOT MOVE OUT OF THE IDF POSITION ABOVE YARZAH EXCEPT PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE WITHDRAWAL PLAN. THE IDF PRESENCE IN BAABDA, TIED AS IT IS TO THE MFA PRESENCE, WAS NOT DISCUSSED. IDF PERSONNEL MEANWHILE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN KEEPING THEIR MOVEMENTS IN THE LAF AREA OF OPERATIONS DOWN TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, BUT THEY HAVE NOT SUSPENDED THEM COMPLETELY.

7. FURTHER QUIET WORK THROUGH DAVID KINCHE WOULD SEEM TO BE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED ON THE IDF/MFA PRESENCE



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IN BAABDA. I SEE NO POINT IN PRESSING ON THE IDF PRESENCE ABOVE YARZAH AT THIS TIME. DILLON

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03603

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PBOR, PEPR, PLO, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

- BEGIN AND HIS ADVISORS, NOVEMBER 25

REF: JERUSALEM 3588

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE SHARON (SEPTTEL), I MET WITH PRIME [REDACTED]

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MINISTER BEGIN FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF NOVEMBER 25 AND TRIED TO PERSUADE HIM THAT THE CONDITIONS ARE RIPE FOR RAPID NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISRAELI-LEBANESE ISSUES. I WENT OVER IN DETAIL THE ASSESSMENT GIVEN TO SHAMIR YESTERDAY AND DESCRIBED THE COMPROMISE PROCEDURAL FORMULA TO START NEGOTIATIONS (REPTTEL). AFTER LISTENING CAREFULLY TO MY PRESENTATION, BEGIN INITIALLY LISTED THREE SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS WHICH UNDERPIN

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ISRAEL'S NEGOTIATING POSITION: (A) ISRAEL'S PROFUND DESIRE TO BRING ITS TROOPS HOME AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE; (B) IRON-CLAD GUARANTEES TO PREVENT THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CONDITIONS IN WHICH ISRAEL'S ENEMIES CAN ATTACK ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON OR ELSEWHERE; AND (C) THE REMOVAL OF PLO TERRORISTS FROM LEBANON BEFORE ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BEGIN THEN COMMENTED ON THE PROCEDURAL FORMULA I HAD OUTLINED AND HIS RESPONSE WAS DISCOURAGING. BEGIN ARGUED STRENUOUSLY THAT ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO A FORMULA ON VENUE WHICH EXCLUDES JERUSALEM AS A SITE OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, HE INSISTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ISRAELI CABINET'S DECISION, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT AN INITIAL PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION CAN BE HELD BELOW MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO WORK OUT TECHNICAL ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I EXPLAINED THAT THESE POSITIONS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE ACCEPTED BY GEMAYEL, WHILE ALSO EMPHASIZING GEMAYEL'S DETERMINATION TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF DISCUSSION ONCE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEGUN. I TOLD BEGIN THAT THE U.S. CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY

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THESE PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES CANNOT BE OVERCOME THROUGH COMPROMISE BY BOTH SIDES, AS WE HAD SUGGESTED, ESPECIALLY SINCE BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL AGREE SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE DIRECTION AND GOALS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. FORTIFIED BY EXTREMELY UNHELPFUL COMMENTS BY SHARON, BEGIN WOULD NOT YIELD. HE AGREED TO PRESENT THE COMPROMISE FORMULA I HAD OUTLINED TO THE ISRAELI CABINET THIS SUNDAY; HOWEVER, I INFERRED FROM HIS ARGUMENTS THAT HE WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE CABINET'S APPROVAL OF THIS FORMULA. SHAMIR HAD ANOTHER COMPROMISE FORMULA, WHICH IS UNPROMISING. IN LIGHT OF THIS DISCUSSION, DRAPER WILL NOT GO TO BEIRUT UNTIL TOMORROW, WHEN HE CAN REPORT TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON OUR LATEST DISCUSSIONS. WE WILL THEN AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE SUNDAY ISRAELI CABINET SESSION BEFORE DECIDING ON NEXT STEPS. THE PROGNOSIS IS NOT GOOD. END SUMMARY.

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3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SHAMIR, SHARON, KIMCHE, BAR-ON, RUBENSTEIN, SAGI, AVNER, KADISHAI, "MANDY," AND MERIDOR FOR 90 MINUTES NOVEMBER 25 IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. DRAPER, FLATEN, HARE, KRECZKO AND KURTZER ACCOMPANIED ME. AT THE OUTSET I GAVE BEGIN THE LETTER OF CONDOLENCE

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FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN; AFTER HE READ IT, BEGIN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A "BEAUTIFUL LETTER." (WE WILL BE PROVIDING SEPARATELY BEGIN'S ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE LETTER MADE TO ME IN A FOLLOW-ON PRIVATE MEETING.)

4. I THEN TOLD BEGIN THAT, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE

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EXDIS

LEBANESE HAVE BECOME CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO
BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AGREE THAT
THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COVER POLITICAL, MILITARY AND

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SECURITY ISSUES. I SAID THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS QUICKLY FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST, ISRAEL AND LEBANON SHOULD ENTER A PROCESS TO DEVELOP AN ON-GOING RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE PAST. SECOND, NEGOTIATIONS ARE IMPORTANT SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON CAN SATISFY ITS NEED TO CONSOLIDATE AUTHORITY AND TO ALLOW IT TO DEAL FORTHRIGHTLY WITH OTHER PROBLEMS TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. I TOLD BEGIN THAT AMIN GEMAYEL HAD COME A LONG WAY, BOTH IN HIS PER-

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SONAL VIEWS AND HIS CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES. AMIN HAS BEEN ABLE TO CREATE A DEGREE OF INTERNAL CONSENSUS WHICH PERMITS GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS ON ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVIOUSLY CREATED POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN LEBANON. HE HAS ALSO CREATED, TOGETHER WITH ACTIVE US INVOLVEMENT, A POSITIVE DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE BY PRINCIPAL MODERATE ARAB STATES THAT LEBANON CAN PURSUE THIS COURSE. FINALLY AMIN PERSONALLY SEES THE VALUE TO LEBANON OF DEVELOPING AN EVOLUTIONARY BUT PERMANENT PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

5. I NOTED THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, THIS POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE HAS BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN NON-SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS. I DESCRIBED HOW AMIN'S ORIGINAL POSITION, WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE CABINET, HAD EVOLVED TO A POINT WHERE I COULD ARGUE, WITH GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS, THAT LEBANON SHOULD AGREE TO POLITICAL CHAIRMANSHIP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I TOLD BEGIN, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE PUSHING AMIN TO ARGUE THIS PROPOSAL IN THE LEBANESE CABINET, I NEEDED BEGIN'S ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD ARGUE SIMILARLY IN THE ISRAELI CABINET FOR MODIFICATIONS IN ISRAEL'S POSITION. I TOLD BEGIN THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING SO THAT FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO PUSH THE LEBANESE INTO ACCELERATING CONTACTS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO AND THAT AMIN HAD ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD DO THIS. HOWEVER, AMIN HAD TOLD ME HE BELIEVES THAT THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL WILL HELP LEBANON GREATLY IN ITS NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO.

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6. I THEN REVIEWED FOR BEGIN THE COMPROMISE FORMULA THAT I HAD TRIED OUT WITH SHAMIR LAST NIGHT (SEPTEL). I TOLD BEGIN THAT DRAPER WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET GEMAYEL LATER TODAY TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR SIMILAR MODIFICATIONS IN LEBANON'S POSITION. I REITERATED AMIN'S CONVICTION THAT HE CAN GO A LONG WAY IN MEETING MUTUAL ISRAELI-LEBANESE INTERESTS BUT THAT HE NEEDS THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO BEGIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. AMIN CANNOT NOW ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL BECAUSE OF HIS INTERNAL PROBLEMS; BUT HE HAS AGREED TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR FATTAL, WHO WOULD BE UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTION, ENJOYING FULL AUTHORITY.

7. I TOLD BEGIN THAT WE CANNOT ALLOW THE PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING RESULTS TO FRITTER AWAY BECAUSE OF THIS PROCEDURAL KNOT. THE U.S., ISRAEL AND LEBANON SHARE COMMON GOALS WHICH ARE TO ENHANCE LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, TO PREVENT HOSTILE FORCES FROM BEING IN LEBANON AND TO INCREASE OVER TIME POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. I WAS ALSO CONVINCED THAT CURRENT LIMITS ON AMIN'S FLEXIBILITY WILL EXPAND AS NEGOTIATIONS UNFOLD. IN THIS REGARD, I CITED AMIN'S STATEMENT TO ME IN WHICH HE SAID "I WILL GO FURTHER THAN PEOPLE BELIEVE I CAN GO," BUT I NEED TIME TO ARRIVE AT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION.

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8. BEGIN INITIALLY REACTED BY SAYING THAT THE IDEAS I HAD RAISED WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AND APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET. TURNING TO SUBSTANCE, BEGIN SAID THE FOLLOWING ISRAELI

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EXDIS

CONDITIONS REMAIN FIRM: (A) "WE WANT TO
BRING OUR BOYS HOME." BEGIN SAID THERE IS NATIONAL
CONSENSUS WITHIN ISRAEL NOT TO REMAIN IN LEBANON
AND THAT ISRAEL HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS
IN LEBANON. RATHER, ISRAEL WANTS AN INDEPENDENT
LEBANON WHICH LIVES IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL.
(B) "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE WILL WE EVER ALLOW
CONDITIONS TO BE CREATED IN WHICH ENEMIES CAN
ATTACK ISRAEL'S POPULATION IN THE GALILEE OR
ANY OTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY. WE MUST HAVE
IRON-CLAD GUARANTEES ON THE GROUND, NOT JUST ON
PAPER." (C) REMAINING PLO TERRORISTS IN LEBANON
MUST LEAVE BEFORE ISRAEL WILL MOVE ON THE

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GROUND. BEGIN SAID THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO
COMMIT THE TERRIBLE FOLLY OF LEAVING LEBANON
BEFORE THE PLO OR SYRIA, SYRIANS WOULD SURELY
STAY AND PLO ACTIVITIES WILL INCREASE. IN
RESPONSE I REITERATED THAT THE U.S. REMAINS
COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SIMULTANEOUS
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES.

9. BEGIN THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTIONS OF LEVEL
OF REPRESENTATION AND VENUE. HE SAID THE ISSUES
TO BE NEGOTIATED ARE POLITICAL AND MILITARY/
SECURITY IN NATURE, AND THUS IT IS PROPER
THAT GOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATIVES RESPONSIBLE FOR

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THESE ISSUES DEAL WITH THEM DIRECTLY. DESPITE LEBANESE PROTESTATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ARMISTICE SYSTEM DOES NOT MEAN A CONTINUED STATE OF WAR, ISRAEL HAS EXPERIENCE WHICH PROVES OTHERWISE AND THEREFORE HAD INSISTED IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THE STATE OF WAR HAD ENDED. BEGIN SAID THAT HE COULD ACCEPT A SINGLE PREPARATORY MEETING BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS BELOW THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, BUT THAT FURTHER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BY MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVES.

10. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF VENUE, BEGIN SAID THE LEBANESE POSITION AGAINST MEETINGS IN CAPITALS IS "CHILDISH." "LEBANON SHOULD NOT CREATE A BOYCOTT OF JERUSALEM." BEGIN SAID NEGOTIATIONS CAN START IN BEIRUT BUT THEN MUST BE HELD IN JERUSALEM. THIS IS NOT A PROCEDURAL ISSUE BUT A QUESTION OF GREAT PRINCIPLE FOR ISRAEL AND ITS PEOPLE, ADDING THAT GEMAYEL SHOULD NOT ASSUME

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THAT ISRAEL CAN EVER AGREE TO RATIFY LEBANON'S REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE IN JERUSALEM. THE QUESTION THEREFORE ACCORDING TO BEGIN IS NOT HOW TO CONVINCE ISRAEL TO GIVE IN, BUT HOW TO CONVINCE LEBANON OF THE COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION OF ISRAEL'S POSITION.

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11. AT THIS POINT IN THE MEETING SHARON INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT SEE THESE ISSUES AS PROCEDURAL BUT SUBSTANTIVE. I SAID NOT ALL PROCEDURAL MATTERS WERE SUBSTANTIVE. AFTER AN INITIAL PROCEDURAL MEETING BELOW THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, SHARON SAID, FURTHER TALKS MUST BE LED BY MINISTERS AND THEY MUST TAKE PLACE IN JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT. SHARON ALSO REITERATED BEGIN'S POINT THAT THE FIRST ITEMS OF BUSINESS MUST BE EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON AND RESOLUTION OF THE PRISONERS ISSUE. "WITHDRAWAL IS NOT THE MAIN SUBJECT; RATHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND NORMALIZATION MUST BE FIRST PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD FUTURE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON."

12. I TOLD BEGIN AND SHARON THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE LEBANESE HAVE ANY PROBLEM IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO FORCE LEBANON INTO A PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEBANON TO ACCEPT. I REPEATED THAT LEBANON IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS, AND THAT

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LEBANON'S WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THESE FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE LOST IN FOCUSING ON UNRELATED
PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE LEB-
ANESE POLITICAL NEGOTIATOR WILL BE A VALID INTERLOCUTOR
WITH SUFFICIENT RANK AND AUTHORITY TO LEAD THE TALKS

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EXDIS

TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. ALSO ONCE AGREEMENT IS
REACHED, THE LEBANESE ARE PREPARED TO ENDORSE THE
AGREEMENT AT THE POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL.
ON THE VENUE QUESTION I SAID FRANKLY THAT AMIN AT
THIS TIME IS NEITHER SADAT NOR MUBARAK. AMIN NEEDS
TO MAINTAIN HIS INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND TO REMAIN
INDEPENDENT OF INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PRESSURE. HIS

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POSITION ON THE VENUE QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN EXERCISE IN BAD FAITH BUT IN TERMS OF PRACTICAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS. I URGED THE ISRAELLIS TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEN RAISE THESE ISSUES DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE. BEGINNING THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME IS THE MOST IMPORTANT

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ISSUE. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE MOOD IN LEBANON AND AMIN'S PERSONAL POSITION ARE AS FAVORABLE AS THEY CAN BE. THIS IS AN OPTIMUM TIME TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED SO THAT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES CAN BE DISCUSSED.

13. BEGIN TOOK ISSUE WITH WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS MY CRITICISM OF ISRAEL FOR WANTING TO "FORCE" LEBANON TO ACCEDE TO ISRAEL'S POSITION ON PROCEDURES. BEGIN STRESSED THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON ARE ENTITLED TO MAKE PROPOSALS BUT THAT NEITHER SIDE CAN EXPECT TO FORCE THE OTHER TO ADOPT ITS POSITION. I AGREED WITH BEGIN BUT SAID THAT THE ESSENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVES COMPROMISE WHICH MEET THE OBJECTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTY WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING ONE'S OWN FUNDAMENTAL POSITION. AT THIS TIME, I STRESSED, BY ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS ISRAEL CAN ACCELERATE LEBANON'S ABILITY TO MOVE POSITIVELY ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, BUT ONLY IF ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS AND MAKES CONCESSIONS TO LEBANON REGARDING LEBANON'S POLITICAL LIMITATIONS. IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT BEGIN NOW, THE SITUATION CAN ONLY DETERIORATE DURING A LONG PERIOD OF INACTIVITY. THIS WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OUR MUTUAL INTEREST OF FOSTERING A STRONG LEBANON/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I DO NOT ARGUE WITH ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO PROPOSE JERUSALEM AS A VENUE, BUT ISRAEL SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT AMIN'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS INTERFERE WITH HIS ABILITY TO DEAL WITH OTHER QUESTIONS. SHARON AGAIN INTERJECTED, SAYING THAT ISRAEL HAS ALREADY BACKTRACKED SUBSTANTIALLY FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSITION WHICH INSISTED ON MOVING DIRECTLY TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. SECOND, SHARON SAID, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ISRAELIS WANT

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TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, ISRAEL IS NOT IN A HURRY. "IF WE WAIT, LEBANON WILL AGREE TO OUR POSITION." SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL CONTINUES TO HAVE "NON-STOP CONTACTS" WITH AMIN. THE FACT OF A DELAY IN GETTING

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NEGOTIATIONS STARTED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT IN SHARON'S VIEW TO YIELD IMMEDIATELY ON THESE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. I REPLIED THAT SHARON'S POSITION WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER LONG DELAYS IN STARTING UP THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WE WERE REACHING AN IMPASSE AND WERE RAPIDLY LOSING MOMENTUM.

14. BEGIN SAID THAT THE U.S. AND LEBANON MUST UNDERSTAND WHAT ISRAEL HAS ACCOMPLISHED IN LEBANON. "WE SAVED THE CHRISTIANS FROM ANNIHILATION AT A HIGH COST TO OURSELVES IN TERMS OF CASUALTIES." BEGIN ALSO SAID THAT THE WAR IN LEBANON SHOWED SOVIET ARMAMENT TO BE WHAT IT IS IN RELATION TO AMERICAN ARMS AND ISRAELI INNOVATIONS. SHARON ADDED THAT ISRAEL ALSO HAD IN FACT "MADE AMIN PRESIDENT OF LEBANON*" I RESPONDED BY REITERATING THAT AMIN HAS PRODUCED AN INTERNAL CONSENSUS TO DEAL REALISTICALLY WITH THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND THAT HE WILL LOSE THIS CAPACITY AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT UNLESS ISRAEL AND LEBANON MOVE QUICKLY INTO NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID ISRAEL IN RETURN MUST CONSIDER GIVING AMIN SOMETHING TO HELP HIM DEAL WITH HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

15. AT THIS POINT AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, SHAMIR SPOKE, PROPOSING THAT ONE MEETING BE HELD AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO DISCUSS ALL THE OUTSTANDING PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. BEGIN DID NOT SEEM OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC WITH THE

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PROPOSAL. I TOLD BEGIN IN CONCLUSION THAT I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE NOW EXCEPT TO WAIT FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AND DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO MODIFY ITS STAND ON PROCEDURES. I ASKED BEGIN TO SUBMIT MY PROPOSED COMPROMISE TO THE CABINET AND HE AGREED. HOWEVER, WHILE HE DID NOT SAY OPENLY WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE PROPOSED COMPROMISE DURING THE CABINET DELIBERATIONS, I INFERRED FROM HIS ARGUMENTS THAT HE WILL IN FACT OPPOSE THE COMPROMISE DURING THE CABINET SESSION.

16. IN VIEW OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING,

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DRAPER WILL RETURN TO LEBANON TOMORROW IN LIEU OF TODAY TO PROVIDE AMIN WITH A READOUT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM. WE WILL THEN WAIT TO HEAR WHAT THE CABINET DECIDES ON SUNDAY, BEFORE DECIDING ON NEXT STEPS. AT THIS MOMENT, IT APPEARS THAT SHARON'S HARD LINE VIEWS HAVE PREVAILED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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GROVE

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SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03601

EX-1

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, NOVEMBER 25, 1982

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH SHARON FOR ONE HOUR IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH PM BEGIN. SHARON PUT FORWARD
CLEARLY HIS OWN VIEWS ON WHAT ISRAEL WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH
IN EXCHANGE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND SAID THAT
ISRAEL WAS IN NO HURRY TO WITHDRAW. THROUGHOUT HIS
PRESENTATION OF THIS ISSUE AND OTHERS WAS A RECURRENT

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THEME THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS WORKING AT CROSS-
PURPOSES WITH ISRAEL. HE ALLEGED THAT WE WERE HOLDING
GEMAYEL BACK CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND THAT
WE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO HIS REQUEST FOR A DIALOGUE ON
HOW TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES PRESENTED
BY THE NEW SITUATION IN LEBANON. SHARON ALSO CRITICIZED
THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EXILED PALESTINIAN MAYORS AS
AN EFFORT TO REVIVE THE PLO.**UNCLASSIFIED**

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3. I OBJECTED TO SHARON'S CLAIM THAT WE WERE HOLDING GEMAYEL BACK, AND SAID THAT WE HAD HELPED PRODUCE GEMAYEL'S CURRENT WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES WITH ISRAEL. I ARGUED WITH SHARON ON THE NEED FOR PROMPT PROGRESS ON LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, BUT AS INDICATED BY THE POSITION HE TOOK IN OUR SESSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS NOT CONVINCED. AND I POINTED OUT THAT OUR MEETINGS WITH WEST BANK MAYORS WAS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF CAMP DAVID. END SUMMARY.

4. I MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON FOR ONE HOUR MORNING OF NOVEMBER 24. SHARON WAS JOINED BY GENERALS TAMIR AND SAGI, AND STAFF. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER, CHARGE FLATEN, AND STAFF. WE AGREED NOT TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES TO ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE SHARON WOULD ATTEND THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN (SEPTEL).

5. AFTER DISCUSSING THE ISRAELI POW AND MIA ISSUE (SEPTEL), SHARON GAVE A LENGTHY PRESENTATION OF ISRAEL'S POSITION CONCERNING LEBANON. HE SAID THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISRAEL WAS THE MAJOR

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ISSUE, NOT WITHDRAWAL. HE DEFINED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO INCLUDE GENERAL SECURITY UNDERTAKINGS (E.G. NO FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON UNLESS MUTUALLY AGREED, A TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, AN END TO THE PLO MILITARY PRESENCE AND TO ITS POLITICAL HEADQUARTERS), THE CREATION OF A 45-50 KM. SECURITY ZONE, AND NORMALIZATION, WHICH SHARON SAID COULD DEVELOP STEP-BY-STEP). SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS "NOT IN A HURRY" TO WITHDRAW, AND MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

6. SHARON SAID THAT THE US AND ISRAEL SHARE CERTAIN INTERESTS CONCERNING LEBANON. HE ASSERTED THAT ISRAEL HAD CREATED STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE US MILITARY PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. HOWEVER, HE WARNED THAT IF THE BEIRUT SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE THROUGH THE CONTINUED INFLOW OF PLO TERRORISTS, BLOODSHED WOULD RESUME AND THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION WOULD DEMAND US WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE US AND ISRAEL BEGIN A DIALOGUE ON THESE STRATEGIC ISSUES ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS, AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE PREVIOUSLY WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS, BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ANSWER.

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7. CITING LEBANESE SOURCES, SHARON ALLEGED THAT AMIN HAD BEEN TOLD IN WASHINGTON TO GO SLOWLY WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE THE US WAS GOING TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE LEBANON CRISIS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION. SHARON SAID THIS WAS A FORMULA FOR DISASTER, SINCE WE WOULD BE SACRIFICING PROGRESS WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE IN PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVES WHICH WERE GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT. SHARON URGED THE US TO MOVE PRAGMATICALLY AND CONCENTRATE ON LEBANON. SHARON REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT ISRAEL HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH GEMAYEL THROUGH ITS OWN CHANNELS, AND

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THAT GEMAYEL OFTEN SAID DIFFERENT THINGS TO US AND

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TO ISRAEL. SHARON SAID THAT GEMAYEL'S "GAMES" WOULD
DETERMINE WHETHER HE WOULD BE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON
OR ONLY OF THE PALACE.

8. SHARON ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE
UNITED STATES WAS TRYING TO REVIVE THE PLO, AFTER
ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEFEAT IN LEBANON. HE
REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EXILED
MAYORS KAWASME AND MILHELM, WHO HE SAID
WERE MORE THAN SUPPORTERS OF THE PLO AND "HAD BLOOD
ON THEIR HANDS."

9. DRAPER AND I DENIED CATEGORICALLY SHARON'S
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CLAIM THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS URGING GEMAYEL TO GO SLOWLY WITH ISRAEL; ON THE CONTRARY, WE WERE URGING HIM TO SIT DOWN NOW WITH ISRAEL. DRAPER SAID THAT HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS, IN WHICH WE HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO BEGIN TALKS NOT ONLY WITH ISRAEL, BUT ALSO WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. I SAID THAT OUR EFFORTS HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN INDUCING LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING NORMALIZATION, AND TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON COMPOSITION OF DELEGATION. GEMAYEL ACCEPTED THAT THE TALKS WOULD PRODUCE A NEW ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATIONSHIP. DRAPER ADDED THAT OUR EFFORTS HAD ALSO HELPED BUILD THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS FOR GEMAYEL'S POSITIONS AND THE MODERATE ARAB ACQUIESCENCE IN DIRECT LEBANON/ISRAEL TALKS. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN LEAVING LEBANON UNRESOLVED UNTIL THE PEACE PROCESS MOVED FORWARD. (I USED SHARON'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO BE PRAGMATIC TO URGE SHARON TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES AND MOVE ON TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. SHARON SAID THAT I HAD TAKEN HIS LANGUAGE OUT OF CONTEXT AND THAT PROCEDURE WAS SUBSTANCE IN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT.)

10. I ALSO TOLD SHARON THAT CONTRARY TO HIS STATEMENTS, THE US AND ISRAEL SHARED MANY GOALS IN LEBANON. WE BOTH SUPPORTED A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON. WE BOTH WANTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND WE BOTH SUPPORTED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SO THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT BECOME AGAIN A BASE FOR TERRORISM. AND, WE BOTH SUPPORTED DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL/LEBANON RELATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT

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OF A PEACE TREATY. I STRESSED THAT DESPITE THIS AGREEMENT ON OBJECTIVES, I STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH SHARON'S CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO HURRY IN RESOLVING THE LEBANON SITUATION. WHILE ISRAEL WAS IN A STRONG POSITION MILITARILY IN LEBANON, TIME WOULD ERODE GEMAYEL'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS FOR, AND EXTERNAL ACQUIESCENCE IN, POSITIVE TALKS WITH ISRAEL. AND, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT FROM SYRIA AND THE PLO WITHOUT ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS.

11. I ALSO SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH WEST BANK MAYORS WAS NOT AN EFFORT TO REVIVE THE PLO, BUT WAS IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, WHICH CONTEMPLATED THE PARTICIPATION OF JORDAN AND INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I SAID WE WOULD BE TALKING WITH A WIDE RANGE OF

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PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD ALSO FACILITATE JORDAN'S ENTRY. I POINTED OUT THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD SUGGESTED THAT WE TRY TO IDENTIFY INHABITANTS IN THE WEST BANK WHO MIGHT JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. FINALLY, I SAID THAT I AGREED THAT THE US AND ISRAEL SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I SAID THAT WE DID NOT AGREE HOWEVER THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING IN BEIRUT THROUGH THE RE-ENTRY OF PLO MILITARY. I SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS PROGRESSIVELY BETTER, WITH GEMAYEL CONCENTRATING ON ASSERTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO THREAT FROM THE PLO WHICH THE LAF COULD NOT

HANDLE, AND SUMMARIZED THE EFFORTS WHICH WE WERE MAKING TO STRENGTHEN THE LAF. GROVE

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JERUSALEM 03600

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, IS, SY, AL

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION DISCUSSION WITH PRIME

- MINISTER BEGIN ON ISRAELI MIA'S

FOIA Exemptions

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1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT THE END OF MY DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ON LEBANON NOVEMBER 25 (SPETEL), BEGIN RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE MISSING ISRAELIS IN SYRIA, ASKING IF WE HAD RECEIVED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THROUGH THE QADDOUR CHANNEL. DRAPER STARTED TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTING THAT HE AND AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF TAKING UP WITH THE SYRIANS BEGIN'S PROPOSED APPROACH INVOLVING GIVING UP SOME SYRIAN POW'S WHEN WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO HOLD OFF ON MAKING ANY FURTHER INTERVENTIONS AT ISRAEL'S REQUEST IN VIEW OF AUSTRIA'S INVOLVEMENT, WHICH APPARENTLY

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OFFERED SOME PROMISE OF SUCCESS. THIS INFORMATION OBVIOUSLY CAME AS A SURPRISE TO BEGIN.

3. SHARON INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT WE WERE FACTUALLY CORRECT BUT THEN EXPLAINED HE HAD INFORMATION THAT IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, WE HAD CONFINED OUR INTERESTED TO ONE ISRAELI SOLDIER, WHO ALSO HAD AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. DRAPER HEATEDLY INTERVENED, SAYING THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID

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HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM'S MEETING WITH KHADDAM IN WASHINGTON WHEN THE COMPLETE LIST OF ISRAELIS MISSING WAS PRESENTED. THIS WAS ALWAYS HOW WE HANDLED THIS ISSUE. I ADDED THAT SHARON HAD OBVIOUSLY RECEIVED WRONG INFORMATION. CONTINUING, SHARON SAID ISRAEL HAD DECIDED TO PURSUE OTHER SOLUTIONS AND THAT KREISKY, WITH WHOM ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE GOOD RELATIONS, HAD RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY, EMBARKING ON AN EXTENSIVE OPERATION TO TRY TO IDENTIFY THE FATE OF THOSE MISSING. NO ANSWERS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BUT ISRAEL WAS HEARTENED BY AUSTRIA'S FORTHRIGHT POSITION.

4. I VIGOROUSLY RESPONDED THAT DRAPER'S AND MY TRACK RECORD ON ISRAELI POW AND MIA ISSUES WAS WELL KNOWN, REFERRING TO OUR EFFORTS DURING THE SUMMER IN BEIRUT. I REPEATED THAT IT WAS BEYOND MY COMPREHENSION THAT WE HAD NEGLECTED OUR DUTIES, ADDING THAT IN MY VIEW QADDOUR WAS THE BEST AND MOST RELIABLE CHANNEL FOR WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM WHATEVER THE AUSTRIANS, RUMANIANS AND OTHERS MIGHT TRY TO DO. I SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD PERSIST WITH QADDOUR. BEGIN NODDED HIS HEAD AFFIRMATIVELY.

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5. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, WE QUESTIONED SAGI, TAMIR, "MANDY," KIMCHE AND BAR-ON ON SHARON'S ALLEGATION, NOTING THAT THIS BORDERED ON ACCUSING US OF BAD FAITH. NONE OF THE ABOVE COULD SHED ANY LIGHT ON WHY SHARON HAD SPOKEN IN THIS VEIN. I ALSO BUTTON-HOLED SHARON AND TOLD HIM I WANTED THE PRECISE DETAILS ON THE SOURCE OF HIS CONTENTION. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD.

6. FINAL COMMENT: THIS EPISODE ILLUSTRATES THAT SHARON IS BACK TO HIS USUAL TRUCULENT FORM, AS DOES ALSO OF COURSE HIS HARDLINE VIEWS ON THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, BEING REPORTED UPON SEPARATELY. DRAPER TOLD SHARON AND TAMIR THAT WE WANTED IN WRITING AN EXACT ISRAELI RENDITION OF WHAT THEY WANTED US TO SAY TO THE SYRIANS ABOUT THE HINT OR OFFER OF A TURNOVER OF ISRAELI-HELD SYRIAN POW'S. TAMIR PROMISED TO PROVIDE THIS TO DRAPER THROUGH EMBASSY TEL AVIV. GROVE

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PBOR, PEPR, PLO, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR ON LEBANON, NOVEMBER 24, 19821. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: I DEVOTED ALMOST MY ENTIRE SESSION WITH
SHAMIR TO FINDING A COMPROMISE PROCEDURAL FORMULA
WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS
ON WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

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3. DRAPER DESCRIBED OUR EFFORTS WITH GEMAYEL TO EXPLAIN
WHY ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT LEBANON'S PROPOSAL
FOR AN INITIAL PRO FORMA MEETING CHAIRED BY
GENERAL HAMDAN, TO BE FOLLOWED BY SUBSTANTIVE
MEETINGS UNDER CO-CHAIRMEN (ONE MILITARY, ONE
CIVILIAN). ON THE BASIS OF OUR ARGUMENTATION,
GEMAYEL WAS NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SINGLE CIVILIAN
CHAIRMAN, PROVIDED THERE WAS AN INITIAL PRO FORMA

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MEETING CHAIRED BY HAMDAN. GEMAYEL HAD, HOWEVER, SAID THAT THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE CABINET FOR APPROVAL AND THAT THE AGREED ISRAELI-LEBANESE OUTCOME--IN WHATEVER DOCUMENTARY FORM--WOULD HAVE CABINET SANCTION. I DID NOT REPEAT NOT SAY THAT A CABINET MINISTER WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO SIGN ON BEHALF OF THE LEBANESE (I AM HOLDING THIS IN RESERVE).

4. DESPITE MY EMPHASIS ON THE MOVEMENT IN THE LATEST LEBANESE POSITION AND THE NEED TO GET ON WITH THE TALKS, SHAMIR WOULD NOT BUDGE. HE HAD TWO MAJOR OBJECTIONS. THE FIRST WAS THAT PERHAPS ISRAEL SHOULD WAIT FOR THE TALKS WITH PLO AND SYRIA TO BEGIN, BUT I BELIEVE I CONVINCED SHAMIR THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE ANYONE A VETO OVER THE PROCESS. I COULD NOT OVERCOME HIS SECOND OBJECTION, WHICH WAS HOLDING THE FIRST MEETING UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF GENERAL HAMDAN.

5. AFTER MUCH BACK-AND-FORTH, I SAID THAT DRAPER WAS PREPARED TO GO IMMEDIATELY BACK TO LEBANON TO SEE IF GEMAYEL COULD ACCEPT THE FOLLOWING DEAL:

-- BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO AMEND PREVIOUS CABINET DECISIONS;

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-- NO INITIAL MEETING CHAIRED BY HAMDAN ON THE LEBANESE SIDE;

-- A SINGLE CIVILIAN LEBANESE CHAIRMAN AT A LOWER-THAN-MINISTER LEVEL (AMBASSADOR FATTAL) FROM THE START;

-- THE MEETINGS TO BEGIN WITH PROCEDURE AND PROCEED TO SUBSTANCE RIGHT AWAY AT THAT LEVEL (BUT NOT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL UNLESS AGREED LATER);

-- VENUE IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, BUT NOT IN THE CAPITALS;

-- ISRAEL TO AMEND APPROPRIATELY ITS CABINET DECISION REQUIRING MINISTERIAL-LED DELEGATIONS TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANCE, AND WITH VENUE IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.

6. SHAMIR AGREED TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. ONE HOUR LATER, HANON BAR-ON CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT BEGIN WANTED TO HEAR THE PRESENTATION DIRECTLY FROM ME BEFORE MAKING ANY DECISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, I WILL NEED TO GO THROUGH ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAIN TOMORROW.

7. I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE PRESENT

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PROCEDURAL LOGJAM WILL BE BROKEN. SHAMIR WILL BE SYMPATHETIC TO THIS COMPROMISE FORMULA. SHARON MAY ATTEMPT TO INSIST ON ISRAEL'S ORIGINAL CABINET POSITIONS, NAMELY MINISTERIAL-LED MEETINGS IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT BEGIN WILL BE PERSUADED THAT ISRAEL'S NEED FOR A POLITICAL COMPOSITION TO THE DELEGATIONS HAS BEEN MET AND THAT IT IS NOW TIME TO GET GOING WITH THE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

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8. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR FOR NINETY MINUTES AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 24. SHAMIR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR,

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DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, LEGAL ADVISOR RUBINSTEIN, MAJOR GENERAL TAMIR, MOSSAD OFFICIAL "MANDY" AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF. ACCOMPANYING ME WERE DRAPER, CHARGE FLATEN, POL/C HARE, KRECKO AND SCOTT. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT WE HAD BEEN CONCENTRATING OUR EFFORTS SO FAR ON GETTING ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY, AND STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE (AND WE) WERE INTERESTED IN GETTING THE TALKS GOING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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9. IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THE POINT THAT DRAPER WOULD BE CARRYING THE BRUNT OF THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT, HE DESCRIBED THE PRESENT SITUATION AND GEMAYEL'S LATEST COUNTER-OFFER. DRAPER NOTED THAT WE HAD HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN LEBANON WITH A WIDE RANGE OF LEBANESE POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, TUENI, THE ARSLANS, PIERRE GEMAYEL, CHAMOUN, AND WALID JUMBLATT AMONG OTHERS. DRAPER UNDERSCORED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE LEBANESE WERE READY TO PROCEED WITH TALKS. GEMAYEL HAS A RARE DEGREE OF NATIONAL UNITY, INCLUDING SUPPORT FROM THE SUNNIS FOR DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS. DRAPER ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE FELT THAT THEY CAN ONLY BEGIN REAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO ON WITHDRAWAL AFTER FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEGUN. HE CONTINUED THAT WE HAD MANAGED TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE LEBANESE UNDERSTAND FULLY ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR STRONG POLITICAL CONTENT IN THE MEETINGS, AND AS A RESULT, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS AGREEABLE TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BEING CHAIRED BY AMBASSADOR FATTAL. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO MEET HIS CABINET REQUIREMENTS, HE STILL WANTS THE FIRST PRD-FORMA PROCEDURAL MEETING TO TAKE PLACE UNDER GENERAL HAMDAN.

--

10. WE UNDERSCORED THAT THE FIRST MEETING WITH HAMDAN WOULD BE PURELY PRO FORMA AND WOULD BE FOCUSED ON CLEARING UP AS MANY PROCEDURAL DETAILS AS POSSIBLE. THE SECOND MEETING, WHICH COULD OCCUR THE FOLLOWING DAY, WOULD HAVE AMBASSADOR FATTAL AS SOLE CHAIRMAN, WOULD DEAL WITH ANY PROCEDURAL

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MATTERS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED AT THE FIRST MEETING, AND THEN PROCEED DIRECTLY TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. I POINTED OUT THAT THE LEBANESE CABINET DECISION HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN TO HAVE HAMDAN CHAIR ALL THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE LEBANESE SIDE. THEN GEMAYEL HAD MOVED TO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CO-CHAIRMEN, AND NOW WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SINGLE CIVILIAN CHAIRMAN. HOWEVER, UNDER EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS, GEMAYEL NEEDED AN INITIAL MEETING UNDER HAMDAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP, IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE TERMS OF THE CABINET RESOLUTION WHICH HAD NAMED HAMDAN AS CHAIRMAN ON THE LEBANESE SIDE.

--
11. DRAPER AND I REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT ALL MEETINGS AFTER THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE UNDER A CIVILIAN CHAIRMAN, HAVING FULL AUTHORITY FROM THE PRESIDENT, AND THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO MOVE TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR THE FUTURE OF GOI/GOL RELATIONS BUT NEEDED TO ACCELERATE MOVEMENT ON PLO/SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. I REPEATED THAT THERE WAS A GENERAL LEBANESE CONSENSUS ON HAVING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND THAT SIGNIFICANTLY THE MODERATE ARABS, AND EVEN THE SYRIANS, DO NOT OBJECT TO THIS PROSPECT. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD ASSURED ME THAT HE IS PREPARED TO SEND AN EMISSARY (LESS THAN MINISTERIAL RANK) TO TALK DIRECTLY TO THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO ABOUT WITHDRAWAL, BUT IT IS HIS FEELING THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO GET THE ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY FIRST. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE CABINET, WHICH SHOULD MORE THAN ADEQUATELY SATISFY ISRAEL'S NEED FOR MINISTERIAL

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EXDIS

INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS PREPARED TO GO A LONG WAY, BUT THE ISRAELIS MUST BE PREPARED TO HELP. I SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS AGREE TO THIS FORMULA WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE DISCUSSIONS TO GET UNDERWAY WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

12. SHAMIR SUGGESTED IT COULD BE "USELESS" FOR ISRAEL TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE PLO/SYRIA.

"MAYBE IT WOULD BE BETTER IF SYRIA AND THE PLO KNEW ISRAEL WOULD NOT START NEGOTIATIONS FIRST." WE DISAGREED WITH THIS THESIS. I SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE TOLD ME THAT WITHDRAWAL IS A SYRIAN-LEBANESE

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 03588 03 OF 04 250551Z

MATTER. THEY ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW "WHEN ISRAEL HAS WITHDRAWN," BUT HAVE MOVED FROM A POSITION OF BEING PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT WITHDRAWAL ONLY AFTER THE ISRAELIS HAD WITHDRAWN TO A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEBANESE NOW. I TOLD SHAMIR IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE NOT YET FORMALLY ASKED THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW, ALTHOUGH GEMAYEL'S PUBLIC POSITION IS CLEAR. THIS SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. I SAID I WAS CONVINCED THE SYRIANS INTENDED TO WITHDRAW.

13. SHAMIR NOTED THAT THE PLO WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL NOT LEAVE LEBANON. I COUNTERED THAT THIS WAS THE VIEW OF A FEW PLO OFFICIALS, BUT WE


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BELIEVED THE PLO WAS PREPARED TO LEAVE LEBANON. I ADDED THAT PROMPT ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS WOULD ACCELERATE LEBANESE EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. SHAMIR REPEATED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THE PLO SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON FIRST. WE DESCRIBED REPORTS THAT THE PLO WAS CONSIDERING SERIOUSLY THE EVACUATION OF PLO FIGHTERS TO ALGERIA AND POSSIBLY JORDAN AND IRAQ AS WELL.

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14. RETURNING TO THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL, SHAMIR SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD DECIDED THAT SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. SHAMIR ADDED THAT, EVEN IF THE LEBANESE PROPOSED AMBASSADOR FATTAL AS CHAIRMAN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, ISRAEL WOULD STILL HAVE TO OBTAIN CABINET APPROVAL FOR A MODIFICATION IN ITS POSITION ON MINISTERIAL LEVEL TALKS AS WELL AS ON VENUES IN THE TWO CAPITALS. I REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO DO THAT AT SOME POINT ANYWAY, SINCE IT WAS MY JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF



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MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETINGS. DRAPER POINTED OUT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD AGREED TO MEETINGS BOTH IN ISRAEL AND IN LEBANON, THOUGH NOT IN THE CAPITALS. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL WAS A CONCESSION WHICH WE HAD HAD TO EXTRACT FROM GEMAYEL, AND WE NEEDED A POSITIVE DECISION QUICKLY IF WE WERE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FAVORABLE MOOD IN LEBANON AT THIS TIME. SHAMIR SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SKIP THE FIRST MEETING AND MOVE DIRECTLY TO MEETINGS WITH THE LEBANESE SIDE CHAIRED BY AMBASSADOR FATTAL.

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15. GENERAL TAMIR UNHELPFULLY REPEATED THE FULL ISRAELI POSITION AND ADDED MORE WRINKLES. FIRST, THERE WAS ISRAEL'S CABINET DECISION CONCERNING THE CHAIRMANSHIP AND VENUE OF THE MEETING. SECOND, ISRAEL OPPOSED HAMDAN, A MILITARY MAN, CHAIRING THE LEBANESE SIDE IN EVEN ONE MEETING. ISRAEL IS CONCERNED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS ALREADY TRYING TO FIND COMPROMISES WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, AND IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, THIS PROCESS WOULD COMPLICATE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. TAMIR ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD DEAL WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA AT MINISTERIAL LEVELS, IN CONTRAST TO THOSE WITH ISRAEL. FINALLY, TAMIR SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR LEBANON TO CLEAR UP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA BEFORE STARTING WITH ISRAEL. BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD NEED TO MODIFY THEIR ORIGINAL DECISIONS. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT

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DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIANS WOULD BE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL; THEY WOULD BE LOWER IN LEVEL. WITH RESPECT TO VENUE, I SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL TAKE IT UP WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHEN DISCUSSIONS

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GET UNDERWAY, BUT I REITERATED MY VIEW THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT DISCUSSIONS IN CAPITALS AT THIS TIME. WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL'S CONCERN ABOUT COMPROMISES, I OBSERVED THAT GEMAYEL MUST MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIMS IN LEBANON AND I SAID WAZZAN WAS THE MOST REASONABLE, CREDIBLE MUSLIM AROUND.

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16. AFTER A LOT OF GIVE-AND-TAKE, AND WHILE STRESSING THE TIME PRESSURE BUILDING AGAINST US, I SUGGESTED THAT WE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING DEAL:

-- BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO AMEND PREVIOUS CABINET DECISIONS;

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-- NO INITIAL MEETING CHAIRED BY HAMDAN ON THE LEBANESE SIDE;

-- A SINGLE CIVILIAN LEBANESE CHAIRMAN AT A LOWER-THAN-MINISTER LEVEL (AMBASSADOR FATTAL) FROM THE START;

-- THE MEETINGS TO BEGIN WITH PROCEDURE AND PROCEED TO SUBSTANCE RIGHT AWAY AT THAT LEVEL (BUT NOT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL UNLESS AGREED LATER);

-- VENUE IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, BUT NOT IN THE CAPITALS;

-- ISRAEL TO AMEND APPROPRIATELY ITS CABINET DECISION REQUIRING MINISTERIAL-LED DELEGATIONS TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANCE, AND WITH VENUE IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.

17. I ASKED SHAMIR IF ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL IF I COULD GET PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO CHANGE THE LEBANESE CABINET DECISION AND ACCEPT IT. SHAMIR AFTER A LOT OF HEDGING REPLIED THAT, IF LEBANON AGREED, THE PROPOSAL COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE ISRAELI CABINET. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT GO TO GEMAYEL ON THAT BASIS, BUT NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ASSURE HIM THAT BEGIN WOULD SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL IN CABINET DELIBERATIONS. I SAID AMBASSADOR DRAPER WOULD GO TO BEIRUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IF THE ISRAELIS COULD GIVE ME THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES. DRAPER JOCULARLY ADDED THAT BOTH CABINETS MOVING TOGETHER WOULD BE A GOOD FIRST EXAMPLE OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI COORDINATION.

18. RUBENSTEIN ASKED IF THE PROPOSAL WAS TO START

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WITH POLITICAL OFFICIALS, BUT LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT MINISTERS COULD HEAD THE DISCUSSION EVENTUALLY. I REPLIED THAT I WANTED TO BE ABSOLUTELY STRAIGHT WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE LEBANESE SIMPLY

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COULD NOT AGREE TO MINISTERIAL-LEVEL TALKS. THE ISRAELIS COULD RAISE IT IN THE DISCUSSIONS IF THEY WANTED, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO ILLUSIONS. THE LEBANESE JUST COULD NOT DO IT NOW, THOUGH I DID NOT TOTALLY FORECLOSE THIS POSSIBILITY AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.

19. I SUMMED UP BY OBSERVING THAT IN MY VIEW WE WERE DN THE THRESHHOLD OF GETTING DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY. DRAPER WAS READY TO GO TO LEBANON RIGHT AWAY TO PUT THE PACKAGE TO GEMAYEL IF I COULD OBTAIN THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELI SIDE. I ASKED SHAMIR TO GET BACK TO ME QUICKLY, SO DRAPER COULD TAKE THE QUESTION UP WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

20. SHAMIR AGREED TO RAISE THE QUESTION WITH BEGIN AND GET BACK TO ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SUBSEQUENTLY, BAR-ON CALLED ME TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED TO HEAR FROM ME DIRECTLY ON THURSDAY MORNING. I WILL TAKE IT UP WITH BEGIN THEN, AT WHICH POINT I HOPE DRAPER COULD PROCEED TO BEIRUT IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

21. AS THE MEETING CLOSED, I BRIEFLY REVIEWED MY DISCUSSIONS IN DAMASCUS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FROM DAMASCUS. KHADDAM WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WITH ME.
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EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: BRINGING ABOUT A
LEBANESE-ISRAELI COMPROMISE

1. [REDACTED]

2. WE MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR LATE THIS AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 24, AND MAY HAVE REACHED A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE FORMULA FOR GETTING ISRAELI-LEBANESE TALKS STARTED. THIS IS SUBJECT TO SHAMIR'S CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND POSSIBLY DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, AND BEGIN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH US AT 1130 THURSDAY MORNING.

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3. THE ESSENCE OF THE UNDERSTANDING IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE TO AMEND PREVIOUS
CABINET DECISIONS.-- THE LEBANESE FOR THEIR PART WOULD AGREE TO
DESIGNATE FATTAL AS DELEGATION HEAD RIGHT FROM
THE START, WITHOUT THE PRELIMINARY, PRO FORMA MEETING
CHAIRIED BY HAMDAN.**UNCLASSIFIED**

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-- BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE FATTAL-
LED LEBANESE DELEGATION AND THE ISRAELI DELEGATION
WOULD MOVE THROUGH PROCEDURAL ISSUES AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND GO STRAIGHT TO SUBSTANCE.

-- THE VENUE AND OTHER PROCEDURAL MATTERS WOULD
BE SETTLED IN THE INITIAL MEETING OR MEETINGS, BUT
IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT MEETINGS WOULD BE
HELD IN BOTH LEBANON AND IN ISRAEL, BUT NOT IN
THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.

-- ISRAEL FOR ITS PART WOULD AMEND ITS EARLIER
CABINET DECISION REQUIRING THAT SUBSTANTIVE TALKS
BE HELD AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND THAT THE
VENUE BE IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.

4. FOR BEIRUT: IF BEGIN AGREES TO THIS FORMULATION
AT 1130 MEETING, DRAPER WILL GO BY SPAR AIRCRAFT
TO BEIRUT AT ABOUT 1300-1330 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 24,
SEEK AMIN GEMAYEL'S CONCURRENCE, AND RETURN THE SAME
AFTERNOON IF POSSIBLE TO ISRAEL TO REPORT RESULTS.
SPAR CREW HAS BEEN ALERTED TO ARRANGEMENTS. WE WILL
FLASH YOU CONFIRMATION OF DRAPER'S TRAVEL. YOU SHOULD

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SEEK DRAPER APPOINTMENT WITH GEMAYEL FOR ABOUT
1500.
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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/23/83

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), XF, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS NOVEMBER 24 -
- DECEMBER 2REF: (A) AMMAN 9808 ✓ (B) AMMAN 9821 ✓
- (C) JIDDA 8763 ✓ (D) STATE 326889 ✓

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. THIS IS ANOTHER ROUND-ROBIN RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS
AND COMMENTS IN REPTELS.3. HERE ARE MY PROPOSED PLANS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
FAHD'S PLANS FOR A VACATION IN MOROCCO OR SPAIN, AND
HASSAN'S TRAVEL PLANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS:-- A) WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24: DEPART DAMASCUS AT
0800 LOCAL TIME (0600 ZULU) FOR ISRAEL. FLIGHT
PLANS BY DAO SEPTTEL. DRAPERS, KRECZKO AND BUERLE**UNCLASSIFIED**

WILL BE WITH ME.

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-- B) DRAPER MAY HAVE TO MAKE A QUICK TURNAROUND TRIP FROM BEN GURION AIRPORT TO BEIRUT AND BACK ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 25, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THE DRAPERS AND BUERLE WILL RETURN TO BEIRUT ON EARLY MORNING FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, VIA SPAR AIRCRAFT. SPAR AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN PROCEED TO AMMAN TO AWAIT ME THERE.

-- C) FRIDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 26: I WILL CROSS THE BRIDGE AT 1000 LOCAL, JOINED BY KRECZKO. DEPENDING ON WHETHER THERE IS A START ON ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, KRECZKO WILL EITHER RETURN TO BEIRUT ON SUNDAY OR STAY WITH ME FOR THE REMAINDER OF MY VISITS. AS FOR ARAFAT'S VISIT TO AMMAN, I SEE NO PROBLEM WITH MY OWN PLANS I WAS TO SEE THE KING ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27. OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN AMMAN COULD BE FITTED IN.

-- D) SUNDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 28: DEPART BY SPAR AIRCRAFT FOR CAIRO. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE MUBARAK SUNDAY AFTERNOON OR MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 29 AND LEAVE FOR RABAT ON MONDAY AFTERNOON.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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-- E) AMBASSADOR MURPHY MIGHT WANT TO JOIN ME IN CAIRO IF IT TURNS OUT THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO MEET WITH KING FAHD AT THE NEXT STOP: RABAT.

-- F) MONDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 29: DEPART CAIRO FOR RABAT, IN ORDER TO MEET WITH KING HASSAN ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30.

-- G) IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE TO FIT IN MEETING WITH KING FAHD IN MOROCCO OR IN SPAIN WITH AN ALLOWABLE TIME FRAME THROUGH FRIDAY MORNING AT THE LATEST DECEMBER 3, WHEN I WOULD HAVE TO GO TO ROME FOR THE SEMINAR DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS TRAVEL MESSAGES.

-- H) MORNING OF DECEMBER 6: FAIRBANKS AND I COULD GO TO LONDON FROM ROME AND BE READY TO SEE PYM LATER IN THE DAY OR AT ANY TIME ON DECEMBER 7.

-- I) I WOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON FROM LONDON IDEALLY ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 8.

4. I AM ASSUMING THAT AMBASSADORS FAIRBANKS AND CLUVERIUS WILL STAY WITH ME ON MY TRIPS AFTER AMMAN,

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Date Printed: 10/07/1996

DOC NUMBER 2DAMASC08465

CHANNEL: n/a


AND POSSIBLY KRECKO AS WELL. AT THE END OF APPROPRIATE STOP, I WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH CLUVERIUS LEAVING AND RETURNING TO JORDAN AND ISRAEL FOR FOLLOWUP TALKS.

5. ADDRESSEES SHOULD BE SURE TO ADDRESS THEIR COMMENTS TO JERUSALEM OVER THE NEXT TWO DAYS, FOR I WILL BE THERE. PAGANELLI



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EX- DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PBOR, PEPR, PLO, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SYRIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER ON LEBANON, NOV. 23, 19821. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~2. SUMMARY: MY SESSION WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM PRO-
DUCED LITTLE NEW LIGHT CONCERNING THE SYRIAN POSITION OR
POTENTIAL SYRIAN FLEXIBILITY ON LEBANON. KHADDAM WAS
ANXIOUS TO LEARN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ABOUT WHAT THE

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ISRAELIS EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE LEBANESE AND HOW MUCH OF THE ISRAELI DEMANDS THE U.S.
WOULD SUPPORT. HE IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL WILL
USE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO EXTRACT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
MILITARY ADVANTAGES, AND HE LAID DOWN CLEAR MARKERS THAT**UNCLASSIFIED**

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SYRIA WILL OPPOSE ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH DETRACT FROM LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OR WHICH THREATEN SYRIAN SECURITY.

3. I IN TURN PRESSED KHADDAM FOR INFORMATION ON THE POSITIONS THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD TAKE DURING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

KHADDAM WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, REVERTING TO HIS STANDARD POSITION THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS A MATTER FOR SYRIA AND LEBANON TO DISCUSS AND THAT, ONCE ISRAEL WITHDREW, THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY PROBLEMS CONCERNING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. KHADDAM REITERATED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE PREPARED TO RECEIVE A LEBANESE EMISSARY IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER ISSUES. KHADDAM AGREED THAT THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS SHOULD ALSO CONSULT OVER THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN BA'ALBEK, WHERE IRANIANS AND THEIR LEBANESE SUPPORTERS ARE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THAT TOWN. END SUMMARY.

4. I MET FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS TUESDAY MORNING, NOV. 23, WITH SYRIAN FOMIN KHADDAM. KHADDAM WAS JOINED BY MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHARA AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS KAYLANI. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND PAGANELLI, AND STAFF. WE DISCUSSED LEBANON AND THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS (SEPTTEL).

5. AFTER DESCRIBING FOR KHADDAM MY NEW POSITION AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MIDDLE EAST MATTERS AND MY ANTICIPATED TRAVEL SCHEDULE, I REITERATED STRONGLY

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THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. I STRESSED THE URGENCY IN MOVING FORWARD ON LEBANON, AND THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT UNILATERALLY PRODUCE A RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE WITHOUT FULL COOPERATION FROM SYRIA, ALONG WITH THE OTHER PARTIES. I DESCRIBED SOME OF THE STUMBLING BLOCKS AND MY HOPE TO BREAK THE PRESENT PROCEDURAL IMPASSE ON LEBANON - ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS.

6. AT KHADDAM'S REQUEST, I GAVE A SUMMARY OF SOME OF THE THINGS THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE SEEKING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE, BUT WITHOUT SAYING WHICH CONCEPT WE MIGHT SUPPORT AND WHICH WE MIGHT OPPOSE. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR PRAGMATISM. I STRESSED THAT SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES MUST BE REALISTIC AND NOT TRY TO PREVENT LEBANON FROM MAKING "ARRANGEMENTS" WITH ISRAEL WHICH WILL BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

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7. KHADDAM DID NOT OBJECT TO THE IDEA OF LEBANON/ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, HE DID SAY THAT SYRIA WOULD OPPOSE ANY LEBANESE CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD DEROGATE FROM LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OR WHICH WOULD THREATEN SYRIAN SECURITY. HE SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT ISRAEL MAINTAIN AN ELECTRONIC WARNING STATION AT MOUNT BARUK. HE ALSO DID NOT WANT TO SEE ISRAELIS - CIVILIAN OR MILITARY - GOING FREELY INTO LEBANON UNDER SOME "OPEN BORDER" CONCEPT.

8. I SAID THAT WITHOUT GETTING INTO THE PARTICULARS, THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI PROPOSALS WHICH AFFECTED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OR SYRIAN SECURITY, AND THAT

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 08464

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PBOR, PEPR, PLO, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SYRIAN

THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT LEBANON IN EFFORTS TO PRESERVE SOVEREIGNTY, MAINTAIN AN INTERNAL CONSENSUS, AND SUSTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. ON THE OTHER HAND LEBANON AND WE SUPPORTED PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILE ACTION FROM OR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. DRAPER SAID SOME SENSIBLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ALSO WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF

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SYRIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, AS WELL AS REPEATS OF SUCH MILITARY ACTIONS AS THOSE OF 1978 AND 1982. I SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD BROAD SUPPORT IN LEBANON FOR THIS APPROACH. KHADDAM SAID HE WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF GEMAYEL'S AND CONSIDERED HIM THE BEST POSSIBLE MARONITE TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL. I SAID THE MAIN TASK WAS TO GET THE ISRAELI/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, AND TO FOCUS ON PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

9. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO MOVE THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS IF I KNEW MORE OF THE SYRIAN POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL, AND I PRESSED KHADDAM TO REVEAL SOME OF THE SYRIAN THINKING, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS TIMING. KHADDAM WAS NOT FORTHCOMING. HE STRESSED SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR THE INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON, AND FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PERSONALLY, AND SYRIA'S DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL. BUT HE CAME BACK TO THE BASIC SYRIAN POSITION THAT THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON CAN NOT(##)

EQUATED, AND THAT ONCE ISRAEL WITHDREW, SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW"FASTER THAN ANYONA CAN IMAGINE". ALTHOUGH I CAME BACK TO THIS ISSUE SEVERAL TIMES, KHADDAM WOULD GO NO FARTHER WITH ME. HOWEVER, KHADDAM DID SAY THAT SYRIA

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REMAINS READY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH LEBANON AT ANY TIME. (COMMENT: I WILL BE URGING AMIN GEMAYEL TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO SYRIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO BEGIN TO PROBE THE SYRIANS ON WITHDRAWAL ISSUES, ALTHOUGH HE WILL WANT TO WAIT UNTIL ISRAELI-LEBANESE TALKS BEGIN. END COMMENT)

10. FINALLY, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRANIANS AND THEIR LEBANESE SUPPORTERS TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE KEY BIQA TOWN OF BA'ALBEK. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT IT WAS MADNESS

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FOR THE IRANIANS TO BE THERE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THEIR RECENT ACTIONS. SINCE THEY WERE IN A SYRIAN ZONE OF CONTROL, SYRIA SHOULD SEE THAT THEY LEFT IMMEDIATELY. KHADDAM COUNTERED INITIALLY WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT MANY OF THE INSURGENTS WERE LEBANESE CITIZENS AND THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BEEN IN THE COUNTRY FOR A LONG TIME. HE INSISTED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE NOT COMING FROM SYRIA. IN THE END, HOWEVER, HE AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE. PAGANELLI

NOTE BY OC/T: (##) TEXT OMISSION PARA 9. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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FOR HABIB

DEPT FOR AMBASSADORS FAIRBANKS AND CLUVERIUS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP, PEPR, JO, US, IS, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: USG POSITON ON "MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS
RECOGNITION"1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. DURING CHARGE'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN NOVEMBER 22, HUSSEIN COMPLAINED THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY COOKS STIRRING UP THE PEACE PROCESS BROTH. SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID HE WAS "FLABBERGASTED" TO LEARN FROM PLO OFFICIAL KHALID AL-HASSAN DURING HIS TRIP TO PARIS THAT THE USG WAS URGING THAT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO STEP FORWARD ON "MUTUAL RECOGNITION" (SIC). IF USG HAS ADOPTED SUCH A POSITION, HUSSEIN WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING IT FIRST-HAND. HUSSEIN EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD POSITIVE TALKS WITH

PAGE 02 AMMAN 09849 231708Z

KHALID AL-HASSAN WHO TOLD HIM HE IS PUTTING HIS FULL WEIGHT BEHIND THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. HOWEVER, KHALID AL-HASSAN SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE AND THAT IF THE PLO WOULD PROPOSE MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION NOW THE USG WOULD OPPOSE IT. HUSSEIN ALSO EXPRESSED CONFUSION ON HOW THIS IMPACTED ON THE QUESTION OF A U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE.

3. CHARGE' SAID THAT TWO SEPARATE POINTS HAD TO BE MADE:

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FIRST, TO ELIMINATE ANY AMBIGUITY INsofar AS USG POLICY TOWARD THE PLO IS CONCERNED, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE USG POSITION. IF THE PLO UNAMBIGUOUSLY ACCEPTS UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242, 338 AND RECOGNIZES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, WE WILL ENTER INTO CONTACTS WITH THE PLO ALONG THE LINES THE KING IS FAMILIAR WITH. SECOND, AS CONCERNS MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE PLO AND ISRAEL, WE HAVE MADE THE POINT THAT SUCH A FORMULA WOULD BE A NON-STARTER AT THIS TIME. FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES THIS APPROACH INVOLVES CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO BLOCK FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS. CHARGE' SAID THAT HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY SOON TO OBTAIN FIRSTHAND FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS PARTY THE USG POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. THE KING SAID HE DEFINITELY INTENDED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH HABIB.

4. COMMENT. HUSSEIN IS EXERCISED OVER THIS POINT AS EVIDENCED FURTHER BY HIS SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALL TO CHARGE' TO EMPHASIZE THAT HE WANTED TO EXPLORE THIS ISSUE FULLY WITH HABIB AND THAT HE WOULD RESERVE COMMENT UNTIL THAT TIME. NEEDLESS TO SAY, HABIB AND PARTY SHOULD COME PREPARED. DJEREJIAN

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11-22-83

TAGS: OVIP, PINT, PINS, PEPR, SY, LE, US, IS, SY

SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS NOVEMBER 23-26

1. ~~(C-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. THIS IS A ROUND ROBIN ANSWER TO VARIOUS CABLES.

3. FOR AMMAN: THERE IS NO PROBLEM, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED,
WITH POSSIBILITY THAT ARAFAT MAY BE IN AMMAN AT SAME TIME AS
HABIB.

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4. FOR DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM: TRAVEL PARTY WILL
INCLUDE HABIB, DRAPERS (2), KRECZKO, AND BUERLE FOR BOTH
SYRIA AND ISRAEL. AS USUAL, WE LEAVE TO POSTS MOST
APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATION DECISION. WE WELCOME THANKS-
GIVING ARRANGEMENTS SUGGESTED BY TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM
FOR THURSDAY.

5. PRESENT PLANNING IS THAT DRAPERS AND BUERLE WILL RETURN

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TO BEIRUT FROM ISRAEL ON THURSDAY LATE AFTERNOON OR FRIDAY EARLY MORNING FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR AND SHARON ON THURSDAY AND SENDING OF NECESSARY REPORTS. KRECZKO MAY REPEAT MAY ACCOMPANY HABIB TO AMMAN.

6. FOR JERUSALEM: RE YOUR 3555, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE LINE THAT HABIB AND COMPANY WILL BE FULLY TAKEN UP WITH LEBANON ON THIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. DO NOT ON THIS VISIT MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETINGS WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS.
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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXD DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PLO, SY, IS, LE, PBOR, XF, MOPS, PEPR

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: INITITAL SUMMING UP

1. (S) (ENTIRE PINT)

2. JOINED BY DRAPER AND DILLON, I HAVE HAD
EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS -- SINCE MY ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT --
WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM,
COUNSELOR TUENI, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, PARLIAMENT
SPEAKER AL-ASSAD, THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS,

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THE PAPAL NUNCIO, AS WELL AS POLITICAL LEADERS SA'AB
SALAM, WALID JUMBLATT, PIERRE GEMAYEL, CAMILLE CHAMOUN
AND OTHERS.

3. AS I INDICATED BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON, I HOPED
ON MY BEIRUT VISIT: A) TO DETERMINE THE ABSOLUTE LIMITS
OF LEBANESE FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL;
B) TO FIND A WAY TO BREAK THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE OR
DECIDE WHETHER AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT APPROACH SHOULD

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TO TRIED; AND C) TO GET A BETTER FIX ON THE ROLES OF UNIFIL AND AN EXPANDED MNF. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL AND SYRIA POINTED TOWARD EARLY AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

4. IN THIS REPORT I WILL ADDRESS PRIMARILY THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATING SCENE. I HAD SOME CONCERN ON ARRIVING IN BEIRUT THAT THE CURRENT IMPASSE MIGHT HAVE TO BE BROKEN THROUGH AN ENTIRELY NEW APPROACH, BUT I NOW BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MAKE A FURTHER MAJOR EFFORT TO GET ISRAELI/LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AND COMPLETED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, COVERING POLITICAL AND SECURITY MATTERS AS WELL AS WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS. HERE IS THE WAY THE SITUATION IS SHAPING UP.

-- A) THE LEBANESE ARE EXTRORDINARILY EAGER TO NEGOTIATE, AND THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEBATE AND TO DEAL WITH THE VARIOUS ISRAELI DEMANDS AND CONDITIONS, EVEN IF THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT SOME OF THEM. THEY ARE PREPARED TO GO FAR TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON A TOTAL PACKAGE DEAL, INCLUDING SIGNATURE ON A DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS. GEMAYEL WANTS THE PACKAGE DEAL SEWN UP PRIOR TO EVEN AN INITIAL PULLBACK OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES, FOR HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT STORIES CIRCU-

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LATING AMONG LEBANESE POLITICIANS TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WILL ONLY BE A PULLBACK AND THAT IT WILL NOT BE FOLLOWED BY A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN, ISRAELI, AND PLO FORCES.

-- B) ON PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE LEBANESE MAY BE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE FURTHER. THEY ARE CONSIDERING DROPPING THE IDEA OF A PRELIMINARY, PRO FORMA MEETING WITH GENERAL HAMDAN IN THE CHAIR, TO BE FOLLOWED BY MORE FORMAL MEETINGS CHAIRED BY CO-CHAIRMEN. THEY MAY REPEAT MAY BE READY TO GO STRAIGHT TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A DELEGATION HEADED BY A SINGLE, CIVILIAN CHAIRMAN, AMBASSADOR FATTAL. THIS WOULD SATISFY THE ISRAELI BOTTOMLINE POSITION.

-- C) HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE INSIST THAT FATTAL-LED DISCUSSIONS GO FROM PROCEDURAL MATTERS TO SUBSTANCE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND ON TO THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI IDEA THAT A FATTAL-LED DELEGATION WULD DEAL ONLY WITH PROCEDURES AND THAT SUBSTANCE MUST BE DEALT WITH AT THE MINISTERIAL-LEVEL WITH MEETINGS IN BEIRUT AND IN JERUSALEM. THE LEBANESE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL ACCEPT MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM (OR BEIRUT); HOWEVER, THEY ARE READY TO MEET ELSEWHERE IN ISRAEL WITH THE ISRAELIS, ALTERNATING MEETINGS BETWEEN KHALDAH AND AN ISRAELI VENUE.

-- D) CONSEQUENTLY, IF WE HAVE THIS NEW LEBANESE POSI-

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TION IN OUR POCKET WHEN DRAPER AND I GO TO ISRAEL, WE WILL URGE ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE, HAVING IN MIND OUR DESIRE TO GET AN AGREED PACKAGE OF ARRANGEMENTS TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCRS.

--E) PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISORS, AS WELL AS KEY POSITICIANS, BELIEVE THAT HE HAS FOR THE MOMENT A RARE NATIONSL CONSENSUS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE HAS CONDITIONED POLITICIANS AND THE PUBLIC ALIKE TO THE PROSPECT OF CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GET THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE HAS INSTILLED A FEELING THAT, DESPITE HAVING BEEN IN OFFICE

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[REDACTED]

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LESS THAN TWO MONTHS, HE CAN ASSURE FOME FORWARD MOVEMENT. THE ONLY SERIOUS BACKBITING HE IS GETTING IS FROM THE MARONITE FAR RIGHT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 38
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
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-- F) IN ADDITION, HE HAS ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT UNDER-
STANDING FOR HIS OBJECTIVES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO;
AND GEMAYEL TOLD US HE HAD A VERY SATISFACTORY TELEPHONE
TALK WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD OF DAMASCUS, WHO REPORTEDLY
SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE DIRECTION IN WHICH
GEMAYEL WAS HEADED. (THE "REAL" SYRIAN POSITION IS
LIKELY TO CAUSE EXTREMELY SERIOUS PROBLEMS.)

-- G) THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR LEBANON CENTERS ON THE
QUESTION OF SEVEREIGNTY. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ARE PRE-
PARED TO GIVE COMPLETE ASSURANCES AND PROVIDE FOR PRECISE ARRANGE-
MENTS REGARDING ANY HOSTILE THREAT FROM LEBANESE
TERRITORY TO ISRAEL. THEY ARE ALSO PREPARED TO BEGIN
AN EVOLUTIONARY POLICY WITH PRACTICAL MOVES IN THE

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DIRECTION OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. BUT THEY ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT CONDITIONS THAT MIGHT BE SEEN A MAJOR VIOLATIONS OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. THEY ALSO DO NOT WISH TO ALIENATE THEIR SUPPORTERS AMONG THE ARAB NATIONS. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL INSIST ON UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS AND WILL CALL ON THE US FOR HELP AND INTERVENTION WITH THE ISRAELIS.

-- H) GEMAYEL HAS TENTATIVELY SELECTED JEAN 'UBAYD, A FORMER JOURNALIST AND ASPIRING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, AS HIS NEGOTIATOR WITH SYRIA AND POSSIBLY WITH THE PLO, ALTHOUGH IN THE LATTER TASK, 'UBAYD MIGHT BE JOINED OR REPLACED BY ANOTHER NEGOTIATOR YET TO BE NAMED. THE LEBANESE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY MUST HAVE SERIOUS TALKS STARTED WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE THEY CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO.

4. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH AND SELF-DEFEATING FOR THE ISRAELIS TO PUT ANY MORE OBSTACLES INTO THE STAR OF SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, AND I WILL MAKE THIS CASE STRONGLY IN ISRAEL.

5. THE MOST THOROUGH EXPRESSION OF LEBANESE VIEWS CONCERNING THE LIMITS OF THE LEBANESE POSITION WAS GIVEN TO US BY FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM. HE CHARACTERIZED THEM AS PERSONAL VIEWS (BUT THEY SOUND CLOSE TO THOSE OF GEMAYEL AND TUENI):

THE NEGATIVE LIST: SALEM WOULD SAY NO FLATLY TO THE FOLLOWING:

- 1) OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN EACH COUNTRY, WHETHER BY LIAISON OFFICES OR OTHERWISE. (SOME FORM OF ONGOING CONTACT THROUGH JOINT COMMISSIONS IS NOT RULED OUT.)
- 2) NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS (THE STRESS IS ON AGREEMENTS; SOME NORMALIZATION THROUGH PRACTICAL

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ARRANGEMENTS IS NOT RULED OUT.)

--3) ISRAELI NAVAL PATROLS OF LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS (BUT ISRAELI AIR RECONNAISSANCE OF LEBANON ABOVE A CERTAIN ALTITUDE COULD BE CARRIED ON WITHOUT REQUIREING LEBANESE AGREEMENT).

-- 4) ISRAELI ASSISTANCE THAT ALL OF THE PLO MUST LEAVE FIRST, BEFORE ANY ISRAELI PULLBACKS OR WITHDRAWALS.

--5) A PEACE TREATY.

-- 6) A JOINT COMMISSION FOR SECURITY (SALEM IS VAGUE ON THIS. HE IS UNHAPPY WITH THE SECURITY ZONE CONCEPT PER SE, AND DOES NOT WANT AN AREA OF LEBANON TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM ANOTHER).

--7) THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF OPEN BORDERS.

-- 8) A POSSIBLE ISRAELI DEMAND THAT HADDAD AND HIS FORCES CONSTITUTE THE BACKBONE OF FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. (SALEM INSISTS THAT THERE SHOULD ONLY BE AUTHORIZED

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LEBANESE ARMY AND SIMILAR FORCES IN THE SOUTH.)
-- 9) JOINT STANDING COMMISSIONS ON NORMALIZATION
AND TRADE.
-- 10) THE PRESENT ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON PRO-
CEDURES LEADING TO A PEACE TREATY.
-- 11) THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT THE MNF AND UNIFIL
REMAIN OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE.
-- 12) ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON TALKS IN JERUSALEM.
-- 13) TALKS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL (ALTHOUGH GEMAYEL
SAID THAT -- GIVEN GOOD PROGRESS AND ISRAELI UNDER-
STANDING -- HE WOULD CONSIDER HAVING THE FOREIGN MIN-
ISTER SIGN WHATEVER AGREEMENT RESULTS)M
THE
POSITIVE AGENDA: MATTERS SALEM IS WILLING TO
DISCUSS THOROUGHLY:

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EXDIS

- 1) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
- 2) LEBANON NOT TO BE ABBASE FOR HOSTILE ACTIONS DIRECTED AT ISRAEL.
- 3) THE CONCEPT OF NON-BELLIGERENCY.
- 4) PROHIBITIONS ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA.
- 5) INCORPORATING HADDAD'S FORCES IN THE LAF, PROVIDED HADDAD DOES NOT HAVE A POSITION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. LEBANON MUST ALSO FEEL FREE TO TRANSFER HADDAD'S FORCES ELSEWHERE.
- 6) EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN LEBANON (ON CONDITION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND THAT THE STATIONS BE OPERATED BY NON-ISRAELIS. GEMAYEL IS FAR MORE OPPOSED THAN SALEM TO THE STATIONS).
- 7) ISRAELI AIR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS ABOVE A CERTAIN

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ALTITUDE AND ONLY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD.

- 8) LIMITATIONS ON LAF WEAPONRY IN A SECURITY ZONE, OR EVEN IN ALL OF LEBANON.
- 9) SIMULTANEOUS ISRELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.
- 10) NEUTRALITY OF LEBANON (NOTING THAT THIS WOULD REQUIRE ANNULMENT OF CERTAIN ARAB LEAGUE COMMITMENTS. SALEM IS WILLONGTO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT IF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IS POSITIVE IN LEBANON AND IN THE ARAB WORLD).
- 11) SOME PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND GOODS ACROSS THE BORDERS, BUT UNDER CONDITIONS.
- 12) THE RETURN OF ISRAELI POW'S AND BODIES.
- 13) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL AGREEMENTS WHICH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WOULD APPROVE.
- 14) THE SECURITY ZONE, ON CONDITION IT IS TEMPORARY IN DURATION. (HE WAS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT SORT OF SECURITY ZONE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT REJECT THE CONCEPT.)
- 15) RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO STRATEGIC OR SENSITIVE AREAS LIKE JABAL BARUK (NO FOREIGN FORCES TO BE ALLOWED).
- 16) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AFTER A FULL PACKAGE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED.

5. NOTE: SOME OF THESE POINTS ARE DUPLICATIVE, BUT ARE GIVEN AS PRESENTED BY SALEM. IT IS INTERESTING BUT CERTAINLY NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC MENTION BY SALEM OF THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF ILMAC, NOT IS THERE A CLEARLY DEFINED ROLE FOR UNIFIL OR AN MNF. WE WILL SEEK FURTHER REFINEMENT AND CLARIFICATION OF LEBANESE VIEWS, ESPECIALLY FROM PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE SALEM LISTS DO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR

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NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, PROVIDED WE CAN BREAL THE
PROCEDURAL IMPASSE AND GET THEM TALKING SUBSTANCE WHICH WE
HOPE TO DO WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

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E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), XF, US
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS

REF: BEIRUT 8445 ✓

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. CONGEN JERUSALEM IS DELIGHTED TO WELCOME AMBASSADOR HABIB BACK ONCE AGAIN. BRANDON GROVE WILL HAVE RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON BY TUESDAY EVENING, AND WILL OF COURSE MAKE ALL THE USUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HABIB TO STAY IN THE RESIDENCE.

3. BRANDON IS HOSTING A SMALL THANKSGIVING DINNER AT

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1300 THURSDAY, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD WANT HABIB TO JOIN HIM. OTHERS OF US WHO ARE HOLDING DINNERS OF OUR OWN WOULD BE ONLY TOO HAPPY TO SEE THAT DRAPER AND ANY OTHERS ARE ALSO WELL TAKEN CARE OF. THIS CAN ALL BE SORTED OUT AFTER ARRIVAL.

4. FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS, IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO KNOW ASAP WHO BESIDES DRAPER IS COMING (AND IT WILL BE MOST REPEAT MOST HELPFUL IF SANDY BUERLE IS INCLUDED).

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5. FOR HABIB:

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--NADIM ZARU IS STILL DINING OUT ON HIS MEETING WITH YOU. WE CONSTANTLY HEAR REFERENCES TO IT (THOUGH THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A REPORTING CABLE), AND NADIM IS NOW FREQUENTLY CITED AMONG OTHER PALESTINIANS AS SOMETHING OF AN AUTHORITY ON YOUR VIEWS AND METHODS.

--A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE NOW ASKING IF YOU PLAN TO MEET WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS THIS TIME AROUND. THE NATURE OF THEIR INTEREST VARIES CONSIDERABLY. ONE INDIVIDUAL (NOT KEY) HAS ASKED SPECIFICALLY FOR A MEETING. A FEW OTHERS HAVE TOLD US IN STRONG TERMS THAT A SHOW OF INTEREST BY YOU IN THE KIND OF MODERATES WHO TRIED TO PUT THE PETITION (URGING THE PLO TOWARD RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL) TOGETHER COULD BE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE. FREIJ HIMSELF (THE PETITION'S CHIEF ARCHITECT) WOULD APPRECIATE SUCH SUPPORT, BUT WONDERS IF IT MAKES SENSE FOR YOU TO ENGAGE PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY UNTIL YOU HAVE SOMETHING "NEW" TO TELL THEM.

--AT THE SAME TIME, THE AL FAJR (PRO-PLO) NEWSPAPER HAS TAKEN A VERY NEGATIVE POSITION ON YOUR INVOLVEMENT, AND

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IN EFFECT, URGES THAT LOCAL LEADERS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH YOU. WE UNDERSTAND THAT OTHERS, LIKE BASSAM SHAKA AND PERHAPS KARIM KHALAF, ARE ACTUALLY TRYING TO LINE UP PEOPLE AGAINST THE IDEA OF ANY MEETINGS WITH YOU.

--SO AS NOT TO ALLOW EXPECTATIONS TO BALLOON, WE HAVE BEEN TELLING THOSE WHO ASK SIMPLY THAT WE ASSUME YOU WILL BE FULLY TAKEN UP WITH LEBANON, AT LEAST ON THIS NEXT VISIT. IT WILL BE EASY AND CREDIBLE TO LEAVE IT AT THAT. IF YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED, HOWEVER, WE'LL NEED TO KNOW THAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SO THAT WE CAN COME BACK TO YOU WITH SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS. PLEASE ADVISE.

6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV, WHICH WILL BE PROVIDING FURTHER THOUGHTS ON SCHEDULING BY SEPTTEL. COVEY

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FROM HABIB

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBASSADORS FAIRBANKS AND CLUVERIUS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), XF, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS

1. ~~(G-ENTIRE TERM)~~

2. I APPRECIATE THE COMMENTS FROM ADDRESSEES ON MY TRAVEL PLANS, AS WELL AS KING HUSSEIN'S READINESS TO MEET WITH ME ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 27 OR 28. AFTER WEIGHING MY NEEDS AND PRIORITIES, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY FOR THE SCHEDULE OUTLINED BELOW. IT WOULD ALLOW AMBASSADORS

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FAIRBANKS AND CLUVERIUS AN OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN ME IN AMMAN FOR TALKS ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY.

3. PROPOSED SCHEDULE:

--TUESDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 23: TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS FROM BEIRUT FOR MEETING WITH ASSAD, KHADDAM, ET AL.

--WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24: TRAVEL TO ISRAEL FOR

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MEETINGS WITH BEGIN ON THAT DAY OR THURSDAY.

--FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, OR SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 27:
TRAVEL FROM ISRAEL TO JORDAN FOR MEETINGS WITH HUSSEIN
ET AL ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27.

--SUNDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 28: TRAVEL FROM AMMAN
TO RIYADH FOR MEETINGS THAT EVENING OR MONDAY WITH FAHD.

--MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, OR TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30:
TRAVEL FROM RIYADH TO CAIRO FOR MEETINGS WITH
MUBARAK ON TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY.

--THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2: TRAVEL TO ROME FOR CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS' SEMINAR, REMAIN IN ITALY UNTIL SUNDAY
AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 5, OR MONDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 6,
AT WHICH TIME TRAVEL TO RABAT.

--TUESDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 7, OR WEDNESDAY MORNING,
DECEMBER 8: TRAVEL VIA COMMERCIAL AIR FROM MOROCCO TO
WASHINGTON. (PLEASE NOTE I WOULD PREFER TO ARRIVE IN
WASHINGTON NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 8.)

4. ADDRESSEE COMMENTS ARE INVITED. DRAPER WILL BE WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ME FOR THE PROPOSED DAMASCUS VISIT AND AT LEAST THE FIRST
DAY OF TALKS IN ISRAEL, BUT WILL RETURN IMMEDIATELY
THEREAFTER TO BEIRUT TO INFORM GEMAYEL OF THE
ISRAELI POSITION AND TO GET THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE
NEGOTIATIONS STARTED.
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DEPARTMENT PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; CINCEUR FOR POLAD

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MARR, LE, SY, IS, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE POSITION ON EVE OF
- US CONSULTATIONS

1. () ENTIRE TEXT.)

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2. SUMMARY: BEFORE DEPARTING FOR WASHINGTON, AMBASSADOR DRAPER MET INTENSIVELY WITH LEBANESE LEADERSHIP TO GAIN FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANESE POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. DECEMBER 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR TUENI HIGHLIGHTED LEBANESE INSISTENCE ON RAPID PROGRESS ON BASIS OF DECISIVE US ACTION. GEMAYEL

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AND WAZZAN IN PARTICULAR WARNED OF DANGER OF FURTHER DELAY FOR BOTH LEBANON AND US. WHILE LEBANESE FURTHER REFINED THEIR POSITION ON VENUE DURING MEETINGS, THEY DREW LINE AT ACCEPTING JERUSALEM. THEY ALSO ARGUED FOR SIGNIFICANT WORK ON SUBSTANCE BEFORE MEETINGS EVER TOOK PLACE, EITHER THROUGH SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY OR THROUGH SOME KIND OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN. THEY SHOWED INTENSE INTEREST IN PRECISE FORM OF ANY NEW SIGNED DOCUMENT THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS, AND FINALLY EVEN WAZZAN APPEARED TO ACQUIESCE IN INEVITABILITY OF SUCH A DOCUMENT. LEBANESE POSITIONS ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC ISSUES -- BORDER ARRANGEMENTS AND SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS IN FUTURE, OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION, HADDAD'S FORCES, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STATIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND PLO -- WERE FURTHER CLARIFIED. END SUMMARY.

3. IN PREPARATION FOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON, AMBASSADOR DRAPER HELD AN INTENSIVE ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP DEC. 3-6. ON DEC. 2, HE AND ROSS MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER TUENI. ON DEC. 3, HE AND ROSS MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, TUENI, AND AMBASSADOR FATTAL. ON DEC. 6,

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JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, HE MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, SALEM AND TUENI. WAZZAN'S PRESENCE AT THE LAST MEETING WAS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT PERMITTED GEMAYEL AND DRAPER TO BRING WAZZAN ALONG ON SEVERAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE NEED FOR A NEW SIGNED DOCUMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AT THE END OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE THREE MEETINGS ARE OUTLINED BELOW.

4. LEBANESE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

AT THE DEC. 6 MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM PRESENTED WHAT HE CALLED "OUR MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN" ON THE OCCASION OF DRAPER'S DEPARTURE:

-- DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON MUST START NOW. THEY CANNOT WAIT FOR BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. US PRESTIGE IS AT STAKE.

-- LET THE US, IF IT WISHES, CALL FOR LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS TO BE HELD ANYWHERE BUT IN JERUSALEM.

-- LET THE US SUGGEST, IF IT WISHES, THAT ALL DELEGATIONS BE HALF MILITARY, HALF CIVILIAN, WITH ONE US CHAIRMAN.

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-- THE LEBANESE PROBLEM CANNOT BE LINKED TO THAT OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- THE US SHOULD COMMIT ITSELF TO DISCUSS SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL WITH SYRIA AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES.

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-- THE US SHOULD GUARANTEE LEBANON'S COMMITMENT TO MAKE LEBANON SAFE FOR ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS.

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-- IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO REAFFIRM THAT THE US WILL NOT PERMIT ANY PROLONGED OCCUPATION, SETTLEMENTS, ZONE OF INFLUENCE, OR PROTECTORATE BY ISRAEL OR SYRIA.

-- LIKEWISE, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO REAFFIRM THAT LEBANON IS A FRIEND, THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS A GOOD FRIEND, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS BECOMING STRONGER AND PROCEEDING IN THE RIGHT

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DIRECTION.

-- FROM A HUMANITARIAN POINT OF VIEW, LEBANON SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE ALLOWED TO SUFFER ANY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

-- (ADDED BY TUENI AT THE END OF THE MEETING) THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S STAND ON THE PROPOSED INCREASE IN AID TO ISRAEL.

5. NEED FOR FIRM AND RAPID US ACTION

THE MAJOR COMMON THEME OF DRAPER'S THREE MEETINGS WAS THE NEED FOR RAPID RESULTS THROUGH FIRM US ACTION. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED THIS MOST ELOQUENTLY AT THE DECEMBER 6 MEETING:

-- THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE SITUATION HAS BECOME VERY DANGEROUS. IT WAS READY TO GO A LONG WAY AND HAD PRESENTED VERY POSITIVE PROPOSALS, BUT EVERY TIME IT MADE A CONCESSION, ISRAEL PRESENTED A NEW CONDITION. IT HAS THEREFORE DECIDED TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POSITION (AGAINST TALKS IN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM), ESPECIALLY SINCE THE US HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING.

-- LEBANON NOW EXPECTS THE US EITHER TO APPLY REAL PRESSURE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO AGREE TO A COMPROMISE ON VENUE OR TO PRESENT NEW US IDEAS.

-- NO TIME SHOULD BE WASTED, SINCE TIME IS NOT ON LEBANON'S SIDE. THE SITUATION IN THE 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS IS VERY DANGEROUS. IN THE SOUTH,

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6. WAZZAN VOICED THE SAME CONCERNS, ADDING THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWALS IF ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WERE NOT ARRANGED. THE US, HE EMPHASIZED, IS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION. FURTHERMORE, ITS ATTITUDE ON LEBANON WILL BE THE TOUCHSTONE NOT ONLY FOR THE FUTURE OF THAT COUNTRY, BUT ALSO FOR THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS, AND HOW COULD IT SUCCEED IN DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IF IT DID NOT SUCCEED IN LEBANON?

7. IN ALL THREE MEETINGS, THE LEBANESE STRESSED THAT THEY WERE WAITING FOR THE US TO COME FORWARD WITH USEFUL PROPOSALS. IF IT PROVED UNABLE TO DO SO, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ITS OWN BY EXPLORING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS RECOURSE TO THE UN OR UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS OF VARIOUS SORTS. IF IT CAME TO THAT, LEBANON WOULD STILL WELCOME CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US.

8. DRAPER EMPHASIZED AT ALL THREE MEETINGS THAT THE LEBANESE CONCERNS WERE AT THE HEART OF THE WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS THAT HE AND AMBASSADOR HABIB WERE ABOUT TO UNDERTAKE. THE NEED FOR RAPID MOVEMENT AND LEBANON'S EXPECTATION THAT THE US WOULD MOVE DECISIVELY WOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

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9. FURTHER REFINEMENT ON LEBANESE POSITION ON VENUE

AT THE DECEMBER 2 AND 3 MEETINGS, THE LEBANESE FURTHER REFINED THEIR POSITION ON VENUE. THEY COULD ACCEPT GENEVA, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, AND EVEN CAIRO (IF MUBARAK TOOK THE INITIATIVE), BUT NOT ATHENS OR CYPRUS. THEY COULD ALSO ACCEPT KHALDAH AND A SUBURB OF ISRAELI JERUSALEM, BUT ONLY IF THE ISRAELIS COMMITTED THEMSELVES NOT TO ADVERTISE THAT THE MEETINGS WERE IN FACT BEING HELD INSIDE THE JERUSALEM CITY LIMITS. THEY COULD, OF COURSE, ACCEPT KHALDAH AND ANY OTHER SIMILAR TOWN IN ISRAEL.

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10. WHEN, AT THE DECEMBER 3 MEETING, DRAPER AGAIN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IF PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE FINAL TWO SESSIONS BE HELD IN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM, AS GEMAYEL HAD ONCE INTIMATED. TUENI QUICKLY PULLED THAT OPENING OFF THE TABLE, CLARIFYING THAT GEMAYEL HAD MEANT THAT MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM WOULD BE ALL RIGHT ONCE THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD WAS RIGHT. SALEM INDICATED THE LEBANESE COULD GO NO FURTHER THAN TO SAY THEY WOULD GIVE SUCH A PROPOSAL "SERIOUS CONSIDERATION" IN THE LIGHT OF ARAB ATTITUDES. HE WAS CAREFUL TO HIGHLIGHT THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF KING HASSAN, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE, ON THIS POINT. TUENI FOLLOWED SUIT, CITING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SYRIANS, THE PLO, AND EVEN THE VATICAN ON THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM.

11. NEED FOR PRELIMINARY WORK ON SUBSTANCE

AT ALL THREE MEETINGS, THE LEBANESE WARNED THAT, EVEN IF THE IMPASSE ON VENUE COULD BE BROKEN, A LOT OF GROUND WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN COVERED BEFORE THE MEETINGS STARTED. OTHERWISE, THEY RAN THE RISK OF BREAKING DOWN. TUENI STRESSED DEC. 2 THAT THE LEBANESE COULD EVEN REVIEW THE SPECIFIC WORDING OF COMMITMENTS IN ADVANCE TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. ON DEC. 3, SALEM RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY TO DO THIS, AND ON DEC. 6 THE LEBANESE SEIZED

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ON DRAPER'S PASSING MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME KIND OF "PLAN" AKIN TO THE AUGUST PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO AND SYRIANS FROM WEST BEIRUT AS BEING, IN TUENI'S WORDS, "VERY REASONABLE." IN SPITE

[REDACTED]

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OF LEBANESE PRODDING, DRAPER AVOIDED ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ANY "PLAN," DESCRIBING IT SIMPLY AS ONE WAY OF MELDING POSITIONS ON WHICH AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, PERHAPS IN WRITING, TO FORM THE BASIS OF NEW UNDERTAKINGS. THE LEBANESE, TUENI IN PARTICULAR, PRESSED HARD ON THE TIMING AND "MECHANISM OF IMPLEMENTATION" (I.E., GUARANTEES AND ASSURANCES) OF ANY SUCH PLAN. AGAIN, DRAPER AVOIDED DETAILED DISCUSSION, INDICATING MERELY THAT ANY PLAN COULD HAVE PORTIONS THAT WOULD BE SELF-EXECUTING AND OTHERS THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO ACT. SALEM EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT DISCUSSION OF A PLAN COULD PROCEED MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS AND OFFERED TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

12. FORM OF FINAL AGREEMENT

MUCH OF THE DECEMBER 6 MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO EXAMINING THE POLITICAL "PRICE" THAT LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. GEMAYEL, SPECIFICALLY, WANTED TO KNOW WHERE ON THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND A PEACE TREATY THE FINAL AGREEMENT WOULD STAND. DRAPER INDICATED THAT THE MOST OBVIOUS SIGNED AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN UNDERTAKING TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AND FORMALIZING OTHER AGREED ARRANGEMENTS. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE LIMITED MERELY TO NON-BELLIGERENCY AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS; THE ISRAELIS WOULD WANT A PEACE TREATY IN ALL BUT NAME. WAZZAN ARGUED THAT ANY AGREEMENT BE MERELY AN EXPANSION OF THE EXISTING ARMISTICE ACCORD, AT LEAST UNTIL THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION HAD BEEN SOLVED AND THE ARMISTICE ACCORDS SUPERSEDED. TUENI BRUIED THE IDEA OF BRINGING THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTO EFFECT THROUGH EXCHANGES OF LETTERS WITH THE US. DRAPER MADE IT

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CLEAR IN THE GIVE AND TAKE THAT, WHATEVER THE PRECISE FORM, A NEW DOCUMENT SIGNED BY BOTH THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO EMERGE. EVEN WAZZAN -- TO WHOM GEMAYEL SAID AT ONE POINT, "SPARE ME ANY MORE TALK ABOUT THE ARMISTICE ACCORD" -- SEEMED BY THE END OF THE MEETING TO HAVE ACQUIESCED IN THE NEED FOR A NEW SIGNED DOCUMENT.

13. EXAMINATION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES

THE THREE MEETINGS GAVE DRAPER A CHANCE TO DEEPEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEBANESE POSITION ON A

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NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. AT THE DECEMBER 6 MEETING, HE COUPLED EXAMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH A REMINDER THAT LEBANON SHOULD REVIEW THE FEZ SUMMIT DECLARATION CAREFULLY, SINCE ONE CLAUSE GAVE THE ARAB STATES THE RIGHT TO DEFINE THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THIS, HE SAID, COULD BE USED TO COVER WHATEVER LEBANON DID WITH ISRAEL. SALEM IMMEDIATELY CAUTIONED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THIS CLAUSE, AND THE SYRIAN REACTION MIGHT BE A PROBLEM. --BORDER ARRANGEMENTS AND SECURITY: AT THE DEC. 3 MEETING, DRAPER PRESSED SALEM AND TUENI FOR A FULLER PRESENTATION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN "INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE" ALONG THE BORDER. TUENI REPLIED THAT AT A MINIMUM LEBANON WANTED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS. MORE DESIRABLE WERE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF A SYSTEM OF DETECTION. MOST DESIRABLE WOULD BE THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL OR MNF FORCES. SALEM ADDED THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS WANTED ANY DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION, THE LEBANESE WOULD WANT AN INTERNATIONAL

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PRESENCE. BASICALLY, HE SAID, THE LEBANESE WANTED AN INDEPENDENT BODY OF SOME KIND TO ADJUDICATE ANY DISPUTES OR ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS SO THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NO LONGER BE BOTH JUDGE AND JURY, AS THEY HAD BEEN DURING "THE NIGHTMARE OF THE PAST." SALEM ALSO EMPHASIZED THE LEBANESE DESIRE THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS APPLY TO ALL OF LEBANON, ON BOTH THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN BORDERS.

-- MECHANISM FOR DEVELOPING ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS: AT BOTH THE DEC. 3 AND 6 MEETINGS, DRAPER UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A PROCESS BY WHICH ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS COULD EVOLVE. GEMAYEL ASKED FOR A WRITTEN PRO-

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POSAL ON THIS ISSUE.

-- OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION: AT THE DEC. 6 MEETING, DRAPER OFFERED THE US LIAISON OFFICE IN PEKING AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS MIGHT AGREE TO. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT A LIAISON OFFICE COULD OPERATE IN LEBANON, ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT VERY WELL BE NO COUNTERPART OFFICE IN ISRAEL. THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE ALREADY EXISTED, HE NOTED, AND IT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO FOLLOW THE STATE OF RELATIONS. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IT COULD NOT HAVE A FORMAL OFFICE.

-- HADDAD'S FORCES: AT THE DECEMBER 3 MEETING, SALEM DESCRIBED THE ARRANGEMENTS BEING CONTEMPLATED FOR SA'D HADDAD AND HIS FORCES -- THE FORMER LAF SOLDIERS WOULD BE REINTERGRATED; A "LEBANESE SOLUTION" WOULD BE FOUND FOR HADDAD AND THE OTHER LAF OFFICERS; THE NON-LAF PORTION OF HADDAD'S MILITIA WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND ABSORBED INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY. SOME MIGHT BE CONSCRIPTED UNDER THE NEW MILITARY SERVICE LAW.

-- ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STATIONS: AT THE DECEMBER 3 MEETING, SALEM SAID THE PRESENCE OF ANY ISRAELI MILITARY PERSONNEL AT SUCH STATIONS WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. AT THE DEC. 6 MEETING, GEMAYEL SAID ANY SUCH STATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

-- RESIDUAL PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES: AT THE DEC. 3 MEETING, DRAPER ASKED WHAT THE LEBANESE INTENDED TO DO WITH RESIDUAL PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES SUCH AS HOSPITALS. SALEM, IN AN IMPASSIONED RESPONSE, SAID THE LEBANESE HAD LEARNED TO BE VERY ALERT FOR THE

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TRANSFORMATION OF ANY PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS INTO
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WHILE THEY WOULD ALLOW HUMANI-
TARIAN ACTIVITIES, THEY WOULD SUBORDINATE THE EXISTENCE
AND LOCATIONS OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS TO LEBANESE SECURITY
CONCERNS.

-- TALKS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO: AT THE DEC. 6
MEETING, DRAPER ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF TALKS
WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. TUENI SAID SOME TALKS HAD
BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT A VERY LOW
PROFILE HAD BEEN MAINTAINED. GEMAYEL ADDED THAT
LEBANON HAD BEGUN DOING WHAT IT MUST WITH BOTH THE

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SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS, BUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL HAD DEADLOCKED THE OTHER TALKS.

14. COMMENT: AS A RESULT OF THIS ROUND OF TALKS, DRAPER IS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON WITH ALL THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE POSITION AS IT NOW STANDS. WHILE THE LEBANESE ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF DISCOURAGEMENT, AS THE TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF SALEM'S "MESSAGE" FOR THE PRESIDENT SHOW, THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO US SPONSORSHIP OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND ARE AWAITING ANY NEW IDEAS THAT THE US MAY PUT FORWARD IN A VERY POSITIVE AND EAGER SPIRIT. THEY DO REMAIN AFRAID, HOWEVER, OF ANY SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN GETTING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED. AT THE DEC. 3 MEETING, SALEM SPOKE OMINOUSLY OF THE RISK THAT SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BECOME ANOTHER "TERRITORY OF SETTLEMENT" AKIN TO THE WEST BANK IF MATTERS DRAGGED ON TOO LONG. DILLON


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TEL AVIV 18190

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/07/88

TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CONTROVERSY OVER ALL GED REMARKS

- ON PLO, ROLE IN AID EFFORTS WITH CON RESS

REFS: A) ROME 27246\B) TEL AVIV 181211

1.

2. STORIES ALLEGING THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB TOLD A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY IN FLORENCE OCTOBER 4 THAT FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WAS PREDICATED ON NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE U.S., ISRAEL, EGYPT, AND JORDAN AND THE PLO HAVE RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE MEDIA ATTENTION IN ISRAEL IN THE PAST TWO DAYS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM TEHIYA MK GEULA COHEN IN THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE YESTERDAY, SHAMIR SAID THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HABIB, AND THAT HE HAD

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ASKED TO HAVE THE STATEMENTS VERIFIED.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WENT ON TO TELL THE COMMITTEE THAT A TREND WAS TAKING SHAPE IN U.S. POLICY TO LEAVE THE KEY TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS IN THE HANDS OF THE PLO. SHAMIR WAS QUOTED AS SAYING "THE POLICY IS BECOMING CLEARER WITH EACH SUCCESSIVE DAY, AND IT IS A DANGEROUS POLICY. WASHINGTON IS SPREADING THE IMPRESSION THAT JORDAN IS POWERLESS TO

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PLAY A ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS UNLESS IT GETS THE GREEN LIGHT FROM THE PLO. WASHINGTON IS SUGGESTING THAT PROGRESS DEPENDS ON DECISIONS BY THE ARAB WORLD, WHICH HAS ALREADY RECOGNIZED THE PLO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS."

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONVINCE THE CONGRESS TO LEAVE AID TO ISRAEL AT THE LEVELS RECOMMENDED IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST HAVE ALSO COME UNDER SOME CRITICISM IN ISRAEL. MK GEULA COHEN IS REPORTED TO HAVE SENT A CABLE TO THE PRIME MINISTER CHARGING THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD "DESTROYED HIS CREDIBILITY AS AN HONEST BROKER" WITH THE TELEPHONE CALLS, CONTINUING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WEIGH THE POSSIBILITY OF RULING OUT FURTHER AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN CONTACTS WITH THE LEBANESE. ISRAELI TELEVISION ALSO QUOTED LABOR MK ELIAHU SPEISER AS SAYING THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB COULD NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED A NEUTRAL INTERMEDIARY. SHAMIR CONTINUED TO DOWNPLAY THE AID CONTROVERSY BY REPLYING TO COHEN YESTERDAY DURING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETING THAT DIFFERENCES ABOUT LEBANON WITH THE UNITED STATES ARE ULTIMATELY TACTICAL, AND ONE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DESCRIPTION THAT THE U.S. WAS

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PLAYING ONLY A NEGATIVE ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. COMMENT. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN INSTRUCTED MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO COMMENT ON THE ALLEGED HABIB STATEMENT ABOUT THE PLO UNTIL HE RECEIVED CLARIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES. AMBASSADOR LEWIS PASSED THE CONTENTS OF REF A TO PRIME MINISTER ON AMBASSADOR HABIB'S BEHALF TODAY. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL COOL COMMENTS ABOUT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S ROLE AS AN HONEST BROKER, ALTHOUGH IT IS LESS LIKELY TO EASE CONCERNS THAT THE U.S. IS SHIFTING ITS POLICY TOWARD THE PLO. AS WE REPORTED IN REF B, THERE IS A BODY OF ISRAELI THINKING WHICH BELIEVES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS AID TO ISRAEL ARE ONLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF MOVES TAKEN TO WOO THE PLO INTO JOINING THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS POINT OF VIEW WILL CONTINUE TO ATTRACT ATTENTION AS EFFORTS TO PURSUE THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE GO FORWARD. END COMMENT. LEWIS

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E.O. 12356:N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: HABIB'S REMARKS IN FLORENCE

9302566

REFS: (A) ROME 27246, (B) TEL AVIV 18091, (C) RIYADH 3310

YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED BY NOW ROME'S REPORT OF AMBASSADOR
HABIB'S STATEMENTS IN FLORENCE AS WELL AS TEL AVIV'S
REPORT (REF B) OF SHAMIR'S STATEMENT. FOLLOWING IS PRESS
GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT USED BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AT
NOON BRIEFING ON DECEMBER 6:

QUOTE: Q: IS IT TRUE THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID IN
FLORENCE DECEMBER 4 THAT A GLOBAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE
U.S., ISRAEL, EGYPT, JORDAN AND THE PLO IS NEEDED FOR AN
ACCORD ON PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A: -- IT IS NOT TRUE THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB MADE SUCH A
STATEMENT. HE REVIEWED WELL-KNOWN ADMINISTRATION

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POSITIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND SAID NOTHING DURING
THE COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE IN FLORENCE THAT HAS NOT
BEEN SAID MANY TIMES BEFORE. THERE WERE NO DEPARTURES IN
POLICY. END QUOTE. DAM

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

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RIYADH 03310

E.O.: DECL: 1-7-83

TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, XF, SA, US

SUBJECT: REPORTED HABIB STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS
INVOLVING PLO

TEXT

1. (U) SAUDI PRESS DECEMBER 6 CARRIES AP ITEM FROM WASHINGTON REPORTING THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB IN FLORENCE ON DECEMBER 4 SAID NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE U.S., EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE PLO WERE NEEDED TO REACH A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 PROPOSALS. BBC ARABIC LANGUAGE NEWS BROADCAST DECEMBER 6 CARRIED SIMILAR ITEM. ISRAELI FOREIGN MINI-

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STER SHAMIR ASKED THE U.S. FOR A CLARIFICATION THE SAME DAY, ACCORDING TO LOCAL RADIO BROADCASTS.

2. AMBASSADOR HAS APPOINTMENT WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH MORNING DECEMBER 7 AND ANTICIPATES BEING QUERIED ABOUT REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO HABIB. REQUEST DEPARTMENT PROVIDE USLO RIYADH BY IMMEDIATE CABLE TEXT OF HABIB REMARKS ALONG WITH ANY STATEMENTS ISSUED BY SHAMIR OR CLARIFICATIONS MADE BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN.

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AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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ROME 27246

RABAT FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, IT, XF

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR HABIB REMARKS

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 18102^{NR} NOTAL, (B) PENDLETON (NEA) TELCON
WITH GERTH (FLORENCE) (C) RIYADH 3310^{NR} NOTAL

1. REF A REQUESTED COMPLETE TEXT OF REMARKS SUPPOSEDLY MADE BY
AMBASSADOR HABIB IN ITALY ON PLO ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST
PEACE. WE GATHER FROM REF B THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT HABIB'S REMARKS ON THE BASIS OF
PRESS REPORTS. REF C REPORTS THAT THE SAUDI PRESS HAS PICKED
UP AN AP ITEM ALLEGING THAT HABIB SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE

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NEEDED AMONG THE U.S., EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE PLO.

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB TOOK PART IN A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION
ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN FLORENCE DECEMBER 4, DURING A
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY.
CONSULATE FLORENCE TAPED ENTIRE SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR HABIB
AND THERE FOLLOWS DIRECT QUOTATION FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB'S
REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIA-
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BEGIN QUOTE: HE (PRESIDENT REAGAN) TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE RELEVANCE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER REJECTED THE VIEW THAT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION MUST BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS SPEAK OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. IT ALSO SPEAKS IN SIMPLE AND RATHER DIRECT WORDS OF THE DESIRABILITY THAT PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS IS A NECESSARY FACTOR. THEREFORE WHILE ONE DOES NOT DISREGARD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, ONE MUST REACH THE CONCLUSION, IF YOU WANT TO BE PRACTICAL, THAT IT WILL ONLY BE RESOLVED IN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE SOUGHT TO BUILD UPON AN ALMOST UNIVERSAL RECOGNITION FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF LAST SUMMER THAT IT WAS TIME AGAIN FOR THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY TO DEAL WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HIS INITIATIVE WAS DESIGNED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS, HAVING AS ITS INITIAL OBJECTIVE THE SEATING AT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS OF THE ORIGINAL CAMP DAVID TRIO PLUS THE ADDITION OF THE JORDANIANS WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN THE FIRST STAGE. THE PROPOSITION IS AS LAID OUT IN OUR OWN VIEWS AND IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS THE

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CREATION OF AUTONOMY IN A TRANSITION PERIOD. THE THEORY IS AND THE REALITY IS THAT PEOPLE MUST LEARN TO LIVE WITH EACH OTHER, THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN VALUE IN SELF-GOVERNMENT AND A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD THAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND WITH RECOGNITION THAT THE FINAL SOLUTION DEPENDS UPON NEGOTIATIONS. END QUOTE.

3. THE SPEECH CONTAINS NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE PLO OR TO THE PLO'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. TO THE CONSULATE'S BEST UNDERSTANDING NO SUCH REFERENCE WAS EVEN IMPLICIT.

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MILADS HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, US, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM

-- B'ABDA AND YARZAH

REF: JERUSALEM 3334 AND PREVIOUS

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.)

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08982 01 OF 02 050807Z

2. FOR OVER TWO MONTHS, ROSS AND I HAVE BEEN URGING
THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE THEIR MFA LIAISON OFFICE AND IDF
SPOKESMAN OUT OF THE "SHAHIN CENTER" BUILDING IN
B'ABDA TO A LESS POLITICALLY SENSITIVE LOCATION.

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AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTING THAT THE IDF POSITIONS IN YARZAH ARE AN UNNECESSARY NBUISANCE. DAVID KIMCHE, WHO RECOGNIZES THE POLITICAL SYMBOLISM INVOLVED, HAS REPEATEDLY TOLD US HE HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE ISSUE AND TOLD ME A WEEK OR SO AGO THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD FOUND A NEW PLACE FOR THEIR OFFICE.

3. AT SOME POINT OVER THE LAST WEEK, THE ISRAELIS ZDID IN FACT MOVE THEIR OFFICE FROM B'ABDA AND THEIR MIGITARY UNITS FROM YARZAH WITHOUT INFORMING EITHER US OR THE LEBANESE. BY DIRECT OBSERVATION, ROSS ASCERTAINED THAT THE MFA LIAISON OFFICE AND IDF SPOKESMAN HAD MOVED TO A SAUDI-OWNED VILLA. (KIMCHE INDICATED THEY INTENDED TO RT LEGALLY FROM A LEBANESE AGENT.) WHILE IN A FORMAL SENSE THIS VILLA IS LOCATED IN YARZAH, THE ONLY ACCESS TO IT IS FROM THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY HALFWAY BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND JAMHUR. ALTHOUGH IT OVERLOOKS THE MINISTRY, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD IS SUCH THAT IT IS VERY SECLUDED AND THUS POLITICALLY MORE ACCEPTABLE. WHILE UNIFORMED ISRAELI SOLDIERS STAND GUARD WITHIN THE GROUNDS OF THE VILLA, NO ARMORED VEHICLES ARE PRESENT.

4. ROSS AND I HAVE BEEN PLAYING IT AMONG OUR LEBANESE CONTACTS AS AN ISRAELI GOOD WILL GESTURE. SOME OF THE LEBANESE OFFICIALS WE HAVE TALKED TO HAVE EXPRESSED SOME PIQUE AT NOT HAVING BEEN INFORMED OF THIS DEVELOP-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03

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MENT THROUGH THE LAF-IDF LIAISON MECHANISM, BUT THERE MAY BE PROBLEMS WITH THAT MECHANISM AT PRESENT. COL. ABU FARHAT, WHO IS THE SENIOR DAY-TO-DAY LAF LIAISON OFFICER, HAS STOPPED ATTENDING MEETINGS BECAUSE THE IDF IS SENDING ONLY A RESERVE LIEUTENANT TO REPRESENT IT. COL. REUBEN, THE REGULAR LIAISON OFFICER, HAS BEEN HOSPITALIZED IN ISRAEL FOR SOME TIME, AND THE IDF HAS NOT SENT A REPLACEMENT. ROSS MENTIONED THIS TO ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICER YITZHAK LEOR DEC. 2, AND LEOR REPLIED THAT HE TOO HAD BEEN UNHAPPY WITH THE IDF'S FAILURE TO REPLACE REUBEN AND WOULD MAKE A RE-

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INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY

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SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 08982

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FROM DRAPER

NEWED REQUEST THAT IT DO SO.

5. THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS, WE HAVE RECEIVED AUTH-
RIZATION TO BEGIN US PATROLS IN THE B'ABDA AREA.
THESE IN FACT BEGAN DECEMBER 3. AT THE PRESENT PHASE
OF RELATIVE IMPASSE ON THE NEGOTIATING FRONT, THE
INITIATION OF THESE PATROLS HAS BEEN A USEFUL ADDITION
TO THE SCENE. DILLON

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 STATE 333970
ORIGIN SS-25

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STATE 333970

DECLASSIFIEDE.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MILI, IS, LE, US, XF, FR
SUBJECT: LETTER TO FOREIGN MINTSTER CHEYSSON FROM
SFCRETRY SHULTZREF: (A) STATE 327094^m, (B) DAMASCUS 8466^m

1. ~~S - ENTIRE TEXT.~~
2. PARA 3 CONTAINS TEXT OF A LETTER FROM SECRETARY
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

PAGE 02 STATE 333970

SHULTZ TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON, DATED NOVEMBER 26,
1982. (ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO EMBASSY PARIS.) PLEASE
DELIVER TEXT ASAP TO APPROPRIATE CONTACT AT QUAI D'ORSAY.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

HIS EXCELLENCY
CLAUDE CHEYSSON,
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS**UNCLASSIFIED**

OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
PARIS.

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DFAR CLAUDE:

I WAS MOST PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON LEBANON AND TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT ON THE ISSUES YOU RAISE. I HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY OF SHARING YOUR LETTER WITH AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB, WHO IS CURRENTLY IN THE AREA TO ADVANCE THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

THERE IS NO DOUBT, CLAUDE, THAT TIME IS A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. MOMENTUM MUST BE MAINTAINED IN OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. FOR THIS REASON, PRESIDENT REAGAN DISPATCHED AMBASSADOR HABIB BACK TO THE AREA WITH A BROADER MANDATE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A PROMPT OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND FOR A RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF OTHER FOREIGN FORCES AND ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WAKE OF THESE WITHDRAWALS. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE PROCEDURAL DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES CAN AND SHOULD BE SURMOUNTED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03

STATE 333970

THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF REGION OF LEBANON REMAINS TENSE. THE VARIOUS FACTIONAL LEADERS HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING A RECONCILIATION TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS TOLD US THAT FOR NOW OUR HELP IS NOT NEEDED, AS HE IS PURSUING HIS OWN EFFORTS. WE FULLY SUPPORT HIM IN THESE EFFORTS.

WITH REGARD TO YOUR CONCERN ABOUT OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA NEAR BFIR'T, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAS TAKEN THE POSITION SO FAR THAT THERE SHOULD BE A WIDER AGREEMENT TO COVER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS BEFORE ANY SINGLE PULLBACK TAKES PLACE. THESE MATTERS WILL, OF COURSE, BE THE TOPIC OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I HAVE ASKED MORRIS DRAPER TO BE IN TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR HENRY IN BEIRUT TO CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS. IN ADDITION, WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE LIAISON AND COORDINATION COMMITTEE, WITH AMBASSADORIAL REPRESENTATION WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

THANK YOU AGAIN FOR SHARING YOUR IDEAS AND CONCERNS. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU VERY SOON IN PARIS.

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WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

END TEXT.

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PAGE 01 RABAT 08930 301300Z
ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6131
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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RABAT 08930

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE RESPONSE TO ISRAELI CABINET DECISION

REF: STATE 332873

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY SHOULD HANDLE THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ROMBERG'S STATEMENT (REFTEL, PARA 1). IN MY VIEW, WE SHOULD NOT BE SAYING THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IS THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED, SINCE WE MAY BE IN FOR A PROTRACTED PROCEDURAL IMPASSE AND NEED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE WAYS FOR MOVING AHEAD.

3. I RECOMMEND THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY STRESS THE FOLLOWING

PAGE 02 RABAT 08930 301300Z

POINTS:

- WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAVE NOT YET BEGUN. AMBASSADOR HABIB AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO GET THESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED IMMEDIATELY.

- WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK ALL POSSIBLE WAYS TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AS SOON AS

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POSSIBLE. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS
TOWARD AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN LEBANON WITH PEACEFUL,
STABLE RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. REED

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SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 30128

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, EG, US

SUBJ: TABA NEGOTIATIONS: HABIB AND ALI DISCUSSIONS,

- NOV. 28

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: IN A CLOSED SESSION IN ALI'S OFFICE ON NOV. 28, I TOLD ALI OF SHAMIR'S PROPOSAL THAT TABA TALKS COULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS RESUMED NORMALIZATION MEETINGS FOLLOW ACCORDING TO A SCHEDULE. IN RESPONSE, ALI REITERATED GOE'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY PRECONDITIONS BEFORE RESUMING TALKS ON TABA. I TOLD ALI THAT I WAS PASSING THE MESSAGE FROM SHAMIR FOR HIS CONSIDERATION AND TRYING TO HELP PUT THE TABA QUESTION BEHIND US. ALI STRESSED THAT THE TABA ISSUE IS IN THE FOREFRONT OF EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THAT THE GOE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE SEEN AS CAPITULATING TO ISRAELI DEMANDS. END SUMMARY

PAGE 02 CAIRO 30128 01 OF 02 291846Z

3. PRIOR TO MY FORMAL MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI, AMBASSADORS ATHERTON, FAIRBANKS AND I HAD A TWENTY-MINUTE TETE-A-TETE WITH ALI, MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI, AND UNDERSECRETARY SHAFEI ABDEL HAMID. I TOLD ALI THAT IN THE COURSE OF A QUIET SESSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR HE HAD RAISED THE TABA

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QUESTION AND SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE. I RELATED TO ALI HOW I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION TO BE ONE INVOLVING PRECONDITIONS CONCERNING NORMALIZATION TALKS, AND HOW SHAMIR RESPONDED THAT THE GOE WOULD BE SATISFIED TO SCHEDULE A TABA MEETING AS LONG AS THEY HAVE A SCHEDULE FOR TALKS INVOLVING OTHER MATTERS. I RELATED HOW SHAMIR HAD INITIALLY SUGGESTED THAT RESUMED NORMALIZATION TALKS SHOULD FOLLOW TABA TALKS BY A FEW DAYS AND MY COUNTER ASSERTION THAT A FEW WEEKS WOULD BE MORE REALISTIC. I STRESSED HOW SHAMIR REITERATED THAT TABA TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE "AS LONG AS WE HAVE A SCHEDULE" AND SAID I WAS ONLY PASSING THIS ON TO ALI FOR HIS CONSIDERATION.

4. IN RESPONSE, ALI SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE THE LINKAGE BEFORE ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE LETTER FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR SENT TO HIM. I TOLD ALI THAT IT IS MORE A QUESTION OF MECHANICS THAN LINKAGE AND SUGGESTED THAT IF HE WANTS TO HAVE A TABA MEETING, THE WAY IS OPEN. ALI, IN TURN, STEADFASTLY MAINTAINED THAT THE GOE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY PRECONDITIONS BEFORE RESUMING THE

PAGE 03 CAIRO 30128 01 OF 02 291846Z

TABA TALKS AND SAID THAT THE SHAMIR FORMULATION IS SUCH A PRECONDITION. TABA, HE ASSERTED, IS A SEPARATE MATTER FROM QUESTIONS OF NORMALIZATION. I POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF THEY WANT TO SEPARATE THE ISSUES, THERE MUST BE A TIME SPAN INVOLVED. I CAREFULLY STRESSED THAT AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT IS VERY IMPORTANT. I ASKED IF IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE GOE IS UNHAPPY ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS PURCHASE OIL FROM EGYPT AND LITTLE ELSE. ALI SAID THIS SITUATION HAS NO BEARING ON THE TABA ISSUE AND NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS CLAIM THE EGYPTIANS DO NOT FULFILL CONTRACTS, AS WAS RAISED DURING THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY EL-SAID. AMBASSADOR ATHERTON INTERJECTED THAT THE CLAIM THAT THERE IS A TRADE PROBLEM STEMS FROM THE ISRAELI, NOT THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. BOUTROS GHALI SAID THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT NORMALIZATION CONTINUES WITH EGYPT DESPITE THE INVASION OF LEBANON AND THAT THIS DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH REALITY BECAUSE THE ONLY "NORMALIZATION" ACTIVITY CURRENTLY CARRYING ON IS TRADE IN OIL. ALI THEN NOTED THAT \$600 MILLION OF OIL IS PUR-

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CHASED BY ISRAEL CONTRASTED WITH BETWEEN \$9-15
MILLION TOTAL FOR ALL OTHER GOODS.

5. GETTING BACK TO THE TABA QUESTION, I SAID THAT
IN PASSING THE MESSAGE FROM SHAMIR WE WERE TRY-

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 30128 02 OF 02 291846Z
ACTION SS-25

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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 30128

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ING TO HELP PUT THE TABA QUESTION BEHIND US. ALI
STRESSED THAT THE TABA ISSUE IS IN THE FOREFRONT
OF EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THAT PEOPLE NEED
TO FEEL THAT THE GOE IS MAKING HEADWAY. BOUTROS
GHALI SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS IN ASWAN YESTERDAY
AFTERNOON, ONE-THOUSAND KILOMETERS FROM CAIRO,
HE HAD EXPECTED QUESTIONS ABOUT INTEGRATION WITH
THE SUDAN OR PROBLEMS RE THE ASWAN DAM BUT ALL HE
HEARD ABOUT WAS TABA. THIS, EXPLAINED BOUTROS,
SHOW HOW IMPORTANT THE QUESTION IS TO THE
EGYPTIAN PEOPLE. I CONCLUDED THE CLOSED SESSION
BY NOTING THAT I HAD PROMISED TO DELIVER A MESSAGE

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CHANNEL: n/a

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AND THAT I HAD DONE SO. ATHERTON

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PAGE 01
ORIGIN SS-25

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STATE 332873

E [REDACTED] BEIRUT FOR AMBS. DILLON AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR

TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE RESPONSE TO ISRAELI CABINET DECISION

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF Q AND A FROM NOVEMBER 29
NOON BRIEFING: BEGIN TEXT.

ISRAELI POSITION ON TALKS WITH LEBANON

QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT, ALAN, ON THE ISRAELI
CABINET STATEMENT YESTERDAY WHICH STILL SEEMS TO INSIST
ON THE TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE TAKING PLACE IN JERUSALEM

PAGE 02 STATE 332873

AND BEIRUT?

ANSWER: AMBASSADOR HABIB AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAVE BEEN
DISCUSSING WITH THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS
IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO GET THESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED
IMMEDIATELY. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THEY HAVEN'T BEGUN
YET.

WE BELIEVE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THOSE TWO

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GOVERNMENTS IS THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE SHARE WITH LEBANON AND ISRAEL, THAT IS, THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LEBANON, FREED FROM THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IN ITS TERRITORY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEFUL, STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

THE QUESTION OF HOLDING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN JERUSALEM IS, OBVIOUSLY, A MATTER OF GREAT SENSITIVITY TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. WE HOPE THAT ALL THE REMAINING PROBLEMS CAN BE WORKED OUT IMMEDIATELY, AND WE WILL BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN HELPING TO DO THIS. END TEXT.

2. (S) FOR HABIB: REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON HOW DEPUTY SECRETARY SHOULD HANDLE THIS QUESTION IN HIS SFRC TESTIMONY ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1.

3. (S) FOR BEIRUT: WHAT IS GOL'S REACTION TO ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON JERUSALEM AS VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS? WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR LEBANESE TO ACCEDE TO THIS IN ANY FORM? IF NOT, WHY NOT? SHULTZ

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 17760 291406Z
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FOR AMB. DRAPER
AMEMBASSY RABAT FOR AMB. HABIB

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SOPN, IS, LE
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE: ISRAEL-LEBANON
- NEGOTIATIONS
1. EMBASSY SUGGESTS FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE FOR USE
TODAY BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN:Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE ISRAELI CABINET
DECISION REJECTING TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE OUTSIDE
OF THE TWO CAPITALS, BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM?A: --WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE
ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAVE NOT YET BEGUN. AMBASSADOR
HABIB AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH
THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IDEAS
ABOUT HOW TO GET THESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED IMMEDIATELY.

PAGE 02 TEL AV 17760 291406Z

-- WE REGRET THE ISRAELI CABINET'S REJECTION OF THE MOST
RECENT FORMULA. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE IMPORTANT
THING AT THIS STAGE IS TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED.-- WE BELIEVE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS IS THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES
WE SHARE WITH LEBANON AND ISRAEL: STRENGTHENING OF THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LEBANON,
FREED FROM THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IN ITS

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TERRITORY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEFUL, STABLE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

2. REQUEST DEPARTMENT ADVISE IF QUESTION ARISES AND IF
PRESS GUIDANCE USED.
LEWIS

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
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BEIRUT 8715

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

RABAT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: WHERE WE NOW STAND IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI
IMPASSE

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT

2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, I MET WITH
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TONIGHT, NOVEMBER 29, FOR ALMOST AN
HOUR. GEMAYEL WAS ALONE. HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A REPORT OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08715 291858Z

MY TALKS IN ISRAEL WHICH I HAD PROVIDED TO HIS COUNSELOR, GHASSAN
TUENI, ON SUNDAY NIGHT, FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM ISRAEL.

3. GEMAYEL REGARDED THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON MEETING
IN JERUSALEM AS APRETEXT BASICALLY. HE SAID HE HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL DOESNOT WANT AN AGREE-
MENT WITH LEBANON, AT LEAST AT THIS TIME. HE SAID IT
HAD NOT BEEN EASY TO MAKE SOME OF THE CONCESSIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXTENDED. HE HAD

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TALKED OVER WITH TUENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM EARLIER IN THE DAY. THE POSSIBILITY OF DEALING WITH THE JERUSALEM MEETING REQUIREMENT IN SOME WAY, BUT BOTH ADVISORS WERE STRONGLY AGAINST ANYTHING THAT COMMITTED LEBANON TO MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM.

4. GEMAYEL THEN DREW OUT A 7-PAGE DOCUMENT, CLASSIFIED SECRET, WHICH PURPORTS TO BE AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL. HE SAID THIS WAS A DOCUMENT PREPARED BY MOSSAD, ALTHOUGH THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN CIRCULATED AS THE PRODUCT OF A 15-MAN COMMITTEE IN THE SO CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES". WITH A TOUCH OF BITTERNESS, HE SAID THAT HE HAD GOTTEN THE COPY FROM HIS OWN FATHER, PIERRE GEMAYEL, WHO HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS VERY DANGEROUS.

5. GEMAYEL READ US A FEW EXTRACTS FROM THE PAPER TO ILLUSTRATE HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW CONDUCTING A CAMPAIGN AMONG THE CHRISTIANS TO SHOW THAT IT IS AMIN GEMAYEL WHO DOES NOT WANT PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THE DOCUMENT AMONG OTHER THINGS ARGUES THAT THE DEATH OF AMIN'S BROTHER, BASHIR, HAD HAD A DISASTROUS IMPACT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND ISRAEL. THE PAPER DECLARED THAT A CRISIS OF CON-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FIDENCE INCOMMUNICATION HAD BEEN CAUSED BY SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS THE ACTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF AMIN, INCLUDING HIS MEETING WITH PLO LEADER ABU IYAD IN MOROCCO, HIS TELEPHONE TALK WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, AND HIS SPEECHES AT THE UN AND ON INDEPENDENCE DAY. THE PAPER GOES ON TO LIST A LONG SERIES OF ISRAELI GRIEVANCES ALONG FAMILIAR LINES WITH THE THEME THAT LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND AMIN HIMSELF SHOULD RECOVER THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.

6. GEMAYEL SAID THAT IT WAS A PAPER OF CALUMNY AND CONSTITUTED AN INCITEMENT OF CHRISTIAN OPINION (DETAILS BY SEPTTEL).

7. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SENDING A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE FULL COOPERATION WITH THE US.

8. EMPHASIZING THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON, I EXPLORED SOME IDEAS FOR GETTING AROUND THE IMPASSE:

-- ON VENUE, I SUGGESTED THAT WE RECONSIDER MEETINGS OUTSIDE LEBANON AND ISRAEL, SUCH AS IN EUROPE. AIR-LINE TRAVEL TO A NUMBER OF CAPITALS IS NOW FAR EASIER AND MORE REGULAR. AMIN'S ATTITUDE WAS VERY POSITIVE. HE SUGGESTED MEETINGS IN NEW YORK ALSO, BUT I SAID THE ISRAELIS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A SITE WITH A UN FLAG NEARBY. WE EVEN JOKED A LITTLE ABOUT GOING TO CAIRO.

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996 Doc NUMBER: 82BEIRUT08715

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-- I ASKED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE FORMALLY IN ADVANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE CONCLUDING MEETING IN JERUSALEM AND ONE IN BEIRUT, AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS -- HELD ELSEWHERE -- HAD BEEN COMPLETED. AMIN WAS RESERVED. HE SAID IF THAT WERE THE PRICE TO PAY FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL, THE RESTORATION OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OF LEBANON'S TERRITORY, AND ECONOMIC RESTORATION, HE MIGHT BE READY TO DO IT. " I DO NOT WANT TO MISS AN OPPORTUNITY." COMMENT: HE WAS, HOWEVER, EXTREMELY RESERVED AND SQUIRMED AT THE PROSPECT.
-- WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE US HAD PUSHED FOR

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DIRECT, FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS, I SAID WE HAD TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CLEAR AWAY SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE UNDERBRUSH-- THROUGH US MEDIATION --PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF DIRECT TALKS. I SAID I HAD HINTED AT THIS POSSIBILITY TO SHAMIR ONE DAY,WHO OF COURSE DID NOT LIKE THE PROSPECT; HOWEVER, THE ISRAELIS HAD PUT US IN A BIT OF A CATCH 22 SITUATION AND WE HAD TO THINK OF ALTERNATIVES. GEMAYEL SAID HE WOULD BE VERY PLEASED IF WE COULD ARRANGE UNDERSTANDINGS IN ADVANCE ON THOSE ISSUES WHERE THERE WAS NO BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
9. COMMENT: I WILL BE HAVING FURTHER TALKS WITH GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS, AND WILL SEND SOME COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30.
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JERUSALEM 03615

EXDTS

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

9302566

AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: MOPS, PBOR, XF, LE, IS, PEPR
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: VIEWS OF ITALIAN AND FRENCH
AMBASSADORS ON MNF (IN BEIRUT)

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. IN MY MEETINGS WITH THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN AMBAS-
SADORS ON SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 27, EACH MAN IN
HIS OWN WAY EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT AN IMPASSE IN
GETTING ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED COULD
HAVE A NEGATIVE SPILLOVER EFFECT IN DEVELOPING AN

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03615 281429Z

EXPANDED MNF. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO PUT AS MANY AS 2,800 TROOPS
INTO AN EXPANDED MNF, WITH THE PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINT
BEING THE NEED TO RETAIN A FRENCH PRESENCE IN UNIFIL.
THE ITALIAN RECONFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PRE-
PARED TO EXPAND ITS PRESENT FORCE SIGNIFICANTLY, PER-
HAPS BY AS MUCH AS A BATTALION. BOTH MEN REMAIN
ATTRACTED TO THE CONCEPT OF AN EXPANSION BY EACH OF
THE THREE PARTNERS IN THE MNF, PLUS AT MOST A CON-

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TRIBUTION FROM THE BELGIANS.

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3. BOTH MEN SAID IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS DECIDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON WHAT THEIR CONTINGENTS WOULD BE DOING. THE ITALIAN SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A VISIT FROM THE GENERAL IN CHARGE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND THE LATTER HAD REMARKED THAT THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT SOON WOULD HAVE LITTLE WORTHWHILE TO DO. THE TROOPS IN THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT HAD TO BE TOLD THEY WERE GOING TO UNDERTAKE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES, EVEN IF THE ACTUAL MANDATE FOR AN EXPANDED MNF WAS SIMILAR TO THAT COVERING THE BEIRUT AREA.

4. THE TWO AMBASSADORS, EACH IN HIS OWN WAY, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT A SERIOUS DELAY IN GETTING WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES STARTED WOULD BEGIN UNRAVELING THE PRESENT POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN LEBANON, AND THIS IN TURN COULD NOT FAIL TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE THINKING IN ROME AND PARIS. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR QUALIFIED THIS OBSERVATION, HOWEVER, BY SAYING THAT ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF ENJOYS POPULAR SUPPORT IN ITALY, AND HE FELT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SURE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD STICK TO ITS PRESENT COURSE.

5. FOR MY PART, I STRESSED THAT WE WERE MAKING ALL-OUT EFFORTS TO GET ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, AS THE FOUNDATION STONE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER NEGOTIATING TRACKS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. I REVIEWED FULLY WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED DURING THE VISIT PHIL HABIB AND I MADE TO ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THE TALK I HAD HAD THE NIGHT BEFORE WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. GROVE

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AMMAN 09987

DECLASSIFIED

FOR HABIB

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), JO, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN

MINISTER KASIM ET AL NOVEMBER 27

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. DURING A THREE-HOUR RECEPTION AND DINNER HOSTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS PARTY KASIM ASKED HABIB'S VIEWS ABOUT THE IDEA OF THE U.S. CALLING FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE OF ALL CONFRONTATION STATES AND PALESTINIANS AS AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING. THE

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 AMMAN 09987 281544Z

JORDANIANS ALSO REITERATED THAT THEY WILL BE PRESENTING US WITH A LIST OF ISSUES AND QUESTIONS THE KING HOPES TO HAVE ADDRESSED WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM HOSTED A DINNER FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB NOVEMBER 27. HABIB WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS FAIRBANKS, CLUVERIUS AND VIETS, AND BY DCM DJEREJIAN AND COLLINS. THE JORDANIAN SIDE INCLUDED KASIM, CINC

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LT. GEN. ZAID BIN SHAKER, MINISTER OF INFORMATION ABU ODEH, AMBASSADOR MAJALI AND FARUK KASRAWEH FROM THE MFA.

4. CONVERSATION THROUGHOUT THE EVENING REVOLVED AROUND ALMOST THE SAME ISSUES COVERED DURING THE MEETING WITH HUSSEIN EARLIER IN THE DAY. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, ONE NEW POINT RAISED.

5. KASIM OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO START NEGOTIATIONS AND WANTED HABIB'S THOUGHTS ABOUT THE IDEA OF HAVING THE U.S. ISSUE A CALL TO JORDAN, EGYPT, SYRIA, LEBANON, THE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAEL TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR A MEETING. HABIB SAID HE HAD TO QUESTION WHETHER SUCH AN APPROACH HAD ANY ADVANTAGES OVER THE COURSE THE U.S. AND JORDAN ARE EMBARKED UPON, AND THERE WERE CLEARLY SOME PROBLEMS. A CALL LIKE THAT, KASIM SUGGESTED, WOULD IMMEDIATELY BRING A PLO DEMAND TO BE INCLUDED. THAT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BRING STALEMATE. IT WAS ALSO PROBLEMATIC THAT ISRAEL, WHICH TAKES THE POSITION THAT IT SUPPORTS ONLY THE PROCESS THAT ALREADY EXISTS --CAMP DAVID-- WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME. LEBANON, WITH ITS FRAGILE CONSENSUS AND UNDER OCCUPATION WOULD ALSO BE LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS, AND

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SYRIA WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REFUSE. THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, WHICH ADMITTEDLY FOCUSES ON JORDAN, HAS THE MERIT OF SEEKING TO EXPAND NEGOTIATIONS BY INCLUDING ANOTHER PARTY WHICH CLEARLY SHARES THE OBJECTIVE OF PEACE AND HAS A STABLE AND STRONG POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CAPABLE OF MAKING HARD DECISIONS. IN SHORT, HABIB CONCLUDED, WHILE OTHER APPROACHES SHOULD BE LOOKED AT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO LOOK REALISTICALLY AT OPTIONS WHICH STAND A CHANCE OF ACTUALLY LEADING TO A NEGOTIATION.

6. IN DISCUSSING THE KING'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON, KASIM SAID THE JORDANIANS WERE TAKING SERIOUSLY THE NEED TO PROVIDE US WITH A SYSTEMATIC IDEA OF THE ISSUES THE KING WOULD WANT TO HAVE ADDRESSED. TAKING A FOLDER AT THAT POINT, KASIM SAID THAT DURING HIS OCTOBER VISIT HE HAD PROVIDED WASHINGTON WITH SOME QUESTIONS JORDAN HOPES TO HAVE ADDRESSED DURING THE KING'S VISIT. KASIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOW REFINING OTHERS AND THEY WILL BE GIVING THESE TO US IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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9302566

DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER; AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: XF, MOPS, LE, IS, SY

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI CABINET NOVEMBER 28

PARTIALLY REJECTS U.S. COMPROMISE

1. [REDACTED]

2. WE WERE INFORMED JUST BEFORE 1400 LOCAL, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 20, THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET AFTER SOME FOUR HOURS OF DEBATE HAD AGREED THAT DELEGATIONS COULD BE HEADED BY CIVILIANS OF LESS THAN MINISTERIAL RANK BUT HAD REAFFIRMED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM, THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. ISRAELI RADIO A FEW MINUTES LATER CHARACTERIZED THE CABINET DECISION AS A TURN-DOWN OF THE HABIB PROPOSALS BUT ALSO AS A "COMPROMISE PROPOSAL". KIMCHE SAID

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THE CABINET DECISION INCORPORATED THREE POINTS, THE THRUST OF WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- (A) THE CABINET REAFFIRMED ITS EARLIER DECISIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT ANY ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE OF A POLITICAL-SECURITY NATURE, BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON COULD NEVER AGAIN BE A PLATFORM FOR ASSAULTS ON ISRAEL OR ITS CITIZENS.

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-- (B) PROPERLY AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVES
(NOT NECESSARILY MINISTERS) SHOULD HEAD THE DELEGA-
TIONS.

-- (C) NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE NATIONAL
CAPITALS OF BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM (BUT KIMCHE NOTED THAT
THIS WAS MEANT THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD START IN BEIRUT).
3. BEIRUT: FOR ROSS: PLEASE INFORM APPROPRIATE LEBAN-
ESE OF THE THRUST OF THIS DECISION AND SAY THAT I WILL
TRY TO RETURN TO BEIRUT LATER TODAY IF POSSIBLE AND
CERTAINLY NO LATER THAN TOMORROW MORNING. I WILL WANT
TO CONSULT WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS FIRST.

4. COMMENT: IN LIGHT OF WHAT SHAMIR IN PARTICULAR SAID
TO ME THIS MORNING, I EXPECT THAT THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE
ON TALKS IN JERUSALEM WILL NOW REPEAT NOW BE EXTREMELY
FIRM, AND MAY ATTRACT THE SAME DEGREE OF INTENSITY AS
THE QUESTION OF MUBARAK'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM SOME MONTHS
AGO. GROVE

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PEPR LE IS
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LETTER TO BEGIN

REF: AMMAN 9929✓

1. ~~(S) ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY WHICH SHOULD BE

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DELIVERED TO BEGIN BEFORE HIS CABINET MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE
DISCUSSIONS YOU AND OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE
JUST CONCLUDED WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB. IN VIEW OF WHAT SEEMS

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TO BE A DEVELOPING IMPASSE, I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU IN ALL FRANKNESS OUR PERSEPECTIVE.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO LEBANON. AMONG THESE COMMON GOALS, WE SEE THE FOLLOWING:

- THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FREE FROM THE INTERFERENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCES;
- THE DETERMINATION THAT LEBANON MUST NEVER AGAIN BE USED AS A BASE FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAEL; AND
- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEFUL STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL LEADING TO THE CREATION OF REAL PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE HELP AND THE CONTINUING ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS OUR FIRM BELIEF THAT THESE SHARED OBJECTIVES CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SERIOUS, FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, UNDER THE FORMULA WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO YOU NOVEMBER 25, INTENDS TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN THE OBJECTIVE OF ISRAEL, AS WELL AS OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN LIGHT OF THIS APPRAISAL, I WAS SURPRISED AND DEEPLY TROUBLED TO LEARN THAT YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO THE LEBANESE READINESS TO BEGIN DIRECT TALKS APPEARS TO BE NEGATIVE. FRANKLY, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I HAVE BEEN COUNTING HEAVILY ON YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP TO ASSURE THAT THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE TOWARD A NEW ERA OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS IS NOT LOST.

PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS EAGER TO ESTABLISH A BASIS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WITH ISRAEL. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS DECIDED THAT HE CAN LEAD HIS GOVERNMENT TO AUTHORIZE DIRECT TALKS WITH YOURS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE MEANS TO OBTAIN NOT ONLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA. AT OUR URGING, HE IS NOW READY TO CONDUCT SUCH TALKS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

THESE HAVE NOT BEEN EASY DECISIONS FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. HE GOVERNS A COALITION WHICH INCLUDES GROUPS THAT ARE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS TOWARD LEBANON. TO PRESERVE LEBANON'S NATIONAL CONSENSUS HE MUST ADVANCE WITH CAUTION. ISRAEL'S DEMANDS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN

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JERUSALEM AND AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL FROM THE BEGINNING ARE CLEARLY BEYOND WHAT HE CAN ACCEPT. HE IS ALREADY BE-
SET BY VOICES WITHIN LEBANON AND THROUGHOUT THE ARAB
WORLD WHICH ASSERT THAT ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF
LEAVING LEBANESE TERRITORY UNLESS IT CAN EXACT POLITICAL

CONCESSIONS WHICH WILL LEAVE LEBANON UNDER A PERMANENT
SPHERE OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE AND CONTROL.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON IS CLEARLY UNDESIRABLE
AND INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS. THE FORCES OF THE PLO AND

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SYRIA ARE STILL IN THE FIELD, AS ARE THE ISRAELI DEFENSE
FORCES. THE DAILY RISK OF INCIDENTS AND THE CONTINUED
OCCUPATION OF LEBANON SHOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO BOTH OF
OUR GOVERNMENTS. FOR SEVEN WEEKS NOW, AMERICAN EMISSARIES
HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET DIRECT TALKS STARTED BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD RESOLUTION OF
THIS IMPASSE. I WANT TO APPEAL TO YOU TO DO WHATEVER IS
NECESSARY TO BREAK THAT IMPASSE SO THAT TOGETHER WE CAN
MOVE CLOSER TO ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES..

SINCERELY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ (END TEXT) SHULTZ

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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 8669

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

AMMAN PASS AMB HABIB; JERUSALEM PASS AMB DRAPER

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECT: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PINT, LE, US, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: WAZZAN EXPRESSES HIS ANGER, NOV. 27

REF: BEIRUT 8613

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY. AT A NOVEMBER 27 MEETING TO REVIEW THE LEBANESE TALKING POINTS PREPARED FOR AMB DRAPER'S USE WITH BEGIN, AN UPSET PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN BITTERLY APPEALED FOR AN EFFECTIVE US COMMITMENT TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. HE STRESSED THAT

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LEBANESE AND ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT HAD BEEN OBTAINED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NINE POINTS PRESENTED TO THE LEBANESE EARLY IN THE HABIB MISSION. FOR THE US TO FAIL TO CARRY THROUGH ON THE FULL WITHDRAWAL INCLUDED IN THOSE POINTS WOULD GREATLY WEAKEN THE POSITION OF MODERATE POLITICAL FIGURES IN LEBANON AND LEBANON'S STANDING AMONG ARAB MODERATES. US CREDIBILITY WAS AT STAKE, AND PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY CIRCLES WERE ALREADY

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QUESTIONING EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON THE US. DRAPER EMPHASIZED IN RESPONSE THAT US POLICY CONTINUED TO WORK FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN A UNITED, SOVEREIGN COUNTRY IN CONTROL OF ALL ITS TERRITORY. AT ANOTHER POINT, DRAPER CAUTIONED THAT LEBANON WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO TAKE SOME CHANCES TO OBTAIN WHAT IT SOUGHT FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. BY THE END OF THE MEETING, WAZZAN HAD ACCEPTED THE TALKING POINTS, BUT HAD REPEATED HIS CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE IF ISRAEL SOUGHT MORE CONCESSIONS AND THE US FAILED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. COMMENT: SO FAR, WAZZAN HAS BEEN BROUGHT ALONG, BUT HE IS PROBABLY REACHING A LIMIT. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB DRAPER, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE PUGH AND ROSS, WAS CALLED TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S IN-TOWN RESIDENCE IN SINN AL-FIL AT 1200 NOVEMBER 27 TO REVIEW THE TALKING POINTS PREPARED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR TUENI LATE NOVEMBER 26. FOR DRAPER'S USE WITH BEGIN. THE SESSION WAS CLEARLY MEANT FOR MORE THAN A REVIEW OF THE TALKING POINTS, SINCE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN WAS PRESENT IN ADDITION TO SALEM AND TUENI. FOR ONE HOUR, IN THE GUISE OF REVIEWING THE TALKING POINTS, GEMAYEL WORKED TO ASSOCIATE WAZZAN WITH THEIR CONTENT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WAZZAN FINALLY CONCURRED, BUT NOT BEFORE DELIVERING HIMSELF OF A BITTER APPEAL FOR AN EFFECTIVE US COMMITMENT TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

4. GEMAYEL SET THE STAGE BY OUTLINING THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING (REFTEL). HE STRESSED THAT:
-- THE LEBANESE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE THE LAST MEETING OF THE LEBANESE TEAM (THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 26), WHEN GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, SALEM, TUENI, AMBASSADOR FATTAL, AND GENERAL HAMDAN HAD REVIEWED THE STATE OF PLAY -- IF LEBANON GOT SOMETHING TANGIBLE IN RETURN, IT WOULD NOT LET PROCEDURAL FORMALITIES GET IN THE WAY OF NEGOTIATIONS.
-- HOWEVER, THE ISRAELIS APPEARED TO BE IN NO HURRY, RAISING NEW ISSUES EACH TIME THE LEBANESE AGREED TO SOMETHING.
-- TO BREAK THIS PATTERN, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS RELYING DIRECTLY ON THE US. THE US HAD TO PRESS ISRAEL TO RAPID NEGOTIATIONS AND WITHDRAWALS.
-- IF THE ISRAELIS PERSISTED IN DRAGGING THEIR FEET, LEBANON SHOULD THINK ABOUT "PUTTING ITSELF IN GOD'S HANDS," DROPPING ANY IDEA OF EARLY NEGOTIATIONS AND RESORTING TO OTHER COURSES OF ACTION SUCH AS THE UN.

5. WAZZAN, WHO OBVIOUSLY HAD SOMETHING TO GET OFF HIS CHEST, SAID HE WOULD SPEAK IN ARABIC "TO EXPRESS

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HIMSELF IN THE MOST PRECISE POSSIBLE TERMS":

-- THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HE AND OTHERS HAD HAD WITH LEBANESE AND ARAB PARTIES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE HABIB MISSION HAD BEEN BASED ON THE COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE NINE POINTS GIVEN TO THE LEBANESE EARLY IN THE HABIB MISSION. THESE ALL FORMED COMPLEMENTARY PARTS OF A WHOLE, STARTING WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT AND ENDING WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.
-- HAD IT BEEN KNOWN THAT THE PROCESS MIGHT STOP AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT, THE VARIOUS

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PARTIES MIGHT HAVE REFUSED TO GO ALONG AND KEPT THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON TO BALANCE THE PRESENCE OF THE ISRAELIS.

-- ANY US ACQUIESCENCE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ONLY SOME OF THE NINE POINTS WOULD REPRESENT A GRAVE INJUSTICE AND SCORNFUL ATTITUDE TOWARD LEBANON.

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

SINCE WAZZAN AND OTHERS HAD OBTAINED THE SUPPORT OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT ON THE BASIS OF THE NINE POINTS AS A WHOLE, ANY RETREAT WOULD CAUSE A FUNDAMENTAL DISEQUILIBRIUM IN LEBANON'S DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL BALANCE. STATES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO WOULD DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM LEBANON FOR FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED OF COMPLICITY IN THIS RETREAT.

-- US WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO DICTATE WHO WILL NEGOTIATE FOR LEBANON IS, FRANKLY, SURPRISING. US ACCEPTANCE OF THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS A DEFAMAION OF LEBANON AND A VIOLATION OF THE NINE POINTS PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB. THE APPARENT SOFENING OF US EFFORTS IS BRINGING US CREDIBILITY INTO QUESTION TO THE DERIMENT OF THE US AND OF ALL THOSE WHO HAVE SUPPORTED IN INSIDE LEBANON AND IN THE REGION.

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-- PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC CIRCLES ARE ASKING INCREASINGLY WHETHER THE US IS IN FACT UNABLE TO DO MORE AND ADVOCATING RECOURSE TO OTHER MEANS OF ACTION IF HIS IS SO. ALREADY, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL LEFTIST NEWSPAPERS HAS PRESENTED WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO WAZZAN ATTACKING HIS "PREFERENCE FOR A US ROLE." ANY DELAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF SUCH CIRCLES AND INCREASE THE PRESSURES ON MODERATES.

-- IF THE US IS NOT GOING TO PRESS TO GET ISRAEL TO ALTER ITS "SHAMEFUL" POSITION, THEN THE WHOLE POLICY BUILT IN COMMON AMONG MODERATES AND THE US FOR THE REGION WILL COLLAPSE. SURELY, THE US CAN DO MORE.

6. DRAPER EMPHASIZED IN RESPONSE THAT US POLICY REMAINED AS ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY: WE HAVE A DEEP DESIRE FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN A UNITED, SOVEREIGN COUNTRY CONTROLLING ALL OF ITS TERRITORY. THIS IS WHY WE ARE AMONG OTHER THINGS, ANXIOUS TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REBUILD ITS ARMED FORCES.

7. HAVING COMMUNICATED HIS SENSE OF BETRAYAL AND HUMILIATION, WAZZAN LISTENED WITHOUT VISIBLE EMOTION AS TUENI AND SALEM READ AND DISCUSSED THE LEBANESE TALKING POINTS. SINCE THEY READ THEM IN ENGLISH, A LANGUAGE WAZZAN DOES NOT UNDERSTAND, GEMAYEL HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO A SELECTIVE RUNNING TRANSLATION INTO ARABIC, SOFTENING SOME OF THE ASPECTS DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES.

8. WAZZAN'S ONLY REJOINDER WAS TO INSIST THAT LANGUAGE BE ADDED MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE VARIOUS POINTS EXPRESSED WERE TO BE SEEN AS STRENGTHENING THE ARMISTICE

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AGREEMENT, NOT ABROGATING IT, PENDING A MORE GENERAL SETTLEMENT. ONE SHOULD NOT, HE SAID, GIVE UP SOMETHING UNTIL ONE HAD SOMETHING BETTER. GEMAYEL FINALLY APPROVED THE TALKING POINTS AS REVISED AND AUTHORIZED DRAPER TO USE THEM AS HE THOUGHT BEST WITH BEGIN.

9. WAZZAN THEN RAISED A SECOND MAJOR THEME: HOW MUCH TIME SHOULD THE LEBANESE GIVE THE US TO REVERSE ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE? WHAT SHOULD LEBANON'S NEXT STEP BE? DRAPER REPLIED THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE COMPROMISE, THEN THE US WOULD HAVE TO REASSESS THE WHOLE SITUATION. THAT WOULD BE THE NEXT STEP, AND THE LEBANESE SHOULD NOT THINK IN TERMS OF ANY SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME.

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10. WAZZAN COMPLAINED THAT HE AND SALEM WERE BEING PRESSED TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS SUCH AS THESE BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE PARLIAMENT, AND SOME WERE URGING THAT THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO OTHER MEANS OF ACTION -- THE UN, FOR INSTANCE. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KNOW WHAT TO ANSWER OR, IF ADVISABLE, TO PUT OFF THE HEARINGS. DRAPER ADVISED THAT, IN THE EVENT THE ISRAELI CABINET REJECTED THE PROPOSED COMPROMISE, WAZZAN AND SALEM NOT RUSH TO ANSWER SUCH QUESTIONS PENDING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE SITUATION. IF THE ISRAELI CABINET AGREED, THEN THE QUESTIONS WOULD BE EASIER TO ANSWER. HOWEVER, AS THE US HAD BEEN URGING REPEATEDLY, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME CHANCES TO OBTAIN WHAT IT WANTED OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. IN CLOSING, WAZZAN SAID HE COULD ACCEPT EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN PRESENTED UP TO NOW. HIS FEAR WAS FOR THE FUTURE AND FOR THE US RESPONSE IN THE FACE OF FURTHER ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE.

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12. COMMENT: WAZZAN WAS OBVIOUSLY UPSET, AND HIS INCLUSION IN TODAY'S MEETING WAS PROBABLY INTENDED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO GIVE DRAPER A CHANCE TO HELP CALM HIM DOWN. WITH GEMAYEL, DRAPER, SALEM, AND TUENI WORKING ON HIM, HE ACCEPTED THE TALKING POINTS PREPARED FOR DRAPER'S USE. SO FAR, HE HAS BEEN BROUGHT ALONG, BUT HE IS PROBABLY REACHING A LIMIT. IT WAS NOT EVIDENT FROM TODAY'S DISCUSSION THAT WAZZAN KNOWS OF GEMAYEL'S WILLINGNESS IF NECESSARY TO JETTISON THE "FACE-SAVING" FIRST MEETING UNDER GENERAL HAMDAN. IT IS QUITE LIKELY GEMAYEL PLANS TO GET HIM TO SWALLOW THIS LAST CONCESSION BY HIGHLIGHTING THE RECIPROCAL ISRAELI CONCESSIONS ON MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION AND MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM, IF IN FACT THEY ARE OBTAINED.

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: NEXT STEPS

REF: BEIRUT 8613

1. ~~_____~~

2. I AGREE THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR DRAPER TO CARRY GEMAYEL'S TALKING POINTS TO BEGIN PRIOR TO SUNDAY ISRAELI CABINET MEETING. IN ADDITION, I BELIEVE IT IS TIME FOR HIM TO PRESENT A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY TO PM BEGIN STATING IN BRIEF OUR

PAGE 02

AMMAN 09929 270702Z

INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S UNWILLINGNESS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MANNER PROPOSED AS A RESULT OF THE LATEST EXCHANGES, I.E., POLITICAL LEVEL BUT LESS THAN MINISTERIAL, BUT NO TALKS IN JERUSALEM. IN SO DOING, WE SHOULD INDICATE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE VALIDITY OF GEMAYEL'S BELIEF HE CAN GO NO FURTHER WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POSITION. THE MESSAGE MIGHT ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT AFTER SEVEN WEEKS OF A PROCEDURAL MINUET, THAT THE SITUATION

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ALLOWS FOR MUCH MORE TIME BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN.
TO THE EXTENT THAT WE STAY IN THIS LIMBO, THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IN LEBANON WILL NOT IMPROVE, THERE WILL BE NO
PROGRESS ON GETTING SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL, AND THE
CHANCES OF ESCALATORY CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON WILL
INCREASE. VIETS

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AMMAN FOR AMB. HABIB AND TEL AVIV FOR CHARGE FLATEN AND
DAO FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: (DRAPER, MORRIS, LE, IS

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: VISIT TO ISRAEL, NOVEMBER 27

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A MEETING WITH GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, SALEM AND TUENI, AT WHICH THEY THRASHED OUT AGREED POINTS I COULD MAKE AT MY DISCRETION TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IF I CAN SEE HIM TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING PRIOR TO THE CABINET MEETING. THE POINTS ARE CAST IN GENERAL TERMS. THEIR SIGNIFICANCE LIES IN THE FACT THAT WAZZAN CAME ONBOARD, DESPITE HIS VERY REAL ANGER AND SENSE OF BEING HUMILIATED.

3. CHARGE FLATEN: IN LINE WITH OUR PREVIOUS TALKS OVER BREAKFAST YESTERDAY WITH PHIL, I HOPE THAT YOU CAN

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ARRANGE A MEETING FOR ME WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, SAYING THAT I WANT TO DESCRIBE TO HIM THE THRUST OF THE MORE THAT FIVE HOURS OF MEETINGS WITH GEMAYEL, ET AL, SINCE RETURNING FROM ISRAEL.

4. HAVING JUST LEARNED THAT THE HELICOPTER CAN LAND AT DOV AIRPORT IN LIEU OF BEN GURION, I WILL TRY REPEAT TRY FOR A WHEELS UP DEPARTURE NO LATER THAN 1515 LOCAL TIME (1315 ZULU). ESTIMATED FLIGHT TIME

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, EG, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: TABA: ASSESSING WHERE WE STAND

REFS: (A) JERUSALEM 3587, (B) STATE 330371, (C) CAIRO
29845, (D) CAIRO 29694

1. [REDACTED]

2. DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON TABA (REF B) CROSSED WITH REPORTING CABLE (REF A) ON AMBASSADOR HABIB'S DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR NOVEMBER 24 ON THIS SUBJECT. SINCE ALL OF THE DEPARTMENT'S POINTS WERE COVERED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB, NO FURTHER ACTION IS BEING TAKEN BY THE EMBASSY AT THIS TIME.

3. HOWEVER, IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION WITH MFA EGYPT DESK OFFICER LAMDAN NOVEMBER 26, LAMDAN PROVIDED SOME ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI

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DISCUSSIONS ON TABA. HE CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL FINDS THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL, CONVEYED TO SASSON BY ALI, TO BE INSUFFICIENT, IN THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN RESUMING TABA TALKS AND OTHER NORMALIZATION NEGOTIATIONS. LAMDAN SAID THAT SASSON, DURING HIS MEETING WITH ALI, REJECTED THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL ON THE SPOT ALTHOUGH HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT ALI'S POSITION TO JERUSALEM. LAMDAN SAID THE MFA DOES NOT BELIEVE ANY FURTHER

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RESPONSE TO ALI'S PROPOSAL IS NECESSARY.

4. ACCORDING TO LAMDAN, ALI'S PROPOSAL TO SASSON WAS CAST IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, IN WHICH ALI ASKED FOR ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO TALK ABOUT TABA (WITHOUT SPECIFYING DEC. 10 OR ANY OTHER DATE), FOLLOWING WHICH ISRAEL SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT "EVERYTHING ELSE WOULD FALL INTO PLACE." ALI REPORTEDLY DID NOT SPECIFY A COMMITMENT OR TIMETABLE FOR OTHER NORMALIZATION NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ALI REPORTEDLY DID NOT TALK AT LENGTH ABOUT MORTADA'S RETURN. LAMDAN SAID SASSON PERCEIVED, BY "OBLIQUE IMPLICATION," THAT MORTADA WOULD RETURN WHEN A LEBANESE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, BUT THIS WAS NOT CLEAR FROM ALI'S PRESENTATION.

6. WITH REFERENCE TO SHAFIE ABDEL HAMID'S QUERY ON THE FORMAL OPENING OF THE SONESTA HOTEL IN TABA (REF. D), LAMDAN SAID THAT THE PLANNED NOV. 15 CEREMONY HAD BEEN POSTPONED BECAUSE OF THE TYRE DISASTER, AND THAT THE MINISTER OF TOURISM HAD OFFICIALLY INAUGURATED THE HOTEL IN A LOW-KEY CEREMONY NOV. 24. THIS INFORMATION SUPERSEDES THE COMMENT BY EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LIAISON

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OFFICERS IN TABA (REPORTED IN TEL AVIV 17266) TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HOTEL HAD "FORMALLY" OPENED NOVEMBER 15, AS SCHEDULED.

7. LAMDAN SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO RAISE THE MFA'S CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON AND CAIRO IMPLYING THAT THE USG HAS ADOPTED A FORMAL POSITION SUPPORTING EGYPT'S CLAIM TO TABA. LAMDAN SAID THE MFA UNDERSTANDS THE USG SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO RESUME TABA NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WOULD BE DISTRESSED IF THE USG HAD TAKEN POSITIONS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN DISPUTE. POLOFF CATEGORICALLY REJECTED LAMDAN'S ASSERTION, SAYING THAT WHILE INDEED THE USG IS ACTIVELY WORKING TO BRING THE PARTIES BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, WE HAVE NOT TAKEN A POSITION ON THE MERITS OF EITHER SIDE'S CASE. LAMDAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION ON HEARING THIS AND SAID THAT HE ASSUMES ISRAELI REPORTING HAS BEEN BASED ON PERSONAL VIEWS HELD BY U.S. OFFICIALS.

8. NEXT STEPS: AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL RAISE THE TABA ISSUE IN CAIRO, AS REQUESTED BY SHAMIR. WE BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS WILL REJOIN THE TABA TALKS IF THEY HAVE A FIRM COMMITMENT AND SCHEDULE IN HAND THAT OTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON NORMALIZATION ISSUES

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND CHARGE FLATEN FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, SY, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS WITH
GEMAYEL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. SUMMARY: LONG TALKS TONIGHT, NOVEMBER 26, WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS CLOSEST FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORS RECONFIRMED THAT A LEBANESE DELEGATION CANNOT MEET IN JERUSALEM OR ITS SUBURBS, NOR CAN ITS DELEGATION BE HEADED BY A MINISTER "AT LEAST AT THIS TIME." GEMAYEL, HOWEVER, IS DESPERATELY READY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH A LEBANESE DELEGATION HEADED FROM THE START BY A SENIOR

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CIVILAIN OFFICIAL, AMBASSADOR FATAL, WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY, PRO FORMA MEETING HEADED BY A MILITARY OFFICER. GEMAYEL TALKED ABOUT ENLISTING ACTIVE US INTERCESSION WITH IS AEL, BUT IN THE END DID NOT PRESS THE POINT.

3. GEMAYEL AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT I COULD PRESENT TALKING POINTS ON THE LEBANESE POSITION AUTHORIZED BY

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HIM PERSONALLY IN A POSSIBLE MEETING I MIGHT TRY TO HAVE WITH BEGIN ON SATURDAY NIGHT, ON THE EVE OF ISRAEL'S CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY. I BELIEVE IT IS WORTH A TRY. GEMAYEL BELIEVES THE ISRAELIS SHOULD COOPERATE IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROVIDE THE "MAXIMUM" FOR ISRAEL FOR WHICH HE COULD GAIN THE SUPPORT AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, AND NOT MERELY FROM THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CLOSE TO ISRAEL. IT WAS AN IMPRESSIVE PRESENTATION. END SUMMARY.

4. THIS MORNING, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, HABIB, FLATEN AND I MET AT BREAKFAST WITH DAVID KIMCHE AND HANAN BAR-ON TO EXAMINE WHAT WE COULD DO TO RETRIEVE HE SITUATION AND BREAK THE IMPASSE WHICH THREATENS TO DEVELOP. HABIB AND I AGREED THAT I WOULD BRIEF GEMAYEL IN BEIRUT TONIGHT ON WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED IN OUR TALKS IN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, DETERMINE WHA FURTHER FLEXIBILITY HE MIGHT HAVE IN MEETING ISRAELI PROCEDURAL CONDIIONS, AND THEN "DANCE AROUND CAREFULLY" SOME OF THE IDEAS THA WERE DISCUSSED IN THE INFORMAL BREAKFAST MEETIN WE HAD. AT THE BREAKFAST MEETING, INCIDENTALLY, BOTH ISRAELIS OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM HAS NOW BECOME FAR MORE IMPORTANT AND THUS FAR HARDER TO OVERCOME, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE

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CLEVER AND EMOTION-LADEN WAY SHARON DEVELOPED THE ISSUE IN THE FRIDAY MEETING WE HAD WITH BEGIN, SHARON, AND SHAMIR.

5. JOINED BY CHARGE PUGH AND ROSS, I MET FIRST FOR AN HOUR FROM 4 TO 5 PM WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR TUENI TO DESCRIBE THAT OUTCOME OF OUR EFFORTS IN ISRAEL TO PRODUCE A COMPROMISE FORMULA IN WHICH THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE CABINETS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO AMEND PREVIOUS DECISIONS. I MADE CLEAR INTER ALIA THAT THE ISRAELIS SAID THEY HAD BEEN GETTING WORD FROM THEIR LEBANESE FRIENDS, ALLEGEDLY CLOSE TO GEMAYEL, WHO MAINTAIN THAT GEMAYEL COULD GIVE IN TO SOME OF THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS, IN PARTICULAR BY HAVING THE LEBANESE DELEGATION HEADED BY A MINISTER.

6. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT A DELEGATION FROM THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" WOULD BE APPROACHING GEMAYEL TO URGE HIM TO SEND A MINISTER FOR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS (GEMAYEL LATER SAID THE DELEGATION HAD NOT PRESSED HIM). SALEM SAID THAT TALKS WITH HE ISRAELIS AT THE MINISTERIAL-LEVEL OR IN JERUSALEM OR ITS SUBURBS WERE IMPOSSIBLE "AT THIS STAGE." HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY NO TO WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PUTTING FORTH AS NON-NEGOTIABLE CONDITIONS. LEBANON WAS READY TO ENTER INTO GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS

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AND IN FACT WAS ANXIOUS TO DO SO, BUT LEBANON COULD
NOT DESTROY IS PRESENT POLITICAL CONSENSUS NOR ISOLATE

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EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND CHARGE FLATEN FROM DRAPER

ITSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD. SALEM SAID HE WOULD NOT
RULE OUT CABINET-LEVEL PARTICIPATION OR EVEN A MEETING
IN SOME SUBURB OF JERUSALEM AT SOME POINT WHEN NEGOTIA-
IONS WERE APPROACHING AN END, BUT NO SUCH DECISION

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COULD BE TAKEN NOW. IF SUCH A MOVE IN JERUSALEM IN PARTICULAR WOULD ATTRACT STRONG OPPOSITION FROM THE SYRIANS, THE SAUDIS, AND EVEN THE JORDANIANS. SALEM SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE PRESIDENT REAGAN CALL BEGIN ON SATURDAY NIGHT, PRIOR TO THE SUNDAY CABINET MEETING, TO URGE THAT NO FURTHER OBSTACLES BE PUT INTO THE PATH OF NEGOTIATIONS LEBANON COULD CARRY OUT AT THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADOR FATTAL.

7. WE THEN WENT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TALKED WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR ALMOST THREE HOURS. (DETAILS BY SEPTTEL.) HE, GEMAYEL, WAS MORE TIRED THAN I HAVE EVER SEEN HIM, AND HE WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AND UPSET BY MY ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS IN ISRAEL. I MINCED NO WORDS WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE GETTING CONFLICTING SIGNALS FROM THEIR FRIENDS IN THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" AND FROM OTHER MARONITES, WHO CLAIM TO BE CLOSE TO HIM, THE PRESIDENT. GEMAYEL SAID THAT NONE OF THESE PEOPLE WHOM THE ISRAELIS CONTACTED COULD SPEAK FOR HIM, BUT HE HAD SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO DISSUADE THEM FROM INDULGING IN "WISHFUL THINKING." HE SAID HE KNEW THAT THERE WERE DRUZE, EVEN MANY SHIA FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, AS WELL AS CHRISTIANS LONG CLOSE TO THE ISRAELIS, WHO WANTED HIM TO GO FURTHER, BUT HE COULD NOT DO SO. HE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT, AS THE LEADER OF A COUNTRY ALMOST TOTALLY IN OCCUPATION BY THE ISRAELIS, THE SYRIANS, AND THE PLO, HE HAD NO ROOM FOR MANEUVER. HE HAD TO STAY IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND HE HAD TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPORT HE NOW HAD FROM KEY POLITICIANS. AT ONE POINT, HE SAID THAT IF SA'AB SALAM AND KAMAL AL-ASSAD WOULD GIVE HIM THEIR SUPPORT HE WOULD SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL TOMORROW. THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE, AND HE NOTED THAT EVEN KAMAL AL-ASSAD HAD SIGNIFICANTLY AMENDED HIS EARLIER PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL BY SAYING IN EFFECT HIS SUPPORT WAS CONDITIONED ON MAINTAINING ARAB WORLD SOLIDARITY.

8. WITH A NOTE OF DESPERATION IN HIS VOICE, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT KIND OF PROTECTION COULD THE US GIVE HIM IF HE MADE FURTHER CONCESSIONS AND, HE ADDED, WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE WOULD THE US PUT ON ISRAEL TO

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[REDACTED]

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DETER IT FROM EXTRACTING CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD CRACK OPEN THE COUNTRY. HE BRIEFLY SAID HE MIGHT SEND A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A RESOLUTION, OR STOP ALL EFFORTS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AND BEGIN "SPEAKING HIS MIND." IT IS INTERESTING, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS THEME OF DIRECT US ASSISTANCE NOW BUT INSTEAD COMMENCED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO EXAMINE SOME OF THE IDEAS I THEN ADVANCED FOR PUTTING BEGIN INTO A MORE RECEPTIVE FRAME OF MIND ON THE EVE OF THE SUNDAY CABINET SESSION WHICH WOULD DEBATE CONDITIONS FOR ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEBANON.

9. I DID, HOWEVER, REPEAT TO GEMAYEL WHAT PRESIDENT REGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD SAID TO HIM IN WASHINGTON TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSENSUS OR LEBANESE RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD DESTROYED OR PUT INTO SERIOUS JEOPARDY.

10. HERE IS THE WAY GEMAYEL CAME OUT ON VARIOUS CONCEPTS AND IDEAS, AFTER A LOT OF GIVE AND TAKE:

--TALKS IN JERUSALEM OR ITS SUBURBS ARE IMPOSSIBLE, AS WELL AS IN TEL AVIV, BUT THEY CAN BE HELD IN ISRAELI LOCALES CLOSE TO EITHER CITY.

--HE CANNOT PUT A MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION, EITHER FOR PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS ALTHOUGH AS HE TOLD US PREVIOUSLY, CONCLUDING SESSIONS HEADED BY A LEBANESE MINISTER WERE NOT FORECLOSED.

--HE IS OF COURSE PREPARED TO MAKE FATTAL THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION FROM THE VERY START AND ELIMINATE THE PRO FORMA SESSION CHAIRED BY HAMDAN ON THE LEBANESE SIDE.

--HE CANNOT AT THIS TIME SEND A SPECIAL EMISSARY (E.G., AMBASSADOR FATTAL, CAMILLE CHAMOUN, ETC.) TO MEET WITH BEGIN, EVEN SECRETLY. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE ISRAELIS STOP APPLYING THEIR VARIOUS PRESSURES THROUGH THEIR FRIENDS AMONG THE MARONITES,

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HE COULD POSSIBLY DESIGNATE A SINGLE EMISSARY FROM WITHIN THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES" TO CARRY ON A SPECIAL DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS, WHICH WOULD RE-

FLECT HIS, GEMAYEL'S, DIRECT VIEWS. (HE DROPPED THIS IDEA, HOWEVER, SINCE HE DOUBTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD EVER BE WILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR CONTACTS AND PRESSURE TACTICS.)

--HE THEORETICALLY WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET WITH BEGIN

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EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND CHARGE FLATEN FROM DRAPER

PERSONALLY, BUT ONLY IF HE COULD BE ASSURED SATISFACTORILY THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE KEPT SECRET AND, EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THAT THERE WOULD BE "RESULTS" TO MEET HIS BASIC CONCERNS.

--IF NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WRITE A LETTER TO FATTAL EXPLAINING HIS POSITION FULLY, WHICH FATTAL COULD THEN SHOW TO KIMCHE.

--FINALLY, HE SAID HE COULD GIVE ME ASSURANCES TO GIVE TO BEGIN (IN THE KIND OF ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH BEGIN THAT PHIL HABIB AND I HEARD AS A SUGGESTION FROM KIMCHE AND BAR-ON THIS MORNING). THIS WOULD BE TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE MAXIMUM THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED THAT WOULD STILL GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE

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PEOPLE AND NOT JUST THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES." HE SAID IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HE WAS THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD BRING THE WHOLE COUNTRY WITH HIM IN A CONTROVERSIAL AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, BUT STRESSED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT TIME WAS PRECIOUS AND HIS PRESENT HONEYMOON IN LEBANON WOULD NOT LAST FOREVER.

11. AT THIS POINT, ROSS SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS WE COULD GET MORE SPECIFIC, EITHER THROUGH AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM GEMAYEL WHICH I COULD DELIVER TO BEGIN TOMORROW NIGHT, SATURDAY, AFTER SHABBAT, OR IN A LETTER FROM GEMAYEL TO ME FROM WHICH I COULD QUOTE LIBERALLY IN A MEETING WITH BEGIN. GEMAYEL SAID HE WAS IN PRINCIPLE WILLING TO CONSIDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE, AND WITH MY STRONG CONCURRENCE HE SUMMONED FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM FROM A DINNER HE WAS ABOUT TO ATEND. WE REVIEWED WITH SALEM THE POSSIBLE NEW IDEAS, BUT SALEM WAS VERY FEARFUL OF EXPOSING GEMAYEL TO THE PRESSURES AND CRITICISM WHICH WOULD DEVELOP IF ANY PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, WHETHER TO BEGIN OR TO ME, WERE LEAKED TO THE PRESS.

12. IT WAS AGREED AT THE END THAT SALEM WOULD TAKE A CRACK AT DRAFTING TALKING POINTS WHICH I MIGHT THEN COMMUNICAE TO BEGIN AS HAVING BEEN AUTHORIZED BY GEMAYEL HIMSELF. I WILL REVIEW THEM TOMORROW MORNING AND SOLICIT PHIL HABIB'S VIEWS IN THE MEANTIME. IF THIS APPEARS TO BE A POTENTIALLY USEFUL APPROACH, I COULD THEN GO TO ISRAEL TO MEET WITH BEGIN ON SATURDAY

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NIGHT, AS DISCUSSED EARLIER.

13. ACTION REQUESTS:

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--AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'M INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT THIS FINAL APPROACH OF PRESENTING POINTS PERSONALLY AUTHORIZED BY GEMAYEL, AND WRITTEN BY THE LEBANESE, COULD DO NO HARM AND POSSIBLE COULD BE HELPFUL, BUT I WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS.

--TEL AVIV FOR CHARGE FLATEN: I AM REQUESTING-- ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS--HELICOPTER TRANSPORT FROM THE NAVY IN THE EVENT THAT WE DECIDE TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS SATURDAY EVENING APPROACH TO BEGIN. ASSUMING THAT PHIL COMES IN WITH SOME COMMENTS BY THEN, I WILL FLASH YOU A MESSAGE BY ABOUT 1200 TOMORROW MORNING ON WHETHER TO PROCEED, IN WHICH CASE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD GET IN TOUCH FIRST WITH DAVID KIMCHE.
PUGH

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XF, PEPR, IS, JO, SY, SA, LE, PLO, US
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH BEGIN ON PEACE PROCESS

1. [REDACTED]

2. AMB HABIB MET PRIVATELY WITH PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN FOR HALF AN HOUR 25 NOV, TO INITIATE
DISCUSSIONS OF THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS.
THE PRIME MINISTER MENTIONED HIS UNHAPPINESS OVER NOT
BEING CONSULTED IN ADVANCE, BUT DID NOT DWELL ON THE
ISSUE, ALTHOUGH HE APPARENTLY HAD SPENT MUCH OF HIS MEET-
ING EARLIER IN THE WEEK WITH FORMER SECRETARY HAIG
DISCUSSING HIS DEEP HURT AT AMERICAN PROPOSALS WHICH

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ISRAEL HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT IN ADVANCE. IN THE
MEETING WITH HABIB, HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER MOVED
QUICKLY TO HIS INSISTANCE THAT ALL DISCUSSIONS BE ON
THE BASIS OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. HE SAID THAT
ISRAEL WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE FEZ
OR PRESIDENT REAGAN OR ANY OTHER PROPOSALS THAT ARE AROUND
AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE PREPARED
AT ANY TIME TO REOPEN DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

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3. HABIB NOTED THAT HE WAS GOING FROM JERUSALEM TO AMMAN THE FOLLOWING DAY. HE TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT IT WAS A PRIME OBJECTIVE OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE TO GET JORDAN INTO THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THAT IT WAS HIS OBJECTIVE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT JORDANIAN MOVE WHEN HE VISITS AMMAN. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS PROVIDE FOR THE INCLUSION OF AMMAN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS FULLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CAMP DAVID AND THAT CAMP DAVID PROVIDES FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES WERE TO BE INCLUDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT. HABIB REPLIED THAT PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK, ACCORDING TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, CAN JOIN THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME, BUT PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM OTHER LOCATIONS WOULD ENTER ONLY BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REFRESH HIS MEMORY ON THAT SPECIFIC POINT IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S QUESTION, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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MINISTRY TALKING WITH HIM AND OTHER AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SUBJECT OF "HOW TO IMPLEMENT CAMP DAVID." IF THIS WAS THE BASIS ON WHICH WE CONTINUED CONTACTS, THE PRIME MINISTER INVITED US TO DISCUSS WITH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES THE CONTENTS OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. GROVE

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Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
United States Section • 1213 Race Street • Philadelphia, PA 19107-1691 • (215) 563-7110

Nov. 20, 1988

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The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Shultz,

Enclosed is a copy of the letter the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, U.S. Section, has sent to President Reagan (with copy to President-elect Bush) urging the Administration to respond in a timely and positive fashion to the recent actions taken by the Palestine National Council (PNC). These actions can be a significant turning point leading to negotiations and a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and the Arab world. The U.S. must play a positive role in the beginning of such a peace process. Especially important is the need for the U.S. to accept the PNC resolutions as fulfilling the conditions for US dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and to begin discussions immediately. We urge the U.S. government to make this positive response.

Very truly yours,

Dolores Taller, Chair
Middle East Committee
WILPF

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President Ronald W Reagan
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D C 20500

Dear Mr. President

The Palestine National Council (PNC), the parliamentary body of the PLO meeting in Algiers this past week took important steps which provide a unique opportunity for peace with Israel. In a formal policy statement it has recognized United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. This fulfills US conditions for dialogue with the PLO. UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which include recognition of the state of Israel, will now be the policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). These policies in tandem with the second action, the declaration of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, is a significant acknowledgment by the PLO that it accepts a Palestinian state next to, not instead of, Israel.

The continuing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza not only is causing Palestinians to suffer, but is also a threat to the security of Israel and a danger to the whole region. Moves toward peace are essential soon.

The US government has the power to facilitate a serious peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. We urge the US government to

1. Communicate immediately its support of these steps and begin discussions with the PLO. A timely positive response will strengthen and encourage the PLO's efforts for peace and moderation.

2. Recognize the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination by recognizing, in principle, the newly declared Palestinian state.

3. Begin diplomatic efforts to convene an International Peace Conference under United Nations auspices for negotiations between Israel and the PLO and the other parties concerned, which would lead to a peace settlement, make the Palestinian state a reality, and create conditions assuring security and peace for Israel, the Palestinian state, and the region.

The US government must not miss this new opportunity for peace. We urge the US government to act now.

Very truly yours

Anne Ivey
Anne Ivey, Pres.

cc President-Elect George Bush
Secretary of State, George Shultz

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(GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION) AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

-- TWO TRILATERAL SUMMITS HELD IN AL-AQABA AND BAGHDAD BY MUBARAK, ARAFAT, KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, AND IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN.

-- MUBARAK SPEAKS ABOUT VARIOUS DOMESTIC ISSUES IN AN INTERVIEW TO AL-AHRAM'S EDITOR IN CHIEF.

-- PRIME MINISTER ISSUES A MILITARY DECREE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANIES.

-- OPPOSITION AL-WAFD REPORTS ON THE COMING ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE IMF.

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1. AQABA SUMMIT/BAGHDAD SUMMIT. THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL PAPERS OCTOBER 23 REPORTS MUBARAK, KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, AND ARAFAT HELD A TRILATERAL SUMMIT IN AL-AQABA TO DISCUSS JOINT COORDINATION TO PUSH THE PEACE PROCESS. THE THREE LEADERS AGREED THAT EGYPT BE A PARTNER AND NOT A MEDIATOR IN THE PEACE EFFORTS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE INTERESTS OF THE ARAB WORLD. THE THREE LEADERS ALSO DISCUSSED THE IDEA OF A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN CONFEDERATION AND BOOSTING JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN UNDERSTANDING. IN STATEMENTS TO THE EDITORS IN CHIEF OF EGYPTIAN PAPERS, ARAFAT PAID TRIBUTE TO MUBARAK'S EFFORTS TO PUSH FORWARD JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE. ARAFAT POINTED OUT THAT THE PNC

TO BE HELD IN ALGERIA NOVEMBER 12-14 WILL REVIEW FOUR
OPTIONS, NAMELY PROCLAIMING A PALESTINIAN STATE UNDER
OCCUPATION; PROCLAIMING A TEMPORARY PALESTINIAN STATE AND
GOVERNMENT; PROCLAIMING A TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT; OR PUTTING
THE OCCUPIED AREAS UNDER TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION. ARAFAT ADDED THAT THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE
CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE. IN
STATEMENTS TO REPORTERS, OSAMA AL-BAZ SAID "WE WANT THE
ISRAELI VOTERS, ARAB OR JEWISH, TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR
INTERESTS LIE IN PEACE AND THAT THERE IS AN ARAB PARTNER
WILLING TO NEGOTIATE AND READY FOR A JUST PEACE." AL-BAZ
NOTED THAT THERE ARE FOUR POSITIVE SIGNS ABOUT THE STAND
OF THE US SIDE, NAMELY THE REPEATED TALK ABOUT PALESTINIAN
POLITICAL RIGHTS; THE PRESENT DISPUTES INSIDE THE US
JEWISH COMMUNITY ABOUT THE RIGHT OF THE JEWISH PRESSURE
GROUPS TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE US JEWS; SECRETARY
CARLUCCI'S CRITICISM OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF THE ISRAELI
LOBBY ON US INTERESTS; AND THE TONING DOWN OF THE
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN BETWEEN BUSH AND DUKAKIS REGARDING THE

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
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AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 CAIRO 25036

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
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PAGE 02 CAIRO 25036 02 OF 04 241650Z

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, OCTOBER 21-24, 1988
PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL PAPERS OCTOBER 24 REPORTS MUBARAK, ARAFAT, AND PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN HELD A TRILATERAL SUMMIT IN BAGHDAD TO DISCUSS PEACE MOVES. IN STATEMENTS UPON HIS RETURN TO CAIRO, MUBARAK SAID THAT THE RESULTS OF THE AQABA SUMMIT WERE GOOD AND STRESSED THAT THE EFFORTS EXERTED WERE ONLY AIMED AT PEACE AND CREATING A HEALTHY ATMOSPHERE AMONG THE ARABS. MUBARAK CRITICIZED SYRIA AND THE LIKUD FOR CIRCULATING THAT THE AQABA SUMMIT WAS HELD TO SUPPORT PERES AND THE LABOR PARTY. IN STATEMENTS AFTER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT, ARAFAT LAUDED MUBARAK'S EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE ARAB NATION AND SAID THAT MORE SUMMITS AND MEETINGS WOULD FOLLOW. ARAFAT NOTED THAT HE HAD CALLED UPON THE ARAB VOTERS TO SUPPORT THE ISRAELI CANDIDATES WHO ADVOCATE PEACE, AND THAT HE HAD ASKED THE LEADERS OF THE UPRISING NOT TO USE WEAPONS DESPITE THE SAVAGE PRACTICES OF THE JEWISH SETTLERS AND THE ISRAELI FORCES. IN A

RELATED ITEM, AHAM OCTOBER 24 QUOTES ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY AS CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO RECOGNIZE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS.

2. EGYPT/US. AKHBAR EL-YOM OCTOBER 22 QUOTES AMBASSADOR WISNER AS SAYING THAT THE US WILL HAVE FINANCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 1500 SCHOOLS IN EGYPT BY THE YEAR 1991. THE AMBASSADOR AND EDUCATION MINISTER FATHY SOROUR ATTENDED THE INAUGURATION OF THE SEVEN HUNDREDTH SCHOOL IN QALYUBIYYA AND SIGNED A NEW AGREEMENT OF DOLLARS 36 MILLION TO BUILD NEW SCHOOLS NATIONWIDE. SEPARATELY, AKHBAR EL-YOM REPORTS SECRETARY CARLUCCI WILL VISIT CAIRO UNCLASSIFIED

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EARLY NEXT MONTH FOR A FEW DAYS.

AKHBAR EL-YOM'S COLUMNIST KAMAL ABDEL RA'OUF OCTOBER 22 WRITES THAT HE RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM AMBASSADOR WISNER TO ATTEND THE BUSH-DUKAKIS DEBATE. AFTER REVIEWING PARTS OF THE DEBATE, ABDEL RAOUF NOTED THAT, LIKE OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE WAS COMPLETELY ABSENT FROM THE DEBATE. THE COLUMNIST THEN QUOTES AMBASSADOR WISNER AS SAYING THAT THIS YEAR'S ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IS A STRANGE ONE; IT HAS LITTLE INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, BUT FOCUSES ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE US PEOPLE AND THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR PROSPERITY AND WELFARE. CONCLUDING, THE COLUMNIST POINTS OUT THAT IF BUSH WINS, THEN US POLICY TOWARD EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NOT CHANGE MUCH, BUT IF DUKAKIS WINS, THEN HE WILL NEED AT LEAST SIX MONTHS TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

AKHBAR EL-YOM'S WEEKLY COLUMNIST HUSSEIN FAHMY OCTOBER 22 REFERS TO SHAMIR'S STATEMENT THAT ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD LEAD TO A THIRD WORLD WAR. HE WRITES THAT DESPITE WORLD OPPOSITION, ISRAEL STILL CAN COORDINATE WITH THE US AND THE ZIONIST LOBBY TO LAUNCH AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARABS OR AT LEAST DEAL A PRE-EMPTIVE BLOW AT THEM AND THEN AFFECT US RESOLUTIONS AND STANDS IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL. THE COLUMNIST CONCLUDES BY URGING THE ARABS TO BE PREPARED FOR THEIR ENEMY BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

3. EGYPT/USSR. AKHBAR OCTOBER 21 REPORTS THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO SAID IN AN INTERVIEW TO THE KUWAITI PAPER "AL-WATAN" THAT THERE IS AN INVITATION FOR MUBARAK TO VISIT MOSCOW BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. THE

AMBASSADOR SAID MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WILL SHORTLY VISIT

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 CAIRO 25036

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
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LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
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PAGE 02 CAIRO 25036 03 OF 04 241652Z

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, OCTOBER 21-24, 1988
EGYPT AND THE ARAB REGION. SEPARATELY, PAPERS REPORT THE
AMBASSADOR CONFERRED WITH PRIME MINISTER SEDKY ON
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO EGYPTIAN
PROJECTS.

4. EGYPT/GDR. AKHBAR OCTOBER 23 REPORTS THE EAST GERMAN
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ARRIVED IN CAIRO FOR A VISIT FOR A
FEW DAYS.

5. EGYPT/ROMANIA. AKHBAR OCTOBER 21 REPORTS THE FIRST
DEPUTY OF THE ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER WILL ARRIVE IN CAIRO
OCTOBER 23 AT THE HEAD OF AN ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO ATTEND
THE MEETINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE JOINT
EGYPTIAN-ROMANIAN COMMITTEE. HE WILL SIGN A NEW PROTOCOL
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

6. EGYPT/CANADA. ALL PAPERS OCTOBER 22 REPORT THE
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO EXTEND A NON-REIMBURSABLE
GRANT OF 5 MILLION CANADIAN DOLLARS FOR ENERGY PROJECTS IN
THE RED SEA AND THE NEW VALLEY.

7. EGYPT/IMF. AHAM OCTOBER 23 REPORTS A NEW ROUND OF
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF WILL BEGIN IN CAIRO OCTOBER 24
DURING WHICH THE FINAL AGREEMENT ON EGYPT'S LETTER OF
INTENT IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED.

DOMESTIC NEWS

8. INTERVIEW BY MUBARAK. MUBARAK SPOKE ABOUT VARIOUS
DOMESTIC ISSUES IN A LONG INTERVIEW TO AHAM'S EDITOR IN
CHIEF IBRAHIM NAFEI OCTOBER 21. AFTER REVIEWING EGYPT'S
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GRAVE PROBLEMS WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE, MUBARAK SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN DOING HIS BEST TO SERVE EGYPT, AND THAT HE COULD NOT FIND A WAY OTHER THAN BORROWING IN ORDER TO HAVE THESE PROBLEMS RESOLVED. MUBARAK EMPHASIZED THAT THERE IS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN ALGERIA AND WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EGYPT, ADDING "I'M OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE; WE JUST HAVE TO ENDURE THE BURDEN THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT TRANSITIONAL YEARS." SAYING THAT "I CAN'T SPEND MORE THAN LE 2.2 BILLION ANNUALLY ON EDUCATION", MUBARAK REAFFIRMED THAT FREE EDUCATION WILL CONTINUE AND CALLED UPON THE WELL-OFF TO ESTABLISH COOPERATIVE FUNDS TO SET UP CIVIL EDUCATION ESTABLISHMENTS IF THEY WANT TO ACHIEVE FOR THEIR CHILDREN THE DESIRED LEVEL OF EDUCATION. MUBARAK REITERATED THAT HE HAS NO INTENTION OF SELLING THE PUBLIC SECTOR BECAUSE 65 PER CENT OF THE PEOPLE ARE LOW-INCOME EARNERS, AND A SUBSIDIZED PUBLIC SECTOR IS NECESSARY TO OFFER COMMODITIES TO LOW-INCOME EARNERS AT REASONABLE PRICES. "I WANT TO ASK THOSE WHO WONDER AT THE NATURE OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES NOW ? WE APPLY WHAT IS SUITABLE FOR US WHETHER IT IS FROM THE SOCIALIST OR THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY. AT ANY RATE, WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF FINISHING THE FINAL TOUCHES OF A NEW LINE OF MANAGEMENT FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR." MUBARAK STRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND FOR INCREASING EXPORTS. ON THE 50 PER CENT REPRESENTATION OF WORKERS AND FARMERS AT THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, MUBARAK SAID THERE IS NO REASON FOR CHANGING THE LAW ON THIS BECAUSE THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIETY WOULD PROVIDE ALMOST THE SAME PERCENTAGE EVEN IF THIS LAW WERE ABOLISHED. MUBARAK WENT ON TO HAIL THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE

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AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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COMSIXTHFLT
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DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 CAIRO 25036

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
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PAGE 02 CAIRO 25036 04 OF 04 241654Z

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, OCTOBER 21-24, 1988
IMPORTANT CHANGES PERIODICALLY ONLY FOR PUBLIC INTERESTS.

ON THE ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANIES, MUBARAK SAID "WE ONLY

WANT THEM TO PUT THEIR MONEY AND ASSETS IN THE BANKS BECAUSE THEY BELONG TO DEPOSITORS. IF THE HIGH INTEREST THESE COMPANIES OFFER WAS REAL, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PUT HALF ITS BUDGET WITH THESE COMPANIES. ANYWAY, THE MONEY OF THE DEPOSITORS MUST BE RETURNED AND THESE COMPANIES WILL NOT BE LEFT WITHOUT BEING BROUGHT TO ACCOUNT. THIS ISSUE IS NOT A JOKE; THESE COMPANIES MUST RETURN THE DEPOSITORS' MONEY FROM ABROAD AND WE WILL NOT ALLOW ANYONE OF THESE COMPANIES' OWNERS TO STEAL THE PEOPLE'S MONEY BY ANY MEANS."

9. GREATER CAIRO INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS. ALL PAPERS OCTOBER 21 REPORT MUBARAK PAID A VISIT TO THE BIGGEST SEWAGE PROJECT IN THE WORLD IN GREATER CAIRO, AS WELL AS TO DRINKING WATER AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS. MUBARAK PAID THANKS TO THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES WHICH ASSIST ADDITION TO UK AND EC. MUBARAK ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE US GRANT ESTABLISHING 500 SCHOOLS NATIONWIDE.

10. NO PRICE INCREASES UNTIL NEXT YEAR. AHAM OCTOBER 22 REPORTS IN ITS LEAD ITEM THAT MUBARAK HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO IMPOSE ANY PRICE INCREASES WITHIN THE COMING FEW MONTHS AND TO POSTPONE THEM UNTIL NEXT YEAR. HE STIPULATED THAT THE INCREASES SHOULD BE GRADUAL AND TAKE SOCIAL CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT.

11. MILITARY DECREE. ALL PAPERS OCTOBER 21 REPORT PRIME UNCLASSIFIED

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MINISTER SEDKY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY MILITARY RULER, ISSUED A "MILITARY DECREE" PROHIBITING THE (ISLAMIC) INVESTMENT COMPANIES FROM DISPOSING OF THEIR ASSETS FREELY UNTIL AFTER RETURNING THE MONEY TO DEPOSITORS AND OBTAINING THE APPROVAL OF THE MONEY MARKET AUTHORITY. THE DECREE IS EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY FROM JANUARY 1988. ALL PAPERS OCTOBER 23 REPORT THE PROSECUTION HAS STARTED INVESTIGATING AL-RAYAN ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANY BECAUSE OF ITS REFUSAL TO RETURN DOLLARS 400 MILLION FROM ABROAD.

12. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR OCTOBER 24: USD 1 EQUALS PT 231.0 (BUYING) AND PT 231.6 (SELLING).

OPPOSITION NEWS

13. EGYPT/IMF. AL-WAFD OCTOBER 22 REPORTS THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT RECEIVED CONFIRMATION FROM THE SEVEN GREAT INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES THAT THEY WILL EXERT PRESSURE ON THE IMF TO RESPOND TO EGYPT'S REQUESTS. REPORTEDLY, THE ECONOMIC REFORM COURSE WILL BE CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER EGYPTIAN CONCESSIONS THAT MAY CONFLICT WITH SOCIAL CONDITIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO RAISE THE PRICES OF ENERGY, AND COMBINE THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE CENTRAL BANK WITH THE FREE EXCHANGE MARKET WITHIN 18 MONTHS.
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FILM= D880951-0738

DATE= 16 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= DAMASCUS

DRAFTER= n/a

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EO= OA

SUBJECT= SYRIAN LOW PROFILE ON AQABA MEETING

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= MEETING, LIBERATION FRONT, POLITICAL LEADER, FOREIGN RELATIONS, PALESTINIANS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, SY, PLO, (MUBARAK, MOHAMMAD HOSNI), (HUSSEIN I), (ARAFAT, YASSER)

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL KPAL SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN LOW PROFILE ON AQABA MEETING

1. [REDACTED]
2. AS OF OCTOBER 26 THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF OR REFERENCE TO THE AQABA MEETING BETWEEN MUBARAK, HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT IN THE SYRIAN MEDIA. HOWEVER, BOTH ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS ON OCTOBER 25 CRITICIZED ARAFAT'S STATEMENTS (MADE IN AQABA) URGING ARAB CITIZENS IN ISRAEL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS AND VOTE FOR PERES. THE PRESS ASSERTED FORCEFULLY THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SHAMIR AND PERES. AN EDITORIAL IN "AL-BA'TH" ARGUED THAT ALL (SIC) ISRAEL WARS AGAINST THE ARABS WERE, IN FACT, WAGED BY THE LABOR PARTY. THE LATEST CALL BY THE "PALESTINIAN RIGHT", EDITORIAL CONTINUES, RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS AND STRIKES AT ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE; IT PUTS NEGATIVE PRESSURE ON THE INTIFADA AND IS AN IMPLICIT CALL TO STOP RESISTING ISRAEL.

[REDACTED]
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PAGE 02 DAMASC 06225 261507Z

3. KHADDAM'S OCTOBER 25 VISIT TO HUSSEIN IN

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AMMAN WAS THE LEAD STORY IN SYRIAN PRESS. ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS, LEBANON WAS THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THEIR DISCUSSION.

4. COMMENT: THE ABSENCE OF ANY SYRIAN PRESS REPORTING ON THE TRIPARTITE MEETING IN AQABA APPEARS TO BE BASED ON SYRIAN DESIRE NOT TO ANTAGONIZE KING HUSSEIN. THE PRESS HAS CONTINUED ITS NEGATIVE COMMENTARY ON ARAFAT AND HAS, OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS, CARRIED COMMENTARY CRITICAL OF MUBARAK'S REGIME, DESPITE MUBARAK'S REPORTED CONCILIATORY REMARKS IN AQABA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESS HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE HIGH-LEVEL, CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP SHARED BY SYRIA AND JORDAN OVER LEBANON (SIC). AT THIS POINT DISCRETION IS THE BETTER PART OF VALOR FOR SYRIA, WHICH FINDS ITSELF INCREASINGLY POWERLESS TO STOP WHAT IT SEES AS THE MARCH TOWARDS ACCOMMODATION WITH ISRAEL. IGNORING AN IMPORTANT EVENT LIKE THE AQABA MEETING, HOWEVER UNDERSTANDABLE, ONLY INCREASES ONE'S SENSE THAT THIS REGIME IS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER ARAB FRONT-LINE STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS, AND DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION YET.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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THE SECRETARY

NEA:RWMURPHY
NEA:ESWALKER
NEA/IAI:JLHIRSCH
PM/ISP:CDUELFER

OES:RJSNITH INR:RCLARKE
S:LJOHNSON
S/S:MLEVITSKY
S/S-OBTROTTER

IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: TSPA, IS

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY: ISRAEL'S SATELLITE
LAUNCH

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, FOREIGN MINISTER PERES,
AND DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN.

3. BEGIN TEXT: CONGRATULATIONS ON ISRAEL'S SUCCESSFUL
SATELLITE LAUNCH. THIS IMPRESSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVE-
MENT REFLECTS YOUR NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO SCIENTIFIC
EXCELLENCE. ISRAEL'S SPACE PROGRAM WILL CONTRIBUTE NOT
ONLY TO SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES BUT ALSO TO THE GREAT GOAL
OF PEACE ON THE PLANET EARTH. END TEXT.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date. 2/12/97

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TRSE-00 PM-10 CIP-08 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 OES-09
ACDA-12 SCSC-01 USIE-00 SP-02 DCEE-00 SNP-01 C-01
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, SY, IS, UR
SUBJECT: SYRIAN EDITORIAL AND CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI
SATELLITE AND MISSILE

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1. [REDACTED]
2. SYRIAN PRESS HAS CARRIED THE EXPECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING U.S.-ISRAEL COOPERATION IN LAUNCHING A "SPY SATELLITE," SEPTEMBER 19. HOWEVER, A SEPTEMBER 21 QUASI-EDITORIAL IN "AL-BATH" TOOK THE ISSUE BEYOND ARAB-ISRAELI CONCERNS BY SUGGESTING THAT THE LAUNCH MISSILE IS A U.S. ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE DRAWDOWNS.
3. ON BOTH SEPTEMBER 20 AND 21, SYRIAN PRESS CARRIED REPORTS OF THE SEPTEMBER 19 ISRAELI LAUNCH OF A SATELLITE. REPORTS LINKED THE SATELLITE WITH U.S.-ISRAELI COOPERATION, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR COOPERATION IN THE STAR WARS PROGRAM. MOST REPORTS FOCUSED ON THE THREAT POSED TO THE ARAB HOMELAND BY AN ISRAELI

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SPY SATELLITE. A FEATURE ARTICLE OF SOME SIX COLUMNS

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IN "TISHRIN" ON THE 21ST. SAID THE U.S. SPOKESMAN HAD
TRIED TO HIDE US INVOLVEMENT IN THE LAUNCH. THE
ARTICLE WENT ON TO SPECULATE ON ITS MILITARY USE.

4. A QUASI-EDITORIAL IN "AL-BATH" SEPTEMBER 21, MADE
THE EXPECTED ACCUSATIONS THAT THE LAUNCH DEMONSTRATED
ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS FACTORS OF CURRENT STRATEGIC
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. THE PEN-
ULTIMATE PARAGRAPH SWITCHED GEARS, HOWEVER, HIGH-
LIGHTING THE DANGER OF THE MISSILE TO THE PEACE
AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD. A ROUGH TRANSLATION IS
AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE: "ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, THE
SATELLITE IS AN AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO COMPENSATE
FOR ITS AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS TO DESTROY
MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. IT PROVIDES, WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL IN THE STAR
WARS PROGRAM, AND SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER THE EXPERIMENT
WITH WHAT IS CALLED THE ARIHA (?) MISSILE, A MISSILE
CLEARLY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURE AND GOALS." END
QUOTE.

5. COMMENT: DATT WAS VISITED BY SOVIET COUNTERPART
SEPTEMBER 21 ON WHAT HE CALLED AN "URGENT MATTER"
WHICH WAS, IN FACT, SUBJECT OF PARA 4. DATT WILL
REPORT SEPTTEL.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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TAGS: ECPS, PREL, CA

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION -- ISRAELI SATELLITE, CAMPAIGN
/88.

1. THERE WAS ONE ITEM ON ISRAEL IN CANADIAN NEWSPAPERS
SEPT. 22, AND THREE ON THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
EXCERPTS FOLLOW.

2. TORONTO SUN COLUMNIST ERIC MARGOLIS WROTE A PIECE
ENTITLED: "ISRAEL'S EYE IN THE SKY." "THE ARAB NATIONS
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OF THE MIDEAST WILL NOW HAVE TO GET USED TO THE

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UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING THAT SOMEONE IS LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDERS. THE SOMEONE IS, OF COURSE, ISRAEL WHICH JUST LAUNCHED ITS FIRST SATELLITE ON MONDAY.....

3. "WHAT PRECISELY WAS LAUNCHED INTO LOW ORBIT REMAINS SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY. THE BEST GUESS IS THAT IT WAS EITHER A TEST PACKAGE DESIGNED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A FORTHCOMING LAUNCH OF A SPY SATELLITE OR AN ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING SYSTEM TO MONITOR ARAB COMMUNICATIONS....

4. "ISRAEL HAS LONG PUT INTENSE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI-CONTROLLED CHANNEL ON U.S. SPY SATELLITES. THE U.S. MILITARY RESISTED THIS BUT WAS FORCED BY CONGRESS TO GRUDGINGLY SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH EDITED SATELLITE IMAGERY AND ELECTRONIC DATA. AMERICA'S ARAB ALLIES WERE OUTRAGED THAT SUCH DATA WERE PASSED ON TO THEIR ENEMY.

5. "THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF SUCH IMAGERY WAS SEEN IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. SATELLITE PHOTOS PROVIDED BY THE U.S. ALLOWED IRAQ TO SEE WHERE IRANIAN ATTACKS WOULD BE MOUNTED AND TO PREPARE COUNTERMEASURES. EVERYTHING IRAN DID WAS OBSERVED BY U.S. SATELLITES AND QUICKLY RELAYED TO BAGHDAD. DEPRIVED OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, IRAN LOST ITS ONLY CHANCE TO WIN THE WAR.

6. "AN ISRAELI SATELLITE WILL PERFORM A SIMILAR USEFUL ROLE. IT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO SECRETLY MASS TROOPS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK ON

ISRAEL.... MONDAY'S LAUNCH ALSO DELIVERED ANOTHER MESSAGE TO THE ARAB STATES. THE MISSILE THAT LOFTED THE
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SATELLITE WAS LIKELY AN ISRAELI-BUILT JERICHO II.... LAST AUGUST, THE SOVIET UNION PROTESTED TO ISRAEL AFTER THE JERICHO WAS TEST-FIRED INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE MISSILE'S RANGE PUTS THE SOUTHERN USSR UNDER RISK OF ISRAELI NUCLEAR STRIKES....

7. "HOW ISRAEL, WITH A CHRONICALLY AILING ECONOMY, AND UNDER A TIGHT AUSTERITY PROGRAM, MANAGED TO FIND THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS NEEDED TO BUILD A SPY SATELLITE SYSTEM REMAINS A MOST INTRIGUING MYSTERY. ONE MUST

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WONDER IF THIS HUGELY EXPENSIVE PROJECT WAS NOT FUNDED BY THE U.S. THROUGH TOP-SECRET BLACK PROGRAMS. ISRAEL HAS CONFIRMED IT IS A MINI-SUPERPOWER, AND PERHAPS THE WORLD'S FOURTH OR FIFTH-RANKING MILITARY POWER.

8. "ISRAEL IS A WHOLE MILITARY GENERATION AHEAD OF THE ARABS AND WILL LIKELY REMAIN SO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE GREATEST DANGER IS NO LONGER ARAB ARMORED DIVISIONS BUT THE SEETHING REVOLT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE MORAL ROT IT IS CAUSING INSIDE ISRAEL. THE TERRITORIES HAVE BEEN TURNED BY ISRAEL INTO A MAMMOTH PENAL COLONY FOR PALESTINIANS."

9. THE TORONTO STAR'S WASHINGTON COLUMNIST BOB HEBURN WROTE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNDER THE HEADLINE, "TO BUSH, MEDICARE FIRST STEP TO COMMUNISM." "GEORGE BUSH, THE AMERICAN SUPER-PATRIOT LAST SEEN WRAPPING HIMSELF IN THE STARS AND STRIPES AT A NEW JERSEY FLAG FACTORY, IS RAISING CANADA-BASHING TO NEW HEIGHTS OF LUNACY.

10. "IT STARTED LAST MONTH WITH HIS STRIDENT DEFENCE OF

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DAN QUAYLE, HIS RICH RUNNING MATE WHO SERVED HIS COUNTRY
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR BY WRITING PRESS RELEASES FOR THE
NATIONAL GUARD.... BUSH HAILED QUAYLE AS A TRUE AMERICAN,
INSINUATING THAT AMERICANS WHO MOVED TO CANADA WERE A
BUNCH OF SNIVELLING TRAITORS. TODAY, MANY OF THOSE
AMERICANS ARE HARDWORKING CANADIAN CITIZENS.

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11. "NOW BUSH AND HIS SLEAZEBALL HANDLERS ARE
INDIRECTLY LASHING OUT AT CANADA'S UNIVERSAL HEALTH

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INSURANCE SCHEME, SUGGESTING IT IS THE EQUIVALENT OF A COMMUNIST PLOT TO RUIN THE ECONOMY....THE BUSH GOAL IS TO SCARE THE LIVING DAYLIGHTS OUT OF AMERICANS. WHY? BECAUSE BUSH FEARS MANY AMERICANS MIGHT VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE MICHAEL DUKAKIS BECAUSE OF HIS PROMISE TO PUSH FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE....

12. "DUKAKIS PROPOSED TUESDAY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRE EMPLOYERS TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THEIR WORKERS....HIS PLAN IS BASED ON A SIMILAR SCHEME APPROVED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN HIS HOME STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. THE ROOTS OF THAT PLAN EMERGED FROM DUKAKIS' CLOSE INVESTIGATION OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM....

13. "BUSH HATES THE CANADIAN SYSTEM. HE HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED MANDATED INSURANCE BENEFITS.... AMERICAN HEALTH CARE FOR THE WORKING POOR IS A NATIONAL DISGRACE. BESIDES SOUTH AFRICA IT IS THE ONLY MAJOR COUNTRY THAT FAILS TO PROVIDE BASIC HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS....

14. "DUKAKIS SEEMS EAGER TO EMBRACE FOREIGN SOLUTIONS -- MANY OF THEM CANADIAN -- TO DEEP-SEATED PROBLEMS. HE FAVORS CANADA'S APPROACH ON ACID RAIN, NOTICE OF PLANT CLOSINGS, AND NOW ON MEDICAL INSURANCE. HOWEVER, BUSH IS TYING HIMSELF EVER CLOSER TO AMERICAN IMAGES: THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE, THE FLAG, THE RIGHT FOR EMPLOYERS TO LET THEIR LOW-PAID WORKERS FEND FOR THEMSELVES ON HEALTH CARE, THE THINLY VEILED FOREIGN BASHING...."

15. THE NEXT CAMPAIGN ITEM APPEARED IN THE OTTAWA

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CITIZEN AND WAS WRITTEN BY SOUTHAM NEWS' WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT PETER CALAMAI UNDER THE HEADLINE, "DIRTY TRICKS SURFACE IN U.S. ELECTION, AS IN PAST." "FOR U.S. POLITICS, IT WAS A TYPICAL WEEK IN THE DIRTY TRICKS DEPARTMENT. THE DEMOCRATS STARTED A RUMOR THAT A TOP CAMPAIGN AIDE TO GEORGE BUSH WAS ONCE ARRESTED IN NEW YORK'S CENTRAL PARK ON A FIREARMS CHARGE. THE REPUBLICANS TRIED TO REVIVE A STORY THAT MICHAEL DUKAKIS IS HOMOSEXUAL....

16. "VETERAN CAMPAIGN-WATCHERS CITE THREE DEVELOPMENTS

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WHICH ARE PUSHING THE POLITICKING TOWARDS THE NASTIER
END OF THE SPECTRUM: THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPELLING
NATIONAL ISSUES, THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF DIRECT
MAIL AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND THE CONTINUED RISE
OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL CONSULTANTS...."

17. "JESSE IS DUKE'S ALBATROSS" WAS THE TITLE OF A
TORONTO SUN PIECE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON COLUMNIST ALLAN
FOTHERINGHAM. "THERE IS ONE PARTICULAR IMAGE THAT
REMAINS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION IN STEAMY ATLANTA
IN JULY. IT IS THE SIGHT OF JESSE JACKSON ON STAGE, AND
ALL THE JACKSON CHILDREN ON STAGE... ALL OF IT TAKING
UP AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME IN A CONVENTION THAT WAS
SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO MICHAEL DUKAKIS...."

18. "JACKSON, WITH HIS ENORMOUS EGO, EXTRACTED SO MUCH
FROM DUKAKIS IN RETURN FOR BEING A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE
TEAM THAT IT LEFT THE QUESTION OF WHO ACTUALLY IS IN
CHARGE OF THE PARTY. IT ESPECIALLY LEFT THE QUESTION
WITH THE VOTERS DUKAKIS NEEDS MOST IN NOVEMBER: THE

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SO-CALLED REAGAN DEMOCRATS. RONALD REAGAN RAN AWAY
WITH THE 1980 ELECT

ON AND SCORED A LANDSLIDE IN 1984 BY
STEALING AWAY THE WHITE, BLUE-COLLAR VOTE IN THE
SOUTH....

19. "POOR DUKAKIS, WITH ALL HIS OTHER PROBLEMS, CAN'T

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REALLY WIN WITH GUY WHO HOGGED ALL THAT TIME IN
ATLANTA. HE KNOWS THAT THOSE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS DON'T

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FANCY JACKSON IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND HE DOESN'T WANT TO REINFORCE THOSE VIEWS BY EMBRACING JESSE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE MUST FIND SOMETHING USEFUL FOR JACKSON TO DO -- OR RISK THE TICKING GRENADE CALLED JESSE BLOWING UP A MAJOR DISPUTE, TO THE DELIGHT OF THE BUSHITES.

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FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3429
INFO EC COLLECTIVE
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AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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PARIS ALSO FOR DCM AND CONGEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, XE, EEC, PLO, PTER
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REFS: A)BRUSSELS 12596, B)STRASBOURG 30728

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1. SUMMARY: THE YASSAR ARAFAT VISIT TO THE SOCIALIST GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG SEPTEMBER 13, 14 IS BEING TERMED HERE AS A MEDIA VICTORY FOR THE PLO. BUT NOT WITHOUT SOME COST TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE FRENCH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT. THE FRENCH JEWISH COMMUNITY WAS DEEPLY ANGERED BY THE VISIT, AND WITH DUMAS' MEETING WITH ARAFAT. DUMAS REPORTEDLY PUSHED ARAFAT HARD TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. THE WISDOM OF THE INVITATION AND MEETING WILL BE DEBATED FOR SOME TIME. CRITICS CHARGE THAT THE VISIT PROVIDED THE PLO WITH UNDUE LEGITIMACY AND ARAFAT WITH "AN UNWARRANTED IMAGE AS MODERATE PEACE SEEKER." SUPPORTERS VIEW THE VISIT AS STRENGTHENING MODERATE GROUPS IN THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND INCREASING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE PLO. END SUMMARY.

2. YASSAR ARAFAT ARRIVED IN STRASBOURG SEPTEMBER 13TH, COMING BY AIR FROM TUNIS. HIS TWO "MYSTERE 20" JETS LANDED AT STRASBOURG ENTZHEIM AIRPORT, OFFLOADING THEIR 46 PASSAGERS (INCLUDING 15 ARMED BODYGUARDS) AT THE MILITARY BASE TERMINAL. HE WAS MET BY IBRAHIM SOUSS, PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN FRANCE, EP SOCIALIST GROUP CHAIRMAN RUDI ARNDT AND TWO VICE CHAIRMEN, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENCH PREFECTURE. SECURITY FOR HIS ARRIVAL WAS PARTICULARLY TIGHT. HIS ARRIVAL TIME WAS KEPT SECRET TIL THE FINAL MOMENTS. GENDARMES LINED THE ROUTE INTO STRASBOURG AND SURROUNDED BOTH HIS HOTEL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BUILDING. SPECIALLY TRAINED MARKSMAN WATCHED FROM THE TOP OF NEIGHBORING STRUCTURES. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT EVEN PROVIDED ARAFAT

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WITH A FLEET OF THREE FULLY ARMORED RENAULT 25S AND A SCORE OF ARMED POLICE GUARDS. THEY WISHED TO ASSURE HIS SAFETY DURING HIS STAY ON FRENCH SOIL.

3. A GROUP OF SOME 200 ARAFAT SUPPORTERS WERE BROUGHT TO HIS HOTEL MINUTES BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL. THIS WAS THE ONLY DEMONSTRATION ARAFAT WAS TO SEE. A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION HAD WOUND ITS WAY THROUGH STRASBOURG EARLIER IN THE DAY, BEFORE ARAFAT HAD LANDED. THE LOCAL JEWISH COMMUNITY HAD COME OUT IN FORCE TO PROTEST THE

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ARAFAT VISIT. THEIR MARCH WAS PEACEFUL, FULLY IN CHARACTER WITH THE JEWISH HIGH HOLIDAY SEASON. A CROSS SECTION OF LOCALLY ELECTED OFFICIALS LED THE 2000 PERSON PROTEST MARCH, INCLUDING STRASBOURG MAYOR (UDF SENATOR) MARCEL RUDLOFF, AND UDF SENATE LEADER DANIEL HOEFFEL. COE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT LOUIS JUNG, AND PIERRE PFLIMLIN, PAST PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ALSO JOINED THE PROTEST MARCHERS. THE ONLY NOTED FRENCH SOCIALIST IN THE GROUP WAS STRASBOURG SUBURB MAYOR ALFRED MULLER (WHO IS CONSIDERED A CLOSE FRIEND OF MICHEL ROCARD). A NOISY COUNTERMARCH WAS HELD IN THE AFTERNOON GROUPING TOGETHER SOME 500 PRO ARAFAT DEMONSTRATORS. THEY WERE JOINED BY COMMUNIST EX MINISTER OF HEALTH JACK RALITE, AND SENATOR CHARLES LEDERMANN.

4. THE DAYS ACTIVITIES WERE CENTERED WITHIN THE PALAIS D'EUROPE: MEETINGS WITH THE SOCIALIST GROUP (165 MEMBERS), THE COMMUNIST GROUP (48 MEMBERS), THE ECOLOGISTS (20 MEMBERS), PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT LORD PLUMB, GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER CARLOS PAPOULIAS, EC COMMISSIONER CLAUDE CHEYSSON, AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ROLAND DUMAS. ARAFAT ALSO HAD SEVERAL SUCCESSFUL ENCOUNTERS WITH THE PRESS, INCLUDING A CONCLUDING PRESS CONFERENCE.

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5. ARAFAT MET PRIVATELY FOR 56 MINUTES WITH ROLAND DUMAS IN A SPECIAL OFFICE PROVIDED BY LORD PLUMB, 26 MINUTES LONGER THAN SCHEDULED. THE FRENCH BILLED THE MEETING AS INFORMAL AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARAFAT'S

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VISIT TO THE SOCIALIST EP GROUP. DUMAS MAINTAINED THAT
IT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION OF ARAFAT IN

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FRANCE. HE REFUSED TO ANSWER PRESS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS, MAKING ONLY A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PRESS (SEE BELOW). DUMAS REPORTEDLY ENCOURAGED ARAFAT TO TAKE A CLEARER STAND ON ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BOUNDARIES. HE TOLD ASSOCIATES THAT ARAFAT APPEARED TO HIM MORE FORTHCOMING, AND MORE REALISTIC ABOUT ISRAEL, THAN DURING HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH ARAFAT. THE DUMAS ENCOUNTER OVERSHADOWED ARAFAT'S MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER CAROLOS PAPOULIAS WHO HAD FLOWN TO STRASBOURG ESPECIALLY FOR THE OCCASION. THE LATTER MEETING RECEIVED ONLY LIMITED PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL FRENCH AND ENGLISH PRESS.

6. DUMAS PRESS STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS FROM FRENCH): "I MET WITH MR. ARAFAT TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO DO SO BEFORE THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING. I TOLD HIM THAT FRANCE IS A FRIEND OF ISRAEL, AND THAT ISRAEL WANTS PEACE. BUT ISRAEL HAS NEITHER PEACE OR SECURITY. THE PALESTINIANS ALSO WANT PEACE, BUT THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT IS HARDENING. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. FIRST WE MUST TALK TO THE PARTIES AND CONVINCE THEM TO ACT. I TOLD HIM THAT ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE WITHIN SAFE AND ACKNOWLEDGED BORDERS. THE PALESTINE PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO A HOMELAND AND TO ASSURE THEIR OWN DESTINY. THIS FUTURE CAN ONLY BE BUILT BY DIALOGUE. THE FACILITATING SUCH A DIALOGUE; IN BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER; GETTING THEM TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER, HELPING THEM CARRY OUT A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, CONFIRMING THE PRINCIPLES OF ACCORD THEY ESTABLISH, AND GUARANTEEING THEIR AGREEMENTS. THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE OF AN

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BRING TOGETHER ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ANY GESTURE WHICH COULD LEAD THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL, AND TO CONSTRUCT A POLITICAL PROGRAM THAT IS REALISTIC AND JUST IS DESIRABLE. FRANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE ANY SUCH ACTION. SIMILARLY, FRANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE ANY GESTURE THAT WOULD LEAD ISRAEL TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, AND TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS THEREFROM. THIS IS WHAT I TOLD MR. ARAFAT, ASKING HIM IN TURN IF THE MOMENT HAD NOT COME TO SILENCE THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND TO

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GIVE THE FLOOR TO THE NEGOTIATORS." DUMAS MAINTAINED THAT FRANCE'S POLICIES VIS A VIS ISRAEL AND THE PLO HAD NOT CHANGED. IT WAS PRECISELY AS STATED BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IN JERUSALEM IN 1982, HE TOLD THE PRESS.

7. REACTION'S TO THE ARAFAT VISIT, AND TO THE MEETING WITH DUMAS WERE VARIED. FRENCH MEPS ALFRED COSTE-FLORET (CONSERVATIVE) AND SIMONE VEIL, PRESIDENT OF THE LIBERAL GROUP REPORTEDLY TERMED THE VISIT AS "HARMFUL TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND TOTALLY INOPPORTUNE." PAST EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT PIERRE PFLIMLIN WAS ALSO VERY CRITICAL OF LORD PLUMB FOR RECEIVING ARAFAT. "WE HAVE NOT ADVANCED ONE IOTA TOWARDS PEACE," HE SAID. CRITICS CHARGED THAT THE VISIT PROVIDED THE PLO WITH UNDUE LEGITIMACY AND ARAFAT WITH "AN UNWARRANTED IMAGE AS MODERATE PEACE SEEKER." FRENCH UDF POLITICAL LEADERS, MEETING IN PARIS, ALSO STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE ROCARD GOVERNMENT FOR AUTHORIZING DUMAS' MEETING WITH ARAFAT. THEY FOUND THE MEETING "SHOCKING" AND TERMED THE ROCARD GOVERNMENT AS "TWO FACED" WHEN IT CAME TO ISRAEL AND THE PLO. GISCARD D'ESTAING ALSO INDICATED "SUPRISE" THAT MITTERRAND AND ROCARD WOULD AUTHORIZE SUCH A MEETING AT THIS TIME. THE ALSATIAN FRENCH SOCIALISTS BROKE WITH THEIR MOTHER PARTY, CALLING THE

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ACTION EUR-00

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

SECTION 03 OF 03 STRASBOURG 31259

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE PGARLAND, EUR/WE AND NEA
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR DCM AND CONGEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, XE, EEC, PLO, PTER
SUBJECT: ARAFAT VISIT TO STRASBOURG

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VISIT "A SERIOUS MISTAKE," AND "INOPPORTUNE."
8. FRANCE'S 700,000 MEMBER JEWISH COMMUNITY, THE

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LARGEST IN EUROPE, IS REPORTED TO BE "ANGRY AND UPSET" OVER THE ARAFAT VISIT. THEY ARE EVEN MORE DISTURBED BY THE POSITIVE PRESS REACTION. SOME JEWISH LEADERS HAVE WARNED THAT THE JEWISH COMMUNITY WILL NOT QUICKLY FORGET. IT WILL REFLECT ITSELF IN SEVERAL FUTURE ELECTIONS, ONE CONTACT SAID. HE ARGUED THAT THE JEWISH VOTE IN FRANCE IS A SWING VOTE AND THAT THE DUMAS MEETING MAY COST THE SOCIALISTS IN THE UPCOMING CANTONAL, MUNICIPAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. BUT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HAS ALREADY BEGUN TAKING DAMAGE CONTROL STEPS. ISRAEL AMBASSADOR SOFER HAS CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL PRESIDENT CHAIM HERZOG WILL VISIT FRANCE BEFORE YEAR'S END.

9. THERE WAS ALSO STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE VISIT AND DUMAS-ARAFAT MEETING. ARAFAT'S TRIP TO STRASBOURG WAS INTENDED, ONE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONTACT TOLD CONGEN, TO PURPOSEFULLY HEIGHTEN HIS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE PRIOR TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING. THE MODERATE PLO WING, WHICH ARAFAT NOW CALLS HIS OWN, NEEDS AS MUCH STRENGTH AS IT CAN GATHER FOR THE CRUCIAL COUNCIL MEETING, HE SAID. THAT IS WHY THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER CAME, THAT IS WHY DUMAS CAME, WITH THE FULL AGREEMENT OF THE ELYSEE. LE MONDE ALSO STATED THAT THE DECISION FOR DUMAS TO MEET ARAFAT CAME FROM MITTERAND. HE WAS CONCERNED, THE ARTICLE SAID, THAT SHAMIR WAS TOO OBSTINATE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE WEST BANK. IF FRANCE WANTS TO HELP IN A SETTLEMENT, IT MUST TALK TO ALL PARTIES, THE ARTICLE SAID. THE FIGARO QUOTED GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS AS DESCRIBING ARAFAT AS "A MODERATE WHO WAS
[REDACTED]

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SEACHING FOR SOLUTIONS." "ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT FACT AND TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT," PAPOULIAS SAID. EC COMMISSIONER CLAUDE CHEYSSON REPORTEDLY CALLED THE MEETING A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY AND INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT ARAFAT HAD INDICATED A FIRM COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT, AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE PROCESS AND FIRM GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. OTHER DEFENDERS ARGUED THAT ARAFAT HAD EXTENDED THE OLIVE BRANCH AND HAD GONE AS FAR AS HE COULD GO, PRIOR TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING, TO SIGNA HIS ATTENTION FOR PEACE. THE FIGARO

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ALSO REPORTED THAT THE ARAFAT VISIT AND THE PALESTINE
10. IF SEDUCING THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA WAS HIS
OBJECTIVE, ARAFAT SUCEEDED. AND HIS AUDIENCE WAS
LARGE. SOME 380 MEMBERS OF THE PRESS SIGNED UP FOR THE
ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE. ONE COULD HARDLY SEE OVER THE
WALL OF CAMERAS. THE DERNIERE NOUVELLE D'ALSACE CALLED
HIM AN "EXCELLENT ACTOR" PORTRAYING A GENTLE, ALMOST
LIKEABLE CHARACTER." OTHER PRESS LINES ALSO READ
FAVORABLE: "HE DEFENDED HIS CAUSE EXCELLENTLY WITH
ALMOST DIABOLIC SMOOTHNESS." "HE SPEAKS PEACE, HE OFFERS
HIS HAND." "HE SEEKS AN ISRAELI DE GAULLE, WITH THE
COURAGE TO MAKE PEACE." "HE WISHES ISRAELIS A HAPPY NEW
YEAR AND JEWS A CHANA TOVA." BUT THE PRESS CONCLUDES
ALSO THAT "HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY." "NO CLEAR ANSWERS
TO ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS -- PERHAPS SOME NUANCES OPEN TO
INTERPRETION."
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PAGE 01 STRASB 30728 121539Z
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STRASBOURG 30728

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE PGARLAND AND EC COLLECTIVE,

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: EEC, PLO, PTER, PREL, COE

SUBJECT: ARAFAT VISIT TO STRASBOURG

REF: BRUSSELS 12195

1. LOCAL SOURCES INDICATE THAT FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER
ROLAND DUMAS IS PLANNING TO MEET WITH PLO LEADER YASSAR
ARAFAT DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG SEPTEMBER 13, 14, 1988. ARAFAT
IS VISITING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT THE INVITATION OF
THE SOCIALIST GROUP. PROTESTS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE

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MEETING HAVE BEEN REPORTEDLY LODGED WITH THE FRENCH

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FOREIGN MINISTRY BY FRENCH JEWISH COMMUNITY PRESIDENT
THEO KLEIN AND ISRAEL AMBASSADOR OVADIA SOFFER.

2. QUAI OFFICIALS ALLEGEDLY FAVOR A MEETING WITH ARAFAT AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS A WAY TO INSERT DUMAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. THE EP PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNE SETTING FOR AN INFORMAL, NON COMMITTAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN DUMA AND ARAFAT, THEY REPORTEDLY BELIEVE. DUMAS WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO STRESS TO ARAFAT THE NEED FOR BOLDER STEPS TOWARD RECONCILIATION WITH ISRAEL. THIS WOULD INCLUDE ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PEACE PLAN.

3. COUNCIL OF EUROPE LEADERSHIP, WHICH SHARES THE PALAIS DE EUROPE WITH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, HAS TURNED DOWN PLO OVERTURES TO MEET ALSO WITH ARAFAT. SOME COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARIANS, HOWEVER, MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE ARAFAT VISIT. SPANISH SOCIALIST MIGUEL MARTINEZ WILL BE FLYING BACK FROM A GENEVA MEETING OF THE COE ASSEMBLY'S POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS A POSSIBLE COE SPONSORED PARLIAMENTARY MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE.

4. PROTESTS AGAINST THE ARAFAT VISIT ARE PLANNED BY EUROPEAN JEWISH COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS. A PEACEFUL MARCH AND PRAYER SERVICE ARE TO BE HELD IN FRONT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BUILDING. GIVEN THE JEWISH NEW YEAR HOLIDAY, SPECIAL DEROGATION'S FROM RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ARE BEING SOUGHT FROM PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN RABBIS. THE LOCAL DEMONSTRATION WILL ALSO BE LED BY STRASBOURG MAYOR (SENATOR) MARCEL RUDLOFF, FRENCH CENTER SENATE LEADER DANIEL HOFFEL AND ALSATIAN SENATOR

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(AND PRESIDENT OF THE COE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY) LOUIS JUNG. PIERRE PFLIMLIN, PAST PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, IS ALSO EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEMONSTRATION AS A COUNTERPOINT TO LORD PLUMB'S RECEPTION OF ARAFAT. A SMALL PRO-ARAFAT COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION IS ALSO PLANNED BY LOCAL MIDDLE EAST STUDENT GROUPS.

5. THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES ARE TAKING WIDE RANGING PRECAUTION'S FOR ARAFAT'S SECURITY, INCLUDING LARGE

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SCALE POLICE SURVEILLANCE THROUGHOUT THE CITY. ARAFAT'S
ENTOURAGE IS PLACED AT AROUND 50 PERSONS. FRENCH VISA'S
WERE ISSUED TO ARAFAT'S PARTY ON A SOMEWHAT BELATED, BUT
EXPEDITED BASIS. ARAFAT, HIMSELF, APPARENTLY DOES NOT
NEED A VISA TO TRAVEL TO FRANCE.
COMRAS

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO EC COLLECTIVE.

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ACTION NEA-11

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SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12596

FROM USEC

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE GARLAND

DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, XE EEC, PLO
SUBJECT: ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT

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REFS: (A) BRUSSELS 12195, (B) BRUSSELS 12512

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1. SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION. ARAFAT'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SEPTEMBER 14 TOOK PLACE BEFORE A PACKED AUDITORIUM WITH TIGHT SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT. SURROUNDED BY A LARGE ENTOURAGE, ARAFAT TOOK QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS BUT MADE NO OPENING REMARKS. HIS SPEECH THE PREVIOUS EVENING TO A CLOSED MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST GROUP (TEXT FAXED TO EUR/RPE) HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED TO US PRIVATELY BY BOTH ISRAELI DIPLOMATS AND SOCIALIST GROUP MEMBERS AT THE EP AS "NOTHING NEW." TO SOME OBSERVERS HERE, ARAFAT APPEARED SOMEWHAT MORE

OPEN IN HIS RESPONSES AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. ARAFAT SAID THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) WOULD MEET IN OCTOBER AND CONSIDER THE OPTION OF SETTING UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THE PLO WOULD TAKE OVER FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXPENSES IN THE WEST BANK FOLLOWING JORDAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE AREA. HE SAID HIS MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS THIS MORNING WAS "EXTREMELY POSITIVE" BUT HE DECLINED TO GO INTO DETAILS. (FOR HIS PART, PAPOULIAS, WE UNDERSTAND, TOLD A GROUP OF JOURNALISTS THAT ARAFAT WAS A RESPONSIBLE INTERLOCUTOR AND THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.) ARAFAT TOLD THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS MEETING THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 14 WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS. HE SAID THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO HAVE DUMAS MEET WITH ARAFAT WAS "BRAVE" GIVEN THE CURRENT FRENCH LOCAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ARAFAT SAID HE WISHED A HAPPY NEW YEAR TO ALL ISRAELIS AND JEWS. BEFORE ARAFAT TOOK QUESTIONS, RUDI ARNDT, SOCIALIST GROUP CHAIRMAN, SAID HE

[REDACTED]

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WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE PRESS HAD FOCUSED ON THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN STRASBOURG RATHER THAN ARAFAT'S VISIT TO THE SOCIALIST GROUP AND HAD IGNORED THE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE AIRPORT TO WELCOME ARAFAT. WE HAVE HEARD ESTIMATES OF BETWEEN 500 AND 1,000 PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEMONSTRATION AGAINST ARAFAT. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE ARE BELOW. END OF SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION.

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3. ASKED FOR THE DATE FOR THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND WHAT HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE ABOUT A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, ARAFAT SAID THE PNC WOULD MEET "NEXT MONTH" AND WOULD DISCUSS OPTIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE PLO LEGAL AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE TO THE VACUUM LEFT BY KING HUSSEIN'S LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE WEST BANK. THE OPTIONS WERE: (A) AN INTERNATIONAL MANDATE BASED ON UN RESOLUTIONS FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND (B) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. ARAFAT SAID HE WONDERED IF EUROPE WOULD RECOGNIZE SUCH A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. EUROPE'S RESPONSE WAS VERY IMPORTANT.

PLO RESPONSIBILITIES IN WEST BANK

4. ARAFAT SAID THAT FOLLOWING KING HUSSEIN'S ACTION, THE PLO HAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 23,000 PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS WHO RECEIVED PAYMENT FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THE PLO

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ACTION NEA-11

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12596

FROM USEC

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE GARLAND

DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, IS, XE EEC, PLO

SUBJECT: ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN
HAS DECIDED TO SHOULDER THE "ENTIRE FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC,
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY." HE ALSO SAID

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HE HAD DECIDED TO APPLY JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN LAW IN
GAZA AND THE WEST BANK UNTIL NEW LAWS ARE PASSED.

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TALKING TO ISRAEL

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5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM A.B. NATHAN OF THE VOICE OF PEACE, ARAFAT SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO MEET WITH ANYONE REPRESENTING ISRAEL. HE SAID, "I AM EXTENDING THE HAND OF PEACE."

MEETING WITH PAPOULIAS

6. ARAFAT CHARACTERIZED HIS MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS AS "EXTREMELY POSITIVE." THEY HAD, HE SAID, A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO COOPERATE TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THEY DISCUSSED "MORE DELICATE ISSUES" WHICH HE DID NOT REVEAL.

QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE MEETING OF ARAFAT WITH EC FOREIGN MINISTERS

7. A JOURNALIST ASKED WHETHER PAPOULIAS HAD GIVEN ARAFAT ANY INDICATION WHETHER PAPOULIAS AND HIS EC COLLEAGUES INTENDED TO INVITE HIM TO MEET WITH THE EC FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL. NO ANSWER WAS GIVEN AS RUDY ARNDT, SOCIALIST GROUP CHAIRMAN, JUMPED IN AT THIS POINT
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INFERRING THAT THE QUESTION CONCERNED AN INVITATION TO SPEAK BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. HOWEVER, AN EC PERMDEL CONTACT WHO WAS PRESENT, RECALLED PRIVATELY THAT THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD MET WITH JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN NOT LONG AGO IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION AND HE SUGGESTED THE UNANSWERED QUESTION UNDOUBTEDLY REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMILAR MEETING WITH ARAFAT.

MEETING WITH DUMAS

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7. ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT HIS MEETING LATER IN THE DAY WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS IN STRASBOURG, ARAFAT COMMENTED THAT ONE MUST REMEMBER THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME HE HAD MET WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS. HE SAID IT WAS A "BRAVE DECISION" BY THE FRENCH AT THE "HIGHEST LEVEL TO TAKE IN AN ELECTION PERIOD."

GETTING THE US AND BRITAIN TO RECOGNIZE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

8. THE UK, ARAFAT SAID, HAD A MORAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT HAS AN "HISTORICAL DUTY TO CORRECT ITS MISTAKE." WITH REGARD TO THE US, ARAFAT REFERRED TO WILSONIAN PRINCIPLES. HE SAID THE US HAD RECOGNIZED ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF UN RESOLUTION 181, WHICH CALLED FOR CREATION OF BOTH A JEWISH STATE AND A PALESTINIAN STATE. HE SAID WE ASKED THE US TO "BE MORE FAIR."

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ACTION NEA-11

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12596

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DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, XE EEC, PLO
SUBJECT: ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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9. ASKED WHETHER HE FAVORED BUSH OR DUKAKIS, ARAFAT

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SAID THAT IT WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE TO DECIDE. HE SAID HE HOPED THE NEW PRESIDENT
WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO SOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE
ARMS RACE, ETC.

ON THE CAIRO DECLARATION

10. ASKED ABOUT THE CAIRO DECLARATION, ARAFAT ACCUSED
ISRAEL OF ENGAGING IN TERRORISM. HE SAID THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WERE THE VICTIMS OF ISRAELI TERRORISM.

ISRAELI ELECTION

11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER PERES OR
SHAMIR WAS THE MORE CAPABLE OF PROMOTING PEACE, ARAFAT
SAID HE WAS "LOOKING FOR A DEGAULLE OF ISRAEL." KINGON

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= HAMAS-PFLP CHALLENGE TO THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3860, 88 JERUSALEM 3614

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TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, IS, PLO

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Date 2/12/97

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03939

PARIS FOR WINN, LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KPAL, KIL, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: HAMAS-PFLP CHALLENGE TO THE UNIFIED
LEADERSHIP

REFS: A) JERUSALEM 3860, B) JERUSALEM 3614

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. THE WEST BANK AND EAST JERUSALEM
LARGELY ADHERED TO A NOVEMBER 29 GENERAL STRIKE
CALLED BY HAMAS AND THE PFLP TO MARK THE
ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1947 UN PARTITION
RESOLUTION. THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF
THE UPRISING (UNLU), IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PNC'S ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 181, HAD NOT

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03939 01 OF 02 301443Z

CALLLED FOR A STRIKE. HOWEVER, IT IS UNCLEAR
WHETHER THE WIDESPREAD OBSERVANCE OF THE STRIKE
INDICATES THE POWER OF HAMAS AND/OR THE PFLP,
WHO REJECT A TWO-STATE SOLUTION, OR JUST
INERTIA. IN ANY CASE, THE UNITY OF THE
INTIFADA'S UNDERGROUND LEADERSHIP, IN WHICH

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FATAH AND THE PFLP HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN THE PAST, IS FRAYING. END SUMMARY.

3. THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST HAMAS AND THE PFLP USED THE NOVEMBER 29 ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1947 UN PARTITION VOTE TO CHALLENGE THE AUTHORITY OF UNLU IN THE WEST BANK. NOVEMBER 29 HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN A DAY OF STRIKES AND PROTEST AGAINST THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE. WITH THE PNC'S ACCEPTANCE OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 181 AS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE, UNLU DID NOT CALL A GENERAL STRIKE FOR NOVEMBER 29 IN ITS LATEST LEAFLET, NUMBER 29 (REF A). INSTEAD, THE LEAFLET URGED THAT THE DAY BE MARKED BY THE RAISING OF FLAGS AND ESCALATION OF THE INTIFADA.

4. HAMAS AND THE PFLP, HOWEVER, SIGNALLED THEIR REJECTION OF 181 AND THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE BY CALLING FOR A NOVEMBER 29 GENERAL STRIKE. IN ADDITION TO CALLING THE STRIKE, HAMAS LEAFLET NUMBER 32 DENOUNCED 181 AS "A TREASONOUS RESOLUTION WHICH DESERVED REJECTION" AND TERMED ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE ISRAEL IN DIALOGUE "MERELY A WASTE OF TIME AND A CONTINUATION OF DEGRADATION." AN ALTERNATE LEAFLET 29, APPARENTLY ISSUED BY THE PFLP, REJECTED 242,

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03939 01 OF 02 301443Z

DEMANDED THE TOTAL LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, AND CALLED FOR A NOVEMBER 29 STRIKE IN PLACE OF THE NOVEMBER 28 DATE CONTAINED IN THE UNLU-AUTHORIZED VERSION. THE PFLP ALSO ISSUED A LEAFLET IN ITS OWN NAME DENYING THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS BOUND BY THE PNC'S ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND CALLING FOR SUPPORT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE, ADHERENCE TO PREVIOUS PNC DECISIONS, AND AN ESCALATION OF THE UPRISING.

5. IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO THE CONTRADICTORY STRIKE CALLS, PFLP-FATAH CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN NABLUS. A SPECIAL UNLU LEAFLET ISSUED IN RAMALLAH SPECIFICALLY CALLED ON SHOPS TO REMAIN OPEN ON NOVEMBER 29. THE NOVEMBER 28 STRIKE WAS UNIVERSALLY OBSERVED. IN THE WAKE OF THE U.S. REJECTION OF ARAFAT'S VISA APPLICATION, HOWEVER, RUMORS CIRCULATED THAT UNLU WOULD CALL STRIKES FOR NOVEMBER 29 AND 30 IN PROTEST. THUS, MANY

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SHOP OWNERS WERE UNCERTAIN WHAT THE PARTY LINE WAS. IN THE END, THE NOVEMBER 29 STRIKE WAS WIDELY OBSERVED IN THE WEST BANK. IN EAST JERUSALEM, WHERE PREVIOUS HAMAS STRIKE CALLS HAD LARGELY GONE UNHEEDED, SHOPS WERE SHUTTERED AND MANY SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED. STORES FAILED TO OPEN IN HEBRON AND JERICHO. RAMALLAH, WHICH WAS SEALED OFF FROM ITS ENVIRONS BY IDF ROADBLOCKS, REPORTED TOTAL ADHERENCE TO THE STRIKE. IN NABLUS, THE STRIKE WAS ENFORCED BY JOINT HAMAS-PFLP GANGS CHANTING "PALESTINE IS MUSLIM." ONLY IN BETHLEHEM DID SHOPS OPEN. AS

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03939 02 OF 02 301443Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 EUR-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 PA-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 /046 W
-----264153 301502Z /46

O 301438Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4163
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03939

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PARIS FOR WINN, LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KPAL, KIL, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: HAMAS-PFLP CHALLENGE TO THE UNIFIED
LEADERSHIP

MANY AS HALF WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHUT BY HAMAS
SUPPORTERS, AND SOME CLASHES WITH FATAH
SUPPORTERS WERE REPORTED. (DESPITE UNCERTAINTY,
SHOPS AND SCHOOLS OPENED NORMALLY NOVEMBER 30.)

6. COMMENT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER
MOST PALESTINIANS OBSERVED THE NOVEMBER 29
STRIKE OUT OF SUPPORT FOR HAMAS AND/OR THE PFLP,
PROTEST OVER THE U.S. REFUSAL TO ISSUE ARAFAT A
VISA, OR MERELY OUT OF HABIT. AS INDICATED REF
B, PLO ACCEPTANCE OF 181 CROSSED A HAMAS RED
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03939 02 OF 02 301443Z

LINE AND HAS SPURRED INCREASED AND MORE OPEN
OPPOSITION FROM THE FUNDAMENTALISTS. THE PFLP
ACTION IN SUPPORTING THE HAMAS STRIKE CALL IS
POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS, INDICATING THAT THE
UNITY OF THE UNDERGROUND INTIFADA LEADERSHIP IN
THE TERRITORIES, IN WHICH FATAH AND PFLP HAVE
COOPERATED ALTHOUGH UNEASILY IN THE PAST, IS
FRAYING. END COMMENT.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88COTONO03448

FILM= D881047-0052

DATE= 29 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= COTONOU

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ABIDJAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PLO DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD: -- BENINESE REACTION

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 380788, 88 STATE 383930

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SOVEREIGNTY, GOVERNMENT REACTION, ENDORSEMENT, VISA, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= PREL, BN, PLO, (ARAFAT, YASSAR)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
IN PART
☐ DENY
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

IS; FPC/CDR

Date. 2/12/97

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority
() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

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[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 COTONO 03448 291628Z
ACTION NEA-11

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PA-01 INRE-00
ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /055 W
-----200602 291658Z /41

O 291627Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY COTONOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4699
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY PARIS

[REDACTED] COTONOU 03448

PARIS FOR FENDRICK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PLO, PREL, BN
SUBJECT: PLO DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD:
-- BENINESE REACTION

REF: A) STATE 380788, B) STATE 383930,
-- C) USINFO WASHDC 281743Z NOV88

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH GPRB HAS NOT YET MADE AN OFFICIAL
DECISION REGARDING RECOGNITION OF A NEW PALESTINIAN
STATE, WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH RECOGNITION IS LIKELY.
GPRB WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF USG DECISION TO REFUSE ARAFAT
VISA. (END SUMMARY)

3. ECONOFF MET WITH MFA DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AND ARAB
AFFAIRS JOEL ADECHI ON NOVEMBER 28 TO DISCUSS TALKING
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 COTONO 03448 291628Z

POINTS PROVIDED REF A ON PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL'S
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. STRESSING OUR
OPPOSITION TO EFFORTS BY EITHER ISRAEL OR THE ARAB
STATES TO RESOLVE UNILATERALLY THE FINAL STATUS OF THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA AND TO ANY UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF

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STATEHOOD, ECONOFF STRESSED USG DESIRE TO ENSURE PEACE IN THE REGION THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ADECHI RESPONDED THOUGHTFULLY, SAYING THAT THE GPRB SUPPORTS BOTH THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO EXIST.

4. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN AN OFFICIAL GPRB DECISION REGARDING RECOGNITION OF THE NEW PALESTINIAN STATE DECLARED BY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), HE CONTINUED, SUCH A DECISION IS VERY LIKELY. ECONOFF ASKED WHAT TYPE OF ASSISTANCE THE PLO PROVIDED BENIN, IF ANY. ADECHI REPLIED THAT TWO MEDICAL DOCTORS HAD BEEN SENT BY ARAFAT TO BENIN AS PART OF A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGE SHORTLY AFTER ARAFAT'S MAY 1986 VISIT TO COTONOU BUT THAT BOTH PHYSICIANS HAD SINCE DEPARTED AND NOT BEEN REPLACED. THE PLO AMBASSADOR TO LAGOS HAD RECEIVED ACCREDITATION TO BENIN IN 1986, ADECHI ADDED, AND HAD ACCOMPANIED ARAFAT'S SPECIAL ENVOY, AMIR ABU HASSIRA, ON HIS NOVEMBER 24 CALL ON PRESIDENT KEREKOU. HASSIRA DELIVERED BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON THE PNC DECISION, ADECHI SAID. (ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS, HASSIRA ALSO TRANSMITTED A MESSAGE OF THANKS FROM YASSER ARAFAT TO PRESIDENT KEREKOU FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH BENIN HAS GIVEN THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE "IN THEIR RIGHTFUL STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION.")

5. ADECHI THEN CRITICIZED THE USG DECISION TO DENY ARAFAT A VISA TO ATTEND THE UNGA AS AN INVITEE. USING

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 COTONO 03448 291628Z

INFORMATION PROVIDED REF B, ECONOFF OUTLINED THE U.N. HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND THE RIGHT OF THE USG TO BAR THE ENTRY OF THOSE PERSONS WHO REPRESENT A THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY, PARTICULARLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS CONDONING OR LENDING SUPPORT TO TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS. ADECHI COMMENTED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT THE PLO OBSERVER MISSION AT THE U.N. HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK FOR THE PLO, HE AND THE REST OF THE GPRB COULD NOT HELP BUT WONDER WHY THE USG HAD CHOSEN THIS MOMENT TO DENY ARAFAT ENTRY, SINCE "ARAFAT HAS SHOWN THAT HE REPRESENTS THE MORE REASONABLE FACTION OF THE PLO." ADECHI SAID THAT HE AND OTHER GPRB OFFICIALS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE VISA REFUSAL WAS "A PARTING SHOT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN" AND THAT THEY HOPED PRESIDENT-ELECT BUSH WOULD PROVE "MORE FLEXIBLE."

6. COMMENT: WE EXPECT THE GPRB TO JOIN NEIGHBORING BURKINA FASO, NIGER, AND NIGERIA IN RECOGNIZING A NEW

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INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. ADECHI ACCEPTED AN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED REF A AND PROMISED TO SHARE THESE VIEWS WITH OTHERS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT FIND OUR ARGUMENTS CONVINCING. FOR THE RECORD, WE FOLLOWED UP ON THIS ISSUE BY PROVIDING ADECHI A COPY OF THE USIA-PROVIDED FRENCH TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S DECISION ON ARAFAT'S VISA (REF C) ON NOVEMBER 29. END COMMENT. STADTLER

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE384295

FILM= D881043-0817

DATE= 28 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= EAP/PIA:SRIFSHIN (0412P))

OFFICE= ORIGIN EAP

TO= PORT MORESBY

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= US POSITION ON PNC DECLARATION PORT MORESBY 02540

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS RELEASE, POLICY, PALESTINIANS, RECOGNITION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PP, US, IS, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ DENY
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

IS, FPC/CDR

Date 2/12

MP Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS auth:
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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PAGE 01 STATE 384295
ORIGIN EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 L-03 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
JUSE-00 SP-02 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /035 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/PIA:SRIFSHIN (0412P))
APPROVED BY: EAP/EMCKUNE
NEA/IAI:DDEAN(SUBS)

-----125460 282136Z /70

O 282128Z NOV 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] STATE 384295

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PP, US, IS
SUBJECT: US POSITION ON PNC DECLARATION

PORT MORESBY 02540

1. ON NOVEMBER 16, THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE OUTCOME OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL:

QUOTE: AFTER REVIEWING THE OUTCOME OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THERE ARE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE TRYING TO MOVE THE PLO IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. THAT'S ENCOURAGING AND SHOULD CONTINUE. BUT MEASURED AGAINST THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, MORE MOVEMENT ON KEY ISSUES WILL BE REQUIRED. AND MEASURED AGAINST THE POSITIONS THE PLO MUST ADOPT IN ORDER FOR THE U.S. TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH IT, THE RESULTS OF THE PNC SESSION FALL SHORT OF MEETING THOSE REQUIREMENTS. END QUOTE.

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STATE 384295

2. IN RESPONSE TO FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS, THE SPOKESPERSON MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL REMARKS:

--THE REFERENCE TO RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 IS AN ADVANCE OVER PREVIOUS EFFORTS BY THE PNC; NEVERTHELESS IT IS AMBIGUOUS, BOTH IN ITS PLACEMENT IN THE TEXT AND ITS

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MEANING.

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--POSSIBLY IMPLIED OR INDIRECT REFERENCE TO ISRAEL'S
RIGHT TO EXIST IS NOT SUFFICIENT; RECOGNITION MUST BE
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

--THE STATEMENT ON TERRORISM IS A RESTATEMENT OF PREVIOUS
POSITIONS. IT IS STILL PERFORMANCE THAT COUNTS.

3. AS WE RECEIVE MORE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON THIS,
WE WILL PASS IT TO YOU. SHULTZ

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88BUENOS12712

FILM= D881043-0619

DATE= 28 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= BUENOS AIRES

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION ARA

TO= STATE
BOGOTA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ARGENTINE REACTION TO PLO'S UNILATERAL - DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 380788, 88 STATE 383655

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, GOVERNMENT REACTION, RECOGNITION, INFLUENCE, POLIC

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, AR, PLO

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UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
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() DENY IN PART
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 2/12/97

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority

() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

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[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 BUENOS 12712 01 OF 02 281921Z
ACTION ARA-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
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SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /077 W
-----122527 281924Z /44

P 281914Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9881
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 12712

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PLO, PNC, AR
SUBJ: ARGENTINE REACTION TO PLO'S UNILATERAL
- DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD ✓

REF: (A) STATE 380788 (B) STATE 383655 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. DESPITE LOBBYING BY ARAB DIPLOMATIC
COMMUNITY, ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN NO PUBLIC
POSITION ON PNC UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF PALESTINIAN
STATEHOOD. MFA OFFICIAL ADVISED US THAT ARGENTINA
HOPES FOR A COORDINATED POSITION FROM THE LATIN GROUP
OF EIGHT. STRENGTH OF ARGENTINE JEWISH LOBBY AND
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BUENOS 12712 01 OF 02 281921Z

PLANS BY PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TO VISIT ISRAEL EARLY IN
1989 MAKE IT UNLIKELY GOA WILL SUPPORT MAJOR SHIFT
IN ITS BASIC POSITION OF NON-RECOGNITION TO PLO AND
PALESTINIAN NATION. WILLINGNESS TO COORDINATE WITH
G-8 IS POTENTIALLY HARMFUL, HOWEVER, GIVEN PRESENCE
IN GROUP OF GOVERNMENTS WITH MORE RADICAL POSITIONS

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ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. END SUMMARY

3. THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL'S (PNC) UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD IN ALGIERS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD ATTENTION IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS. TO DATE, ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS OFFERED NO PUBLIC REACTION. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, FOUR ARAB AMBASSADORS CALLED ON MFA SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL AFFAIRS ALCONADA SEMPE NOVEMBER 23 TO LOBBY ON BEHALF OF PNC DECLARATION. WE MET NOVEMBER 25 WITH MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (BOSSO) TO MAKE REF A TALKING POINTS (ALSO LEFT AS NON-PAPER), INQUIRE ABOUT EARLIER VISIT BY ARAB AMBASSADORS, AND HEAR GOA REACTIONS TO THE PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD.

4. BOSSO NOTED GOA OFFICIAL LINE ON THE STATEHOOD DECLARATION THAT ARGENTINA IS "STUDYING" THE QUESTION. HE ASSURED US THAT THIS IS THE LINE ARGENTINES TOOK WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS THE DAY BEFORE. THE ARAB AMBASSADORS LOBBIED HARD FOR GOA STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PNC DECLARATION AND FUTURE RECOGNITION OF THE PLO. THE ARGENTINES REFUSED TO COMMIT.

5. REF B RECEIVED AFTER DEMARCHE. HOWEVER, BOSSO CONFIRMED ARGENTINES HOPE TO COORDINATE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE PNC DECLARATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BUENOS 12712 01 OF 02 281921Z

LATIN AMERICAN GROUP OF EIGHT. MOST G-8 PRESIDENTS AND/OR FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL ASSEMBLE IN MEXICO CITY DECEMBER 1 FOR THE NEW MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S INAUGURATION. BOSSO PREDICTED A COORDINATED G-8 RESPONSE AFTER THE MEXICO CITY INAUGURATION. HE NOTED, WITH SOME FRUSTRATION, THAT BRAZIL'S QUICK RESPONSE TO THE PALESTINIAN DECLARATION WOULD COMPLICATE EFFORTS AT COORDINATION, BUT COULD PROBABLY BE FINESSED WITH CAREFUL DRAFTING.

6. WHEN PRESSED, BOSSO DOWNPLAYED POSSIBILITY GOA WOULD SHIFT ITS FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF NON-RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN NATION. ARGENTINA HAD REBUFFED ALL PRESSURES TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS. IT HAS THE STRONGEST AND LARGEST JEWISH LOBBY IN LATIN AMERICA (ALTHOUGH BALANCED BY AN EQUALLY STRONG ARAB-ARGENTINE LOBBY). PRESIDENT ALFONSIN HAS TENTATIVE PLANS TO VISIT ISRAEL EARLY IN 1989 AND BOSSO DID NOT THINK IT LIKELY HE WOULD TAKE SUCH A DRASTIC STEP AS

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TO RECOGNIZE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE BEFORE THE VISIT. IN SHORT, GOA WOULD NOT BE PUSHING HARD FOR RECOGNITION IN GROUP OF EIGHT CONSULTATIONS, BUT WOULD NOT RESIST A CONSENSUS POSITION.

7. COMMENT. BOSSO'S CORE MESSAGE OF GOA RELUCTANCE TO TAKE DRASTIC STEPS CONCERNING PALESTINE AT THIS TIME IS PROMISING. HIS STATEMENT THAT ARGENTINA WAS LOOKING FOR A G-8 COORDINATED POSITION IS NOT. IN THE PAST, GOA HAS USED G-8 CONSENSUS DECISIONS AS COVER FOR DIFFICULT POLITICAL DECISIONS ON CENTRAL AMERICA, NARCOTICS, TRADE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. ARGENTINA HAS A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE JEWISH DOMESTIC LOBBY. OTHER G8 MEMBERS SUCH AS BRAZIL,

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 BUENOS 12712 02 OF 02 281921Z
ACTION ARA-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /077 W

-----122521 281924Z /44

P 281914Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9882
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 12712

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PLO, PNC, AR

SUBJ: ARGENTINE REACTION TO PLO'S UNILATERAL

PERU, AND MEXICO DO NOT, OR AT LEAST THEIR ARAB-ISRAELI
POLICIES ARE NOT VISIBLY AFFECTED BY SUCH A LOBBY.
WE SHOULD WATCH THE G-8 CAREFULLY ON THIS QUESTION AND
MAY WANT TO CONSIDER ADDING IT TO THE AGENDA FOR
FUTURE DIALOGUE IF THE G-8 DOES ADOPT A COORDINATED
POSITION ON THE PNC DECLARATION.

GILDRED

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88HELSIN08772

FILM= D881042-0190

DATE= 28 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= HELSINKI

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= FINNISH REACTION TO U.S. TALKING POINTS ON THE PLO'S UNILATERAL
DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 380788, 88 STATE 379072

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= GOVERNMENT REACTION, NAM, SELF DETERMINATION, MEETING, DISCUSSION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, FI, US, PLO, PNC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ DENY IN PART
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

S/FPC/CDR

Date 2/2/97

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

TS authority

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PAGE 01 HELSIN 08772 01 OF 02 280859Z
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P 280855Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7576
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 08772

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PLO, PNC, NAM, KPAL, FI
SUBJECT: FINNISH REACTION TO U.S. TALKING POINTS ON
THE PLO'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD

REF: (A) STATE 380788, (B) STATE 379072

1. [REDACTED]
2. LABATT MET WITH MFA OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN AND OTHER THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS, CARL ARNE
HARTMAN, NOVEMBER 25 TO DELIVER TALKING POINTS IN
REF A.
3. HARTMAN SAID FINLAND HAS NO PLANS TO
EXTEND RECOGNITION TO THE NEW "STATE" DECLARED BY
THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) DURING ITS MEETING
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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IN ALGIERS. HE WAS NEVERTHELESS POSITIVE ABOUT THE
POSITION ADOPTED BY THE PNC AND ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PNC AND ISRAEL.

4. HARTMAN NOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO OTHER NORDIC

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GOVERNMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION AND THAT THEY ARE UNANIMOUSLY IN ACCORD WITH THE FINNISH POSITION.

5. HARTMAN ASKED IF THE U.S. IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PNC PRONOUNCEMENT. WITH GUIDANCE PROVIDED FROM REF B, LABATT RESPONDED THAT THE PNC HAD MOVED IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION ON CERTAIN ISSUES AND REAFFIRMED A FEW CONSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS IT HAS TAKEN IN THE PAST. NEVERTHELESS, NUMEROUS AMBIGUITIES AND INCONSISTENCIES REMAIN, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN TWO KEY DOCUMENTS--THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE POLITICAL STATEMENT ISSUED IN ALGIERS. HARTMAN AGREED WITH THE FOREGOING AND NOTED THAT HIS OFFICE IS STILL STUDYING THE DOCUMENTS--PARTICULARLY THOSE PARTS CONCERNING THE PNC POSITION ON TERRORISM. HARTMAN INDICATED THAT IN ONE DOCUMENT THE PNC PROMISED TO GIVE UP TERRORISM AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING ITS GOALS. HOWEVER, HARTMAN CONTINUED, IN THE OTHER DOCUMENT THE PNC STATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM RESORTING TO VIOLENCE SHOULD THE SITUATION WARRANT ITS USE.

6. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF A NOVEMBER 21 STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER KALEVI SORSA FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN NOTE WITH SATISFACTION OF THE POSITION ADOPTED BY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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COUNCIL DURING ITS MEETING IN ALGIERS, ACCORDING TO WHICH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD BE CONVENED ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

THIS CORRESPONDS TO THE POSITION OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT AS TO THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF ISRAEL AND OF THE PALESTINIANS CONSTITUTES A PRECONDITION FOR A PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS IMPLIES ON ONE HAND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED (SIC) BOUNDARIES AND ON THE OTHER HAND THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STATEHOOD.

AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PALESTINIAN

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STATEHOOD, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF TERRITORY AND BORDERS,
MUST BE REACHED AT A PEACE CONFERENCE OR OTHERWISE
BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE REGION.

THE PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS AS A
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL
DECISION. HOPEFULLY, IT WILL OFFER NEW OPPORTUNITIES
FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE
PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND PROMOTE THE CONVENING
OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE.

THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT ISRAEL
WOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AND, ON HER PART,
CONTRIBUTE TO THE INITIATING OF A FRUITFUL PROCESS
OF PEACE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7577
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AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 HELSINKI 08772

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PLO, PNC NAM, KPAL, FI

SUBJECT: FINNISH REACTION TO U.S. TALKING POINTS ON

UNQUOTE. SCHNABEL

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
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FILM= D881042-0784

DATE= 28 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= ATHENS

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 380788, 88 STATE 379072

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= NAM, MEETING REPORT, SECRETARY GENERAL, PALESTINIANS, INDEPENDENCE,
POLICY, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, XE, GR, IS, PLO, PNC, (GEORGIU, CONSTANTINE)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date

2/12/97

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
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☐ DENY IN PART
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive into
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MO Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority 10%

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 18572 281353Z
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P 281334Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4213
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
EC COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] ATHENS 18572

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, NAM, XE
SUBJECT: PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

REF: (A) STATE 380788; (B) STATE 379072

1. [REDACTED]
 2. CHARGE CALLED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MFA, CONSTANTINE GEORGIU, ON NOVEMBER 25, AND WENT THROUGH THE REF A'S TALKING POINTS, WHICH WERE LEFT WITH GEORGIU AS A NON-PAPER.
 3. THE GIST OF GEORGIU'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE GOG VIEWS THE PALESTINIAN DECLARATION AS CONTAINING POSITIVE ELEMENTS WHICH MERIT A POSITIVE, FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE WORLD
- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 ATHENS 18572 281353Z

COMMUNITY. THE DECLARATION REPRESENTS, IN EFFECT, A TENTATIVE VICTORY FOR THE MODERATE FORCES AMONG THE PALESTINIANS, HE CONTINUED;

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IT IT FAILS TO PRODUCE BENEFITS FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, THE MODERATES WILL HAVE SUFFERED A SET-BACK FROM WHICH THEY MAY NEVER RECOVER.

4. THE CHARGE TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS ANALYSIS OF THE DECLARATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE (DRAWING ON GUIDANCE IN REF. B). HE ASKED WHAT SORT OF "FAVORABLE RESPONSE" TO THE DECLARATION MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING FROM THE GOG, AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THERE WAS ANY VALIDITY TO WIDESPREAD PRESS REPORTS THAT THE GOG INTENDS BOTH TO RECOGNIZE THE DECLARED PALESTINIAN STATE AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, TO UPGRADE ITS RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL TO FULL DE JURE STATUS. GEORGIU SAID THAT THESE QUESTIONS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND THAT NOTHING MORE COULD BE SAID AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED, AT THIS TIME THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THE USG WILL YET RESPOND TO THE PALESTINIAN INITIATIVE "IN A WAY THAT MAKES THE MOST OF THE OPPORTUNITY IT OFFERS."

5. COMMENT: AS WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING, THE GOG HAS LONG BEEN INDICATING IT INTENDS TO UPGRADE ITS RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS SOON AS THE INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR DOING SO ARE MORE PROPITIOUS THAN THEY ARE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THE "INFANTIDA." THE PALESTINIAN DECLARATION HAS GIVEN RISE TO A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 ATHENS 18572 281353Z

SITUATION IN WHICH THE GOG NO DOUBT BELIEVES IT CANNOT DO THIS UPGRADING WITHOUT ALSO EXTENDING DE JURE RECOGNITION TO THE DECLARED PALESTINIAN STATE. THE GOG THUS APPEARS TO HAVE THREE VIABLE SHORT-TERM OPTIONS: (A) PROCEED TO DO BOTH; (B) RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY, WHILE ASSURING THE ISRAELIS THAT THE UPGRADING ON THAT SIDE WILL FOLLOW AS SOON AS THE UNREST IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS BECOME MARKEDLY LESS OF A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH; OR (C) TAKE NEITHER ACTION. OUR EXPECTATION IS THAT THEY WILL GO FOR OPTION (C), MAINLY BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THEY WILL NOT WANT TO GO BEYOND THE EC CONSENSUS ON THE PALESTINIAN MATTER AT LEAST SO LONG AS GREECE HOLDS THE EC PRESIDENCY, I.E.,

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UNTIL THE END OF THIS YEAR. END COMMENT.
COHEN

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV16959

FILM= D881039-0845

DATE= 25 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= GAZA WRAP-UP; NOV 17-23

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 16590

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= REPORT, CASUALTY, VIOLENCE, BANNING, INTERNAL CONTROL, PALESTINI,
SELF GOVERNMENT, INDEPENDENCE, KREME

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, IS, GZ, PNC

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☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ DENY ☐ IN PART
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

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Date:

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 16959 01 OF 03 251554Z
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2433
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 16959

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; NOV 17-23

REF: TEL AVIV 16590

1. (U) SUMMARY. NO GAZANS WERE KILLED, AND BETWEEN 29 AND 34 WERE REPORTED WOUNDED DURING THE PERIOD (FOR THE SECOND WEEK IN A ROW, INJURIES WERE ROUGHLY HALF PREVIOUS FIGURES). THE MASSIVE CURFEW ON GAZA WAS LIFTED ON NOV 17, THOUGH LIMITED CURFEWS REMAINED OR WERE REIMPOSED. THERE WERE GENERAL STRIKES NOV 19 AND 23. CALL FOR THE LATTER STRIKE GOT TO GAZA LAST MINUTE. GAZA REACTION TO THE PNC DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WAS POSITIVE, WITH SOME PUBLIC REJOICING DESPITE IDF STRICTURES. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE REJECTED THE DECLARATION AND CALLED FOR THREE DAYS OF MOURNING. DEFENSE MINISTER CALLED PUBLIC REACTION TO PNC A "FAILURE" AND VOWED TO MAINTAIN LARGE TROOP PRESENCE TO ASSURE CONTINUED

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"FAILURE." HOWEVER, TROOP PRESENCE ON GAZA STREETS DECLINED AFTER NOV 17. A GRENADE ATTACK ON AN IDF PATROL NOV 20 DID NO DAMAGE AND CAUSED NO INJURIES. TRIAL OF FOUR GIVATI BRIGADE MEMBERS CONTINUES.

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QUESTIONS ABOUT STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM LED TO THEIR RELEASE FROM DETENTION. EIGHT GAZANS UNDER DEPORTATION ORDER WILL APPEAL TO HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. END SUMMARY

2. (U) NONE KILLED:

-- NO GAZA RESIDENTS WERE KILLED DURING THE PERIOD.

3. (U) APPROXIMATELY 29-34 WOUNDED:

-- ON NOV 17, SOME 16 GAZANS WERE REPORTED WOUNDED IN VARIOUS CLASHES ON THE FIRST DAY FOLLOWING THE LIFTING OF THE IDF'S GENERAL CURFEW.

-- ON NOV 18/19, THE IDF SAID FOUR GAZANS WERE WOUNDED IN CLASHES, CENTERED PRIMARILY IN GAZA CITY AND DAYR AL-BALAH REFUGEE CAMP. JERUSALEM POST SAID PALESTINIAN SOURCES CLAIMED 12 WOUNDED IN THE TWO DAYS.

-- ON NOV 21, TWO SHATI CAMP TEENAGERS WERE SHOT IN THE LEGS AND SLIGHTLY WOUNDED.

-- ON NOV 22, APPROXIMATELY FIVE GAZANS WERE REPORTED WOUNDED IN CLASHES IN KHAN YUNIS, AND SHATI AND JABALYA CAMPS. OF THESE, TWO WERE FROM SHATI CAMP, ONE A 16 YEAR OLD SHOT IN THE ABDOMEN, AND ONE AN 18 YEAR OLD SHOT IN THE LEG.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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-- ON NOV 23, BETWEEN TWO (IDF SOURCES) AND FOUR (PALESTINIAN SOURCES) WERE REPORTED WOUNDED, INCLUDING A 12 YEAR OLD IN NUSAIRAT CAMP, SHOT IN THE STOMACH, IN SERIOUS CONDITION, AND A FOUR YEAR OLD FROM JABALYA CAMP.

4. (U) STRIKES AND CURFEWS:

-- AS REPORTED REFTTEL, THE MASSIVE CURFEW IMPOSED ON ALL OF GAZA DURING THE PNC MEETINGS WAS LIFTED THE MORNING OF NOV 17, WITH THE REPORTED EXCEPTION OF RAFAH TOWN.

-- ON NOV 19, CURFEWS WERE IMPOSED ON REFUGEE CAMPS IN RAFAH AND KHAN YUNIS.

-- ON NOV 19, GAZA (AND THE WEST BANK) OBSERVED A

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GENERAL STRIKE, CALLED BY THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP AND HAMAS, TO MARK THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH IN THE 1930'S OF SHAIKH AZAD AL-DIN AL-QASIM.

-- ON NOV 20, ALL REMAINING CURFEWS IN GAZA WERE LIFTED.

-- ON NOV 23, CURFEWS WERE IMPOSED ON DAYR AL-BALAH AND SHATI CAMPS, AND ON SHABURA NEIGHBORHOOD OF RAFAH.

-- ON NOV 23, GAZA (AND THE WEST BANK) OBSERVED A GENERAL STRIKE, CALLED BY THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP, IN SOLIDARITY WITH PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES. GAZANS WHOM EMBOFFS VISITED NOV 21 AND 22 WERE AWARE THAT A LEAFLET CALLING FOR A NOV 23 STRIKE HAD APPEARED IN THE WEST BANK, BUT, AS OF THE MORNING OF NOV 22, HAD NOT SHOWN UP (OR AT LEAST NOT BEEN WIDELY CIRCULATED) IN GAZA. ONLY HOURS BEFORE THE STRIKE,

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ACTION NEA-11

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O 251547Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2434
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 16959

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; NOV 17-23

GAZANS WERE STILL UNCERTAIN WHAT WOULD BE THE
SITUATION ON NOV 23.

5. PNC AFTERMATH:

-- (U) GAZA SOURCES GAVE EMBOFFS SOME INSIGHT INTO
THE GAZA REACTION TO THE PNC DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE. THE IDF HAD AT LEAST TWICE THE NORMAL

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PATROLS ON THE STREETS (IN GAZA CITY, ONE OBSERVER WHO WAS ABLE TO MOVE ABOUT NOTED PATROLS ON VIRTUALLY EVERY STREETCORNER IN ONE AREA) AND ACTED QUICKLY TO BREAK UP DEMONSTRATIONS. STILL, GAZANS WERE ABLE TO SHOW THEIR JOY BY SETTING HUNDREDS OF TIRES ALIGHT WHICH, WITH ELECTRICITY CUT OFF FOR ABOUT 12 HOURS NOV 15, MADE GAZA CITY GLOW RED AND BLACKENED AN OTHERWISE MOONLIT NIGHT. GAZANS SET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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OFF HUNDREDS OF FIREWORKS WHICH ALSO FILLED THE NIGHT SKY.

-- (U) THE JERUSALEM POST REPORTED COMMENTS OF GAZA PUBLISHER AND LAWYER, ZUHAIR RAYYES, WHO SAID CONSENSUS IN GAZA WAS TO "GIVE PEACE A CHANCE." HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ABANDONING THE RIGHT OF SOME PALESTINIANS TO RETURN TO AREAS THEY LEFT IN 1948 WAS DELICATE, BUT TALK OF PRECISE BOUNDARIES WOULD ONLY CREATE DIVISIONS NOW. "IF THE REFUGEES IN SHATI CAMP UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD NEVER RETURN TO JAFFA AND HAIFA, THEY WOULD NOT BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN STATE. THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO HOPE FOR." ANOTHER GAZAN, ASAD AL-SAFTAWI, HOWEVER, TOLD THE JERUSALEM POST HE ACCEPTED THE IDEA HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO HIS NATIVE ASHKELON. "WE MUST PAY DEARLY FOR PEACE," HE SAID.

-- (U) ISLAMIC RESISTANCE REACTION: THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE (HAMAS) REACTED TO THE PNC DECLARATION BY CALLING FOR THREE DAYS OF "MOURNING." GAZA ISLAMIC LEADER, SHAIKH AHMAD YASIN, TOLD THE JERUSALEM POST THAT THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WAS PREMATURE. "WE GAVE ISRAEL SOMETHING AND GOT NOTHING IN RETURN," HE COMPLAINED.

-- (U) ON NOV 22, DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN, IN AN INTERVIEW, SAID THE IDF WOULD MAINTAIN ITS LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AND CONTINUE TO DEPLOY LARGE NUMBERS OF FORCES TO "PROLONG" WHAT HE CALLED THE FAILURE OF TERRITORIES' RESIDENTS TO MOUNT SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY DURING THE PNC.

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-- (LOU) DESPITE RABIN'S COMMENTS, GAZA RESIDENTS NOTED A SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN THE PUBLIC PRESENCE OF IDF PATROLS IN THE PERIOD. RON KRUMER OF THE TERRITORIES COORDINATOR'S OFFICE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON WHETHER TROOPS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN, BUT SAID SIMPLY THAT THE IDF ADJUSTS TROOP LEVELS TO FIT THE PERCEIVED SITUATION.

6. (U) GRENADE ATTACK:

-- ON NOV 20, A GRENADE WAS HURLED AT AN IDF PATROL, ALONG THE MAIN ROAD LEADING INTO GAZA CITY. IT CAUSED NO DAMAGE OR INJURIES. THE ATTACK CAME APPROXIMATELY A WEEK AFTER THE IDF ANNOUNCED IT HAD ROUNDED UP AN ISLAMIC JIHAD SQUAD SAID TO HAVE BEEN BEHIND TWO GRENADE ATTACKS (AND OTHER INCIDENTS) IN EARLY OCTOBER (TEL AVIV 14624).

7. (U) RAFAH RESIDENT SENTENCED FOR STONE THROWING:

-- ON NOV 23, A 16 YEAR OLD FROM RAFAH WAS SENTENCED TO 18 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR THROWING A STONE AT A TAXI, WITHIN THE GREEN LINE ON THE ROAD FROM NES TZIYONA TO RISHON LE TZIYON.

8. [REDACTED] UPDATE ON RELEASE OF FOUR CHARGED SOLDIERS:

-- RON KRUMER PROVIDED CLARIFICATION ON RELEASE OF FOUR GIVATI BRIGADE MEMBERS CHARGED IN AUGUST BEATING DEATH OF A JABALYA CAMP RESIDENT (REFTEL). ACCORDING TO KRUMER, THEIR TRIAL IS CONTINUING. THE PRESIDING JUDGE ACCEPTED LAWYERS' ARGUMENTS THAT EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE OTHER BEATINGS (NO SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED) WHICH MIGHT HAVE CAUSED THE MAN'S DEATH WERE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW RELEASE OF THE

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PAGE 01 TEL AV. 16959 03 OF 03 251554Z
ACTION NEA-11

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2435

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INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 16959

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; NOV 17-23

FOUR FROM DETENTION WHILE THEIR TRIAL CONTINUES.

9. [REDACTED] UPDATE ON DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS:

-- RON KRUMER HAS TOLD US THAT THE EIGHT GAZANS
UNDER DEPORTATION ORDER WHOSE APPEALS WERE REJECTED
BY THE MILITARY APPEALS COMMITTEE (REFTEL) WILL
APPEAL THEIR CASES TO THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
APPELLANTS' LAWYERS HAVE SO INFORMED THE CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION. THE APPEALS OF TWO OTHERS ARE STILL
UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE MILITARY APPEALS
COMMITTEE. HUGHES

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03873

FILM= D881040-0665

DATE= 25 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION H

TO= STATE

AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= CODEL MCHUGH: MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN ACADEMICS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CODEL, MEETING, ORGANIZATION, OCCUPIED AREA, PALESTINIANS, INDEPENDENCE, GUERRILLA, WEST BANK, NEGOTIATION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, US, IS, PLO, (MCHUGH, MATTHEW F), (HADI, MAHDI ABDUL)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NS/FPC/CDR

Date: 2/12/97

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY

MR Cases Only:

☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY

EO Citations

☐ DENY ☐ IN PART

☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info

TS authority for

FOIA Exemptions

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or

PA Exemptions

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

9304029

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03873 01 OF 02 251524Z
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SS-00 NEA-06 DS-01 /010 W
-----037662 260617Z /21

R 251522Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4118
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03873

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, US
SUBJECT: CODEL MCHUGH: MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN
ACADEMICS

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: ON NOVEMBER 20 CONGRESSMAN MATT MCHUGH CALLED ON DR. MAHDI ABDUL HADI, DIRECTOR OF THE PALESTINIAN ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (PASSIA) AND PROF. GHOURANI OF BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITY. CG AND DPO ACCOMPANIED. ABDUL HADI AND GHOURANI REJECTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT A LOCAL ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP COULD REPLACE THE PLO. THEY ARGUED THAT THE PNC HAS TAKEN AN IMPORTANT STEP TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL, AND THAT THE NEXT PHASE SHOULD BE NORMALIZATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO. THE U.S. SHOULD HELP. MCHUGH STRESSED THE TERRIBLE IMAGE THE PLO AND ARABS MUST OVERCOME IN THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

3. ABDUL HADI DESCRIBED THE INTIFADA AS A SHARP BREAK FROM THE PAST WHEN PALESTINIANS IN THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PRACTICED A POLICY OF "STEADFASTNESS" BUT WERE INCAPABLE OF DECIDING WHETHER TO CHOOSE WAR OR PEACE AND LEFT THE INITIATIVE TO OTHERS. NOW, HE SAID, THE INTIFADA HAS PRODUCED A DECISIVE CHANGE IN

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PALESTINIAN POLICY: A DECLARATION OF PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE AND A DECISION TO SEEK A PALESTINIAN STATE THAT WOULD CO-EXIST WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID THIS BREAK WITH THE PAST WAS THE RESULT OF THE UNITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE GAINED IN THE INTIFADA AND THE ABILITY OF PALESTINIANS FOR THE FIRST TIME TO EXPRESS EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION. HE DESCRIBED THE FORGING OF THIS CONSENSUS AND CONFIDENCE THROUGH VARIOUS MEANS AND EVENTS: LEAFLETS, STRIKES, THE JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT DECISION, THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD, AND SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE TO THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, HE SAID, THE PALESTINIANS NO LONGER FEAR THE ISRAELIS, WHEREAS THE FEARS OF ISRAELIS HAVE GROWN. PALESTINIANS ARE NOW READY TO ACCEPT THEIR "COUSINS" THE ISRAELIS, BUT INSIST THAT ISRAELIS ALSO COMPROMISE AND ACCEPT PALESTINIANS AND A TERRITORIAL DIVISION.

4. ABDUL HADI SAID THE PALESTINIANS' NEW ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL WAS REFLECTED IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND 338 AT THE PNC. THE CHALLENGE FOR PALESTINIANS NOW, HE SAID, IS TO WORK HARD TO IMPRESS ISRAELIS BY TALKING TO THEM, MEETING WITH THEM AND PROVING THAT PALESTINIANS HAVE ACCEPTED CO-EXISTENCE IN ORDER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03873 01 OF 02 251524Z

TO OVERCOME THEIR FEARS. THE FACT THAT ON PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY, ISRAELI SOLDIERS APPEARED IN THE STREETS OF EAST JERUSALEM CARRYING SMALL ISRAELI FLAGS TO PROVE THEY REJECTED THE PALESTINIANS CLAIM SHOWS HOW RESISTANT THE ISRAELIS ARE, ABDUL HADI SAID.

5. CONGRESSMAN MCHUGH OBSERVED THAT ISRAELIS ARE STILL WORRIED THAT, WHEREAS PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MAY HAVE ACCEPTED CO-EXISTENCE, THE PLO CANNOT BE TRUSTED AND THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN THE "POLICY OF PHASES" IN WHICH THE PLO WOULD EVENTUALLY RECOVER ALL OF PALESTINE. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE THEREFORE, MCHUGH ASKED, FOR REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL? ABDUL HADI SAID THE PLO STANDS FOR THE IDENTITY OF ALL

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PALESTINIANS AND IS THEIR UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION. THERE IS NO CHANCE OF AN ALTERNATE LOCAL NON-PLO LEADERSHIP EMERGING THAT WOULD BE LEGITIMATE. HE CALLED THE IDEA A NON-STARTER, SAYING AMERICANS NEED TO UNDERSTAND THIS. THERE IS, INDEED, A LOCAL LEADERSHIP, PROFESSOR GHOURANI ADDED, BUT IT IDENTIFIES COMPLETELY WITH THE PLO. ABDUL HADI SAID THAT IF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED, THE CURRENT OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO WOULD LEAD; BUT IT WOULD FACE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNING AND GRADUALLY PEOPLE FROM THE INSIDE

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03873 02 OF 02 251525Z
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SS-00 NEA-06 DS-01 /010 W
-----037664 260617Z /21

R 251522Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4119
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03873

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, US
SUBJECT: CODEL MCHUGH: MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN
ACADEMICS

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WOULD EMERGE TO REPLACE THE OUTSIDE LEADERSHIP.

6. CONGRESSMAN MCHUGH SAID THAT IF AMERICANS ARE TO ACCEPT THE PLO THEY NEED GREATER REASSURANCE. THE PNC WAS A STEP FORWARD, HE SAID, BUT THE PLO STILL HAS A BIG BURDEN TO OVERCOME; AMERICANS STILL THINK IN TERMS OF SADAT'S DRAMATIC GESTURE TO ISRAEL AS THE KIND OF STEP THE PLO SHOULD TAKE TO OVERCOME THE LEGACY OF MISTRUST OF THE PLO. ABDUL HADI SAID THE SADAT ANALOGY IS WRONG, SINCE EGYPT WAS AN ANCIENT, LARGE, STRONG COUNTRY, WHEREAS THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION IS DIFFERENT. MOREOVER, HE SAID THE PNC HAS ALREADY MADE A GESTURE, AND WENT FURTHER THAN MANY PALESTINIANS EXPECTED. PROFESSOR GHOURANI PREDICTED THAT ARAFAT'S PROPOSED SPEECH AT THE UN WOULD BE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE FEAR OF ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS ABOUT THE PLO'S INTENTIONS AND THAT OVER TIME ISRAELIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE PLO NO LONGER WISHES TO DESTROY ISRAEL.

7. ABDUL HADI SAID THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE A PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION IN WHICH THE PLO AND ISRAEL GAIN CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER. IF THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN, THE RADICALS MAY REEMERGE. THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO HELP IN THIS PROCESS BY DEALING WITH THE PLO; AMERICAN CREDIBILITY AND PRESTIGE ARE AT STAKE AND THE U.S. MUST BECOME MORE ACTIVE. PALESTINIANS IN TURN WILL HAVE TO TRY HARDER TO PRESENT THEIR STORY TO AMERICANS; THERE ARE MANY CONFIDENT AND CAPABLE PALESTINIANS WHO CAN PASS ALONG THIS MESSAGE IF THEY ARE ALLOWED TO DO SO. UNFORTUNATELY THE ISRAELIS HAVE PREVENTED SOME PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM EXPRESSING THEMSELVES HERE AND FROM TRAVELING ABROAD. PROFESSOR GHOURANI SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS STILL HAVE WORK TO DO, AND DISAGREED THAT "THE BALL IS NOW IN THE U.S. COURT;" ALL SIDES STILL HAVE TO DO MORE.

8. MCHUGH STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE TO WORK HARDER TO REINFORCE THEIR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND THAT THE PLO HAS TO OVERCOME

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STRONG OPPOSITION AMONG AMERICANS WHO SEE ARAFAT AS A TERRORIST; ALSO, PALESTINIANS SHOULD STOP SEEKING AMERICAN PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. ABDUL HADI SAID THAT EVEN WITHOUT PRESSURE, WASHINGTON COULD HELP THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BY URGING ISRAEL TO STOP REPRESSIVE MEASURES WHICH DISCOURAGE PALESTINIAN MODERATION, FOR EXAMPLE,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS, DEPORTATION, AND ARRESTS OF MODERATE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO WANT TO PROJECT A MESSAGE OF PEACE TO ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS.
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[REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03859

FILM= D881033-0465

DATE= 23 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 15 - 21, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= OCCUPIED AREA, REVIEW, POLICE FORCE, DEATH

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date:
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<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
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<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS	
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or	
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or	

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03859 01 OF 02 231335Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /081 W

-----260334 231342Z /41

O 231334Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4102
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03859

PARIS FOR WINN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 15 - 21, 1988

1. SUMMARY: ISRAELI TROOPS WERE OUT IN FORCE TO PREVENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NOVEMBER 15 PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. IN ASSOCIATED CLASHES, ONE PALESTINIAN WAS REPORTED SHOT AND KILLED AND 28 PALESTINIANS WERE WOUNDED. THIS BRINGS THE 1988 TOLL TO 322 KILLED AND MORE THAN 200 WOUNDED. NINE OTHER PALESTINIANS WERE INJURED BY BEATINGS AND THREE WERE HOSPITALIZED SUFFERING FROM TEARGAS INHALATION. THREE ISRAELI POLICEMEN AND SIX ISRAELI CIVILLIANS WERE INJURED BY STONES. SIX
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HOMES WERE DEMOLISHED AND 300 CITRUS FRUIT TREES WERE UPROOTED. A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES NOVEMBER 19. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED LARGELY FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

ONE KILLED, 28 WOUNDED

NOVEMBER 15

PALESTINIAN SOURCES REPORTED THAT ONE MAN WAS WOUNDED AT BAYT I'NAN, NEAR RAMALLAH.

NOVEMBER 17

IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED 11 PALESTINIANS DURING A STONE-THROWING INCIDENT AT TAMMUN, NORTH OF NABLUS.

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES AT KUFR JAMMAL, NEAR TULKAREM. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED IN NABLUS.

TWO ISRAELI POLICEMEN WERE INJURED BY STONES THROWN AT THEM BY SCHOOL CHILDREN IN EAST JERUSALEM. A BORDER POLICEMAN WAS ALSO HURT BY STONES THROWN AT HIS PATROL IN SILWAN, SOUTHEASTERN JERUSALEM. AN ISRAELI TAXI DRIVER WAS LIGHTLY HURT BY STONES THROWN AT HIS VEHICLE IN EAST JERUSALEM. TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS WERE INJURED BY STONES THROWN AT THEIR BUS TRAVELLING ON THE SHUFAT-NEVE YAACOV ROAD, NORTHERN JERUSALEM.

NOVEMBER 18

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THREE PALESTINIANS WERE HOSPITALIZED AFTER SOLDIERS USED TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE A DEMONSTRATION IN SILWAN, SOUTHEASTERN JERUSALEM.

NOVEMBER 19

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED FIVE PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES IN QARAWAH BANI HASAN, NABLUS DISTRICT.

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS AT BEIT FURIK, WOUNDED ONE AT KAFR ADDEEK, TWO AT BEITA, AND ANOTHER AT BEIT IMRIN, ALL IN NABLUS DISTRICT.

PALESTINIANS IN NABLUS SAID TROOPS ARRESTED AND BEAT SEVERAL PERSONS AFTER USING TEAR GAS AND LIVE AMMUNITION TO BREAK UP DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CITY. THREE PERSONS WERE HOSPITALIZED WITH BROKEN LIMBS. SEVERAL WOMEN WERE TREATED FOR BEATING INJURIES.

NOVEMBER 20

IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED ONE PALESTINIAN YOUTH AND WOUNDED ANOTHER, AFTER VILLAGERS THREW STONES AT TROOPS WHO RAIDED BAQAH EL HATAB, WEST OF NABLUS.

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH DURING A CLASH AT EIN BAYT ILMA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS.

STONES WERE THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS TRAVELLING NEAR AM'ARI REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR RAMALLAH. ONE

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03859 02 OF 02 231337Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /081 W

-----260374 231343Z /48 41

O 231334Z NOV 88

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4103

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03859

PARIS FOR WINN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 15 - 21, 1988

ISRAELI PASSENGER WAS SLIGHTLY HURT. ANOTHER ISRAELI BUS WAS STONED NEAR HEBRON AND TWO PASSENGERS WERE SLIGHTLY HURT.

SIX PALESTINIANS FROM MADAMA, NEAR NABLUS, WERE HOSPITALIZED WITH INJURIES FROM BEATINGS. REPORTS FROM THE VILLAGE SAID AS MANY AS 20 WERE HURT.

NOVEMBER 21

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH IN TULKAREM REFUGEE CAMP. CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON THE UNCLASSIFIED

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CAMP AND MILITARY BULLDOZERS BLOCKED ENTRANCE ROADS WITH EARTH EMBARKMENTS.

AUTHORITIES UPROOT CITRUS TREES

AUTHORITIES DECEMBER 18 UPROOTED 300 CITRUS TREES BELONGING TO A PALESTINIAN FROM JENIN WHICH WERE LOCATED ALONG THE MAIN JENIN-NAZARETH ROAD, ALLEGING THAT STONES WERE CONSTANTLY THROWN AT ISRAELI MILITARY VEHICLES FROM THE ORCHARD.

MORE HOMES DEMOLISHED

AUTHORITIES DEMOLISHED, DECEMBER 18, FOUR HOMES IN THREE VILLAGES, NEAR JENIN: MISILYAH, KUFAYRAT AND A-RAMAH, ALLEGING THAT THE HOUSES WERE BUILT WITHOUT PERMITS.

AUTHORITIES DEMOLISHED, DECEMBER 16, TWO HOUSES AND SURROUNDING HUTS IN A MODERN SHEEP-FARM AT AZZOUN, NEAR TULKAREM, ALLEGING THEY WERE BUILT WITHOUT PERMITS.

CURFEWS

AT MIDNIGHT NOVEMBER 15, AUTHORITIES LIFTED THE CURFEW IMPOSED ON ALL WEST BANK TOWNS AND REFUGEE

CAMPS EXCEPT TULKAREM TOWN AND NUR ESH-SHAMS
CAMP. THESE WERE LIFTED NOVEMBER 18. THE TRAVEL
BAN FROM THE WEST BANK TO ISRAEL WAS ALSO LIFTED
AS OF MIDNIGHT NOVEMBER 15.

CURFEW WAS IMPOSED NOVEMBER 17 AND 18 IN TOUBAS,
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NABLUS DISTRICT.

CURFEW WAS IMPOSED NOVEMBER 20 ON AMA'ARI REFUGEE
CAMP, NEAR RAMALLAH, FOLLOWING DEMONSTRATIONS, AND
CONTINUED ON NOVEMBER 21.

STRIKES

A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED ON THE WEST BANK
NOVEMBER 19. IT WAS CALLED SEPARATELY BY THE
UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA AND HAMAS TO
MARK THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF PALESTINIAN
NATIONALIST LEADER SHEIKH IZZEDDIN AL-QASSAM, WHO
WAS KILLED IN A BATTLE WITH BRITISH TROOPS IN
1935.
WILCOX

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03847

FILM= D881030-0460

DATE= 22 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= VISIT TO BEITA

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 2715, 88 JERUSALEM 1517

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= VISIT, INCIDENT, PALESTINIANS, INDEPENDENCE, RECOGNITION

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PREL, ASEC, IS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ DENY IN PART
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

AS/FPC/CDR Date: _____
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____
TS authority _____
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03847 01 OF 03 221608Z
ACTION NEA-11

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NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
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-----206070 222017Z /49

P 221531Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4093
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
LUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6781

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03847

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT TO BEITA ✓

REFS: A) JERUSALEM 2715, B) JERUSALEM 1517, ✓
- C) JERUSALEM 1206, D) JERUSALEM 1185 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY

2. CONGENOFF VISITED THE VILLAGE OF BEITA
NOVEMBER 19. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO MEMBERS
OF THE BEITA COMMITTEE, AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
GROUP HELPING THE VILLAGERS REBUILD THEIR HOMES
AND DEFEND THEMSELVES IN COURT AGAINST CHARGES
STEMMING FROM THE APRIL 6 INCIDENT THERE IN
WHICH A CLASH WITH SETTLERS LEFT THREE DEAD.
THE INHABITANTS, ALTHOUGH DIVIDED IN LOYALTY
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03847 01 OF 03 221608Z

BETWEEN FATAH AND HAMAS ALL SUPPORTED THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AND
CRITICIZED THE U.S. FOR NOT ACCEPTING THE PNC
RESOLUTIONS. MANY HAVE ACCEPTED COMPENSATION
FROM THE GOI FOR HOMES DAMAGED AND DEMOLISHED IN
ERROR FOLLOWING THE APRIL 6 CLASH WITH SETTLERS

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AND HAVE BEGUN REPAIRS. THE TRIAL OF 29 VILLAGERS CHARGED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT WILL RESUME NOVEMBER 21. WHILE IN BEITA, CONGENOFF WITNESSED THE TECHNIQUES OF AN IDF RAID.

"WHY DO YOU REJECT US?"

3. BEITA, A VILLAGE OF 7,000 PEOPLE APPROXIMATELY 10 KM SOUTH OF NABLUS, HAS BEEN SPARED MUCH OF THE EVERYDAY IDF HARASSMENT SUFFERED BY OTHER AREA VILLAGES SINCE IT WAS BROUGHT TO WORLD ATTENTION APRIL 6. THE INHABITANTS HAVE THUS BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP AND EXPRESS THEIR RESPONSES TO THE UPRISING WITH RELATIVE FREEDOM. LIKE MANY VILLAGES IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, THAT RESPONSE HAS BEEN MIXED. ALL THE VILLAGERS INTERVIEWED SAID THEY WANTED AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, ALL REJECTED JORDANIAN INFLUENCE, AND ALL GLORIFIED THE FIGHTERS OF THE INTIFADA. THE VILLAGE WAS FILLED WITH PALESTINIAN FLAGS AND EFFIGIES OF MASKED SHEBAB FIGHTERS TIED TO POWER POLES. BUT, AS THE GRAFFITI ON THE WALLS INDICATED, THE VILLAGE IS SPLIT BETWEEN THOSE BACKING FATAH AND A TWO STATE SOLUTION, AND THOSE SUPPORTING HAMAS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AND ITS SLOGAN, "FILASTIN MIN AL-BAHR IL AN-NAHR,"--PALESTINE FROM THE (MEDITERRANEAN) SEA TO THE (JORDAN) RIVER.

4. FOR NOW, THE TWO CURRENTS ARE ABLE TO COEXIST IN BEITA WITHOUT CONFLICT, SINCE BOTH CONCENTRATE ON RESISTING THE OCCUPATION. INDEPENDENCE DAY, NOVEMBER 15, BROUGHT BOTH FACTIONS INTO THE STREETS WAVING FLAGS AND SINGING NATIONALIST SONGS. THE FATAH SUPPORTERS, WHO APPARENTLY FORM THE MAJORITY, CELEBRATED ARAFAT AND THE NEW STATE. HAMAS SUPPORTERS JOINED IN TO CELEBRATE THE CONTINUING OF THE INTIFADA AND THE HOPE FOR A STATE IN ALL OF PALESTINE.

5. THE VILLAGERS INTERVIEWED WERE UNANIMOUS IN ARGUING THAT THE PNC DECLARATION HAD CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE INTIFADA. "NOW WE ARE FIGHTING TO

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DEFEND OUR COUNTRY," STATED ONE YOUNG MAN. HE SAID THE DECLARATION WOULD PROVIDE NEW IMPETUS TO THE UPRISING AND BOLSTER FATAH'S SUPPORT IN THE VILLAGE. HE ALSO ADDED THAT DECLARING A STATE NECESSARILY CREATED A STATE IN FACT. THEREFORE, IT WAS JUST A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW.

6. THE INHABITANTS OF BEITA WERE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. REPOSE TO THE PNC

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
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DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /054 W

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P 221531Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4094
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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TAGS: PHUM, PREL, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT TO BEITA

RESOLUTIONS. "WHY DO YOU REJECT US?" SHOUTED ONE ANGRY MAN. THEY SAID THE PLO HAD MADE ENOUGH CONCESSIONS WITHOUT A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE U.S. OR ISRAEL, AND THAT THEY OPPOSED ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE PLO'S POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, 242/338, AND THE RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE. SOME ALSO ALLEGED THAT THE CONSULATE WAS DISCRIMINATING AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN ISSUING VISAS. CONGENOFF RESTATED THE U.S. POSITION ON THE PNC DOCUMENTS AND VIGOROUSLY DENIED THE ACCUSATION OF BIAS AGAINST PALESTINIANS.

FALLOUT FROM THE APRIL 6 INCIDENT

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7. BEITA'S INHABITANTS, ASSISTED BY THE BEITA COMMITTEE, ARE SEEKING COMPENSATION FOR THE 16 HOMES DEMOLISHED OR DAMAGED WITHOUT A COURT ORDER. (16 OTHERS WERE DEMOLISHED PER COURT ORDER AND THEIR OWNERS CANNOT CLAIM COMPENSATION.) ELEVEN OWNERS HAVE AGREED TO COMPENSATION FROM THE GOI RANGING FROM 20 PERCENT TO 100 PERCENT OF THE ESTIMATED COST OF REPAIRS. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED MONEY, THEY HAVE BEGUN REPAIRS IN AN EFFORT TO COMPLETE THEM BEFORE THE WINTER RAINS BEGIN IN EARNEST. THE BEITA COMMITTEE HAS BEGUN REPAIRS AT ITS EXPENSE ON THE HOMES OF THE OTHER FIVE PENDING RESOLUTION OF THEIR APPEALS. THE 16 FAMILIES WHO CANNOT CLAIM COMPENSATION CANNOT REBUILD ON THE SITES OF THEIR DEMOLISHED HOUSES. THUS THEY HAVE HAD TO FIND OTHER ACCOMMODATIONS, USUALLY WITH RELATIVES ALREADY LIVING IN CRAMPED QUARTERS.

8. TWENTY-NINE VILLAGERS REMAIN IN DETENTION AWAITING TRIAL ON CHARGES STEMMING FROM THE APRIL 6 INCIDENT. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONING OF THE SETTLERS INVOLVED HAS BEGUN AND WILL CONTINUE NOVEMBER 21. THE BEITA COMMITTEE HAS PROVIDED THE SERVICES OF AN ISRAELI ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT THE VILLAGERS.

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9. ACCORDING TO VILLAGERS, OF THE 700 BEITA VILLAGERS WHO WORKED IN ISRAEL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, ONLY 100 STILL DO SO. THE REST HAVE NOT STOPPED WORKING BECAUSE OF PRESSURES FROM THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP, BUT BECAUSE THEY

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WERE FIRED BY THEIR ISRAELI EMPLOYERS IN THE WAKE OF THE APRIL 6 INCIDENT. MOST OF THE 600 WHO LOST THEIR JOBS NOW WORK THE LAND AND DEPEND ON RELATIVES FOR SUPPORT.

ANATOMY OF AN IDF RAID

10. CONGENOFF WAS ABLE DURING HIS VISIT TO WITNESS A RAID ON THE VILLAGE BY AN IDF PATROL, THE FIRST IN SEVERAL MONTHS. (DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE IDF AND VISITING CONGENOFF OCCURED ONLY AT THE CHECKPOINTS LEADING OUT OF THE VILLAGE.) THE VILLAGE'S YOUNG MEN APPEARED AND WARNED THE VILLAGERS OF THE APPROACH OF THE PATROL, THEN QUICKLY MELTED AWAY. THE OTHER INHABITANTS DISAPPEARED INSIDE THEIR HOMES, BUT DID NOT LOCK THE DOORS FOR FEAR OF HAVING THEM BROKEN BY THE SOLDIERS. THE 15-20 TROOPS OF THE PATROL ARRIVED AND BEGAN ENTERING HOUSES AT RANDOM, FORCING THE OCCUPANTS INTO THE STREETS TO TAKE DOWN THE FLAGS AND EFFIGIES AND PAINT OVER THE GRAFFITI. ALTHOUGH CONGENOFF WINESSED NO RESISTANCE BY THE VILLAGERS, A SCUFFLE OCCURED OUT OF SIGHT AND TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED. (THE NOVEMBER 20 JERUSALEM POST REPORTS TWO INJURIES FROM THE RAID.) AFTER APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES, THE PATROL WITHDREW TO THE VILLAGE'S ENTRANCE, THROWING STONES AND BREAKING WINDOWS ON ITS WAY. TWO ROADBLOCKS WERE SET UP AND A HELICOPTER FLEW OVERHEAD AS THE VILLAGE WAS

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ACTION NEA-11

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NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
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P 221531Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4095
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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SEALED OFF.

11. THE YOUNG MEN OF THE VILLAGE ERECTED
BARRICADES--TWO OF BURNING TIRES AND TWO OF
LARGE ROCKS--BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE MAIN ROAD,
AND POSITIONED THEMSELVES IN THE OLIVE GROVE
BORDERING THE STREET AT THE SITE OF THE
ROADBLOCKS. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, THEY
PREPARED TO HURL STONES AT THE SOLDIERS WHO
WOULD HAVE TO CLEAR THE ROADBLOCKS IN ORDER TO
WITHDRAW.

COMMENT

12. THE OBSERVATIONS IN BEITA ARE CONSISTENT
WITH TRENDS WE HAVE NOTICED ELSEWHERE--MUTUAL
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TOLERATION BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE PLO AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND A TENDENCY TO BELIEVE, THAT THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ALTHOUGH THE WEST BANK ELITE REALIZES THAT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE PNC ARE ONLY A STEP IN A DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROCESS, THE LESS SOPHISTICATED ACTIVISTS OF THE INTIFADA HOPE FOR IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE RESULTS.
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
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<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

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FILM= D881030-0032

DATE= 22 NOV 88

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FROM= JERUSALEM

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TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= HANNA SINIORA INTERVIEW ON PNC RESULTS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INTERVIEW, ELECTION, RESOLUTION, PALESTINIANS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4091
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03846

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: HANNA SINIORA INTERVIEW ON PNC RESULTS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 21 IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE WEEKLY EDITION OF AL-FAJR, POLITICAL ACTIVIST AND AL-FAJR PUBLISHER HANNA SINIORA CALLED THE PNC "A TRIUMPH OF THE VOICE OF REASON AND MODERATION," BUT SAID THE PLO CANNOT CHANGE INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES "IN ONE STROKE." HE ALSO SAID THE INTIFADA SHOULD "PURSUE A MORE VIGOROUS, NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN OF RESISTANCE AGAINST THE OCCUPATION" WHILE THE PLO'S ROLE IS TO "DISPEL FEARS OF THE NEWLY EMERGENT STATE OF PALESTINE BY CLARIFYING INTENTIONS, AND LEADING A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN INTERNATIONALLY." TEXT OF INTERVIEW FOLLOWS.
END SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:
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Q. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE PNC MEETING OR DO YOU FEEL IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING?

A. THE RESULTS OF THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS

DISAPPOINTED FRIENDS AS WELL AS FOES. MANY OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMP FEARED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE HARDENING OF THE ISRAELI POSITIONS, THIS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. WHAT I SAW COMING FROM ALGIERS IS THE TRIUMPH OF THE VOICE OF REASON AND MODERATION, AS WELL AS DEMOCRACY AND A FORCEFUL DRIVE TO BUILD UP MOMENTUM FOR A PEACE PROCESS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

Q. ARAFAT WARNED THAT IF THE NEW POSITION THAT CAME OUT OF THE PNC DID NOT YIELD RESULTS, HE WILL GO BACK TO THE PNC AND TELL THEM THAT MODERATION DID NOT WORK. DO YOU AGREE HE SHOULD DO THIS AND HOW LONG WOULD YOU GIVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO REACT?

A. I WOULD BE NAIVE TO THINK THAT IN ONE STROKE THE MOMENTOUS DECISIONS OUR LEADERSHIP TOOK WILL CHANGE ATTITUDES. CERTAINLY THERE ARE IMPORTANT NEW CLEAR DECISIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS TAKEN BY THE PLO, BUT OUR PUSH FOR PEACE AND THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGN HAS JUST STARTED. THE TIME FOR EVALUATION, IN MY OPINION, WOULD BE NOT UNTIL THE MEETING OF THE 20TH PNC. THE NEXT SESSION MIGHT BE HELD IN 12 TO 18 MONTHS.
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Q. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE ISRAELI AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE PNC RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATION OF A STATE, PARTICULARLY THE FEEDBACK COMING FROM THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE?

A. THE U.S. FEEDBACK ON THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WAS EXPECTED, EVEN THE ISRAELI REACTION FROM THE LIKUD WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. THEY HAVE WAX IN THEIR EARS AND THEY ARE UNWILLING TO SEE NEW DEVELOPMENTS. THE REACTION OF THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY WAS A SURPRISE, SHIMON PERES WAS VERY NEGATIVE, INFLUENCED BY HIS CLINGING TO POLITICAL POWER AND JOCKEYING FOR A PLACE IN A NEW GRAND COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE VOICE OF LABOR, IF IT WILL BE THE OPPOSITION PARTY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WAS VOICED BY ABBA EBAN, WHO REACTED IN A POSITIVE MANNER BUT ASKED FOR FURTHER

CLARIFICATIONS. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TOOK A CAUTIOUS WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE, ALTHOUGH WITH FAVORABLE REACTION. THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AND THE EASTERN BLOC WELCOMED THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS, AND BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT MORE THAN 100 COUNTRIES WILL RECOGNIZE THE NEWBORN PALESTINIAN STATE.

Q. WITH THE LIKUD ASKED TO FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS USE OF TOUGH TERMS AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS, THINGS DO NOT LOOK GOOD, DO THEY?

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4092
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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TAGS: KPAL, IS

SUBJECT: HANNA SINIORA INTERVIEW ON PNC RESULTS

A. THE NEXT GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL BE HEADED BY THE LIKUD FOR THE FULL FOUR-YEAR TERM OF THE KNESSET. THE ROAD IS OPEN TO THE LIKUD TO TAKE EITHER OF TWO PATHS. THE LIKUD CAN BUILD ON THE RABIN YEARS, WHICH MEANS ESCALATING THE TENSION AND VIOLENCE, BUILDING NEW SETTLEMENTS AND PROBABLY LEADING TO NOT JUST A CONFRONTATION WITH THE INTIFADA, BUT A MAJOR NEW ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. LIKUD CAN TRY TO BECOME THE DOMINANT ISRAELI PARTY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OR TWO, LIKE LABOR IN THE FIRST THREE DECADES OF THE ISRAELI STATE. THIS REQUIRES A GRADUAL ABOUT TURN AND RECONSIDERATION OF THE 14 POINTS OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN JANUARY TO PAVE THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

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Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE NEXT STEP FOR THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE?

A. DESPITE THE HEAVY SACRIFICES, THE PALESTINIANS, IN ORDER TO KEEP THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION SPOTLIGHTED UNIVERSALLY, MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE SAME COURSE OF THE PAST 11 MONTHS AND AT THE SAME TIME INSIST THAT EDUCATION AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEMS SHOULD BE REOPENED AND PURSUE A MORE VIGOROUS NON-VIOLENT CAMPAIGN OF RESISTANCE AGAINST THE OCCUPATION. THIS IS OUR LOT HERE, WHILE THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IS TO DISPEL THE FEARS OF THE NEW EMERGENT STATE OF PALESTINE BY CLARIFYING INTENTIONS, AND LEADING A POLITICAL DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN INTERNATIONALLY. .
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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03817

FILM= D881026-0127

DATE= 21 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

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ORIGPHAND= n/a

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ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= HAMAS AND PFLP-GC LEAFLETS DENOUNCE PNC

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, OCCUPIED AREA, VIOLENCE, RESOLUTION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, IS, PNC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
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☐ DENY IN PART
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PA Exemptions

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MR Cases Only:
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: HAMAS AND PFLP-GC LEAFLETS DENOUNCE PNC

REFS: A) FBIS AMMAN JO 171804Z NOV 88, ✓
B) TDFIRDB-315/38153-88, C) JERUSALEM 3640

1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT. AN UNNUMBERED
HAMAS LEAFLET WHICH APPEARED NOVEMBER 17 (TEXT
PARA 3) REJECTS THE RESOLUTIONS TAKEN BY THE PNC
AND CALLS FOR THREE DAYS OF MOURNING NOVEMBER
18-20 (SEE ANALYSIS REF B). IT REJECTS THE
PNC'S CALLS FOR PARTITION OF PALESTINE,
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECULAR STATE, RENUNCIATION
OF VIOLENCE OUTSIDE PALESTINE, AND HOLDING OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. INSTEAD, IT URGES
INTENSIFICATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE; THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN "ISLAMIC COORDINATING

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COMMITTEE" COMPOSED OF HAMAS, ISLAMIC JIHAD, AND
THE ULAMA; AND REPENTENCE BY THE PLO.

2. THE PFLP-GC ALSO ISSUED A LEAFLET
NOVEMBER 17 DENOUNCING THE PNC (TEXT REF A). IT
REFERENCES "ALL THE APPEALS THAT HAVE BEEN

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ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL AND ISLAMIC FORCES CALLING FOR THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF MOURNING," AND APPEALS FOR "COMPREHENSIVE SOLIDARITY IN ALL PARTS OF OUR BELOVED HOMELAND WITH THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAMAS' CALL FOR A THREE-DAY MOURNING." THERE HAVE BEEN PRIOR REPORTS OF INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE PFLP-GC AGAINST THE MAINSTREAM NATIONALIST MOVEMENT'S EXPLORATION OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION. WHILE TACTICAL ANTI-FATAH COOPERATION IS CONCEIVABLE, THE LONG TERM GOALS OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS--ONE ISLAMIC, THE OTHER LEFTIST-SECULAR--DIFFER SO GREATLY THAT ANY LONG-TERM ALLIANCE IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF HAMAS LEAFLET.

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE
"THIS IS A STATEMENT AND A WARNING TO THE PEOPLE" (QUOTATION FROM THE KORAN)

PALESTINE IS MUSLIM, FROM THE (MEDITERRANEAN) SEA TO THE (JORDAN) RIVER.

THE MASSES WILL NEVER FORGIVE AND HISTORY WILL

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HAVE NO COMPASSION

THANKS BE TO GOD, FROM WHOM WE GET OUR HELP, WE BEG HIS FORGIVENESS AND ASK HIM FOR GUIDANCE, WE RELY ON HIM AND PRAY AND SALUTE HIS PROPHET, HIS FAMILY AND COMPANIONS TOGETHER WITH ALL THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE PROPHET FOR EVER AND EVER.

O MUSLIMS IN THE LAND OF ISRA' AND MI'RAJ: YOUR BLESSED MOSLEM INTIFADA COMPLETED ITS FIRST YEAR DURING WHICH THE MASSES HAVE ADHERED MORE AND MORE TO THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, WHICH SPARKED THE INTIFADA AND REVEALED THE GREAT POTENTIAL OF THIS MUSLIM PEOPLE. THE CHILDREN OF THE MOSQUES AND MIHRABS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE DESPAIR AND INSTILL FEAR AND TERROR IN THE HEARTS OF THE JEWS. EVERY TIME A MARTYR IS KILLED, THE LAMPS SHINE BRIGHTLY WITH HIS BLOOD AND LEAD THE WAY OF TROOPS OF MOSLEM MARTYRS, WHO RAISE GOD'S

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FLAG ON EVERY INCH IN THE LAND OF PALESTINE.

"YOUR WOUNDS ARE FOR GOD'S CAUSE AND WHOEVER IS KILLED, IS A MARTYR." (QUOTATION FROM THE KORAN)

O STEADFAST MASSES: AFTER SEVENTY YEARS OF JIHAD BY MUSLIM PALESTINIANS, MARTYRDOM OF TENS OF THOUSANDS IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO OUST OCCUPATION AND LIBERATE THE LAND FROM ZIONIST POLLUTION, AT THE TIME WHEN THE ENEMY IS PREPARING TO LEAVE, AND VOICES OF DESPAIR ARE HEARD WITHIN ITS RANKS DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE PNC CAME UP WITH THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS:

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECULAR PALESTINIAN STATE

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[REDACTED]

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ACTION NEA-11

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: HAMAS AND PFLP-GC LEAFLETS DENOUNCE PNC

ON THE BASIS OF THE PARTITION RESOLUTION NO.
181, WHICH MEANS SURRENDERING MUSLIM PROPERTY OF
MORE THAN TWO THIRDS OF PALESTINE, WHICH IS
CONSIDERED, IN TOTO, AN ISLAMIC WAQF. TO GIVE
UP THE LAND OF AL-AQSA, THE LAND OF JIHAD AND
THE PROPHETS, TO A BUNCH OF JEWS, TOGETHER WITH
FREE RECOGNITION OF THE ZIONIST ENTITY, ENDING
THE ARMED STRUGGLE, AND ABORTING THE INTIFADA.

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2. ACCEPTANCE OF 242, WHICH CONSIDERS THE HOLY PALESTINIAN PROBLEM A PROBLEM OF REFUGEES, CONFIRMS THE UGLY OCCUPATION OF OUR MOMELAND AND EXCLUDES PALESTINE FROM THE MUSLIM NATION.

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3. APPROVES AND CONFIRMS THE CAIRO DECLARATION WHICH CALLS FOR NONCONFRONTATION OF THE ZIONIST ENEMY AND REFRAINING FROM ATTACKING ITS INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS CRIMINAL ENEMY WHICH OPERATES IN THE DARK TO ASSASSINATE PALESTINIAN LEADERS EVERYWHERE IS TO BE PERMITTED TO ACT FREELY ACCRODING TO THIS DECLARATION WAS ADOPTED BY THE PNC.

4. DEMANDS HOLDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR PEACE, FOR CONCILIATION WITH THE JEWS, AND RECOGNIZING THEIR RIGHT TO USURP OUR HOLY LAND, WHICH MEANS THAT THE ATHEIST, INFIDEL STATE WILL HOLD THE DESTINY OF MUSLIM PALESTINE.

THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS INDICATE CLEARLY RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS WITH IT, AND CONCILIATION. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME, NEEDED TO DICUSS SETTLEMENT IN GAZA AND THE BLEEDING WEST BANK. PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF THE JEWISH STATE REMAINS OUR RESPONSIBILITY. OUR SMALL STATE WILL REMAIN DISARMED--PROBABLY DEVOID OF STONES TOO?

BEHOLD O MUSLIMS TO WHAT DEGREE OF HUMILIATION, THIS MINORITY, MAKERS OF THE PNC RESOLUTIONS, HAS REACHED. TO WHAT DESTINY DO THEY WANT TO DRAG OUR STEADFAST PEOPLE? ACCORDING TO THE LEXICON OF THE MUJAHIDIN, THERE IS ONE INTERPRETATION ONLY OF SUCH CONDUCT: A TREACHEROUS ACT, COMMITTED LEGALLY, UPON ORDERS FROM AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND ATHEIST

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PAGE 03 JERUSA 03817 02 OF 03 211045Z

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM, BY AN ODD BUNCH OF PLO

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LEADERS WHO ARE INFLICTED WITH JIHAD ANEMIA,
SICK OF FIGHTING AND OVERCOME BY THE SPIRIT OF
DEFEAT AND DESPAIR.

0 MUSLIMS EVERYWHERE: AT THIS DETERIORATING
DANGEROUS STAGE AND WITH THE SERIES OF
CAPITULATION CONCESSIONS OUR MOVEMENT WHICH
DRAWS ITS STRENGTH FROM ITS IDEOLOGY CALLS ON
YOU TO POOL YOUR POTENTIALS AND EFFORTS AND
CONFRONT THE TREACHEROUS ATTEMPTS BY
INTENSIFYING ARMED STRUGGLE AND ESCALATING THE
INTIFADA AND THE HOLY JIHAD.

WE DEMAND ALL THE BELIEVERS INSIDE THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES AND ABROAD TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC
CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE TO INCLUDE THE ISLAMIC
JIHAD, THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND
RELIGIOUS LEADERS (ULAMA) TO CONFRONT THE TREND
OF SETTLEMENT AND SURRENDER ADOPTED BY THE PLO,
WHICH THINKS THAT PALESTINE IS PNC PROPERTY
WHOSE DESTINY AND ISLAMIC FEATURES THEY CAN
CONTROL AND MANIPULATE.

POLITICAL SOLUTIONS HAVE ALWAYS CONTRADICTED THE
JIHAD OF OUR PEOPLE THROUGHOUT HISTORY. PEOPLE
OF THE INTIFADA PREFER TO DIE ON THEIR LAND,
WITH PRIDE AND DIGNITY, RATHER THAN GIVE UP
THEIR RIGHTS AND SURRENDER TO THE ENEMY.

THE PLO LEADERSHIP MUST RETURN TO ITS SENSES AND
REPENT BEFORE THE ALMIGHTY GOD, RISE UP AND BEAR
ITS HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY, INSTEAD OF DIVING
INTO THE SWAMPS OF TREASON.

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
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O 211042Z NOV 88
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03817

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: HAMAS AND PFLP-GC LEAFLETS DENOUNCE PNC

"O YE BELIEVERS, BE PATIENT, TOLERANT AND
STEADFAST. FEAR GOD SO YOU MAY SUCCEED."
(QUOTATION FROM THE KORAN)

FAMILIES OF THE MARTYRS MUST MAKE THEIR VOICES
HEARD. WERE ALL THESE SACRIFICES MADE
THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEARS IN VAIN? WERE THEY
MADE FOR GIVING UP OUR CAUSE? O MUSLIMS: THERE
IS NO SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM EXCEPT
BY A SINCERE RETURN TO THE HOLY BOOK, THE
HONORABLE SUNNA AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC
STATE, THROUGH JIHAD. IT IS NOT PERMISSIBLE,
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
JEWS OR AGREE WITH THEM ON ANYTHING, INCLUDING

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03817 03 OF 03 211046Z

OUR DESTINY. WHOSOEVER SURRENDERS ONE INCH OF
THE LAND OF MOSLEM PALESTINE WILL BE DAMNED IN
THIS LIFE AND IN THE LIFE TO COME.

LET FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1988, SATURDAY, THE
19TH AND SUNDAY THE 20TH BE DAYS OF MOURNING AND
LAMENTATION. PRAYERS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON
BEHALF OF THE SOULS OF THE MARTYRS OF THE
ISLAMIC PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION. MARCHERS SHOULD

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GO OUT AND RAISE BLACK FLAGS IN FACE OF THE
ENEMY AND ITS AGENTS: DAYS OF ANGER,
DENUNCIATION AND CENSURE.

O MUSLIM MASSES: BE FAITHFUL TO GOD AND LET THE
TORCH OF RESISTANCE CONTINUE TO BURN UNTIL GOD
BRINGS VICTORY. MENTION THE NAME OF GOD AT ALL
TIMES BECAUSE: "IF THE SITUATION BECOMES MORE
DIFFICULT, IT IS A SIGN OF APPROACHING RELIEF."
(QUOTATION FROM THE KORAN)

NO TO ILLUSIONARY CAPITULATION SOLUTIONS

NO TO PEACEMAKING WITH THE MURDERERS

NO TO RECOGNITION AND NO TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE CRIMINALS

YES TO THE BLESSED ISLAMIC INTIFADA

"RISE ALL YE LIGHT AND HEAVY, COMMIT YOURSELVES
TO JIHAD, WITH YOUR MONEY, BODIES AND SOULS IN
GOD'S CAUSE." (QUOTATION FROM THE KORAN)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03817 03 OF 03 211046Z

THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, (HAMAS),
PALESTINE

NOVEMBER 11, 1988.

END TEXT.

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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E217

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D881025-0422

DATE= 21 NOV 88

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DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EAP

TO= STATE
WELLINGTON

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= GOA COMMENTS ON PALESTINIAN DECLARATION

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, RECOGNITION, GOVERNMENT REACTION

TAGS= PREL, IS, AS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE

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☐ DENY

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FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

☒ DECLASSIFY

☐ DECLASSIFY

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MR Cases Only:

EO Citations

TS authority

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ 1 or

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/091 W

-----060740 210727Z /20

R 210631Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
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INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

CANBERRA 10440

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, AS
SUBJECT: GOA COMMENTS ON PALESTINIAN DECLARATION

1. (U) AUSTRALIA FINDS THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 15 A POSITIVE THOUGH TENTATIVE STEP IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE GOA WILL NOT, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZE THE DECLARED STATE OF PALESTINE.
2. (U) ON NOVEMBER 18, FOREIGN MINISTER EVANS STATED IN PARLIAMENT THAT THE PNC STATEMENT FALLS SHORT OF AN UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND AN OUTRIGHT RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF TERRORISM. HE CONTINUED THAT "THE QUESTION OF AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WILL ONLY ARISE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THE FUTURE OF

PAGE 02 CANBER 10440 210640Z

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES...(ALTHOUGH) AUSTRALIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING INDEPENDENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT STATE."

3. (U) IN A PRESS CONFERENCE THE SAME DAY, PRIME

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MINISTER HAWKE REITERATED THESE POINTS, SAYING THAT WHILE THE PLO HAS MADE POSITIVE STEPS, THEY ARE NOT YET SUFFICIENT FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION.

4. [REDACTED] A SOURCE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (DFAT) TOLD US THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MINOR PROBLEM IN EVANS' STATEMENT. EVANS SAID THAT AUSTRALIA "WELCOMES THE PNC'S EXPLICIT REJECTION OF THE 'THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM'" WHEN, IN FACT, THE PNC STATEMENT EXCEPTS THE USE OF VIOLENCE FOR "THE NATURAL RIGHT TO DEFEND (PALESTINE'S) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE." (THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY COMPLAINED TO THE GOA OVER THE PARLIAMENTARY REMARKS, PARTICULARLY EVANS' CHIDING THAT ISRAEL "SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE AND RECOGNIZE THE NEW AND POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PNC'S DECLARATION."

5. (C) COMMENT: THE GOA BELIEVES THAT WHILE THE PNC STATEMENT DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS IT SHOULD, IT IS A SMALL STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. AUSTRALIA HAS BEEN URGING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE REGION AND FEELS THAT THIS CAN BE INTERPRETED AS ONE.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D881020-0507

DATE= 18 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= LUSAKA

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= ZAMBIA RECOGNIZES PALESTINIAN STATE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, PRESIDENT, RESOLUTION, FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT

TAGS= PREL, IS, ZA, PLO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
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☐ DENY IN PART
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

IS, FPC/CDR

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MR Cases Only:
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TS authority
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☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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P 181344Z NOV 88
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI

[REDACTED] LUSAKA 04898

LONDON FOR KOLKER

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PLO, IS, ZA
SUBJECT: ZAMBIA RECOGNIZES PALESTINIAN STATE

1. (U) SUMMARY. ON NOVEMBER 16, ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA RECOGNIZED THE STATE OF PALESTINE, CALLED ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND SAID HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN URGING HIM TO PUSH ISRAEL TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO. END SUMMARY.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 LUSAKA 04898 181347Z

2. (U) SPEAKING TO A DELEGATION OF ARAB AMBASSADORS AT STATE HOUSE ON NOVEMBER 16, PRESIDENT KAUNDA SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS. HE PRAISED THE PALESTINIAN DECISION TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242, RECOGNIZING ISRAEL AS

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AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND ASSEITED THAT THE PARTY AND ITS GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA ARE ACCORDING THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT YASSAR ARAFAT FULL RECOGNITION." HE ADDED, "I PRAY THAT ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND ALLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO TO GO BACK TO PALESTINE."

3. (U) PRESIDENT KAUNDA SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ASKING HIM TO ENCOURAGE ISRAEL TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO. NOTING THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE, KAUNDA SAID, "IF THE PLO WERE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS MOVE, ZAMBIA WOULD SUPPORT IT."

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ZAMBIA'S IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OF THE NEWLY DECLARED PALESTINIAN STATE COMES AS NO SURPRISE. THE PLO HAS A RESIDENT AMBASSADOR FULLY ACCREDITED HERE, AND ZAMBIA HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THOUGH IT HAS EQUALLY INSISTED ON ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AS A SOVEREIGN STATE. THE PNC'S REPORTED QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 CLEARLY OPENED KAUNDA'S WAY TO RECOGNIZE THE NEW PALESTINIAN STATE. DAVIDOW

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D881020-0773

DATE= 18 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= MOSCOW

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE
ALGIERS

CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= SOVIETS RECOGNIZE "PROCLAMATION" OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS CONFERENCE, RECOGNITION, MINISTERIAL MEETING, DETERMINAT
PALESTINIANS, OCCUPIED AREA, FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNSC RES 242

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, UR, XF, (BESSME, ALEKSANDR)

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FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

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MR Cases Only:
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

-----MOSCOW 26626

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, XF
SUBJECT: SOVIETS RECOGNIZE "PROCLAMATION" OF A
PALESTINIAN STATE

1. (U) AT A HASTILY CONVENED PRESS CONFERENCE IN
MOSCOW AT NOON ON NOV. 18, SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER ALEKSANDR BESSME NYKH ANNOUNCED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION RECOGNIZED 'THE PROCLAMATION OF
THE PALESTINIAN STATE' ANNOUNCED BY THE PALESTINE
NATIONAL COUNCIL IN ALGIERS.

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 26626 181449Z

2. (U) ACCORDING TO TASS (NOV. 18), BESSMERTNYKH SAID
THAT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WERE RESULTING IN A
SITUATION "WHERE ALL THE SIDES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
THE CONFLICT RECOGNIZE THAT THE PATH TO PEACE AND

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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL LIES THROUGH TALKS ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THAT A JEWISH AND AN ARAB STATE HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS TO EXISTENCE IN PALESTINE."

3. (U) BESSMERTNYKH CALLED FOR THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST "AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY", AND SAID THAT THE U.N. WOULD HAVE AN "ESPECIALLY GREAT ROLE" TO PLAY IN THIS PROCESS. AN OPPORTUNITY HAD BEEN CREATED, HE SAID, TO ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST "AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE WILL AT LAST GAIN A FATHERLAND, THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL WILL GAIN RELIABLE SECURITY AND THE ENTIRE REGION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL REMOVE ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS SOURCES OF TENSION."

COMMENT

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4. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS PAID CLOSE AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PNC MEETING, AND MFA SPOKESMAN GERASIMOV OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS HAS SPOKEN IN FAVORABLE TERMS REGARDING PALESTINIAN ACTIONS AT THE PNC MEETING WHICH WOULD PROMOTE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION HAD THUS FAR REFRAINED FROM JOINING THE RANKS OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAD FORMALLY RECOGNIZED THE PALESTINIAN "STATE".

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 26626 181449Z

5. BESSMERTNYKH'S RUSH ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY (WE UNDERSTAND THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS HELD AT NOON, WAS ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS AT 11:48 A.M.) INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS, WHILE ANXIOUS TO AVOID UNREALISTIC ACTIONS THAT MIGHT HARM SERIOUS EFFORTS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, COULD NO LONGER RESIST THE PRESSURE FROM THEIR PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB ALLIES TO DECLARE SOME FORM OF RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT CREATED IN ALGIERS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF STRONG SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE PLO OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS TO COME UP WITH A NEW POLITICAL PROGRAM THAT INCORPORATED FORMAL RECOGNITION OF 242 AND 338. INTERESTINGLY, THE SOVIET ACTION FALLS SHORT OF ACTUALLY RECOGNIZING A PALESTINIAN STATE, SINCE THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED MERELY THE RECOGNITION OF THE "PROCLAMATION" OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.

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6. THE SOVIETS WERE ACTIVE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE PNC AND DISPATCHED GENNADY TARASOV (MFA NEAR EAST REGIONAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR) TO ALGIERS TO BE PRESENT DURING THE PNC SESSION. THEY WILL NO DOUBT TRY TO TAKE CREDIT FOR ANY POSITIVE EVOLUTION IN THE PLO'S POSITION AND URGE US TO PUSH FOR SOME KIND OF POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL. WE CAN ALSO EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO PUBLICLY STRESS THAT THEY ARE TALKING TO ISRAEL BUT THAT OUR REFUSAL TO DO THE SAME WITH THE PLO IS BLOCKING PROGRESS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS.

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D881021-0182

DATE= 18 NOV 88

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FROM= BANJUL

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ISLAMABAD

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= GAMBIA RECOGNIZES "INDEPENDENT - STATE OF PALESTINE"

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, RESOLUTION, CONFERENCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, TEXT

TAGS= PREL, IS, XF, GA

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P 181557Z NOV 88
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7913
INFO ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[REDACTED] BANJUL 03049

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, XF, GA
SUBJECT: GAMBIA RECOGNIZES "INDEPENDENT
- STATE OF PALESTINE"

1. (U) THE GAMBIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ON
17 NOVEMBER ITS DECISION TO GIVE "FULL
RECOGNITION" TO THE PALESTINIAN STATE IN
THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP.
THE ANNOUNCEMENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF
PLO ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 WHICH TOGETHER
WITH PROCLAMATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE "WILL
PAVE THE WAY FOR A CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN."

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: WE ARE SURPRISED BY THE
RAPIDITY OF THE GAMBIAN DECISION SO SOON
AFTER THE PALESTINIAN PROCLAMATION ON 15
NOVEMBER. THE PNC'S ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION
242 APPEARS TO EXPLAIN GAMBIA'S READINESS TO
ACT. GAMBIAN OFFICIALS HERE CONSISTENTLY
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A HOMELAND FOR
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BANJUL 03049 181611Z

THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND HAVE SUPPORTED
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES
AT WHICH THE PLO SHOULD BE REPRESENTED. OVER
THE LAST YEAR, AND WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OMAR
SEY'S ENCOURAGEMENT, ATTENTION ALSO HAS BEEN
GIVEN TO ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THE GAMBIANS

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HAVE ALSO BECOME RECEPTIVE TO NON-OFFICIAL AND UNPUBLICIZED CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE OF A PLO REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN BANJUL. THUS PNC ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 PROBABLY REMOVED ANY HESITATIONS THE GAMBIANS MAY HAVE HAD ABOUT RECOGNITION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.

3. (U) THE TEXT OF THE GAMBIAN ANNOUNCEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

- "THE GAMBIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO GIVE FULL RECOGNITION TO THE NEWLY-CREATED INDEPENDENT STATE OF PALESTINE IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP. THE PROCLAMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE WAS UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, THE PALESTINE PARLIAMENT IN EXILE, AT ITS MEETING IN THE ALGERIAN CAPITAL, ALGIERS, ON 15 NOVEMBER 1988.

- THE GAMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINIAN STATE IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS POLICY OF FULLY SUPPORTING THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND. THE PROCLAMATION OF A NEW PALESTINIAN STATE IN EXILE ALSO MEANS THE ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTION 242 BY THE PALESTINE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BANJUL 03049 181611Z

LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. THE RESOLUTION RECOGNIZES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE BORDERS WHILE CALLING ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAMBIA WELCOMES THE DECISION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WHICH IT BELIEVES MARKS A NEW PHASE IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. IT IS THEREFORE EXPECTED THAT THAT PROCLAMATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR A CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE SEARCH FOR A GENUINE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT."

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02712

FILM= D880710-0019

DATE= 12 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= CURTAILMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES FOR WEST BANK PALESTINIANS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, HEALTH, WEST BANK, MEDICAL FACILITY, INTERVENTION,
OPPOSITION, BUDGET, ALLOCATION, EXPENDITURE, OCCUPIED AREA, HUMAN RIGHTS

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☒ RELEASE - ☒ DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions
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MR Cases Only:
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Date.

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02712 01 OF 02 121419Z
ACTION NEA-11

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R 121417Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3193
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02712

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: CURTAILMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES FOR WEST
BANK PALESTINIANS

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: DR. MOHAMMED SAID KAMAL, DIRECTOR OF HOSPITALS FOR THE WEST BANK UNDER THE CIVAD, CALLED ON THE CONSUL GENERAL AUGUST 11 TO ASK FOR OUR INTERVENTION TO PROTEST SEVERE ISRAELI BUDGET CUTS IN WEST BANK HEALTH SERVICES. WE RECOMMEND THAT EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE CIVAD AND THE ISRAELI EMBASSY, RESPECTIVELY. END SUMMARY.
3. DR. KAMAL SAID THAT THE CIVAD HAS CUT THE HEALTH SERVICES BUDGET FOR THE WEST BANK IN HALF BY ELIMINATING ENTIRELY THE 15 MILLION DOLLARS ALLOCATED LAST YEAR AND EXPECTED THIS YEAR FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES AND CUT 10-15 PERCENT OFF THE 16 MILLION DOLLAR EXPECTED OPERATING

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BUDGET. THESE DRASTIC BUDGET CUTS, TOGETHER WITH THE DECISION LAST MONTH TO DOUBLE HOSPITAL FEES AND SHARPLY CURTAIL REFERRALS TO ISRAELI HOSPITALS, WILL HAVE AN EXTREMELY DAMAGING

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EFFECT ON HEALTH CARE ON THE WEST BANK, DR.
KAMAL SAID.

4. ACCORDING TO KAMAL, THE CIVAD CLAIMED THE CUTS ARE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF SHORTFALL IN TAX REVENUES FROM THE WEST BANK. KAMAL ARGUED THAT THIS IS AN UNACCEPTABLE RATIONALE, SINCE HEALTH CARE IS A BASIC NEED FOR WHICH THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES SHOULD TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY, IRRESPECTIVE OF LOCAL REVENUE COLLECTIONS. HE SAID THAT IN MOST COUNTRIES HEALTH CARE FOR PEOPLE OF MODEST MEANS IS SUBSIDIZED, AND THAT, WHATEVER THE SHORTFALL IN TAX COLLECTIONS IN THE WEST BANK, HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE THE ISRAELIS TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF HEALTH CARE FOR PALESTINIANS.

5. KAMAL CLAIMED THAT SINCE 1967, THE DISPARITY IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE AVAILABLE TO ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS INCREASED SHARPLY. NO NEW CAPACITY HAS BEEN ADDED TO GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS IN THE WEST BANK, NOTWITHSTANDING A LARGE INCREASE IN POPULATION, NO NEW PRIVATE HOSPITALS HAVE BEEN OPENED, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE TWO SUCH PROJECTS PENDING IN HEBRON, THE COMPLETED RED CRESCENT SOCIETY HOSPITAL, AND ANOTHER HOSPITAL WHICH IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

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[REDACTED]

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KAMAL SAID THAT WEST BANK GOVERNOR SHAIKE ERETZ HAD TOLD HIM YESTERDAY THAT THE LONG DELAYED PERMISSION TO OPEN THE COMPLETED RED CRESCENT SOCIETY HOSPITAL IN HEBRON WILL BE ISSUED IMMINENTLY. ALSO, KAMAL SAID, LOW BUDGETS HAVE RESULTED IN A DETERIORATION OF THE QUALITY OF PERSONNEL AND CARE IN WEST BANK HOSPITALS.

6. KAMAL SAID HE HAD ISSUED A DIRECTIVE TO ALL GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS, COUNTERMANDING A CIVAD DECISION LAST MONTH TO DISCONTINUE FREE TREATMENT OF INTIFADA-RELATED CASUALTIES. HE WAS PLEASED THAT SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE CIVAD ITSELF WITHDREW THE NEW DECISION.

7. ACCORDING TO KAMAL, THE NEW POLICY ADOPTED LAST MONTH LIMITING REFERRALS OF NON-PAYING

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PALESTINIANS TO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS TO 20 PERCENT OF THE PREVIOUS LEVEL HAS CREATED A CRITICAL PROBLEM. APPROVAL FROM THE CIVAD HAS ALWAYS BEEN REQUIRED FOR REFERENCE OF PALESTINIAN PATIENTS WHO LACK THE MEANS TO PAY THE HIGH COST OF HOSPITALIZATION AND SPECIALTY CARE IN ISRAEL, AND THE MEDICAL BILLS FOR SUCH REFERRALS ARE PAID OUT OF EARMARKED FUNDS IN THE CIVAD'S WEST BANK HOSPITAL BUDGET. THE NEW RULE REDUCES THIS EARMARK TO 20 PERCENT OF THE PREVIOUS LEVEL.

8. KAMAL ASKED WHETHER, IN VIEW OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR PALESTINIANS AND OUR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, WE COULD INTERVENE WITH THE CIVAD TO

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----344071 130355Z /23

R 121417Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3194
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02712

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: CURTAILMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES FOR WEST
URGE RECONSIDERATION OF THE BUDGET CUTS.

9. ACTION REQUESTED: WE RECOMMEND THAT AS A FOLLOW UP TO DCM'S EARLIER DEMARCHE TO GOREN ON THE NEW FEE SCHEDULE AND REFERRAL POLICY, EMBASSY RAISE AGAIN WITH THE CIVAD HEALTH CARE PROBLEMS AND EMPHASIZE THE PROBLEM OF THE SEVERE BUDGET CUT. WE SHOULD URGE THE GOI TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IRRESPECTIVE OF TAX COLLECTIONS. WE SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT ALSO RAISE THIS WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY.
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[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02662

FILM= D880694-0106

DATE= 09 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ANOTHER VERSION OF DRAFT PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, INDEPENDENCE, AGREEMENT DRAFT

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS

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<input type="checkbox"/> Denial non-responsive info			
FOIA Exemptions		TS authority to:	
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or	
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or	

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ACTION NEA-11

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SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /070 W
-----044116 091509Z /46

O 091445Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3164
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02662

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: ANOTHER VERSION OF DRAFT PALESTINIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

REF: A) FBIS TEL AVIV 071152Z AUG 88,
B) JERUSALEM 2591

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT. A DRAFT PALESTINIAN
"DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE" IS BEING USED BY
SHAMIR TO DISCREDIT FEISAL HUSSEINI. IT IS ALSO
BEING PROMOTED BY SOME PALESTINIANS HERE TO
CHALLENGE ISRAEL IN THE AFTERMATH OF JORDAN'S
DISENGAGEMENT. AT LEAST TWO VERSIONS HAVE
SURFACED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. ONE (REF A) WHICH
APPEARED IN THE HEBREW PRESS AND IN AL-FAJR, IS
CITED AS THE DOCUMENT TAKEN FROM HUSSEINI'S
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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OFFICE AND ALLEGEDLY LEAKED BY SHAMIR'S OFFICE.
IT IS MORE DETAILED THAN A SECOND VERSION (TEXT
PARA 10) THAT HAS NOT, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, BEEN
PUBLISHED. WHILE BROADLY SIMILAR, THE TWO
DIFFER ON SOME MAJOR POINTS, NOTABLY THE REF A
DOCUMENT'S CITING OF THE 1947 PARTITION

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BOUNDARIES AS THE BORDERS OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE. THE REF A VERSION ALSO HAS A LIST OF 152 PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES APPENDED TO IT, WHO THE DRAFTERS HOPE WILL SUPPORT IT.

3. THE IDEA OF A "DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE" AND A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED HERE FOR SOME TIME, AND PUBLICATION OF THE DOCUMENT HAS EXCITED INCREASED INTEREST IN THE WAKE OF JORDAN'S NEW POLICY. HOWEVER, THE IDEA IS STILL ONLY IN THE DISCUSSION STAGE. PALESTINIANS ARE DIVIDED ABOUT IT, AND NO ONE BELIEVES IT COULD BE ADOPTED WITHOUT APPROVAL BY THE PNC, WHICH THEY CLAIM WILL CONSIDER IT NEXT MONTH. PROPONENTS SEE IT AS A WAY OF CHALLENGING BOTH ISRAEL AND THE PLO TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION MORE URGENTLY, NOW THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS FORSWORN THE JORDAN OPTION. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

4. PARA 10 CONTAINS TEXT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE ANOTHER VERSION OF THE DRAFT PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, PROVIDED TO PAO BY AP REPORTER FROM AN UNNAMED SOURCE. THIS TEXT DIFFERS FROM THE REF A VERSION REPORTEDLY TAKEN FROM FEISAL HUSSEIN'S OFFICE, LEAKED TO THE HEBREW PRESS (REF A) AND AL-FAJR, AND SUMMARIZED

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[REDACTED]

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IN AL-QUDS. ALTHOUGH THE REF A VERSION GOES INTO GREATER DETAIL, BOTH ARE SIMILAR IN SUBSTANCE. THE SHORTER VERSION PROVIDED BELOW DOES NOT MENTION THE 1947 PARTITION BOUNDARIES. UNLIKE THE REF A VERSION, IT SPEAKS OF NEGOTIATING FRONTIERS WITH ISRAEL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IT ALSO DECLARES THE NEW PALESTINIAN STATE'S WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS. PALESTINIAN CONTACTS HERE SAY THE REF A DOCUMENT'S CALL FOR THE 1947 BOUNDARIES IS A NEGOTIATING POSITION BASED ON THE RECOGNITION THAT THE LINE WOULD BE DRAWN WELL TO THE EAST IF A PALESTINIAN STATE WERE ESTABLISHED.

5. EXCEPT FOR THE DIFFERENCES NOTED ABOVE, THE VERSION GIVEN BELOW SEEMS TO BE A SUMMARY OF THE REF A DOCUMENT. THE REF A DOCUMENT GOES INTO

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GREATER DETAIL ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND MENTIONS AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE BODY TO BE SET UP IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BASED ON THE POPULAR COMMITTEES. IT ALSO ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF IDENTITY CARDS AND LAISSEZ-PASSERS.

6. REF A ALSO REPORTS THAT THERE IS A LIST OF 152 PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES ATTACHED TO THE DECLARATION WHO ARE PROPOSED FOR THE INTERIM PALESTINIAN PARLIAMENT. (HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE NAMES.) THE NAMES OF SOME OF THESE PEOPLE APPEAR WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION OR KNOWLEDGE. (THE NAMES OF PRO-JORDANIAN PALESTINIANS ELIAS FREIJ AND RASHAD SHAWAA, BOTH

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[REDACTED]

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
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SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /070 W

-----044321 091511Z /46

O 091445Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3165
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02662

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: ANOTHER VERSION OF DRAFT PALESTINIAN

OF WHOM OPPOSE THE CONCEPT, ARE REPORTEDLY INCLUDED IN THE LIST.)

7. AL-QUDS PUBLISHER MAHMOUD ABU ZULUF TOLD CONGEN OFFICER THE DOCUMENT HAD BEEN CIRCULATING FOR THE PAST MONTH, BUT THAT IT HAD NOT YET GONE BEYOND THE DISCUSSION PHASE. ABU ZULUF NOTED THAT IT IS UNLIKELY FEISAL HUSSEINI HAD ANY SPECIFIC CONNECTION WITH THE DOCUMENT AND DISCOUNTED ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF A BLESSING FROM THE PLO OR THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. HANNA SINIORA TOLD US THAT SARI NUSSEIBEH DRAFTED THE PAPER, WHICH DRAWS CLOSELY ON IDEAS CONTAINED IN AN ARTICLE BY DR. JEROME SEGAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, AND
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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FOUNDER OF THE JEWISH COMMITTEE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE WHO MET ARAFAT IN TUNISIA LAST YEAR. SEGAL'S ARTICLE, "A STRATEGY FOR PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD," APPEARED IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND EAST JERUSALEM PRESS IN RECENT MONTHS. (A COPY OF THE VERSION THAT APPEARED IN THE JULY 22 ISSUE OF MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL IS BEING POUCHED TO NEA/IAI.)

8. ALL THE PALESTINIANS WITH WHOM WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE DECLARATION ASSURE US THAT IT IS STILL ONLY A CONCEPT, AND THAT IT HAS NO STATUS UNTIL IT IS DISCUSSED BY THE PNC WHEN IT MEETS IN SEPTEMBER. SOME CLAIM THAT THE DECLARATION WILL BE STUDIED SOON BY A PNC LEGAL COMMITTEE AND THAT IT HAS CONSIDERABLE MOMENTUM BEHIND IT. OTHERS, NOTING THE DIVISIONS AMONG PALESTINIANS, BOTH HERE AND IN THE PLO, ARE MORE SCEPTICAL.

9. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SHAMIR'S STAFF LEAKED THE DECLARATION AS A MEANS OF DISCREDITING FEISAL HUSSEINI. SHAMIR TOLD ISRAEL TELEVISION, "IT'S GOOD TO KNOW WHOM WE ARE CONFRONTING, WHO IS STANDING BEHIND THE BOTTLE-THROWERS AND ROCK-HURLERS." PERES, HOWEVER, CALLED THE LEAK "A STUPID ACT," WHILE

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RABIN SAID HE WAS BOTH SURPRISED AND EXASPERATED AT THE POOR TIMING OF THE LEAK AND THAT THE DOCUMENT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HUSSEINI'S DETENTION.

10. BEGIN TEXT OF DECLARATION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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A PROPOSAL FOR THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY THE PLO OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE

THIS PROPOSAL FOR THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY THE PLO OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WILL ATTAIN PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PALESTINIAN CONSENSUS FOR A JUST PEACE. A SUMMARY OF THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE PLO AND THE RATIONALE FOR THIS UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE ARE GIVEN HEREUNDER:

- 1. THE PLO MAKES A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND STATEHOOD, ANNOUNCING THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE (IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA) WITH EAST JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THIS DECLARATION IS ISSUED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY THE ARM OF THE PLO, THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING, IN A SPECIAL LEAFLET DISTRIBUTED INT THE TERRITORIES.
- 2. THE PLO BECOMES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE, WITH THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ACTING AS ITS UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES UNTIL THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES.
- 3. THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL BECOMES THE PARLIAMENT OF THE NEW STATE.
- 4. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PLO BECOMES THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE AND ASSUMES

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
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O 091445Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3166
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02662

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: ANOTHER VERSION OF DRAFT PALESTINIAN

POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES SIMILAR TO THOSE
BESTOWED ON A PRESIDENT OF A STATE.

- 5. THE PALESTINIAN STATE WILL PROCEED TO
ISSUE PASSPORTS TO ALL PALESTINIANS WHO WISH
THEM. WHEREVER THEY MAY BE, THUS ENDING THE TITLE
OF STATELESSNESS FOR ALL PALESTINIANS IN EXILE,
BE IT IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA, OR
LIVING IN ARAB GULF COUNTRIES.

- 6. THE PALESTINIAN STATE WILL ISSUE A
DECLARATION EXPRESSING ITS READINESS TO
RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AND NEGOTIATE FRONTIERS WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IF
THE LATTER AGREES TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE

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OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE TO EXIST, AND ACCEPT IN GOOD FAITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 REGARDING COMPENSATION OR RETURN OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES EVICTED FROM THEIR HOMES IN 1948.

- 7. THE NEW STATE OF PALESTINE EMBARKS ON A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FOR WORLDWIDE RECOGNITION OF THE NEW STATE AND ITS ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS. IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WILL GIVE THE PALESTINIAN STATE THEIR IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS SUPPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. IT IS ALSO EXPECTED THAT COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD, THE EASTERN BLOC, SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN WILL IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZE THE NEW STATE.

THE ABOVE PROPOSED PALESTINIAN STRATEGY FOR ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE IS THE NATURAL OUTCOME OF THE HEROIC INTIFADA WHICH IS NOW ENTERING ITS EIGHTH MONTH, AND IS THE LOGICAL AND PRACTICAL STEP TO MOVE FORWARD FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION. IN THE SAME FASHION THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE UNDER OCCUPATION HAVE MADE THE DECISION TO LIBERATE THEMSELVES, BY THEMSELVES, THE LEADERS OF THESE PEOPLE SHOULD ALSO MAKE THIS UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE WITHOUT ASKING THE APPROVAL OR CONSENT OF THE OCCUPIER OR THE UNITED STATES,

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THE ONLY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD STILL OPPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE WILL RENDER USELESS ALL THESE ENDLESS PRE-CONDITIONS FOR CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ON WHO SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT WILL ALSO END ONCE AND FOR ALL THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO, SUCH AS RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND

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338, ETC. THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN THE WEST BANK (INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM) AND THE GAZA STRIP WILL BECOME THE OCCUPIED STATE OF PALESTINE, AND IT WILL BE UP TO THE OCCUPIERS, THE ISRAELIS, TO RECOGNIZE OR NOT TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE TO EXIST, AND TO AGREE TO RECTIFY THE INJUSTICE PERPETRATED AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS IN 1948. ONE FINAL NOTE: IN ORDER FOR THIS STRATEGY TO HAVE A MAXIMUM IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION, THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN ELECTIONS. IT WILL FACE BOTH THESE STATES AND THEIR PEOPLE WITH A PALESTINIAN STATE AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI AND IT WILL BE NOW UP TO THEM TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF EXISTENCE FOR THE PALESTINIAN STATE, IF THEY WANT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

END TEXT.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02728

FILM= D880714-0792

DATE= 08 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

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OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
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CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= POLL CLAIMS 49 PERCENT ISRAELI SUPPORT FOR TRANSFER OF ARABS FROM
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

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CONCEPTS= POLL, TRANSFER, CLAIM, OCCUPIED AREA, EXTREMIST, JEWS, PALESTINIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

FEB 12 1997
Date:

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☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY
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☐ DELETE Non Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority to:
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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ACTION NEA-11

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R 081422Z AUG 88
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3207
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

[REDACTED] JERUSALEM 02728

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: POLL CLAIMS 49 PERCENT ISRAELI SUPPORT
FOR TRANSFER OF ARABS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. (U) THE JERUSALEM POST REPORTS THAT ITS
LATEST IASR POLL FOUND THAT 49 PERCENT OF
JEWISH ISRAELI ADULTS BELIEVE "TRANSFER" OF
ARABS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WOULD ALLOW
THE DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH NATURE OF ISRAEL TO BE
MAINTAINED. RESPONDENTS TO THE POLL, CONDUCTED
IN JUNE BEFORE JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE
TERRITORIES, WERE ASKED, "IF THE TERRITORIES
REMAIN UNDER ISRAELI RULE, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
TO PRESERVE THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE
STATE?" THE SAME QUESTION WAS ALSO ASKED
SUBSTITUTING "JEWISH" FOR "DEMOCRATIC." IN
RESPONSE TO BOTH QUESTIONS, APPROXIMATELY 49
PERCENT SUPPORTED MAKING THE ARABS LEAVE, 30
PERCENT OPTED FOR RELINQUISHING THE TERRITORIES,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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AND 20 PERCENT SELECTED GIVING/DENYING RIGHTS TO
ARABS.

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT. WITH ITS CENTRAL ASSUMPTION

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THAT THE TERRITORIES REMAIN UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL, THIS POLL WAS NOT A STRAIGHTFORWARD REFERENDUM ON THE CHOICE BETWEEN LAND FOR PEACE AND TRANSFER OF THE ARABS. THE 49 PERCENT SUPPORT CLAIMED FOR TRANSFER MAY THEREFORE BE SOMEWHAT SKEWED. NEVERTHELESS, THE TRANSFER OPTION, WHICH WAS ONCE HEARD ONLY AMONG RIGHT WING EXTREMISTS OF THE KAHANE VARIETY, HAS ENTERED INTO THE MAINSTREAM POLITICAL VOCABULARY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA. THE FACT THAT TRANSFER IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BEYOND THE LUNATIC FRINGE IS DEEPLY DISTURBING TO PALESTINIANS. FOR THEM, RECALLING THE MASS INVOLUNTARY MOVEMENT OF ARABS IN THE 1948 WAR, FORCED TRANSFER EAST OF THE JORDAN IN SOME NEW CONFLAGRATION IS THEIR GREATEST FEAR. END COMMENT.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

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FILM= D880714-0857

DATE= 08 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= EX-LIKUD MEMBER AMIRAV PRAISES FEISAL HUSSEINI, ADVOCATES PALESTIN
STATE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, MEETING, RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, PEACE, RECOGNITION,
DETENTION, DETERMINATION, INTERVIEW, WEST BANK, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, GZ, PLO, (HUSSEINI, FEISAL)

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02734 151546Z
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R 081542Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3211
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 02734

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: EX-LIKUD MEMBER AMIRAV PRAISES FEISAL
HUSSEINI, ADVOCATES PALESTINIAN STATE

1. SUMMARY: MOSHE AMIRAV, FORMER MEMBER OF THE
LIKUD WHO WAS EXPELLED FOR MEETING WITH
PALESTINIAN ACTIVIST FEISAL HUSSEINI LAST YEAR,
HAS AGAIN ADVOCATED TALKS WITH THE PLO AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. AMIRAV
EARLIER SPOKE OUT PUBLICLY ALONG THESE LINES AT
A PEACE NOW MEETING IN WEST JERUSALEM, JULY 27,
AT WHICH HE SHARED THE PODIUM WITH FEISAL
HUSSEINI AND REDWAN ABU AYYASH. HUSSEINI, WHO
CALLED FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND A TWO-STATE
SOLUTION VIA MUTUAL RECOGNITION, WAS PLACED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION SEVERAL DAYS LATER.
AMIRAV'S RECENT COMMENTS WHICH INCLUDE ACERBIC
REMARKS THAT BOTH LIKUD AND LABOR HAVE FAILED TO
FACE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE SQUARELY, APPEARED IN
THE PRESS RECENTLY. END SUMMARY.
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2. IN A MEETING OF THE "END THE OCCUPATION
MOVEMENT" IN JERUSALEM AUGUST 10, AMIRAV CALLED
ON ISRAELIS TO "DISABUSE OURSELVES OF DELUSIONS"

AND TO ADMIT "THE BASIC TRUTH THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE THE DECISIONS ON OUR FUTURE TOGETHER WITH THE PALESTINIANS." HE CALLED FEISAL HUSSEINI A "COURAGEOUS MAN WILLING TO SAY THINGS THAT ARE TABOO" IN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE. HE ADDED "IF ONLY WE HAD MORE ISRAELIS WHO WERE WILLING TO SAY AND THINK SIMILAR FORBIDDEN THINGS -- THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD NOT MEAN THE END OF ISRAEL."

3. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE JERUSALEM POST AUGUST 12, AMIRAV SAID EVENTS ARE HEADING TOWARD THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AND THAT THIS EVOLUTION STARTED WHEN BEGIN SIGNED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. HE SAID BEGIN UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAELI LAW COULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, BECAUSE OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM. "BEGIN WAS A DEMOCRAT AND UNDERSTOOD. SHAMIR IS A LEHI (PRE-STATE UNDERGROUND "STERN GROUP") -- HE HAS NO PRINCIPLES. BUT OTHERS IN THE LIKUD, LIKE ARENS AND MERIDOR, KNOW THAT THEY HAVE TO GIVE THE PALESTINIANS VOTING RIGHTS IF WE ANNEX ..." AMIRAV SAID THAT LIKUD'S REJOICING OVER KING HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO DISENGAGE FROM THE WEST BANK IS "IDIOCY, BECAUSE ONLY THROUGH HUSSEIN DID ISRAEL HAVE A CHANCE OF HOLDING ON TO THE WEST BANK." CONTINUING HIS CRITIQUE OF THE LIKUD, HE SAID, "THEY ARE IN FOR A NASTY SHOCK, BECAUSE THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO UNCLASSIFIED

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TALK TO THE PLO SOONER THAN THEY KNOW. HUSSEIN'S MOVE WAS FINAL AND ESSENTIAL. IT WAS VERY MUCH EXPECTED AND FORESEEN. SINCE 1974 THERE HAS BEEN A PROCESS OF DECREASING JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES AND INCREASING PLO RESPONSIBILITY THERE."

4. AMIRAV SAID THAT SHAMIR KNEW, FROM AMIRAV'S EARLIER CONTACTS WITH FEISAL HUSSEINI, THAT HUSSEINI HAD MADE CLEAR THE PLO'S READINESS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. "SHAMIR IS LYING TO THE PUBLIC WHEN HE SAYS THAT THE INTIFADA'S INTENTION IS TO DESTROY THE STATE OF ISRAEL. IT IS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA."

5. AMIRAV CONCLUDED, "ONCE WE USED TO INITIATE,

TO LEAD. TODAY WE'RE DRAGGED ALONG BY EVENTS,
STUNNED AND PUZZLED. ISRAEL'S LEADERSHIP WAS
ACTUALLY SURPRISED WHEN THE INTIFADA BROKE OUT.
HUSSEIN MAKES A SPEECH AND EVERYONE TRIES TO
IGNORE IT. LABOR IS TEN YEARS BEHIND THE TIMES
AND THE LIKUD IS TOO BLOCKHEADED TO SEE WHAT IS
HAPPENING."
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02719

FILM= D880712-0263

DATE= 08 AUG 88

FEB 12 1997

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

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OFFICE= ACTION NEA

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TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST BANK

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 2625, 88 TEL AVIV 11556

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, WEST BANK, WAGES, IMPLEMENTATION, POLICY, SOCIAL SERVICE

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, JO

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02719 01 OF 03 150912Z
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O 080908Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3201
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02719

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT: THE VIEW
FROM THE WEST BANK ✓ ✓

REF: A) JERUSALEM 2625, B) TEL AVIV 11556

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. THE FULL EXTENT OF THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL SERVICE, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE WEST BANK REMAINS TO BE SEEN. MOST PALESTINIAN WORKERS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR AND BE PAID BY THE CIVAD, ALTHOUGH THE CUTOFF OF GOJ SALARIES AND SUPPLEMENTS WILL REDUCE THEIR INCOME AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE WEST BANK ECONOMY. LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITAL SPENDING WILL SUFFER MORE IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY, ALTHOUGH
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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PRIVATE FUNDS WILL CONTINUE TO FLOW INFORMALLY INTO THE WEST BANK. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS REMAIN IN A STATE OF UNCERTAINTY, NOT KNOWING IF THEY WILL HAVE TO RELINQUISH THEIR JORDANIAN TIES. MANY WEST BANKERS CRITICIZE THE

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ABRUPTNESS OF THE KING'S ACTIONS, BUT THESE ACTIONS HAVE STIMULATED PALESTINIAN PRIDE AND DETERMINATION TO TAKE THEIR FUTURE INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. INCREASED DISCUSSION OF GIVING THE INTIFADA MORE POLITICAL CONTENT AND CHALLENGING THE PLO WITH THE IDEA OF A "DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE" AND A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE ARE SYMPTOMS OF THIS IMPULSE. END SUMMARY.

FORMER GOJ EMPLOYEES

//////////

3. IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE CUTOFF OF JORDANIAN SALARIES AND SUPPLEMENTS WILL RESULT IN AN IMMEDIATE REDUCTION IN SOCIAL OR MUNICIPAL SERVICES. CIVAD EMPLOYEES ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE WORKING FOR THE CIVAD, RECEIVING ONLY THEIR CIVAD SALARIES, DESPITE CESSATION OF JORDANIAN PAY. DR. ISSA SALTI, MEDICAL DIRECTOR OF THE RAMALLAH HOSPITAL, SAID ONLY 31 OF THE HOSPITAL'S 215 EMPLOYEES RECEIVE JORDANIAN SALARY BENEFITS; HE ESTIMATES 350 OF THE WEST BANK'S APPROXIMATELY 1700 HEALTH SECTOR EMPLOYEES WERE PAID BY THE GOJ. HE EXPECTS NEARLY ALL TO CONTINUE WORKING. IN SOME CASES, HE SAID, JORDANIAN RETIREMENT BENEFITS, WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FRINGE BENEFITS NOT RECEIVED BY WEST BANK EMPLOYEES, MAY EXCEED THE PREVIOUS

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MONTHLY SALARY. FOR MOST, THERE WILL BE A NET REDUCTION IN INCOME, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO MAKE EMPLOYEES QUIT.

MUNICIPALITIES

//////////

4. HANNA NASSER, DEPUTY MAYOR OF BETHLEHEM, CONFIRMED THAT HIS CITY'S USD 2 MILLION ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET IS RAISED PRIMARILY FROM LOCAL PROPERTY AND SERVICE TAXES, PLUS BUSINESS LICENSE FEES. WITH BUSINESS CONDITIONS DEPRESSED BY THE INTIFADA, THESE REVENUES HAVE BEEN REDUCED, AND THE CITY HAS BEEN IN DESPERATE FINANCIAL STRAITS FOR SOME TIME. ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER WEST BANK MAYORS, MAYOR FREIJ HAS VISITED AMMAN IN PAST MONTHS SEEKING GOJ HELP WITH MUNICIPAL SALARIES, BUT HAS RECEIVED

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NOTHING. THUS, THE NEW JORDANIAN ACTIONS DO NOT
CHANGE AN ALREADY EXISTING MUNICIPAL BUDGET
CRISIS.

LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT

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5. ALTHOUGH WEST BANK INSTITUTIONS WILL
CONTINUE TO FUNCTION, THE SHORTAGE OF
DEVELOPMENT FUNDS RESULTING FROM JORDAN'S
DISENGAGEMENT WILL WORSEN AN ALREADY DEPRESSED
ECONOMY AND FURTHER ERODE THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
MAYOR FREIJ, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID HE IS UNABLE TO
SPEND FUNDS ON NECESSARY ROAD REPAIRS OR OTHER
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN BETHLEHEM. THE CIVAD
HAS MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION TO REDUCE SERVICES
AND MAINTENANCE OWING TO TAX REVENUE

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ACTION NEA-11

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT: THE VIEW

SHORTFALLS. JORDANIAN MONEY FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, WHILE NEVER ABUNDANT, WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REPLACE, AND WE DO NOT FORSEE BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL DONORS ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL FILLING THE GAP SOON. THE GOI'S EFFORT TO RESTRICT FURTHER THE FLOW OF PRIVATE FUNDS INTO THE WEST BANK WILL ALSO HURT. (SEE REF B AND SEPTEL ON TIGHTENING OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE CAIRO-AMMAN BANK.) JUDGING FROM THE SUCCESS WHICH PALESTINIANS HAVE HAD THUS FAR IN TRANSFERRING PRIVATE FUNDS COVERTLY INTO THE WEST BANK, WE DOUBT THAT THE GOI WILL BE ABLE TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY SUCH FLOWS.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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6. THE IMPACT OF JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT ON SPECIFIC WEST BANK AND EAST JERUSALEM PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS REMAINS UNCLEAR. MOST ARE BRANCHES OF THEIR JORDANIAN COUNTERPARTS, WITH SOME BEING DESIGNATED "JORDANIAN" ASSOCIATIONS. EXCEPT FOR THE GRADING OF ENTRANCE EXAMS IN JORDAN BY SOME OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS, THEY HAVE OPERATED MORE OR LESS AUTONOMOUSLY SINCE 1967. IN ANY CASE, ALL THESE ASSOCIATIONS HOPE TO CONTINUE THEIR TIES TO JORDAN. THEY REALIZE THAT RENAMING THEMSELVES "PALESTINIAN" ASSOCIATIONS WOULD BE TO COURT TROUBLE WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. NOR DO THEY DO NOT WANT TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES AS LOCAL NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE APPLICABLE OTTOMAN-ERA LAW, SINCE SUCH ACTION COULD EXPOSE THEM TO INTERFERENCE AND MANIPULATION BY THE CIVAD, WHICH ADMINISTERS THIS LAW.

7. THE BAR ASSOCIATION IS A SPECIAL CASE. AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND THE JORDANIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WEST BANK MEMBERS OF THE BAR WENT ON STRIKE IN 1967 ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE PRACTICE

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UNDER AN OCCUPATION THEY DID NOT ACCEPT.
(OTHERS OPTED TO QUIT AND CONTINUE PRACTICING).
IN RETURN, MEMBERS HAVE BEEN PAID A STIPEND BY
THE JORDANIAN BAR OF APPROXIMATELY USD 100 PER
MONTH. THE BAR ASSOCIATION DOES NOT KNOW
WHETHER ITS MEMBERS WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
THIS STIPEND, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND COMES FROM THE

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GOJ.

NOTARIAL SERVICES AND REGISTRATIONS

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8. WEST BANKERS IN THE PAST HAVE DEPENDED ON
GOJ REPRESENTATIVES HERE FOR A HOST OF NOTARIAL
AND REGISTRATION SERVICES, SUCH AS APPLYING FOR
JORDANIAN PASSPORTS, LEGALIZING BUSINESS
ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDANIAN PARTNERS, AND
RECORDING LAND TRANSFERS. HOW THESE
TRANSACTIONS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE ABSENCE
OF AUTHORIZED GOJ REPRESENTATIVES IN THE WEST
BANK IS UNCLEAR. ACTIVITY IN THESE AREAS HAS
HALTED, AS PEOPLE WAIT TO SEE THE PRACTICAL
EFFECTS OF THE JORDANIAN MEASURES.

THE "POLITICAL VACUUM"

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9. MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE SUPPOSED POLITICAL
"VACUUM" CAUSED BY JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT. IN
FACT, JORDANIAN INFLUENCE ON THE WEST BANK WAS
VERY LIMITED BEFORE THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT AND
THE PLO WAS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY THE
POPULACE. THE REAL POLITICAL VACUUM CONCERNS
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE
PALESTINIANS IN THE TASK OF MAKING PEACE WITH
ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH PALESTINIANS WERE TAKEN BY
SURPRISE BY JORDAN'S NEW POLICY AND WORRY ABOUT
THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING PASSPORTS,

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ACTION NEA-11

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[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02719

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT: THE VIEW

TRAVEL, CITIZENSHIP AND TRADE, THE MAINSTREAM OF
THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY HERE WELCOMES THE KING'S
MOVE AS A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY FOR THE INTIFADA
AND A VINDICATION OF THEIR NATIONALIST
ASPIRATIONS. THEY ARE ANXIOUS, THEREFORE, TO
CREATE A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE INTIFADA
THAT WILL CHALLENGE ISRAEL TO DEAL REALISTICALLY
WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ENCOURAGE THE PLO
TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. THE CURRENT
DISCUSSION OF A PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IS AN
EFFORT TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE
KING'S DECISION TO SEIZE THE POLITICAL
INITIATIVE. WE WILL BE COMMENTING FURTHER ON
THIS SUBJECT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAVI1407

FILM= D880682-0795

DATE= 05 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

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OFFICE= ACTION NEA

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ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= ISRAELI ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 5

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 10994

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CONCEPTS= CAMPAIGN, REVIEW, ELECTION, VOTING, PEACE PLAN, DETERMINATION

TAGS= PGOV, IS

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ACTION NEA-11

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P 051535Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4854

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 11407

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 5
REF: TEL AVIV 10994 ✓

1. SUMMARY: THE "FLOATING VOTERS" WILL DECIDE THE ELECTIONS, ACCORDING TO STRATEGISTS IN LABOR AND LIKUD, AND BOTH ARE FOCUSING THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION. LABOR IS SEEKING TO IDENTIFY THESE VOTERS WITH A MASSIVE TELEPHONE CAMPAIGN, WHILE LIKUD IS USING PARTY BRANCHES TO TARGET THEM BY CROSS-CHECKING LISTS. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS STILL IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL STAGE AND WILL NOT GO INTO HIGHER GEAR BEFORE SEPTEMBER. MEANWHILE, HUSSEIN'S STEPS TO DISENGAGE FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FIT IN NICELY WITH LIKUD'S POSITION THAT THERE IS NO JORDANIAN (TERRITORIAL) OPTION AND COMPLICATE LABOR'S EFFORTS TO CONVINCE ISRAELIS THAT THERE IS. END SUMMARY.

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2. LABOR CAMPAIGN HQ INFORMATION DIRECTOR ZVILI ASSESSED THERE WILL BE NO SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT OF VOTERS AND THAT THE CONTEST WITH LIKUD WILL BE OVER THE 250,000 "FLOATING VOTERS." OUR LIKUD SOURCES SHARE ZVILI'S ASSESSMENT. LABOR IS TRYING TO LOCATE THESE VOTERS THROUGH A MASSIVE TELEPHONE CAMPAIGN. LIKUD'S APPROACH IS BASED ON HAVING ITS LOCAL PARTY CHAPTERS REVIEW AND CROSS-CHECK VARIOUS LISTS.
ISSUES: PEACE PROCESS

3. HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO DISENGAGE JORDAN FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAS UNDERCUT LABOR'S ASSERTIONS THAT JORDAN REMAINS THE PROMINENT POTENTIAL PARTNER. LABOR SPOKESMEN HAVE FURTHER CONFUSED THE PARTY'S MESSAGE WITH VARYING PROPOSALS. PERES AND RABIN SAY THE JORDANIAN OPTION REMAINS OPEN, WITH PERES STRESSING THAT HUSSEIN HAS NOT BACKED AWAY FROM THE LONDON AGREEMENT. BUT YA'ACOBBI RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT HUSSEIN CONTINUING TO BE A PARTNER. WEIZMAN SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKING WITH THE PLO IF IT MEETS ISRAELI CONDITIONS. MK RAMON AND CAMPAIGN HQ SPOKESMAN BURG, FOR THEIR PART, CALLED FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES TO DEVELOP A LEADERSHIP TO TALK WITH ISRAEL. OUR LABOR SOURCES RECOGNIZE LABOR'S FAILURE TO STICK TO A COMMON LINE IS DAMAGING AND THEY ASSERT THE PARTY SOON WILL GET ITS ACT TOGETHER.

4. LIKUD, IN CONTRAST, POINTS TO HUSSEIN'S ACTIONS AS CONFIRMATION THERE IS NO JORDANIAN (TERRITORIAL)

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OPTION. SHAMIR INSISTS, HOWEVER, THAT LIKUD FAVORS DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH HUSSEIN. LIKUD SPOKESMEN, HOWEVER, HAVE REACHED DIFFERENT OPERATIVE CONCLUSIONS. SHARON AND MODAI PROPOSED THE IMPOSITION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY ON SOME OR ALL OF THE TERRITORIES. SHAMIR AND NISSIM, IN TURN, REJECTED THE SUGGESTION AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

5. IN ADDITION, LIKUD SEEMS INCLINED TO BLAME LABOR FOR "LOSING" TABA AND ARENS HAS SUGGESTED LIKUD WILL POINT TO THE TABA ISSUE AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHERE LABOR POLICY LEADS.

LABOR: INTERNAL

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6. PARTY SEC GEN BARAM ANNOUNCED THAT DUE TO HIS BACK PROBLEM HE WOULD NOT BE RETURNING TO HIS POSITION AS CAMPAIGN HQ CHIEF. WEIZMAN, WHO HAS BEEN FILLING IN FOR BARAM FOR THE LAST TWO MONTHS, WILL CONTINUE TO LEAD THE CAMPAIGN.

LABOR-HISTADRUT ACRIMONY

7. HISTADRUT SEC GEN (AND LABOR MK) KESSAR CRITICIZED LABOR THIS WEEK FOR BEING AN "ELECTION (ONLY) PARTY." BAD BLOOD BETWEEN HISTADRUT AND LABOR FLOWED FROM SUGGESTIONS SOME PARTY LEADERS WANTED TO DOWNPLAY THE HISTADRUT (AND KESSAR) IN THE CAMPAIGN AS A RESULT OF THE HISTADRUT'S PROBLEMS. KESSAR, BARAM AND WEIZMAN WILL BE MEETING NEXT WEEK IN ORDER TO GET THE PARTY AND HISTADRUT BACK INTO A COOPERATIVE FRAME OF MIND.

SURPLUS VOTE AGREEMENTS

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
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P 051535Z AUG 88
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9880
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4855

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8. LABOR AND THE CITIZENS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT HAVE CONCLUDED A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT TO SHARE THEIR "SURPLUS VOTES" IN THE ELECTION. LIKUD AND TEHIYA REPORTEDLY ARE ON THE WAY TO A SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT.

LIKUD: INTERNAL

9. STILL NO FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE LIKUD LIST -- BUT NO ONE SEEMS UNDULY DISTURBED.

10. LIKUD, FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF LABOR, IS SETTING UP A TEAM OF FORMER GENERALS TO LEGITIMIZE ITS SECURITY POSITIONS.

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY

11. THE NRP KNESSET CANDIDATES SHOWED THEIR DIFFERENCES ON PEACE PROCESS ISSUES IN AN AUGUST 2 STUDY DAY. POLITICAL SECRETARY YAHALOM OPPOSED ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, CALLING FOR A FUNCTIONAL

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SOLUTION. IN CONTRAST, KNESSET CANDIDATE (AND FORMER GUSH EMUNIM LEADER) PORAT URGED THE IMPOSITION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY AND LAW ON THE TERRITORIES. KNESSET CANDIDATE BIBI, MEANWHILE, CALLED FOR THE PARTY TO RETURN TO A MORE POSITIVE POSITION ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

12. THE NRP KNOWS IT WILL HAVE TO COMPETE WITH LIKUD FOR THE RELIGIOUS ZIONIST VOTER AND IS PLANNING TO CRITICIZE LIKUD ON ITS STANDS ON RELIGIOUS ISSUES.

AGUDAT ISRAEL

13. THIS ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTY WILL APPARENTLY PLACE RABBI MOSHE ZE'EV FELDMAN AT THE HEAD OF ITS LIST. HE IS THE HEAD OF A YESHIVA (RABBINICAL SCHOOL) AND WITHOUT PAST INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS. FELDMAN, THE CANDIDATE OF THE RABBI OF GUR'S HASIDIC FACTION, ALSO RECEIVED THE NOD FROM THE "LITHUANIAN" FACTION OF RABBI SHACH (THE OTHER KEY GROUP IN THE PARTY).

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14. THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED INFIGHTING BETWEEN MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO PERETZ AND INTERIOR MINISTRY DIRGEN DER'I HAS DISRUPTED THE PARTY'S CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION, WHICH APPARENTLY MUST BE REBUILT AND RESPONSIBILITIES REASSIGNED.

KACH

15. THE FIRST FOUR CANDIDATES FOR KACH'S LIST WILL REPORTEDLY BE KAHANE, ATTORNEY MOSHE NEIMAN, ATTOR. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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RAHAMIM COHEN AND A RABBI TOLEDANO.

16. MEANWHILE, LABOR MK RAMON AND CENTER PARTY MK RUBENSTEIN HAVE ASKED THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE TO DISQUALIFY KACH FROM CONTESTING THE ELECTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT KACH IS A RACIST PARTY AND ACCORDING TO LAW SHOULD BE BANNED FROM RUNNING. LIKUD AND EHIYA ARE ALSO LIKELY TO FAVOR BANNING KACH - AS TELL AS THE NON-ZIONIST PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE IN THE GROUNDS OF THE SAME LAW, WHICH BAN PARTIES WHICH REJECT THE STATE OF ISRAEL).

LS

A PORI POLL REPORTED THE ISRAELI PUBLIC BELIEVES MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS FACING ISRAEL ARE THE 'S IN THE HEALTH SECTOR (30 PERCENT), SECURITY RCENT), THE ECONOMIC SITUATION (18.4 PERCENT), ITUATION IN THE TERRITORIES (17.8 PERCENT), THE VING PEACE WITH THE ARAB STATES (8 PERCENT), THE EMS IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR (4.9 PERCENT), LOYMENT (4.2 PERCENT) AND TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (3.5 T).

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02624

FILM= D880682-0620

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TYPE= TE

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

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EO= N/A

SUBJECT= INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 23

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= COOPERATION, VISIT, PALESTINIANS, BOYCOTT, DEMONSTRATION, BOUND,
INTERNAL CONTROL, CONDEMNATION, DEPORTATION, OPPOSITION, HUMAN RIGHTS, W
K, REFUGEE

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS, US, PLO

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 02624

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 23

1. SUMMARY: LEAFLET 23 HAILS JORDAN'S SEVERANCE
OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TIES WITH THE WEST
BANK AS A VICTORY FOR THE UPRISING AND THE PLO,
AND A STEP TOWARD A PALESTINIAN STATE WHOSE
CAPITAL IS JERUSALEM. IT PRAISES PALESTINIANS
FOR "A NEW WAY OF LIFE BASED ON COOPERATION AND
SELF RELIANCE", CLAIMS MURPHY'S VISIT WILL
ATTEMPT TO REVIVE THE ALREADY-DEAD SHULTZ PLAN,
CALLS FOR A CONTINUING BOYCOTT OF ALL U.S.
ENVOYS UNTIL THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE PLO AND
URGES PEOPLE TO GREET MURPHY'S VISIT WITH
DEMONSTRATIONS. IT SUPPORTS CALLING A NEW PNC,
CONDEMNS DEPORTATIONS, VARIOUS FORMS OF
COLLABORATION, AND SALUTES THE EC FOR "REFUSING
TO RENEW ITS TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL", WHILE
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WARNING AGAINST COOPERATION WITH THE ISRAELI
EXPORT MARKETING ORGANIZATION, AGREXCO. IT
SALUTES SYMPATHETIC JEWISH DOCTORS AND OTHERS
WHO OPPOSE THE OCCUPATION AND URGES FURTHER WORK

TO ENLIGHTEN THE ISRAELI PUBLIC, SAYING THAT "A HUMAN BEING WHO ACCEPTS THAT ANOTHER BE OPPRESSED CANNOT BE FREE HIMSELF." GENERAL STRIKES ARE CALLED FOR ON AUGUST 9, AUGUST 17, AND AUGUST 22. THIS LEAFLET APPEARS SLIGHTLY LESS SHRILL AND STRIDENT THAN PREVIOUS ONES. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS: END SUMMARY
NO VOICE RISES ABOVE THE VOICE OF THE UPRISING
NO VOICE RISES ABOVE THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PLO

COMMUNIQUE NO. 23
APPEAL OF THE DEPORTEES

ISSUED BY THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING/THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

TO THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE:

YOUR VICTORIOUS UPRISING WILL BE ENTERING ITS NINTH MONTH WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT IS REGISTERING AN INCREASING NUMBER OF ACHIEVEMENTS AS IT TAKES ITS DIFFICULT COURSE TOWARDS FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, AND TOWARDS FULFILLING THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF OUR PEOPLE TO RETURN TO THEIR LAND TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WHOSE CAPITAL IS JERUSALEM. THE LATEST JORDANIAN MEASURES SEVERING JORDANIAN UNCLASSIFIED

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LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LINKS WITH THE WEST BANK REPRESENT ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GREAT POPULAR UPRISING, AND ONE STEP TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE ALGIERS SUMMIT. THESE MEASURES MUST ALSO BE VIEWED AS STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF OUR PEOPLE, AND AS THE ONLY PARTY AUTHORIZED TO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS OUR PEOPLE IN PALESTINE AND THE DIASPORA. WE CALL UPON JORDAN AND THE ARAB STATES TO EXTEND THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO OUR PEOPLE, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SO THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE.

THIS ACHIEVEMENT FOLLOWS PREVIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS

OF THE UPRISING; YOU HAVE ALREADY INFLICTED AN ECONOMIC LOSS OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS ON THE ENEMY, IN ADDITION TO HAVING WON THREE RESOLUTIONS FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH SPOKE, FOR THE FIRST TIME, OF "OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN LANDS." YOU HAVE EXPOSED TO THE WHOLE WORLD THE RACIST AND FASCIST CHARACTER OF THE OCCUPATION, AND HAVE REINSTATED THE LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE AT THE SUMMIT OF THE UPRISING IN ALGIERS AFTER THEIR NEAR OBLITERATION AT THE EARLIER AMMAN SUMMIT. FURTHERMORE, YOU HAVE MADE GREAT STRIDES TOWARDS DISMANTLING THE APPARATUS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND BUILDING THE NUCLEUS OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE REPRESENTED BY

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ACTION NEA-04

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 02624

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 23

THE POPULAR AND NATIONAL COMMITTEES. YOU HAVE ALSO CREATED A NEW WAY OF LIFE BASED ON COOPERATION AND SELF-RELIANCE. MAY WE ALL BE PROUD OF THESE ACHIEVEMENTS AND WORK TOWARDS PROTECTING AND FURTHERING THEM.

THE VISIT OF THE AMERICAN ENVOY MURPHY TO THE AREA IS NOTHING BUT AN EFFORT TO BREATHE LIFE INTO THE SHULTZ PLAN AFTER THE UPRISING HAD DEALT IT A MORTAL BLOW. THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU) THEREFORE CALLS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE BOYCOTT OF ALL AMERICAN ENVOYS AS LONG AS THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION PERSISTS IN ITS DENIAL OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE AND IN ITS UNCLASSIFIED

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REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO AS OUR SOLE REPRESENTATIVE. WE CALL UPON OUR PEOPLE TO GREET MURPHY WITH DEMONSTRATIONS AND CLASHES WITH THE FORCES OF THE OCCUPATION.

THE UNLU, TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE UPRISING, WELCOME THE IRANIAN DECISION TO IMPLEMENT UN RESOLUTION 598 CONCERNING THE GULF WAR, AND VIEW THIS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS PUTTING AN END TO THIS DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT WHICH HAS SAPPED THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, AND TOWARDS EVICTING THE AMERICAN FLEET FROM THE GULF. THE CESSATION OF THE WAR WILL BE A SERVICE TO OUR UPRISING AND TO THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE OF OUR PEOPLE.

THE UNLU, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SENDS GREETINGS TO THE LEADERS OF OUR REVOLUTION AND OUR PEOPLE NOW MEETING IN BAGHDAD. WE VALUE THEIR EFFORTS IN TAKING DECISIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE UPRISING OF OUR PEOPLE, REINFORCING NATIONAL UNITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PLO AND BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND THE

DECISIONS OF THE 18TH SESSION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. WE ALSO VALUE THEIR EFFORTS IN PRESSING FOR THE CONVENING OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH OTHER PARTIES.

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TO OUR PEOPLE: THE OCCUPYING POWERS ARE DELUDING THEMSELVES IF THEY THINK THAT BY DEPORTING MORE FROM YOUR RANKS THEY CAN CONTAIN THE UPRISING. YOU HAVE PROVEN OVER THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS THAT DEPORTATIONS, DEMOLITION OF HOMES, TORTURE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE WAR ON POPULAR COMMITTEES, THE CLOSURE OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE RUMORS CIRCULATED THROUGH COLLABORATORS AND THE MEDIA THAT THE UPRISING HAS ABATED, WILL ALL FAIL IN THE FACE OF YOUR DETERMINATION. WE URGE YOU TO CONTINUE IN THIS SPIRIT OF DEFIANCE, AND TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO AFFIRM THE FOLLOWING:

WE MUST CONTINUE TO PUT PRESSURE ON COLLABORATORS, THOSE WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RESIGN FROM THEIR POSTS, THOSE WHO PURVEY THE PRODUCTS OF THE ENEMY, AND THE CIRCULATORS OF HARMFUL RUMORS. WORK IN ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS MUST CEASE, AND FINES AND BAIL SHOULD NOT BE PAID.

SOLIDARITY ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF PRISONERS MUST CONTINUE, ESPECIALLY IN PUBLICIZING THE CONDITIONS AT ANSAR III. WOMEN'S COMMITTEES HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ORGANIZING APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES.

THE UNLU SALUTE'S THE PEOPLE FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE IN NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND CHILE. WE CALL UPON ALL PEOPLE OF CONSCIENCE IN THE WORLD TO WORK TOWARDS THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, THE FOREMOST OF WHOM IS THE FIGHTER NELSON MANDELA.

WE SALUTE THE PEOPLE OF JERUSALEM FOR THEIR

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 02624

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 23

DEFENSE OF THE CAPITAL OF OUR PALESTINIAN STATE,
AND CALL UPON THEM TO CONTINUE THEIR PRESENCE
AROUND THE AL-HARAM, AND TO PREVENT THE
RESUMPTION OF EXCAVATIONS IN THE AREA.

WE MUST EXTEND THE PRACTICE OF REFUSING TO
OBEY THE ORDERS OF THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES;
WE SHOULD REFUSE TO ERASE NATIONALIST SLOGANS,
ANSWER SUMMONS, TAKE DOWN PALESTINIAN FLAGS, AND
REMOVE ROADBLOCKS. WE SHOULD ALSO LAUNCH
COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE TO ATTEMPTS AT TAX
COLLECTION AND HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, AS OCCURED IN
THE VILLAGE OF BEIT FURIK.

WE MUST BE WARY OF THE ATTEMPTS OF THE
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OCCUPIER TO CREATE A SCHISM WITHIN THE UNIFIED
RANKS OF THE MERCHANTS; SOME HAVE BEEN TEMPTED
WITH OFFERS TO WAIVE TAXES DUE IN RETURN FOR
THEIR APPLYING FOR RENEWAL OF THEIR TRADE OF
THEIR TRADE LICENSES, THUS KEEPING THE LINKS
WITH THE ENEMY ALIVE.

WE SALUTE THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY IN REFUSING TO RENEW ITS TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, AND CALL UPON OUR GROWERS TO REFRAIN FROM EXPORTING THEIR PRODUCE THROUGH AGREXCO, THE ISRAELI MARKETING BOARD. WE WARN AGAINST SOME INDIVIDUALS WITH SUSPECT LINKS WITH AGREXCO, AND CALL FOR THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL EXPORT AND MARKETING COMPANY. THE UNLU ALSO CALLS UPON THE POPULAR COMMITTEES TO MARKET LOCAL PRODUCE, AND TO ESTABLISH AND STRENGTHEN EXISTING MARKETING COMMITTEES.

THE UNLU WISHES TO AFFIRM THAT THE CLOSURE OF UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES AND THE PREMATURE END OF THE SCHOOL YEAR ARE MEANT TO KEEP OUR PEOPLE IGNORANT. WE THEREFORE HAVE NO RECOURSE BUT TO RELY ON OURSELVES IN EDUCATING OUR YOUTH; POPULAR EDUCATION MUST CONTINUE, AND OUR UNIVERSITIES MUST FIND WAYS TO RESUME EDUCATION THERE, ESPECIALLY FOR STUDENTS IN THEIR FINAL YEARS. WE CALL UPON THE COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION TO SHOULDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND TO PRESS FOR THE REOPENING OF THE UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES.

THE UNLU SALUTES THOSE JEWISH PHYSICIANS WHO
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REFUSED TO OBEY ORDERS BARRING THEM FROM TREATING THE WOUNDED OF THE UPRISING, AND THOSE JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO REPRESSIVE MEASURES BECAUSE THEY SPOKE OUT AGAINST THE OCCUPATION. WE SALUTE ALL THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED IN SUPPORT OF OUR CAUSE, AND CALL UPON THEM TO INTENSIFY THEIR WORK IN ENLIGHTENING THE ISRAELI PUBLIC ABOUT OUR RIGHTS. A HUMAN BEING WHO ACCEPTS THAT ANOTHER BE OPPRESSED CANNOT BE FREE HIMSELF.

THE UNLU INVITES ALL NATIONALIST AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES BEYOND THE GREEN LINE TO END THE CONFLICTS AMONG THEM, AND TO UNIFY THEIR RANKS IN THE SERVICE OF THE UPRISING.

THE UNLU VIEWS WITH PRIDE THE MARCHES CARRIED OUT BY OUR YOUTH CLOTHED IN THE COLORS OF THE PALESTINIAN FLAG IN THE OLD TOWN OF NABLUS. WE ALSO SALUTE THE RESISTANCE OF OUR PEOPLE IN THE

REFUGEE CAMPS IN GAZA, IN NABLUS, JENIN, QABATIYA, BEIT SAHUR, ITHNA, BETHLEHEM, BEIT JALA, TULKAREM, JALAZON, AM'ARI, DAHEISHA, JABALYA, SHATI', BUREIJ AND OTHER PLACES. WE CALL UPON YOU TO WORK TOWARDS IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF POPULAR ORGANIZING AND TO STRENGTHEN POPULAR COMMITTEES AND THE STRIKING FORCES. YOU ARE INVITED TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:

1. TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH OUR PRISONERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE AT ANSAR III, BY ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES ON AUGUST 8. WOMENS COMMITTEES WILL CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES IN THEIR REGARD.

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02624 04 OF 04 051522Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10
ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
DSE-00 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /093 W
-----242505 051547Z /47

O 051515Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3136
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 02624

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA, LEAFLET NO. 23

2RAL STRIKE ON AUGUST 9 TO
MARK THE NINTH MONTH OF THE UPRISING.
3. TO DEVOTE AUGUST 10 TO PUBLICIZING OUR CAUSE
ON THE POPULAR AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS.
JOURNALISTS ARE REQUESTED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE
IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

4. TO DEVOTE AUGUST 13 TO AN EVALUTION OF THE
POPULAR COMMITTEES AND TO DRAWING PLANS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR WORK.

5. TO DECLARE A GENERAL STRIKE ON AUGUST 17 IN HONOR OF JERUSALEM, TH CAPITAL OF OUR PALESTINIAN STATE, AND TO PROTEST THE OPPRESSIVE MEASURES AND ARRESTS CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PEOPLE OF THE CITY.

6. TO MARK THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATTEMPT TO BURN DOWN AL-AQSA MOSQUE ON AUGUST 21 BY STAGING DEMONSTRATIONS AND ENGAGING THE ARMY IN CLASHES. THIS DAY WILL BE DESIGNATED AL-AQSA DAY.

7. TO DECLARE A GENERAL STRIKE ON AUGUST 22 TO PROTEST AGAINST THE HARASSMENT OF MERCHANTS BY THE TAX AUTHORITIES, AND IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE MERCHANTS.

MAY THE STRUGGLE CONTINUE AND MAY THE UNITY OF OUR PEOPLE BE STRENGTHENED. WE SHALL BE VICTORIOUS.

ANNOUNCEMENT: NO PERSON IS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK, MAKE A DECLARATION, OR ISSUE A STATEMENT IN THE NAME OF THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP WITHOUT ITS KNOWLEDGE OR AUTHORIZATION. WE WARN AGAINST ALL DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS FALSELY ATTRIBUTED TO THE UNLU.

THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES/THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
AUGUST 5, 1988

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02556

FILM= D880668-0841

DATE= 02 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP OF JULY 26 TO AUG. 1, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, CASUALTY, DEPORTATION, ARREST, WEST BANK

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<.>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPG/CDR

FEB 12 1997
Date.

☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY

☐ EXEMPT ☐ DECLASSIFY

☐ DATE ☐ IN PART

☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:

EO Citations

TS authority

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02556 01 OF 02 021414Z
ACTION NEA-04

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ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
DSE-00 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /095 W
-----363530 021423Z /41

O 021401Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3076
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02556

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP OF JULY 26 TO AUG. 1,
1988

1. SUMMARY: THE IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED SEVEN
PALESTINIANS. ONE ISRAELI CIVILIAN WAS WOUNDED,
AND TWO PALESTINIANS DIED OF WOUNDS SUSTAINED
EARLIER. EIGHT PALESTINIANS WERE DEPORTED.
AUTHORITIES ORDERED THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARREST OF
ARAB STUDIES CENTER DIRECTOR, FEISAL HUSSEINI. A
GENERAL COMMERCIAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED IN THE WEST
BANK FOR THREE DAYS. THE IDF ORDERED PALESTINIANS
TO REMOVE GRAFFITI AND PALESTINIAN FLAGS WHILE
PALESTINIAN LEAFLETS URGED ISRAELI SOLDIERS TO
DESERT THE ARMY. A MEMBER OF THE KNESSET REPORTED
THAT 97 HOMES HAD BEEN DEMOLISHED OR SEALED SINCE
THE UPRISING BEGAN. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED
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MAINLY FROM LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

KILLED AND INJURED
//////////

2. ON JULY 26, AN ISRAELI SETTLER WAS WOUNDED BY

A ROCK THROWN AT HER CAR, IN EAST JERUSALEM.

-- ON JULY 27, IDF SOLDIERS INJURED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH IN DHEISHEH REFUGEE CAMP DURING A DEMONSTRATION.

-- ON JULY 28, ISRAELI SETTLERS SHOT AND INJURED AN 11-YEAR OLD PALESTINIAN GIRL AFTER STONES WERE THROWN AT THEIR VEHICLE IN AZZAHIRIA, NEAR HEBRON.

-- ON JULY 29, ABDUL FATAH YUSEF ILYAN, 24, OF DEIR ABU-DAEEF, JENIN DISTRICT, DIED OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS WHICH HE SUSTAINED ON JULY 20.

-- ON JULY 30, SA'DIYEH JABR, 55, DIED AFTER ISRAELI SOLDIERS BROKE INTO HER HOUSE AND ARRESTED ONE OF HER CHILDREN DURING CLASHES IN JENIN REFUGEE CAMP. ISRAELI MILITARY SOURCES SAID THAT THE WOMAN DIED OF NATURAL CAUSES.

-- ON JULY 31, AN ARAB BUS DRIVER WAS LIGHTLY INJURED WHEN A PASSENGER IN AN ISRAELI BUS, TRAVELLING ON THE JERUSALEM-HEBRON ROAD, FIRED SEVERAL SHOTS.

-- ON JULY 31, IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND INJURED ONE PALESTINIAN YOUTH DURING DEMONSTRATIONS IN YAABAD, NEAR JENIN AND ANOTHER ONE IN NABLUS.
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-- ON AUGUST 1, IDF TROOPS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS IN NABLUS.

CURFEWS

//////

3. NUMEROUS LOCALITIES WERE PLACED UNDER CURFEW. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INSTANCES WERE:

-- A FIVE DAY CURFEW ON NABLUS AND ITS FOUR SURROUNDING REFUGEE CAMPS AND A TWO DAY CURFEW IN BEIT JALA, NEAR BETHLEHEM, BOTH LIFTED ON JULY 26.

-- A CURFEW IMPOSED FOR FOUR DAYS ON JABAL MUKABIR, A SOUTHERN JERUSALEM NEIGHBORHOOD, LIFTED ON JULY 30.

EIGHT PALESTINIANS DEPORTED

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4. ON AUGUST 1, THE IDF DEPORTED SIX WEST BANK PALESTINIANS AND TWO GAZANS TO LEBANON. (SEPTTEL)

FEISAL HUSSEINI JAILED AGAIN

////////////////

5. ON JULY 31, LESS THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER BEING RELEASED FROM ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, FEISAL ABDUL QADER HUSSEINI WAS PLACED IN SIX MONTH ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION FOR THE THIRD TIME IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS. THE ARAB STUDIES CENTER HE RUNS IN EAST JERUSALEM WAS CLOSED DOWN FOR ONE YEAR FOR ALLEGEDLY DISSEMINATING INCITEFUL MATERIAL. MUSTAFA ABU ZAHARA, A PROMINENT EAST JERUSALEM MERCHANT, WAS ALSO PLACED IN SIX MONTH

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 DSE-00
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /093 W

-----363560 021423Z /41

O 021401Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3077
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02556

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP OF JULY 26 TO AUG. 1,
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. (SEPTTEL)

JORDAN SEVER TIES WITH THE WEST BANK
////////////////////////////////////

6. WE HAVE REPORTED BY SEPTTEL WEST BANK REACTION
TO THE JORDANIAN DECISION LIMITING TIES WITH THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA.

GENERAL STRIKE OBSERVED

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7. IN RESPONSE TO LEAFLET NO. 22, GENERAL
COMMERCIAL STRIKES WERE OBSERVED IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES ON JULY 29 AND ON AUGUST 1. A GENERAL
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STRIKE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 2.

IDF AND PALESTINIAN LEAFLETS

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8. ON JULY 30, ISRAELI HELICOPTERS DROPPED
LEAFLETS IN BETHLEHEM AND HEBRON, ORDERING
RESIDENTS TO REMOVE ANTI-ISRAEL GRAFFITI AND
PALESTINIAN FLAGS IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS.
VIOLATORS WOULD BE FINED 15,000 SHEKELS AND
IMPRISONED.

-- A HEBREW-ARABIC LEAFLET DISTRIBUTED IN NABLUS
ON JULY 31 BY THE UNITED LEADERSHIP OF THE
UPRISING URGED IDF SOLDIERS TO DESERT AND CALLED
FOR A "PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION" TO THE CONFLICT
BY ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE NEXT TO
I

97 HOUSES DEMOLISHED SINCE BEGINNING OF INTIFADA

////////////////////

9. MK DEDI TZUKER SAID ON JULY 28 THAT OCCUPATION
AUTHORITIES HAVE DEMOLISHED 65 ARAB HOMES, CLOSED
13, AND PARTIALLY DEMOLISHED 19, SINCE THE
BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA.
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EXCISE

2000-23-0943

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

Orig to FAIM 88 SEP 20 P8:02
Dist to:

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ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

UNCLASSIFIED

September 19, 1988

88 SEP 19 P7:31

8827623

[REDACTED] w/ Unclassified Attachment

To: The Secretary
From: NEA - Richard W. Murphy
Subject: Congratulatory Message on Israel's Satellite Launch

Issue for Decision

Whether to authorize transmission of the attached cable bearing your congratulations to Shamir, Peres, and Rabin on Israel's successful satellite launch.

Essential Factors

On September 19, Israel announced the successful launch of a small, experimental satellite, the OFEQ-1. Both Peres and Shamir emphasized the technological and scientific goals of Israel's space program and said the launch was not part of the arms race.

Recommendation

That you authorize transmission of the attached cable (INR opposes).

Attachment

As stated.

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SEP 21 1988

[REDACTED] w/ Unclassified Attachment

FEB 12 1997
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IS FPC/CDR
MR Cases Only
EO Citations

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1) RELEASE
2) EXCISE
3) DENY
4) DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions B-1, B-5
PA Exemptions

TO authority
CLASSIFY as () S or
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

B-1

B-5

Drafted:NEA/IAI:MScobey
Wang 33261 x3672
Cleared:NEA:ESWalker
NEA/IAI:JLHirsch
OES:RJSmith
PM/ISP:CDuelfer
INR:RClarke

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03839

FILM= D881029-0820

DATE= 22 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ALGIERS

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PALESTINIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HOPEFUL AND ENTHUSIASTIC ABC
PNC RESULTS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, OCCUPIED AREA, RECOGNITION, RESOLUTION, POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	
FOIA Exemptions	
PA Exemptions	

TS/FPC/CDR
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

CLASSIFY as TS authority
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () & or

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FEE 12 1007
Date.

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03839 01 OF 03 221417Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /087 W

-----171216 221508Z /41

O 221416Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4088
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03839

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: PALESTINIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
HOPEFUL AND ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PNC RESULTS

1

2. SUMMARY: PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FIGURES HERE
ARE VERY PLEASED AND ENCOURAGED BY THE PNC'S
ACTIONS, WHICH WENT FURTHER THAN THEY EXPECTED
BY ACCEPTING 242. THEY BELIEVE THEIR EFFORTS TO
PUSH THE PNC TOWARD MORE DECISIVE AND REALISTIC
ACTION HAVE BEEN REWARDED. THEY SEE THE PNC'S
ACTION AS A HISTORIC DECISION TO COEXIST WITH
ISRAEL, AND BELIEVE THAT IT PROVIDES A PLATFORM
FOR A NEW PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PROGRAM THAT
WILL ULTIMATELY ENGAGE THE U.S. AND ISRAEL IN
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TWO STATE SOLUTION. THEY

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CREDIT ARAFAT WITH LEADING THE PNC TOWARD
REALISM AND HAVE SENT A PETITION TO THE U.S.
EXPRESSING THEIR "ACCEPTANCE OF A JEWISH STATE
IN PALESTINE." THEY SEE ARAFAT'S PROPOSED UNGA

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SPEECH (WHICH IS ALSO ANTICIPATED IN THE LATEST INTIFADA LEAFLET) AS AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP, AND LET US KNOW THAT A U.S. TURN DOWN WILL BE A SERIOUS SET BACK FOR THE MODERATES. WE HAVE CAUTIONED CONTACTS THAT NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE ON ARAFAT'S VISA. THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS HERE SINCE THE PNC, INCLUDING PALESTINIAN MEETINGS WITH CODELS, DAS WALKER AND AN ADL DELEGATION. END SUMMARY.

LOCAL PALESTINIANS SEE HISTORIC CHANGE AT PNC

3. THERE IS A STRONG SENSE IN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL CIRCLES HERE THAT THE PNC TOOK A HISTORIC STEP BY RECOGNIZING ISRAEL INDIRECTLY AND SUPPORTING A TWO-STATE SETTLEMENT BY ACCEPTING RESOLUTION 181 AND SUPPORTING 242, ADVOCATING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, AND OPPOSING TERRORISM.

4. BEFORE THE PNC LOCAL PALESTINIANS FEARED THAT THE PNC WOULD BE UNABLE TO MOVE BEYOND A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION 181, BECAUSE OF THE STRONG OPPOSITION OF THE PFLP TO ANY RECOGNITION OF 242. INDEED, A CONSENSUS MESSAGE FROM LOCAL NOTABLES TO THE PNC BEFORE IT CONVENED OPPOSED 242, REFLECTING THE OPPOSITION OF LOCAL PFLP CADRES, WHO ARE A

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MINORITY BUT WELL ORGANIZED ELEMENT IN THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP HERE (SEE JERUSALEM 3729).

5. LOCAL, PRO FATAH/ARAFAT FIGURES WERE THEREFORE PLEASED WHEN THE PNC WENT FURTHER THAN EXPECTED AND SUPPORTED 242 AND 338 IN ITS POLITICAL STATEMENT. THEY FEEL VINDICATED, SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN QUIETLY PLUGGING FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING PLO POSITION SINCE THE INTIFADA BEGAN.

BACKGROUND ON PNC, ARAFAT'S ROLE

6. OUR PALESTINIAN CONTACTS CREDIT ARAFAT WITH TAKING A STRONG LEAD IN THE PNC FOR A MORE POSITIVE POLITICAL STATEMENT. ONE OF THESE,

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13 - 1

[REDACTED] WAS AT THE PNC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE ONLY PALESTINIAN
FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THERE. HE TOLD US
ARAFAT TOOK THE LEAD IN PUSHING, AGAINST STRONG
OPPOSITION FROM THE PFLP'S GEORGE HABBASH, FOR
AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO 242, AND THAT ARAFAT
WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO MARSHALL A LARGE MAJORITY
AND FORCE A SPLIT VOTE ON THE POLITICAL
STATEMENT. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THIS SPLIT VOTE
IS UNPRECEDENTED IN PNC MEETINGS. [REDACTED] SAID
EDWARD SAID AND IBRAHIM ABU LUGHOD, WHO PUSHED
FOR MORE PROGRESSIVE LANGUAGE, WERE ACTIVE AND
INFLUENTIAL IN ALGIERS. HE ALSO SAID THAT
ARAFAT ALLY HANI AL-HASSAN LOBBIED, ALBEIT
UNSUCCESSFULLY, FOR NO REFERENCE IN THE
POLITICAL STATEMENT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, USING

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03839 02 OF 03 221418Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /087 W

-----171233 221509Z /41

O 221416Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4089
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

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[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03839

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: PALESTINIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
HOPEFUL AND ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PNC RESULTS

THE ARGUMENT THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ'S SUPPORT FOR
"LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS" WAS AN
IMPLICIT U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

7. WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT ARAFAT
GOT HABBASH'S ASSURANCES BEFORE THE VOTE WAS
FORCED THAT THE PFLP WOULD NOT QUIT THE PLO
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE EVEN IF IT LOST THE VOTE.
THE OTHER RADICALS WHO OPPOSED ARAFAT AND THE
242 LANGUAGE WERE REPORTEDLY MEMBERS OF THE
POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT AND THE FACTION
ASSOCIATED WITH MOHAMMED ABUL ABBAS. DFLP BOSS
NAYEF HAWATMEH VOTED WITH ARAFAT AS DID FAROUK
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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KHADDOUNI, A HARD-LINE FATAH MEMBER.

NEXT STEPS: MORE POLITICAL WORK NEEDED

8. OUR PALESTINIAN CONTACTS HERE ARE
DISAPPOINTED WITH THE QUALIFIED U.S. RESPONSE TO
THE PNC. (HANNA SINIORIA SAID RUEFULLY "YOU ARE
ASKING US TO DISROBE.") NEVERTHELESS, THE MORE
SOPHISTICATED ONES UNDERSTAND THE POINT WE ARE
MAKING THAT THE PLO STILL NEEDS TO MAKE A MORE
PERSUASIVE POLITICAL EFFORT TO CLARIFY AND SELL
ITS POSITIONS ON ACCEPTING ISRAEL, 242, AND
OPPOSING TERRORISM IN ORDER TO TALK TO THE U.S.,
OVERCOME DEEP AMERICAN SUSPICIONS, AND MAKE AN
IMPRESSION ON ISRAEL.

9. SOPHISTICATED PALESTINIANS HERE UNDERSTAND
THAT THE PLO IS INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL
PROCESS. BUT THEY BELIEVE THE PNC MADE A
BREAKTHROUGH AND LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR
PROGRESS. THEY NOW FORESEE AN INTENSIVE
PALESTINIAN POLITICAL EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE U.S.
AND ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. IS THEIR IMMEDIATE
TARGET. THE NOVEMBER 21 PETITION TO THE U.S.

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FROM 15 PALESTINIAN NOTABLES (SEPTTEL), WHICH SAYS THE PALESTINIAN "CALL FOR AN INDEPENDENT STATE FOR OURSELVES IS INTEGRALLY LINKED WITH OUR ACCEPTANCE OF A JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE" IS AN EARLY EXAMPLE OF THIS EFFORT. (WE HAVE NEVER SEEN SUCH A CLEAR EXPRESSION OF ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL IN A FORMAL STATEMENT FROM PALESTINIAN LEADERS HERE, AND BELIEVE THIS REFLECTS THEIR

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CONFIDENCE THAT THE PLO HAS AUTHORITATIVELY CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.) AT THE SAME TIME, MODERATES HERE FEAR THAT THE REACTION FROM PALESTINIANS ON THE STREET AND INTIFADA ACTIVISTS WILL TURN ANGRY AND RESENTFUL IF THE PNC PRODUCES NO MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE.

ARAFAT'S PROPOSED SPEACH TO UNGA

10. PALESTINIANS HERE VIEW ARAFAT'S PLANNED ADDRESS TO THE UNGA AS AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP. THEY THINK ARAFAT CANNOT GO TO NEW YORK AND ESTABLISH HIS CREDIBILITY IN U.S. EYES UNLESS HE SPEAKS MORE FORTHRIGHTLY ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, AND THEY BELIEVE HE IS PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT THAT GOES BEYOND THE NEGOTIATED LANGUAGE OF THE PNC DOCUMENTS.

11. HANNA SINIORA AND FAYEZ ABU RAHME ARE TRAVELING TO NEW YORK WHERE THEY HOPE TO ATTEND ARAFAT'S UNGA SPEECH. SINIORA SAID TNEY WILL MEET WITH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN PARIS EN ROUTE. (ABU RAHME'S TRAVEL WAS TEMPORARILY DELAYED BY THE ABSENCE OF A GOI EXIT PERMIT, BUT THE EMBASSY'S INTERVENTION, AT THE REQUEST OF ABU RAHME AND SINIORA, PRODUCED THE PERMIT SUNDAY NIGHT.) THERE IS ALSO TALK HERE ABOUT THE TRAVEL OF OTHER ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS TO NEW YORK FOR ARAFAT'S SPEECH, WHICH JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MASRI MENTIONED TO VISITING DAS WALKER (REFTTEL). WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE NO DECISION ON A VISA TO ARAFAT AND THAT, GIVEN ARAFAT'S PAST RECORD AND HIS UNPOPULARITY IN THE U.S., INCLUDING IN THE CONGRESS, THE QUESTION IS BEING GIVEN THE MOST

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03839 03 OF 03 221418Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03839

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: PALESTINIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
HOPEFUL AND ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PNC RESULTS

SERIOUS SCRUTINY. PALESTINIANS HERE ARGUE THAT
ARAFAT NEEDS ENCOURAGEMENT, AND THAT A REFUSAL
TO ALLOW HIM TO ADDRESS THE UN WOULD BE A BLOW
TO THE MODERATE CAMP IN THE PLO AND THE
PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY WHICH THEY BELIEVE HAS
BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE PNC.
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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88PARIS38266

FILM= D881017-0133

DATE= 17 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= PARIS

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC

AMMAN

TEL AVIV

JERUSALEM

DAMASCUS

CAIRO

RIYADH

USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= (OADR)

SUBJECT= FRENCH REACTION TO PALESTINE NATIONAL - COUNCIL DECLARATIONS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE. ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

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DATE: 12/1/88
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CONCEPTS= GOVERNMENT REACTION, PALESTINIANS, TEXT

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, FR, PLO, (DUMAS, ROLAND)

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PAGE 01 PARIS 38266 171447Z
ACTION EUR-00

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IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /068 W
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P 171446Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3694
INFO EC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

PARIS 38266

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PLO, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO PALESTINE NATIONAL
- COUNCIL DECLARATIONS

1. SUMMARY (U): GOF HAS ISSUED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT
WELCOMING THE PNC ALGIERS DECLARATIONS, AND POINTING
OUT THAT GOF RECOGNITION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN
STATE POSES JURIDICAL PROBLEMS, BUT NOT ONES OF
PRINCIPLE. FM DUMAS ALSO SPOKE OF NEW FRENCH
"INITIATIVES" IN THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY

2. (U) SPEAKING AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NOVEMBER
16, FM DUMAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
BEGIN TEXT: FRANCE, HAVING ALWAYS DEFENDED THE
RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE JEWISH AND PALESTINIAN

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PEOPLES TO THE RECOGNITION AND SECURITY OF CONSTITUENT STATES HAVING GUARANTEED BOUNDARIES. IS PLEASED TO SEE THE DISAPPEARANCE. THROUGH THE PLO ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, OF ONE OF THE GREATEST OBSTACLES TO THAT MUTUAL RECOGNITION. AS EARLY AS 1982. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC HAD. ON THE OCCASION OF HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL. RECALLED THESE PRINCIPLES FROM THE ROSTRUM OF THE KNESSET.

ACCORDINGLY. THE RECOGNITION BY FRANCE OF A PALESTINIAN STATE DOES NOT RAISE ANY DIFFICULTY OF PRINCIPLE. HOWEVER. SOME QUESTIONS CONTINUE TO BE POSED WHICH SHOULD BE EXAMINED. I NOTE IN THIS REGARD THAT IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE TO RECOGNIZE A STATE WHICH DOES NOT EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER SPECIFIC TERRITORY. THIS DOES NOT REDUCE THE FACT THAT A LARGE PART OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE LIVE AND WORK ON LAND WHERE (THEIR) RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT EXIST. ALTHOUGH THE HISTORIC RIGHTS OF THESE POPULATIONS ARE NOT DENIABLE.

I INTEND TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ECC PARTNERS....THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONVEY (TO THEM) THE INITIATIVES WHICH FRANCE WILL UNDERTAKE IN LIGHT OF THE NEW SITUATION WHICH HAS JUST BEEN CREATED.

I EMPHASIZE THAT THE JURIDICAL DEBATE DOES NOT MODIFY A BASIC FACT. WHICH IS THAT ONE CANNOT ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT EXCEPT THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. TO THIS END. FRANCE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE CONVENING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. END TEXT

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PAGE 03 PARIS 38266 171447Z


3. (U) AN AFP PRESS DISPATCH QUOTES "AN AUTHORITATIVE ELYSEE OFFICIAL" AS SAYING THAT THE DECISIONS AT ALGIERS "GO EXACTLY IN THE DIRECTION WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS DESIRED--THAT IS. THE ACCEPTANCE OF UNSCR 242. WHICH SIGNIFIES THE IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. YASSER ARAFAT HAS FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN PULLING THE MAJORITY OF THE PLO IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION....THE PLO HAS TAKEN AN IMMENSE AND SIGNIFICANT STEP. AND IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL NOT TO

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RECOGNIZE THIS IN SEEKING PRETEXTS TO SAY THAT THE
POSITION OF THE PALESTINIANS IS AMBIGUOUS AND FLUID."

3. (C) COMMENT:



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RODGERS

PAGE 04 PARIS 38266 171447Z

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PAGE 01 STATE 320485 TOSEC 140029
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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EXDIS FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY

FOIA Exemptions

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DECAUTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 12/3/01, (BREMER, L.P.)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.) PFOR

9302566

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S SPECIAL CABLE HIGHLIGHTS, NUMBER 2,
DECEMBER 3, 1981

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY CLARK/TODEP 3014

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1. (U) UN: WALDHEIM WITHDRAWS CANDIDACY. THE SECRE-
TARY GENERAL WITHDREW HIS CANDIDACY FOR A THIRD TERM
IN OFFICE. HE CONVEYED HIS DECISION IN A LETTER TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. (REUTER 002)

2. (U) ISRAEL: CABINET APPROVES DRAFT OF EUROPEAN MFO
ANNOUNCEMENT. THE ISRAELI CABINET APPROVED THE AMENDED
DRAFT OF THE US-ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING PARTICIPA-
TION IN THE MFO. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE TRANSMITTED
TO THE PARTICIPATING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REQUESTING
THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF ITS PRINCIPLES. (TEL AVIV 18533)

PAGE 02 STATE 320485 TOSEC 140029

3. VIETNAM: ASEAN JOINT DEMARCHE TO FRENCH. A
SINGAPORE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE ASEAN
FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO A JOINT DEMARCHE IN
PARIS ON THE ISSUE OF AID TO VIETNAM, AND THAT SINGAPORE
WOULD BE PLEASED IF SECRETARY HAIG RAISED THE SUBJECT
WITH THE FRENCH. THE ASEANS BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT
WILL SIGNAL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS WAIVERING ON
THE QUESTION OF VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA, AND

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THAT OTHER COUNTRIES MAY FOLLOW THE FRENCH EXAMPLE. THEY FEEL STRONGLY THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON HANOI SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. (SINGAPORE 12129)

4. [REDACTED] HABIB MISSION: PRESS REPORTS OF SYRIAN REJECTION INCORRECT. PRESS REPORTS THAT SYRIA HAS REJECTED A US MEDIATING ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE STRATEGIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ARE INCORRECT. AT NO TIME DURING THE MEETINGS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND AMBASSADOR HABIB DID THE SYRIANS REJECT A MEDIATING ROLE FOR THE US; THE MOU ISSUE DID NOT ARISE DURING THE ASSAD-HABIB MEETING. (DAMASCUS 7602)

5. [REDACTED] CYPRUS: ANKARA ECHOES DENIALS OF A MILITARY BUILDUP. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MILITARY, ASSURED AMBASSADOR STRAUSSZ-HUPE THAT TURKEY HAS NOT INCREASED ITS FORCE STRENGTH ON CYPRUS. REPAIRED MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO CYPRUS AFTER SERVICING AND AN INSPECTION TEAM RECENTLY VISITED THE ISLAND. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ATTRIBUTED OTHER REPORTS TO THE WORKINGS OF THE "RUMOR MILL." (ANKARA 9052, EXDIS)

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6. [REDACTED] IRAN: PAKISTANI AND TURKISH LEADERS SEEK TO STABILIZE IRAN. DURING RECENT TALKS IN ISLAMABAD, PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ AND TURKISH HEAD OF STATE GENERAL KENAN EVREN DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING THE MORIBUND PAK-TURK-IRANIAN COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AS A VEHICLE FOR STABILIZING IRAN. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS NOW ENJOY BETTER RELATIONS AND EXPANDED TRADE, AND PRESIDENT ZIA HAS NAMED AN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN TO FILL THE POST VACANT SINCE 1980. (ISLAMABAD 16128, 16130; ANKARA 9008)

7. [REDACTED] PAKISTAN: AFGHAN HELICOPTERS STRAFE CIVILIAN TARGETS. AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS STRAFED TWO PAKISTANI BUSES, KILLING FIVE AND WOUNDING THREE PEOPLE DECEMBER 2. THE AFGHAN AIRCRAFT ALSO ROCKETED A PAKISTANI FRONTIER POST IN THE SAME AREA OF BALUCHISTAN DURING THE MOST SERIOUS AFGHAN INCURSION YET. THE ATTACKS WILL INCREASE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE GREATER PROTECTION IN THE BORDER REGION. (ISLAMABAD 16117)

8. [REDACTED] ETHIOPIA: FOREIGN MINISTER DISAVOWS FURTHER WORSENING OF RELATIONS WITH US. DURING A MEETING WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER FELEKE SAID ETHIOPIA WILL TAKE NO STEPS TO WIDEN THE RIFT BETWEEN

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ADDIS ABABA AND WASHINGTON UNLESS "PUSHED TOO FAR."
FELEKE DESCRIBED THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AS PURELY
DEFENSIVE, AND SAID THE US AND NATO REPRESENTED THE ONLY
THREATS TO THE REGION. (ADDIS ABABA 3602)

STOESSEL

NOTE BY OC/T: DISTRIBUTION COORDINATED WITH S/SO PER. MS. POWELL.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** ONLY
*** Current Classification ***

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03708

FILM= D880994-0548

DATE= 09 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
BEIRUT

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= BOTH SIDES PREPARING FOR CONFRONTATIONS AS PNC APPROACHES; NOT
FORBIDDEN TO TRAVEL

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3621, 88 JERUSALEM 3590

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= OCCUPIED AREA, WEST BANK, PEACE PLAN, NEGOTIATION, PALESTINIANS,
OPPOSITION, LIBERATION FRONT

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, IS, PNC

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3. THE IDF IS BRACING FOR VIOLENCE NOVEMBER 12-15 TO MARK THE PNC AND THE ANTICIPATED PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE IDF HAS SENT REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE TERRITORIES AND BEGUN TO ARREST KNOWN ACTIVISTS. AS MANY AS 200 YOUTHS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN NABLUS DURING THE PAST WEEK. IN ADDITION, MILITARY GOVERNORS ARE CALLING IN LOCAL NOTABLES TO WARN THEM TO KEEP THE POPULATION UNDER CONTROL. NABLUS BUSINESSMAN SAID KANAAN WAS SUMMONED TO THE OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR NOVEMBER 8 AND THREATENED WITH REPRISALS IF DISTURBANCES BREAK OUT. OMAR MASRI, MEMBER OF A LEADING NABLUS FAMILY, REPORTED THAT MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN GIVEN THE SAME MESSAGE. IZZEDIN ARYAN, THE RESPECTED RAMALLAH PHARMACIST AND HEAD OF THE RED CRESCENT SOCIETY WHO IS ACTIVE IN MODERATE ISLAMIC AND NATIONALIST CIRCLES, WAS HELD BRIEFLY LAST WEEK FOR QUESTIONING. (ARYAN HAD BEEN DETAINED AT ANSAR 3 EARLIER IN THE YEAR, AND IS UNDER A TRAVEL BAN.)

4. THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU) IS URGING VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS TO MARK THE PNC. CONGEN SOURCES REPORT THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE CALL FOR "MORE MOLOTOVS AND FIREBOMBS, MORE STONES" CONTAINED IN LEAFLET NO. 28 (REFTEL), THE LEADERSHIP IN JERUSALEM IS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ACTIVELY PRESSING LOCAL ACTIVISTS TO PROVOKE CONFRONTATIONS WITH SECURITY FORCES AS A MEANS OF REENERGIZING THE INTIFADA AS IT ENTERS ITS TWELFTH MONTH. GIVEN THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NABLUS SHEBAB, IT IS UNLIKELY THEY WILL NEED ENCOURAGEMENT. FOR THEIR PART, RESIDENTS OF NABLUS ARE STOCKPILING FOOD AND MEDICINES IN ANTICIPATION OF A WEEK OF VIOLENCE AND CURFEWS.

5. [REDACTED] A LONG TIME ADVOCATE OF DIALOGUE AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, TOLD CONGEN MONDAY HE HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN TO TRAVEL ABROAD, EVIDENTLY FOR FEAR THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH PLO FIGURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PNC. IN FACT [REDACTED] HAD

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PLANNED TO VISIT THE U.S. FOR A SPEAKING TOUR WITH AN ISRAELI PEACE NOW ACTIVIST, GEN. (RET) MORDECHAI BAR-ON. BETHLEHEM MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ, A LONG TIME CRITIC OF THE PLO, HAS ALSO BEEN ADVISED TO STAY AT HOME UNTIL THE PNC IS OVER (REF B).

6. COMMENT. IT IS IRONIC THAT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ARE FORBIDDING TRAVEL BY MODERATE PALESTINIANS WHO WOULD BE LIKELY TO COUNSEL GOOD SENSE TO PALESTINIAN CONTACTS ABROAD AND REALISTIC FORWARD-LOOKING POLICIES FOR ADOPTION BY THE PNC. END COMMENT.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

EXCISE

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FILM= D880999-0416

DATE= 10 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT IN GAZA

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION, REVIEW, OCCUPIED AREA, MEETING, SOVEREIGNTY

TAGS= KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS, PLO

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ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 16312

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT
IN GAZA

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. GAZA CONTACTS, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT TRENDS IN GAZA AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS AND BEFORE THE PNC MEETINGS:

-- THE ANTICIPATED PNC DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 181 WILL BE A POSITIVE FORWARD STEP BUT WILL NOT, ALONE, ACHIEVE VERY MUCH.

-- THE UPRISING IS ROOTED DEEP IN GAZA SOCIETY AND WILL CONTINUE, BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO ADVANCE A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

-- THE ISRAELI ELECTION SET BACK CHANCES FOR A
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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SOLUTION - IT PERPETUATED THE STALEMATE IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND STRENGTHENED RELIGIOUS FORCES HOSTILE TO A COMPROMISE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

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-- JOINT U.S.-SOVIET PRESSURE IS ESSENTIAL FOR A SOLUTION.

-- THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE WILL NOT STAND IN THE WAY IF, AS EXPECTED, THE PNC SANCTIONS A TWO-STATE SOLUTION (THOUGH IT MAY HOLD ON TO THE IDEA OF A UNIFIED, ISLAMIC PALESTINE AS AN ULTIMATE GOAL).

-- A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM MUST DEAL WITH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SECURITY CONCERNS.

-- THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF PALESTINIAN SECURITY. A PALESTINE BUSY CREATING ITSELF WON'T BE INTERESTED IN AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL.

-- IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE WHAT GAZA LEADERSHIP WILL EMERGE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION. INTIFADA LEADERS ESSENTIALLY DO THE PLO'S BIDDING AND WOULD DO SO IF PROGRESS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION BROUGHT AN END TO THE INTIFADA. MODERATES SYMPATHETIC TO THE PLO ARE THE MOST LIKELY CORE OF POST-INTIFADA GAZA LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY

3. IN NOV 8 VISIT TO GAZA, POLOFF SPOKE TO LONG-TIME EMBASSY CONTACTS, LAWYER/POLITICAL ACTIVIST [REDACTED] LAWYER/WRITER/PUBLISHER [REDACTED] AND MEDICAL DOCTOR/HEAD OF GAZA RED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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CRESCENT SOCIETY [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WERE WILLING TO TALK AT LENGTH AND EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS. [REDACTED] WHO HAS LONG FOLLOWED A PRO-PFLP LINE, STRONGLY CONDEMNED UNSTINTING U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND SAID THE U.S. COULD INFLUENCE ISRAEL BY THREATENING TO CUT AID. HE FLATLY REJECTED AUTONOMY FOR THE TERRITORIES. HE WORRIED ABOUT PRESSURE FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA. HOWEVER, HE LIMITED HIMSELF TO THESE FEW POINTS, SAYING THAT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES WITH A U.S. EMBASSY REP.

PNC MEETINGS

4. BOTH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WERE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PLANNED NOV 12-15 PNC MEETINGS IN ALGIERS, THOUGH NEITHER PREDICTED ANY DRAMATIC

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BREAKTHROUGHS. [REDACTED] SAID A PALESTINIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE BASED ON UNGA
181. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAEL WAS BOUND TO
OPPOSE THE TERRITORIAL LOSS 181 IMPLIED, BUT IT
SHOULD LOOK BEYOND THAT TO THE RECOGNITION OF TWO
STATES -- ISRAEL AND PALESTINE -- IMPLIED BY
ACCEPTANCE OF 181. FURTHERMORE, 181'S TERRITORIAL
"LINES" WERE ONLY A STARTING POINT FOR
NEGOTIATIONS. [REDACTED] WAS A BIT MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT
THE PNC WHICH, HE THOUGHT, WOULD SAY THE "RIGHT
THINGS" BUT HAVE LITTLE PRACTICAL EFFECT IN MOVING
ISRAEL OFF THE MARK.

POST-ELECTION ISRAEL

5. BOTH [REDACTED] WERE DEEPLY

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2089
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TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT

DISAPPOINTED IN THE ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS. THEY AND MOST GAZANS HAD HOPED FOR A LABOR WIN. LABOR HAD DONE NOTHING FOR THE PALESTINIANS, BUT ITS POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS BETTER THAN LIKUD'S. [REDACTED] WAS CONVINCED THAT THE JERICHO BUS FIREBOMBING HAD COST LABOR SEATS, AND MENTIONED THAT SOME GAZANS EVEN BELIEVED THE INCIDENT HAD BEEN HATCHED FOR THAT VERY PURPOSE. (HE DID NOT SAY WHOM THE CONSPIRACY THEORISTS CONSIDERED RESPONSIBLE.) [REDACTED] WAS APPALLED THAT PALESTINIANS' FUTURE APPEARED TO BE IN THE HANDS OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED RELIGIOUS FANATICS. HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES MIGHT DIFFER ON ANNEXATION OF THE TERRITORIES -- IN HIS VIEW, THEY WERE ALL COMMITTED TO A "GREATER ISRAEL." ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] FELT LABOR AND LIKUD MIGHT TRY TO ESCAPE FROM THE "BLACKMAIL"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES THROUGH A TEMPORARY NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTORAL REFORM, THIS PROSPECT MEANT NO MOVEMENT TOWARD A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

6. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS HELD THAT THE INTIFADA WOULD CONTINUE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE PNC AND/OR ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FORMATION PRODUCED. IT NOW HAS A LIFE OF ITS OWN. PALESTINIANS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO THE PAIN AND DEPRIVATION IT BRINGS. PEOPLE ENDURE, NOT BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF BREAKING RANKS, BUT BECAUSE SUFFERING IS SO WIDELY SHARED THEY WOULD BE ASHAMED NOT TO BEAR THEIR SHARE OF THE BURDEN. WHEN SO MUCH IS ALREADY LOST, THE THREAT OF MORE LOSS HAS LITTLE POWER TO FRIGHTEN.

7. ALTHOUGH THE INTIFADA WOULD ENDURE [REDACTED] FELT THAT NEITHER IT NOR PNC ACTION WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MOVE ISRAEL TOWARD NEGOTIATION WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. THE INTIFADA INCONVENIENCED, BUT DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGE ISRAEL. PALESTINIANS WERE SUFFERING FAR MORE THAN WAS ISRAEL. BUT [REDACTED] WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT APPARENT U.S.-SOVIET COMMON INTERESTS IN RESOLVING REGIONAL DISPUTES (HE CITED ANGOLA, AFGHANISTAN, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR) WOULD BRING

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CONCERTED PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND THE OTHER MAJOR ACTORS.

LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA: HAMAS AND THE PLO

8. AS HE HAS IN THE PAST [REDACTED] MINIMIZED THE STRENGTH AND IMPORTANCE OF HAMAS. [REDACTED] WAS LESS [REDACTED]

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CATEGORICAL. HOWEVER, BOTH HELD STRONGLY THAT HAMAS WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, EVEN THOUGH ITS COVENANT FLATLY REJECTS SUCH A SOLUTION. [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT HAMAS IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO STAND AGAINST (WHAT HE PREDICTS WILL BE) MAINSTREAM PLO POLICY. [REDACTED] TOOK THE LINE THAT HAMAS IS ESSENTIALLY PACIFISTIC AND PRAGMATIC. IT WOULD NOT USE VIOLENCE TO UNDERMINE PLO POLICY AND, INSTEAD, WOULD BE INCLINED TO GO ALONG WITH A TWO-STATE SOLUTION, WITH THE JUSTIFICATION THAT IT IS SIMPLY A STEP TOWARD THE ULTIMATE GOAL -- A UNIFIED, ISLAMIC PALESTINE. ALTHOUGH THEY BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SHAIKH AHMAD YASIN IS THE PRE-EMINENT GAZA HAMAS FIGURE, THEY MINIMIZED HIS INFLUENCE. [REDACTED] RECALLED WIDESPREAD GAZA EXPECTATIONS THAT YASIN'S INTERVIEW ON ISRAELI TELEVISION IN SEPTEMBER WOULD BE A BOMBSHELL. INSTEAD, IT WAS A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT.)

PIECES OF A SOLUTION

9. [REDACTED] ACCEPTED TRANSITIONAL STEPS TO THE FINAL GOAL BUT FOCUSED ON DIFFERENT ASPECTS. [REDACTED] DID NOT SEE INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS SHOULD ISRAEL UNILATERALLY GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO GAZA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WEST BANKERS MIGHT VIEW GAZAN ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH A DEED AS BETRAYAL OF THE WIDER CAUSE, BUT (WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL) IMPLIED THAT IT COULD BE TURNED INTO A FIRST STEP TOWARD OVERALL PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE. IN SUCH A CASE, HE SAID, GAZA WOULD HAVE TO HAVE U.N. SUPERVISION OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, EGYPTIAN "POLICE" ASSISTANCE. HE THOUGHT

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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 04 TEL AVIV 16312

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: POST-ISRAELI ELECTION, PRE-PNC SENTIMENT

MUBARAK MIGHT WELCOME A LIMITED, TRANSITIONAL ROLE
THAT WOULD ENHANCE HIS ALREADY CENTRAL ROLE AS A
BROKER AMONG THE TERRITORIES, KING HUSSEIN, AND
ARAFAT. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, GAZA'S
ONLY FUTURE LAY WITH THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN.

10. [REDACTED] TOOK IT AS GIVEN THAT THE IMMEDIATE
GOAL WAS GAZA/WEST BANK INDEPENDENCE. ONCE THAT
WAS ACCOMPLISHED, PALESTINE MIGHT THEN CONSIDER THE
OPTION OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. HE
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER THE
SECURITY THREAT FROM AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE HAD
TO BE MET. THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT WAS A
DEMILITARIZED PALESTINE WHICH WAS, ITSELF,
PROTECTED FROM ISRAEL BY GUARANTEES, INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION, BUILT INTO A PEACE
AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT OBJECT TO THE EMPLACEMENT OF
[REDACTED]

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ISRAELI EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS ON PALESTINIAN SOIL TO SATISFY ISRAEL THAT PALESTINIAN TERRITORY OR AIR SPACE WOULD NOT BE USED (WHETHER PASSIVELY OR ACTIVELY) BY ANY OTHER POWER TO FACILITATE ATTACK. [REDACTED] ARGUED THAT THE EXAMPLE OF THE PEACE WITH EGYPT SHOULD SHOW ISRAEL THAT MUTUAL GUARANTEES ARE POSSIBLE (AND HE CONTENDED THAT CONTINUING NON-RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE COULD EVEN UNRAVEL THE PEACE WITH EGYPT). FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE WOULD BE TOO CONSUMED WITH ITS OWN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT TO GIVE ANY THOUGHT TO AGGRESSION.

11. [REDACTED] BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL WAS EXPERIENCING A DANGEROUS RADICALIZING PROCESS THAT WOULD, FINALLY, BE A GREATER SECURITY THREAT THAN ANY OUTSIDE FOE. HE CITED THE RESURGENCE OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AS EVIDENCE.

12. [REDACTED] CONTENDED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT FEAR FLOODS OF PALESTINIANS RETURNING TO THEIR HOMELAND. LIKE THE JEWS, MANY WOULD CHOOSE TO STAY WHERE THEY ARE.

13. FINALLY, BOTH [REDACTED] CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP IN A POST-INTIFADA GAZA. [REDACTED] WAS CAUTIOUS. HE SAID THAT, WITH THE "STONE GENERALS" OF THE INTIFADA CROWDING THE STAGE, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE ROOM FOR ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP. [REDACTED] ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTENDED THAT, ALTHOUGH POTENTIAL LEADERS MIGHT EXIST AMONG THE YOUNG INTIFADA "LEADERS" (DIFFICULT TO KNOW BECAUSE THEY ARE SO SECRETIVE), THEY WERE

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REALLY MORE FOOT-SOLDIERS THAN LEADERS, AND WERE SUBJECT TO PLO DISCIPLINE. ALTHOUGH, LIKE [REDACTED] HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE SUCCESSOR TO THE LATE RASHAD SHAWWA (WHO WAS HIMSELF ECLIPSED BY THE INTIFADA), HE CONTENDED THAT HE, TOGETHER WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (BANKER AND BUSINESSMAN) WERE THE ONES WHO COULD MOST READILY CONSOLIDATE

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THE GAINS A PLO-LED INTIFADA HAD MADE.

14. COMMENT: THIS IS A LIMITED VIEW OF CURRENT GAZA "ESTABLISHMENT" OPINION. THOUGH THE SOURCES ARE AMONG GAZA'S BEST-INFORMED AND -CONNECTED, THEIR SECULAR OUTLOOK MAY MAKE THEM UNDERESTIMATE THE CAPACITY OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE TO HINDER A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND THEIR MARGINALITY TO THE INTIFADA MAY MAKE THEM BLIND TO THE STRENGTH OF LEADERSHIP THAT COULD EMERGE FROM THE STREETS. ALTHOUGH PNC "SUCCESS" MIGHT GIVE GREATER WEIGHT TO THEIR VIEWS AND STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE LEADERSHIP VACUUM IN GAZA OR UNDERESTIMATE THE TENSIONS LYING BENEATH INTIFADA UNITY, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTERS IN THE POLITICAL BACKWATER OF GAZA.

15. BY MOST PALESTINIAN STANDARDS, [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] OPINIONS FALL INTO THE "MODERATE" CATEGORY. BY MOST ISRAELI STANDARDS, THEY ARE JUST ANOTHER DRESSING FOR SALAMI TACTICS TO GAIN BACK ALL OF "PALESTINE." A STARTING POINT OF INDEPENDENCE REMAINS BEYOND THE PALE FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS. MOST STRIKING IS THE SENSE THAT THESE PALESTINIANS, ALREADY DISAPPOINTED IN

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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ISRAELI ELECTIONS, ARE PREPARED TO BE DISAPPOINTED
IN THE PNC, AND SEE THE UPRISING CONTINUING, BUT
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE UPRISING IS UNLIKELY TO FORCE
ISRAEL TO MOVE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION. PICKERING

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED] L

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